Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person). — Bob Ross

Strangely, you seem to be saying that the nature (capacity for reason and abstract goals) which allows abortion is what grounds the right to not be aborted.

This is entirely too vague. Do you think the blastocyst has a right to life or not?!? You are purposefully avoiding the question, because you know if you grant it rights then you cannot make this kind of argument that Mrs. Smith has more of a right to bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

Your question is illicit. The standing of Mrs Smith ought far surpass whatever standing you might grant the blastocyst. Your attempts to show otherwise are either misguided or malevolent.

You've lost this discussion.

Your question is illicit. The standing of Mrs Smith ought far surpass whatever standing you might grant the blastocyst — Banno

I agree with this. This is not a matter I generally debate as it's a cesspit of virtue signalling and philosophical bullshit. What do you think is happening when people make the sorts of arguments that makes?

As a general matter, I advocate for sanctifying life, not just in a humanist way, but in a way that truly seperates life and humanity in a mystical way. It's not enough for me to simply say we're humans so therefore we afford ourselves priority, but it means something more to me, where I hold each person out in the universe as a child of God with special purpose.

That argument does hold sway with me, and I can understand why some want to avoid stripping that special assignment from the deserving. I don't think it helps though to assign it where it isn't deserving. To say that the value of my life and your life is infinite is true, but to then to say that also of the zygote doesn't just benignly elevate the zygote to special status, but it demeans my status. It suggests that the loss of the zygote is truly is as monumental as the loss of a child.

As in really? You read of a child drowning and that evokes the same thoughts as a zygote being disposed of at the fertility clinic?

And this is where I think the pro-choice get rightly offended, even if it's doubtfully based in anything I've said about the sacred and holy. It's not in the idea that zygotes are afforded great value. It's in the idea that living breathing people are reduced to the value of a zygote and the rights of each must be weighed as if my life is of no more woth than a zygote.

And I say all this because I am about as religious a poster as posts here, but I find this pro-life position hard to swallow. It just seems the result of some dogma that demands zygote = person without much thought into what that means and it obviously comes from a religious tradition foreign to my own that violates my views of the who we all are.

I'm not at all keen on so-called "trolly" arguments. There are intractable moral situations.

I find your position very interesting and I respect it.

the result of some dogma that demands zygote = person without much thought into what that means and it obviously comes from a religious tradition foreign to my own that violates my views of the who we all are. — Hanover

Yes, that is probably the answer to my quesion to

And I say all this because I am about as religious a poster as posts here — Hanover

Yes. Perhaps my reaction to this is a banality - to identify as religious can signify different things to different people; it’s a very adaptable term. And seems to encapsulate some of our worst and best impulses. The 'religious' may have very little in common.

As a general matter, I advocate for sanctifying life, not just in a humanist way, but in a way that truly seperates life and humanity in a mystical way. — Hanover

Fair enough. I think in the end this 'mystical' perspective will always come down to the presuppositions we hold. Elaborate post hoc justifications are often built upon them. I'm not sure I know what sanctifying life means, except as a kind of poetry.

A lot of people I have encountered who pontificate about the 'sacredness of human life' are simple hypocrites. They're quite comfortable with capital punishment and don't seem to mind if the poor die in vast numbers through lack of affordable services.

:100:

↪Tom Storm I'm not at all keen on so-called "trolly" arguments. There are intractable moral situations. — Banno

That is precisely why I think the trolley problem I suggested works well; because it isn't intractable. It's self-evident what one should do. Even NOS4A2 and Bob Ross accept that we ought actively bring about a situation that kills multiple zygotes so as to save one baby, showing that even those who claim that zygotes are humans who deserve to live accept that their lives do not carry the same moral weight as born humans, and that there are situations in which allowing the zygotes to live is morally worse than causing them to die, proving that their "right to life" is not absolute. That presents the opportunity to explain that the life of a zygote has less moral weight than the woman's bodily autonomy.

That presents the opportunity to explain that the life of a zygote has less moral weight than the woman's bodily autonomy. — Michael

I don't see where this conclusion comes from. I agree the trolly problem can show that there are certain circumstances that justify the killing of an innocent person, but I don't see how that changes the weight a pro-lifer would afford an embryo.

I would assume that if the question is whether one should kill one person to save five, that question would be answered by the pro-lifer the same whether "person" is defined as an infant of an embryo.

The trolly argument (as typically presented) doesn't ask you evaluate the lives that would be killed versus those saved before you decide how to steer the trolly. Questions like "who do I throw off the sinking ship to save it, the nun or the thief?" are typically answered by the Kantian that you cannot morally decide to throw anyone off and both the nun and the thief have to die.

In any event, I don't see how we can make the trolly problem fully applicable to the abortion issue because the only true instance where a choice of life has to be made is when there's a question about saving the mother, which even the most pro-life folks usually defer to saving the mother. That is, most would argue the trolly should be steered to save mom and to run over the embryo. The bigger question is why some sick fuck would put an embryo and a mom on the railroad tracks in the first place

This is the comment in question. Even two pro-lifers accept that we ought kill the zygotes to save the baby (notice in particular that we kill five to save one).

To make this more applicable to abortion, let's assume that continuing the pregnancy will damage the mother's spine, leading to permanent paralysis. Ought we terminate the pregnancy (if that's what the mother wishes)? I say yes. Not only is a zygote's life worth less than the life of a baby, it's worth less than the mother's ability to walk.

So we accept that not only is a zygote's "right to life" not absolute but also that their lives are worth less than other things (even things other than something's life). We might disagree with how little/much a zygote's life is worth, but at the very least we must accept that "we ought not terminate a pregnancy because the zygote has an absolute/overriding right to life" is false.

Pro-choicers then claim that the zygote's life is worth less than the mother's bodily autonomy. Pro-lifers might disagree, but given the reasoning above at least one of their arguments against abortion has been refuted. It's not enough to say that the zygote is human and has a "right to life"; it must be argued that this "right to life" has moral precedence over other concerns.

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things].

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will

No, I mean that a zygote will naturally develop into a being with a rational will all else being equal; no different than how a zygote will naturally develop into having two hands, a body, a brain, etc. per se (whereas, per accidens, it may not fulfill the Telos of which it has for various reasons [e.g., improper gestation, etc.]). When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become.

3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

This is an example, if I am understanding it correctly, of a trolley problem which would be analogous to @RogueAI’s example; and it would equally be immoral to do so.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story.

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim.

All your argument has been thus far, is that zygotes don't have rights. I want to know why you believe that.

Moreover, no, you cannot give zygotes a degree of rights cogently: that converts it into privileges.

So, why do you believe a zygote does not have rights, such as the right to life? Where or when does a human being get those rights?

You just keep asserting it, without giving any ethical reasons for believing it. Why believe that a zygote does not have a right to life? Answer that.

What???

If you are going to claim, like @Banno, that a zygote does not have a right to life or (if I am being overly-charitable) that there are different degrees to a given right, then you must be able to back that up with good reasons and, overall, a cogent and internally coherent ethical theory. Neither of you have demonstrated that at all: Banno just keeps blanketly asserting "it's obvious!".

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things]. — Bob Ross

There is no purpose.

When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become. — Bob Ross

There is no design.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion. — Bob Ross

I fail to see why this is morally relevant. In every case you are performing some action which kills the zygotes and saves the baby. That is all that matters.

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story. — Bob Ross

Saving the baby is all that matters. It is morally impermissible to allow the baby to die because you are unsure whether or not the death of the zygotes is a means rather than an unfortunate consequence.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming that they don't have a right to life. I'm claiming that even if they have a right to life this right to life is not absolute. We see this in the case where we are willing to sacrifice (as an unfortunate consequence) five zygotes to save one baby. Some things are worth more than the life of a zygote (e.g. the life of a baby, or the life of the mother). We just disagree on which things are worth more than the life of a zygote. I think that the mother being able to walk is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if continued pregnancy would lead to the mother's paralysis. And I think that the mother's bodily autonomy is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if the mother does not wish to carry a child to term.

:100:

I didn't say that they deserve to die. I have only said that we ought kill zygotes if it saves babies and that it is acceptable to abort a zygote.

They either deserve to live or deserve to die. The one who seeks to eviscerate the child must face this question, or he has no sense of justice. Everything else is an exercise in excuse-making, in my opinion.

What is the distinction between who someone is and what something physically is, in particular with respect to zygotes? You're the one who often argues against anything like a soul or folk psychology and reduces everything to base biology.

But again, you haven't answered the question. Why is it wrong to judge the moral worth of a human but not the moral worth of a non-human? You're engaging in speciesism without even attempting to justify it.

There is only a grammatical distinction between who and what one is. There is no actual distinction.

Just to be clear, my assertion was that it is wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics. However, it is right to judge the moral worth of human beings based on their actions and behavior.

Well now we might be getting somewhere. Are you suggesting that a living organism has moral worth if and only if someone sees moral worth in it?

That leads to problematic scenarios, such as what if I see moral worth in cows or the serial killer trying to kill you, or what if the pregnant woman doesn't see moral worth in the zygote growing inside her but some random kid half the world away does?

Yes, “moral worth”, like innocence, is not a property of any given object. It is more like a status we afford or ascribe to other things when we consider them morally, at least insofar as I understand the phrase.

The problematic scenario is the one we now find ourselves in. Some pregnant mothers do not see moral worth in their child, do not consider them worthy of moral judgement, and end up seeking its killing. Some have to kill them or die. Some have to kill them or raise the child of their abuser. Some have to kill them or sacrifice their livelihoods. These are very difficult decisions to make and the stakes are very high, but in black-or-white terms, the killing is always selfish act while the birthing is a selfless one.

A lot of people I have encountered who pontificate about the 'sacredness of human life' are simple hypocrites. They're quite comfortable with capital punishment and don't seem to mind if the poor die in vast numbers through lack of affordable services. — Tom Storm

I'd also hold that the sanctity of human life encompasses the right to live to the ability to one's creation, so much so that I would be violating your human rights if I held you against your will in my basement, yet I don't think it hypocritical to incarcerate the guilty. What this means is we draw a distinction between justifiiable imprisonment and unjustifiable imprisonment.

We can do the same for killing. Examples would be war, self-defense, and punishment. I get that you disagree that capital punishment should go in that list perhaps for a variety of other reasons, but someone who is opposed to murder can consistently and non-hypocritically be in favor or capital punishment just as someone can object to an unjustifiable X but support a justifiable X.

The death due to lack of services I know occurs worldwide, but much less so in the West. I'm not suggesting all is well and that there isn't room for improvement, but I don't see where people don't mind unavoidable death occuring all around them or where that mindset is more pronounced among the religious. Are you saying the religious shrug their shoulders to worldwide hunger and withhold support where their non-religious counterparts are trying to assist?

What??? — Bob Ross

In writing about personhood you contrasted us with other species, saying that we possess a "rational Telos" that other species lack, and this rational telos is what grounds human zygotic right to life. Are you suggesting that rational telos is somehow virtuous, or maybe suggesting that human zygotes should have the right to life simply because they’re like you (instinctually valuing what is like you)?

Yes, “moral worth”, like innocence, is not a property of any given object. It is more like a status we afford or ascribe to other things when we consider them morally, at least insofar as I understand the phrase. — NOS4A2

Then what is there to argue? Pro-lifers ascribe moral worth to zygotes and pro-choicers don't. There is no objective fact-of-the-matter that determines one group to be correct and the other incorrect.

Just to be clear, my assertion was that it is wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics. — NOS4A2

But not wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of an organism based on the physical characteristics that determine its species?

They either deserve to live or deserve to die. — NOS4A2

False dichotomy.

So we accept that not only is a zygote's "right to life" not absolute but also that their lives are worth less than other things (even things other than something's life). We might disagree with how little/much a zygote's life is worth, but at the very least we must accept that "we ought not terminate a pregnancy because the zygote has an absolute/overriding right to life" is false. — Michael

If someone accepts that a zygote is a second class person, then I do think they'll have a problem not prioritizing the mother's life. A real pro-lifer could not accept that and would have to bite the bullet and do as Alabama did and say that zygotes in test tubes are people and their disposal is murder. If you're getting concessions from pro-lifers that zygotes are red headed stepchildren, then they aren't true believers.

Would you kill 3 barely conscious, immobile, unresponsive people who will never recover in any way in order to save a single child who is in all ways healthy? That is, do you believe that all people are of the same moral worth in terms of preserving their lives or do you value some more than others? That is, you have a trolly with 3 wonderful people barreling towards a cliff in which all will surely die, but if you veer right, you'll save them, but you'll kill a dozen prisoners, all in for violent felonies.

What about killing 1 person to save 50,000 dogs? Would you do that? And they're super cute dogs. They have floppy ears and their entire body wags when they see you. Fucking cute as shit. Are you going to kill those just for one snotty nosed kid?

This second trolly question is important because it might be that pro-choicers can be accused of picking which people they want in society, offering no inherent value to human life. It's just a human choice based upon human priorities at the time.

Neither of you have demonstrated that at all: Banno just keeps blanketly asserting "it's obvious!". — Bob Ross

I tend to agree with Banno on this one. If you require argumentation to establish that a bunch of cells trumps the personal autonomy and rights of a woman, there's a problem.

Are you saying the religious shrug their shoulders to worldwide hunger and withhold support where their non-religious counterparts are trying to assist? — Hanover

No, I was arguing that some of those who hold a faith in Gods (and the free market) seem to be against universal healthcare. In Australia, for instance, healthcare if mostly free if you are poor or homeless. People are less likely to die unnecessarily from preventable conditions. Many opponents of universal healthcare I've encountered are also opponents of abortion. It's not like they give that much of a fuck about life. Just this particular issue. It's also a curious read of the Gospels (for those who are Christians). Jesus would be a supporter of universal healthcare.

I'd also hold that the sanctity of human life encompasses the right to live to the ability to one's creation, so much so that I would be violating your human rights if I held you against your will in my basement, yet I don't think it hypocritical to incarcerate the guilty. What this means is we draw a distinction between justifiable imprisonment and unjustifiable imprisonment.

We can do the same for killing. Examples would be war, self-defense, and punishment. I get that you disagree that capital punishment should go in that list perhaps for a variety of other reasons, but someone who is opposed to murder can consistently and non-hypocritically be in favor or capital punishment just as someone can object to an unjustifiable X but support a justifiable X. — Hanover

I was talking specifically about capital punishment and abortion. These other examples are a distraction even if they are also examples of contradictions - there's a reason some religions spawn conscientious objectors. I am not making an argument against capital punishment, I am simply identifying a contradiction. It should be noted that there are some religious folk (famously Sister Helen Prejean) who do campaign against capital punishment who are also against abortion on the basis that only God can take lives.

Actually, on reflection I can see how your points have merit when it comes to my hypocrisy argument. Unless the person argues that all life is sacred, no matter what circumstances, it may not be hypocritical.

I tend to agree with Banno on this one. If you require argumentation to establish that a bunch of cells trumps the personal autonomy and rights of a woman, there's a problem.

You are, then, begging the question; and using "obviousness" as a cop-out to actually put in the intellectual work to have a coherent position. Anyone can make an argument that X is true because if X is false then something must be wrong: that's just lazy, circular logic.

If you cannot provide any reasons for why the zygote does not have a right to life (in your view); then you are just wasting everyone's time, because you don't have a view.

Sure. Time wasting is my specialty.

There is no purpose. — Michael

This is an aside, but I disagree. It's no more or less logical to choose backward looking reasons (causes) for why things exist as they do than it is to choose forward looking reasons (purposes) for why things exist as they are. In either instance the first cause or the final purpose is unknowable, and both provide explanatory power. The resistence to looking for purpose is that it demands an altered world view where you accept that purpose exists instead of the typical view that accepts that just causes exist, but the acceptance of causation or the acceptance of purpose are both acts of faith.

this rational telos is what grounds human zygotic right to life

It grounds the right to life for all members of any rational species: it is the fundamental principle that grounds rights for persons—of any kind.

Are you suggesting that rational telos is somehow virtuous

This doesn’t make any sense to me: virtue is excellence relative to something, whereas Telos refers to the purpose(s) behind something. The Telos is what grounds what is virtuous; whereas your question presumes that virtue is absolute and wonders if a specific Telos is virtuous or not. For an aristotelian, this makes no sense at all. Virtue is determined by whether or not a thing is excellent at being something (e.g., itself, a farmer, a spoon, a clock, etc.) and usually in terms of what it is itself (e.g., the virtue of a clock, the virtue of a human, etc.).

The virtue of a person is simply certain states of being, behavioral habits, and intellectual dispositions which make a person excellent at being a person.

or maybe suggesting that human zygotes should have the right to life simply because they’re like you (instinctually valuing what is like you)?

What do you mean by “like you”? If you mean that they look like me, then that is obviously false (unless you think a zygote looks like an adult). If you mean that they have a nature such that they are marked out as a person, because their Telos dictates that they will develop rational capacities; then yes; but this does not only apply, in principle, to humans: any rational species would suffice, or even, honestly, a member of an irrational species that happens to be rational (by freak accident) or a being which is rational (in the proper sense) which is not a member of a species (e.g., certain AI).

CC:@RogueAI

There is no purpose….There is no design

Then, e.g., you cannot say that a baby should have been born with two arms but was born with one instead.

I fail to see why this is morally relevant. In every case you are performing some action which kills the zygotes and saves the baby. That is all that matters

So you think a tactical bomber that kills an innocent bystander when blowing up a military building is intending the same thing in terms of killing in every morally relevant sense than a terror bomber who also kills in innocent person?

So you think that pulling the lever to save the five by killing the one is the same kind of intention [of killing] as killing an innocent person to harvest their organs to save five sick patients?

Your view is too naive. Intentions matter.

I'm claiming that even if they have a right to life this right to life is not absolute.

A right is a entitlement which one can exercise about themselves on other people which is irrevocable. What you just described is a privilege—not a right.

Whatever “right to life” entails or means, it must be absolute if it is a right. E.g., if you have a right to practice any religion (peacefully) that you want, then there is absolutely no circumstances where the nation in which you live can stop you from practicing your religion (peacefully). What you are arguing, is the nonsensical and internally incoherent position that, e.g., the right to freedom of religion isn’t always applicable; which would, in all honesty, convert the “right” to a “privilege”.

We see this in the case where we are willing to sacrifice (as an unfortunate consequence) five zygotes to save one baby. Some things are worth more than the life of a zygote (e.g. the life of a baby, or the life of the mother).

You don’t understand what a right is. Rights are not circumstantial. You cannot go and kidnap an old person who is about to die and harvest their organs to save a young sick patient: the cops would stop you, because that old person has a right not to be killed when innocent. You can’t say “well, in this circumstance, although I think they have that right, we can kill them because I value this young patient more than a really old person who is about to die anyways”. THAT’S NEVER HOW RIGHTS HAVE EVER WORKED.

~~

You just keep asserting it, without giving any ethical reasons for believing it. — Bob Ross

Pretty much. That's right.

When your moral theory arrives at an immoral position, then your moral theory is wrong. Giving a zygote standing over Mrs Smith is immoral, and hence so is any moral theory that reaches that conclusion. Your moral theory reaches that conclusion. Hence it is wrong.

That argument does not require the backing of an ethical theory. It is meta-ethical in that it tells us how to evaluate ethical theories. And yours comes out wanting.

Why believe that a zygote does not have a right to life? Answer that. — Bob Ross

I haven't denied that zygotes have rights, but instead have maintained neutrality on that odd issue. My position is that whatever rights the zygot might have are far outweighed by those of Mrs Smith.