OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.
I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't. — Dan
A free agent is one that has free will — Dan
Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. — Dan
I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room. — Dan
That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.
And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free". — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense. — Metaphysician Undercover
This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe. — Dan
I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like. — Dan
First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things. — Dan
I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom. — Dan
Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will. — Metaphysician Undercover
So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large. — Metaphysician Undercover
You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe." — Metaphysician Undercover
Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible). — Dan
I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). — Dan
Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). — Dan
When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is. — Dan
Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably. — Dan
OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken. — Dan
Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy. — Dan
This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone. — Dan
Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. — Dan
But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan
We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general? — Metaphysician Undercover
My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan. — Metaphysician Undercover
You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do. — Metaphysician Undercover
You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
For example, if you provide the location of an assassin's target and I provide the asssassin with a sniper rifle (assuming they couldn't get either of these things otherwise), and the assassin then assassinates said target with said rifle, surely we all bear some responsibility here. — Dan
It is different because in the case of coercion it leaves the person with the choice to do as you say or have their freedom violated in some way. — Dan
I do not employ an arbitrary division. The divison I employ is whether the communication in question restricts/violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan
You could grab someone and carry/push/otherwise bundle them into a car. That would be forcing them into a car and different from persauding them to get in. I was thinking more that kind of thing, rather moving someone like a puppet. — Dan
You can decieve and educate people on a lot of things that aren't the nature of their own choices. — Dan
Okay, pretty much all of that is wrong. — Dan
OK, so now you accept that teaching someone something (providing the location in your example), actually is causal in a morally relevant way. I'm glad you've come to understand that.
Now, you need to justify the boundary you impose between some acts of teaching, and others. Why, for instance is the person who taught the assassin morally responsible, yet the person who taught the arsonist how to light a fire, is not. Your principle of understanding one's own choices seems completely inadequate. The difference to me seems to be a difference of intention. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see the difference. A threat involves the possibility of having freedom restricted. Likewise,
when someone offers to teach you how to swim, there is the possibility that your freedom will be violated in the future, by drowning, if you choose not to accept the offer. Your claim of a difference is unsubstantiated. The forces of nature are all around us, violating our freedom in many different ways, and learning helps us to make choices which avoid these violations. So I really believe your claim of a difference is completely unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, if these are your claimed principles, you obviously do not know what "understand" means, or you are using the word in a very unusual way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Kidnapping a person is not forcing them to do something. You were talking about forcing a person to do something, as distinct from persuading or threatening them to cause them to do it. I do not see how anyone could force someone to do something other than by some form of persuasion, such as a threat. But all these are instances of using communication to tell people something. By what principle do you distinguish some cases as morally relevant and others as not? — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not a matter of learning about the nature of one's own choices, it's a matter of how education effects one's ability to make one's own choices. You seem to have no respect for how a difference in the number of possibilities present to one's mind, at the time of making a decision, affects the person's ability to make decisions. This is what I've been telling you about since the beginning, and why habit makes a significant difference to one's decision making ability. Lack of relevant knowledge makes a choice difficult, decreasing one's ability to make choices. Increased knowledge which is relevant to the situation makes the choice easier, increasing one's ability to make the choice. This has nothing to do with whether the knowledge is about the nature of making a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
You need to take a good look at what "the ability to make a choice" means. Clearly the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability. This is a principle which is applicable to any type of decision making. Now you propose a special type of decision making, making one's own choice, and my principle, "the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability", is clearly applicable, just like it is applicable to any other type of choosing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course it is all wrong. You described for me specific things, like a distinction between "free will" and "freedom", and I proceed on that basis to show inconsistency in your thesis, so now you must take back what you said, as "all of it is wrong".
So let's go back then, and you can try again. Please define "free will", and "freedom", so that I can have some sort of understanding of what you are talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose someone is at some threat of being drowned in the future if they don't know how to swim. There are quite a few differences between that and the case of someone pointing a gun at you and saying 'your money or your life' though, don't you think? — Dan
Yeah, I don't think any of that is right. Finding a choice difficult to make because you aren't sure which option will be best for you is not the same thing as being unable to make it. — Dan
Sure, each case has a number of differences from every other. That is why I think your procedure of singling out specific cases and claiming "morally relevant" , and claiming others as "not morally relevant" is unjustified. You have not provided any reasonable principles for making that distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not see any other possibility for being unable to make a choice, other than that it is too difficult. How else could someone be unable to make a choice? — Metaphysician Undercover
I haven't singled out cases. I have said that the morality of actions is determined by the extent to which they lead to consequencesthat protect or restrict/violated the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan
For example, you might be able to choose to leave the house if you're locked in a room. You might be unable to choose to go for a walk if you've had your legs broken by local mobsters. You might be unable to choose to sell your car if it's been stolen. Lots of things might prevent you being able to make those choices that belong to you. — Dan
As I've shown, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as explained by you, is not a reasonable principle. This is because you fail to properly account for the meaning of "understand" in your explanation. So you make that principle into something which neglects the moral value of understanding one's choices. — Metaphysician Undercover
None of these restrictions provide the force required for your claim. I can still choose to leave the room if I am locked in. Whether or not I am locked in the room only changes the probability of success or failure in carrying out my choice. Likewise, I can still choose to take a walk after my legs are broken. And I can still choose to sell my car even after it's been stolen. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your examples simply display your failure to recognize the distinction between making a choice, and carrying out the chosen activity. As I told you, it is necessary to maintain this distinction to account for the fact that we often make mistakes or for some other reason do not succeed in carrying out the choices we make. Because of this we must conclude that the choice to act is distinct and separate from the act itself.
Another proof of this separation is the fact that I can choose today, what I will do tomorrow. The act does not necessarily follow directly and immediately from the choice. And in the meantime I might even change my mind, so the original choice is never even acted on. This clearly indicates that there is a separation between the choice, and the act which follows from the choice.
This is all very strong evidence that you misrepresent what it means to understand one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover
You have not shown that. You have asserted that. I have properly accounted for understanding. — Dan
Very often, you seem to want words to correspond with concepts in the broadest possible sense. For example, when I say that being able to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value, you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made. — Dan
I think it is reasonable to say that your choices are limited by not being able to action them and that the way you are using the word "choice" is perhaps a bit nonstandard. — Dan
Certainly your example of choosing what you will do tomorrow is quite odd, since it seems even in your example that the choice to do the action happens at a later time, and that a better word here might be "planning". — Dan
But, more importantly, my question to you is whether your objection is a normative one or more a linguistic one? — Dan
I am not saying that by your claim, "understanding" is the only measure of moral value, I am saying that the ability to "understand" must be given equal weight with the ability to "make" one's own choices, by the statement which is your principle. You clearly give preference to the ability to carry out the act which is representative of the choice (because of your consequentialist bias), and when I give you examples concerning a person's ability to understand one's own choices you simply dismiss them as not morally relevant.
Do you not understand, that it is illogical for you to proceed in this direction? You have defined "moral value" with the principle "able to understand and make one's own choices". Therefore any situations which affect a person's ability to understand and make one's own choices are necessarily of moral value. It is contrary to logic (illogical) to then turn around, and approach from your consequentialist moral principles, and say that since this instance of inhibiting a person's ability to understand one's own choices appears to have no consequences in actions it is therefore not morally relevant. Moral relevance has been defined by that principle. So you cannot logically override your definition to say that in these cases, affecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices is not morally relevant.
This is the problem I've been showing you since the beginning. You have two incompatible principles, moral value based in freedom, and moral value based in consequentialism, and you are trying to display them as being compatible. So you sometimes approach from the side of freedom (the ability to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value), and you sometimes approach from the side of consequentialism (only specific actions are morally relevant), and when you meet in the middle, you annihilate the one side (the side of freedom) in preference of your consequentialist bias. — Metaphysician Undercover
So what? "Planning" is just a specific type of "choosing".
This is the fault of your way of understanding "understanding" which is clearly deficient. You relate things to the more specific, and claim that this constitutes "understanding". You say to me "you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made", and so you fail in your denial of the relevance of the general.
Here's a simple example. Consider what it means to understand what "human being" means. You could point to many specific examples, showing me, those are human beings. But this does not demonstrate an "understanding", because you need to refer to the more general concepts, "mammal", "animal", "living", the concepts which inhere within the concept of "human being", as the defining features, to demonstrate a true understanding.
So when you point to a choice made about what will be done tomorrow, and you say 'that's not a case of making a choice, it's a case of planning', it's like pointing to a child, and saying 'that's not a mammal, it's a human being'. All you do here is demonstrate a gross misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
As it is a case of pointing to a true and real separation, according to the concepts involved, (the separation between making a choice, and acting on a choice), my objection is normative. You ought to respect this difference which I have described, in order that we can go forward with our communication, and this discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have been telling you since the beginning, that freedom of choice as the measure of moral value, is incompatible with consequentialist principles as the measure of moral value. This make the challenge of your op irrelevant. You are offering 10k to anyone who can solve a problem which a sound understanding would designate as impossible to solve. — Metaphysician Undercover
The real issue then, is your motive for doing this. If it is true, as you say, that you've spent close to ten years studying this problem, then by now you should have come to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. This presents the possibility that you are being dishonest, either you did not spend that time studying this problem, or you already know that a solution is impossible and your challenge is a trick of some sort. Another possibility is that you have a disability in relation to your capacity to understand and make your own choices. This would mean that there is some kind of restriction, a force of habit or something similar, which is preventing you from understanding that your choice, to attempt to achieve compatibility between these two, is a choice to do something impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Based on this assessment, I will ask you to justify your belief in consequentialism as providing the best conceptual structure for moral philosophy. To explain what I mean, consider the following example. Suppose you spent ten years trying to solve the problem of making the conceptual structure of libertarian free will compatible with the conceptual structure of consequentialist morality. In this time you were not able to solve this problem, and your philosophical studies only strengthened your believe in libertarian free will. Why would you continue to believe that the conceptual structure of consequentialism provides the best principles for moral philosophy? — Metaphysician Undercover
I am simply pointing out that not having the information you might wish is not the same as being able to understand one's own choice. — Dan
Would you prefer we discuss "actioning one's choices" would that be more beneficial? — Dan
This is a bizarre claim because it seems to rule out the possibility that I am just wrong, which is a common affliction among us humans. — Dan
Your question relies on the fallacy that if a problem is hard to solve, you should abandon the theory or position that spawned it. This seems fairly obviously not true. — Dan
As to why I think consequentialism is the best approach to moral philosophy, I have a few reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is that I don't think we can make a principled distinction between choosing to make something happen and choosing to let it happen. To put it another way, between acting and allowing. Without such a distinction, consequentialism seems like the only really tenable position. — Dan
More generally, I suggest that your approach of assuming I am victim to a bias or indeed a disability may be an instance of engaging in a mode of thought that is perhaps not helpful. It seems, and feel free to disagree, that you are starting with the assumption that I am wrong and preceding from there. I suggest that this may be the cause of the strange understandings of what I mean. — Dan
Do you recognize the difference between misunderstanding, and understanding? Any time that not having adequate information results in misunderstanding, then there is a case of not being able to understand one's own choice. Therefore any time deception influences one's choice, or any sort of falsity influences one's choice, there is a case of a person not being able to understand one's own choice. Furthermore, since a well educated person has better knowledge about a situation relevant to what the person's education is, than does a not well educated person, and can therefore better understand one's own choice in that situation, then that person is better able to understand one's own choice in that situation. I think it is very clear that having better information is of great consequences in relation to being able to understand one's own choice.
I really cannot understand why you deny this. Is it really the case that your ability to understand your chosen principles is that deficient? Or, do you actually understand this and are simply denying it for some other reason? — Metaphysician Undercover
That's not the situation here. There are two theories involved, not one, the moral value of freedom and the moral value of consequentialism. It is very obvious that the two theories are incompatible. I pointed that out to you when I first participated in this thread. If, after ten years of studying this subject, you still do not see what is very obvious, then there is a problem with your approach. If you insist that there is only one theory, your theory, that the two are compatible, then the ten years of study should have proven to you that they are not, and that theory is incorrect. I mean, I recognized the incompatibility after less than a half hour of reading your material.
So I am not saying that you should abandon a problem because it is difficult. I am saying that if after ten years of studying something, you cannot see what others see as obvious about that thing, then the problem must be with your approach. The solution to the problem is to change your approach, allow the possibility that the two are incompatible, and understand each of the two separately. It makes no sense to manipulate the concept of "freedom", or "free will", just to make it fit with consequentialism, because all this does is force you into expressing a misunderstanding of "freedom". — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I see the problem with much more clarity now. You never learned the distinction between choosing and acting on one's choice. This distinction is necessary to uphold, for the reasons I explained. Because you never learned this distinction, and the great importance and significance of it, you did not have the principles required to make the distinction between choosing to make something happen (choosing to act), and choosing to let something happen (choosing not to act). Not recognizing the distinction between choosing, and acting, has made it impossible for you to understand a choice which is not an act, "choosing to let something happen". Choosing not to act is equivalent to acting for you, because you do not distinguish between choosing and acting..
Because of this misunderstanding, you have chosen consequentialism as the only tenable moral position. Clearly your ability to understand your own choice has been crippled by this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is that you do not differentiate between choosing and acting. And so you understand your choice of consequentialism, as the only tenable choice, when this is actually a misunderstanding. Your own ability to understand your own choice in this instance, is seriously deficient, due to this misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am simply employing your primary principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I am demonstrating how your ability to understand and make your own choice concerning the best moral philosophy, has been compromised by a failure to understand the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover
To borrow and example of Hallie Liberto's paper "Intentions and Sexual Consent", imagine you are wanting to buy a secondhand shirt, but you only want to buy it if it is 100% cotton. Sadly, as it is secondhand, the shirt you like is missing any identifying tags that would tell you this and the person working at the secondhand clothes store doesn't know. If you knew that it was a cotton blend, you wouldn't buy it, but if you choose to buy it without knowing one way or another, you have not misunderstood (or failed to understand) your choice. — Dan
You are making a choice with incomplete information (which is presumably how we make basically all choices we ever make) but you understand what it is you are choosing and what it means to make that choice, even if you don't know what the consequences will be from it in the future (such as whether you will have a shirt you are happy with). — Dan
Yeeeeah, I don't think there is a principle to make a serious moral distinction between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen. I agree that I didn't learn such a principle or recognize it, but I think that's because it doesn't exist. I think you may be suffering under a misapprehension. However, this doesn't prevent you from understanding your own choices, it just makes you wrong. — Dan
You seem to proceed from the assumption that I am wrong and also, seemingly, a moron. — Dan
This choice, to take a risk on the unknown is the one which is misunderstood because it is contrary to the original. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can see that it is a misunderstood choice, because there is no explanation, no reason given, as to why the change of mind was made. In other words, this choice was made without any reason, and without a reason for it, it cannot be understood. If the example stated a reason, 'it was so cheap it was irresistible', or, 'it looks so good I forfeit the 100% cotton rule, or the person decided that if they bought it and didn't like it they could give it to someone else, then the choice would be understood. But that's not what happened in the example. The person had a clear choice to only buy cotton, then suddenly dismissed that choice and for no reason at all, bought a shirt of unknown material. Since the person did this for no reason at all, it is very clear that the person did not understand one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the issue of the example is not a matter of making a choice with incomplete information. As you say, we make all choices this way. The issue of the example is that a choice is made without a reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no reason why you went against your rule, you were suddenly overcome with the urge to buy. So you clearly do not understand your choice. This is known as impulse buying, and in a more general sense, it is called "whimsical", and a similar concept is "overcome by passion". They are all concepts which refer to cases of not understanding one's own choices. And, you ought to see that acting by habit fits right in with these, as a case of not understanding one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you recognize that a person can choose to do something, yet fail in doing it? If so, then you need to recognize the distinction between choosing and acting. If you continue to avoid this issue I will be forced to conclude intellectual dishonesty. — Metaphysician Undercover
This looks like you are claiming something lunatic here. Could you please clarify what you mean. — Dan
Putting aside that I didn't give a reason because it isn't the point of the example, you are wanting way too much in order for someone to understand a choice. If people change their mind on a whim, that doesn't mean they don't understand the choice they are making. They might not understand their motives for making it (though this is also debatable) but that isn't the same as not understanding the choice they are making. In this case, they understand that they are making a choice with incomplete information to buy a specific shirt. — Dan
No, that is the point of the example. I think the original version had a reason given since it had more of a complete story. I was just giving you a brief version and the reason behind the choice really isn't the point. — Dan
Again, you want a lot more from "understanding one's choice" than I do. — Dan
However, I've already offered to use "actioning choices" or some similar language if you would prefer. — Dan
Can you see how one is contrary to the other? Unless there is a reason for the change of mind, then a misunderstanding of one's own choices is indicated by the fact that the person has made contrary choices. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, you demonstrate a misunderstanding of "understanding". By my OED, it means "perceive the significance or explanation or cause of". Unless a person apprehends the reason why they discard an earlier choice that they have made to adopt a contrary choice, it is impossible that they could perceive the significance or explanation or cause of that change of mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the point of the example is merely to show an instance of making a choice on insufficient information, then it would not be relevant to what we are discussing. We are discussing "understanding" one's choice. Understanding is not simply a matter of having information it also involves applying the relevant information to the situation at hand. This is the point which you just don't seem to be getting. When a person has relevant information, they do not necessarily apply it. And that is why habit is so important as a source for misunderstanding one's own choices. It inclines one to act (often taking risks) without considering all the relevant information which is available. Failure to consider all the relevant information does not necessarily lead to misunderstanding, it often does not. But it can lead to misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
Acting in a contrary way to how one previously decided that they would act, without a reason for making this contrary choice, implies that the choice is not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover
I really do not know what you could possibly mean by "understanding one's choice", if it's not to perceive the significance or explanation or cause of one's choice. How would you define "understand" in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover
No, this makes no sense. I am telling you that there is a distinction between acting and choosing, and you are now starting to agree with me. Yet you propose "actioning choices" as a way to deny the evidence which demonstrates your misunderstanding of "choice". Look at the shirt example. The choice to only buy if the shirt is 100% cotton, would be excluded as not an "actioning choice", because the person ended up acting on the contrary choice. Then we would be left unable to consider the very important condition of changing one's mind.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why not recognize the real separation between choosing and acting, and then proceed to recognize that you were wrong to conclude that there is no serious distinction to be made between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen? From here we can properly assess your reasons for believing in consequentialism. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is less crazy, but I think still wrong. I don't think it is a misunderstanding to change your mind. Or even to do so on a whim. — Dan
I think "understand" is a good choice to convey the meaning I am attempting to convey here, of being able to comprehend the nature of a choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to a choice and can respond to reasons for making it. — Dan
It is definitely relevant. To understand the choice someone does not need to have all the information they might wish to have, never mind needing to apply it. My point is that the bar I am setting for understanding here is much lower than what you are talking about. — Dan
I mean, I would also quite happily describe the shirt example in terms of having a desire and then making a choice to buy a shirt that doesn't necessarily fufil that desire. I am not worried about whether the person wanting to get the shirt in the first place should be considered a choice or not. I just don't think it matters. — Dan
I have no idea how you have gotten from one to the other there. Let's say we agree that there is a difference between choosing and acting (mostly this seems linguistic to me at the moment). I'm not sure why I should think that choosing to act in a way that brings about some outcome, let's say the death of a person by my flipping a switch and sending a trolley to crush them, and me choosing to act in some other way which leads to the death of five people, in this case, not flipping the switch and watching while the trolley crushes them, are somehow different. Both of them could be considered a choice or an action, or both. The terminology isn't what's important. What's important is that there are two possible worlds (in this hypothetical) and I can pick one in which one person dies or one in which five do, and I can't see a principled reason why the fact that I have to flip a switch (or whatever) to get to the better world but only have to stand around twiddling my thumbs to get to the worse one should make a moral difference. This has nothing to do with whether or not there is a difference between acting and choosing. — Dan
Changing your mind does not constitute misunderstanding one's choice, that's what I said. However, exchanging one choice for a contrary choice, without any reason, must indicate that the person does not understand one's own choices. A whimsical choice, if it is contrary to a prior choice, must be a misunderstood choice, because there is no real reason why the person negates the prior choice in favour of the new choice. The person can give no explanation for the choice. "Whim" means precisely that, without explanation.
Here's another way of looking at it. Lot's of people make New Years' resolutions, then many end up breaking them. Suppose a person resolves to quit smoking, then two days later is lighting up a cigarette. Notice that the two choices are contrary, first to not smoke, second to have a cigarette. One of the two choices must be misunderstood. Either the person doesn't misunderstand the force the addiction has on oneself, making the first choice misunderstood, or the second choice is misunderstood for the reason above. Usually we would not say that the first choice was misunderstood, we'd say that the person was not strong enough to overcome the addiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, don't you agree, that changing one's mind to a contrary choice, without a good reason for doing such, constitutes not being able to comprehend the nature of the choice? Take the shirt example, there is no reason given for the change of mind, therefore the person cannot respond with reasons for making that choice. Imagine the person told someone else, a spouse or someone like that, that they were going to buy a shirt, but only if the shirt is 100% cotton. Then the person brings home a shirt of unknown composition, and the spouse asks, why did you buy that. I don't know. There is no reason given in the example. That's a common answer for children when asked why did you do that, I don't know. Adults give that answer sometimes too. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think you are missing the essence of the example. The decision to only buy the shirt if it's 100% cotton is clearly a choice. It's stated as that in the example. It's not a desire to have a cotton shirt, it's a choice to buy a used shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton.
You can rewrite the example, so as to call it a desire for a shirt, or a desire for a cotton shirt, but then you miss the essence of the example, which is the act of changing one's mind for a contrary choice. Please take note that this is just like your proposal to only consider "actioning choices". By doing this you exclude all the choices which do not end up in action, the choices of inaction, which is will power, and the choices which later get changed and do not end up in action. You can call all these choices "desires" if you want, but what's the point?
Why do you want to exclude all these choices from your consideration of choices? Obviously it's because this type of choice doesn't fit within you moral principles, your morality cannot deal with them. So instead of changing your moral principles to be consistent with the nature of choices in general, you choose to ignore all these choices, and hang on to defective moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, anyone can contrive an example where choosing inaction is just as morally reprehensible as choosing to act. I do not see how this is relevant to the issue of the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you recognize that choices very often define conditions of inaction? Don't buy lottery tickets. Don't buy the shirt if it's not 100% cotton. Don't have a cigarette. Don't have a drink before driving. Thou shalt not... And so on. These are reasoned choices which serve as principles, rules which are designed for the purpose of preventing the urge to act, when the specified act is understood as unreasonable. Such choices do not produce observable acts, though they can change our attitudes. Since a judgement of one's moral character is a judgement of one's attitude, these choices which produce no actions turn out to be very important choices, morally. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. — Dan
I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". — Dan
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