Not if you are a lawmaker making policy on when a woman can and cannot decide what to do with her own pregnancy.

Ridiculous argument.

According to you, there could never be a controversy surrounding any abortion. It’s just word games and platonic form manipulation easily avoided by playing other word games. — Fire Ologist

I haven't said that. These are two different questions:

1. Are zygotes human?
2. Is it wrong kill zygotes?

The two are not the same. It can be wrong to kill zygotes even if we don't label them "human" and it can be right to kill zygotes even if we do label them "human".

You claimed that we derive moral principles from the question "what is actually good?". We don't, because we can't derive propositions from questions.

1. Are zygotes human? — Michael

No. Are human zygotes human beings?

Unless that is the question you haven’t entered the abortion debate.

And you sound like an essentialist every time you point to some distinct object. Like a zygote.

Are human zygotes human beings?

Unless that is the question you haven’t entered the abortion debate. — Fire Ologist

I've addressed it. The question makes no sense in context. The term "human being" isn't like the term "bachelor" with an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions; it's more like the word "game".

Either way, what does zygotes being or not being human have to do with whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes?

When it's a zygote call it a zygote. When it's an embryo call it an embryo. When it's a foetus call it a foetus. When it's a baby call it a baby.

The idea that there must be some label that names/describes it from the moment of conception to the moment of death, and that the existence of this label entails moral facts about, is mistaken.

A many-named thing. What do I label it if I want to know what kind of animal it is?

What do I label it if I want to know what kind of animal it is? — NOS4A2

If you want to know what kind of animal it is then look at it and put it under a microscope. Its physical nature has nothing to do with the conventions of the English language.

But it would be nice to know what type of organism we are ontologically speaking, wouldn't it? Can we not have a word for that?

I've addressed it. The question makes no sense in context. The term "human being" isn't like the term "bachelor" with an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions; it's more like the word "game".

Either way, what does zygotes being or not being human have to do with whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes? — Michael

Are you serious?

A human being in the context of abortion is at least a body, clearly able to be defined and delimited. Body like a pregnant mom. Body like a fetus that can be distinguished from the mom, scraped out and thrown away.

A human being is the thing that pops into existence at birth. No need to delve deeper once it is born. It’s that thing. No more gaming is needed in the context of abortion. The lawmakers and doctors and mothers are done with the hand-wringing at that point. The little bundle of popping joy is the same human being as all of us adults.

Separately, most people agree it is usually bad to intentionally kill human beings. Throwing a newborn baby out a 5 story window would be bad, for instance. It is bad, so they say, because the newborn is a human being and, so they say, killing human beings is bad. (That’s a logical argument.)

So, some people wonder if maybe, aborting a 7 month pregnancy might be like throwing a baby out a window, for instance. Hence the debate.

You can if you want. That's your choice, and it certainly has no moral relevance. An organism just is the physical stuff that it's made of, and that physical stuff is what it is regardless of what, if anything, we call it.

You can if you want. That's your choice, and it certainly has no moral relevance. An organism just is the physical stuff that it's made of, and that physical stuff is what it is regardless of what, if anything, we call it.

It has plenty of moral relevance because that organism is the recipient of your behavior. In any case, it would be nice to have a single name for the being we're talking about.

The right to life of the zygote is in direct conflict with the right to bodily autonomy of the mother; and my point is that the ends do not justify the means, so the mother cannot abort the child as a means towards the good end of upholding their bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

It’s not just bodily autonomy that’s at stake. If I’m not mistaken, the ultimate goal of Neo-Aristotelianism is human flourishing. There doesn’t seem to be a good argument that making abortion illegal will somehow ameliorate human flourishing in general or for the individuals involved in particular cases. Generally speaking, people seek abortion because they’re not prepared to be caregivers. They reason that they, and a child, are not in a position to flourish.

Are you serious? — Fire Ologist

Yes. "it is wrong to kill X if and only if X is a human" is not a tautology. For some X it might be wrong to kill it even if it isn't human and for some X it might be right to kill it even if it is human.

Separately, most people agree it is usually bad to intentionally kill human beings. — Fire Ologist

And this is where we need to distinguish been an intensional and an extensional reading.

It is not the case that it is wrong to kill me because I am human but that it is wrong to kill me and I am human. It is not the case that it is wrong to kill you because you are human but that it is wrong to kill you and you are human. It is not the case that it is wrong to kill humans because they are humans but that it is wrong to kill humans and they are humans.

It would be wrong to kill us even if we weren't human. It's wrong to kill us because we are sufficiently intelligent organisms capable of suffering and the like.

What kind of animal it is has nothing to do with the conventions of the English language. — Michael

You are just playing epistemology games and post modern metaphysician.

So no one can know or say anything about the “real world”. That’s your answer. Probably resolves the discussion with anyone who disagrees with you (at least in your mind).

Impossible to argue with the “word game” resolution to the question of what a particular thing may actually be.

But the government isn’t playing word games. They are assisting some people with killing fetuses and punishing others for doing the same thing based on physical evidence like a dead fetus and calling it a “human being” and a “person” in order to apply laws against homicide.

So you might want to get in the game.

because that organism is the recipient of your behavior — NOS4A2

That's true of every organism regardless of whether we call it "zygote", "human", or "cow". Labels have no moral relevance.

It's wrong to kill me because I am a sufficiently intelligent organism. — Michael

That’s it? You are sufficiently intelligent?

This has nothing to do with laws regulating when and how you can and can’t conduct an abortion.

I’m not going to waste time figuring out “because you are human”. There is a law already - it is wrong to kill a human. That’s the law we are grappling with. Is a a 7-month fetus one of those same things that the law already applies to. Forget “because” word game issues. Be honest.

It’s not a word game to a pregnant mom. Help her think it through.

That’s it? You are sufficiently intelligent? — Fire Ologist

Yes. It would be wrong to kill sufficiently intelligent extra-terrestrial life, even though they are not human.

And the reason it would be wrong to kill them isn't because they're Kryptonian or Species X but because they are sufficiently intelligent and capable of suffering and the like.

Yes. It would be wrong to kill sufficiently intelligent extra-terrestrial life, even though they are not human. — Michael

So the moral pivot point for right killing and wrong killing for you is “intelligence”?

Is that your position?

So the moral pivot point for right killing and wrong killing for you is “intelligence” of the body to be killed or protected?

Is that your position? — Fire Ologist

When "intelligence" is taken to be a general term covering such things as a sufficient degree of self-awareness/consciousness, yes. That's why it's acceptable to kill plants, zygotes, the brain dead, and flies, but not babies.

It's trickier when considering more complex non-human life like cows and dogs, and I'm not averse to vegetarianism being the morally superior position, and that I'm in the wrong in eating meat.

The whole point of normative ethics is to decipher what is actually wrong and right behavior to then correct or validate moral intuitions that we have — Bob Ross

Let's take such an account seriously.

How will you tell if you have your ethical theory right? After all, it will not do to go to all that effort and get the results wrong.

You will need something against which to compare the theory in order to evaluate it.

And whatever you compare it to will need to be independent of the theory, in order to avoid circularity.

The alternative would be either to compare the theory to itself, or to alternate theories. In the first case you would not be able to tell that the theory was right, but only that it was consistent. In the second, you would not be able to say which theory was correct, but only that they perhaps contradict each other.

This is the process used in the sciences, where theories are compared not just against each other but against how things are. How things are provides a way to assess the worth of a piece of science.

In ethics we compare the theory against how things ought be. That's how ethics differed form science.

A central part of ethics is that how things are never tells us how things ought to be. We have to decide that for ourselves.

So how should things be? Well, for one thing, a bunch of cells ought not be evaluated as of the same worth as Mrs Smith. Mrs Smith has qualities not had by the cyst that qualify her as of greater value. If a theory does not agree with this evaluation, it has gone astray.

Those who think otherwise have generally let extraneous factors influence their thinking. Most often they think that there is some mysterious spiritual entity enshrined in the cyst that gives it preeminent value. Usually this is because they think this is what their invisible friend says is the case. Sometimes it is becasue they cannot deal with ideas of gradation, needing a definitive point such as conception from which to apply their expositions.

But for the rest of us it is clear that they are muddled. A cyst is not of the same worth as Mrs Smith.

So back to your claim. Ethical theory cannot tell us how we want things to be. What it can do is inform us about the consistency and consequences of our behaviour.

We do not want Mrs Smith to be reduced to the same value as a mere cyst.

And those who disagree are in moral error, despite how sophisticated their moral theory.

And notice that those who think that abortion is wrong are in Moral error. They like to think they have the moral high ground, and that those who disagree are not taking a moral stance. But if you look at the comments in this thread, you will see that this is not the case. The reasoning of those who are in favour of abortion is often clear, well-considered and valid. Those against abortion do not have a monopoly on moral theory. Further, it is apparent that they are doing it wrong.

:100:

I have, perhaps, a different approach. Maybe I should say what it is first, and then justify it, as the justification is a little long-winded.

What seems noteworthy about the abortion issue is that many perfectly reasonable people think abortions are morally permissible, at least in the early stages of pregnancy. It could be that these people only think this because they have assumed that the developing entity does not have a mind - and so is not a person - until later in the pregnancy process. And/or it could be that most of those who have this view are not relevantly disinterested - they have a vested interest in it being morally ok to abort and this vested interest is corrupting their reason (as it can for any of us). I don't discount those possibilities. However, it could be that it just seems clear to the reason of many that it is morally permissible to abort a pregnancy in the early stages. I take that possibility very seriously too.

That, I think, is good evidence that this is what they are. If we have good evidence too that killing a person is seriously wrong, and would remain so if the person is inside one's body (especially if one is responsible for the person being inside of one), then we have good evidence that the developing entity is not a person in the early stages. For by hypothesis, if they were a person, it'd be seriously wrong to have an abortion.

My approach, then, is not to try and settle the issue of whether the developing entity is a person or not and then extract the moral implications of this; rather it is to take what our reason tells us about the morality of abortions and extract from this a conclusion about the status of the developing entity.

I can anticipate two lines of criticism. One would be epistemological: that what our reason tells us about the morality of actions is not a source of insight into their non-moral features. The other would be that everything i have just said about the moral permissibiity of early-stage abortions could be said equally well about their moral impermissibility. There are plenty of reasonable people who think abortions are wrong throughout. And although they too may be biased or may simply be making assumptions about the status of the developing entity and extracting the moral implications, they may be sincerely reporting the unbiased reports of their reason on the matter.

I think that's correct. But - and this is why i think this approach is different and is an approach, rather than a particular view - establishing whether this is the case is what the debate should be over. That is, the debate should not be over whether or not the developing entity is a person yet or not. Rather, it should be over whether those who think abortions are morally permissible are more likely than the other side to be reporting unbiased deliverances of their reason. If they are, then that's good evidence that early stage abortions are morally permissible (and if that is incompatible with them being the killing of a person, then it's good evidence that this is not what an early-stage abortion is).

Here's what I mean. Let's imagine you are convinced the developing entity is a person. And that - that - is why you believe abortions are wrong. Your reason is not telling you about abortions. You are telling your reason about abortions; you are representing them to be the killing of a person and then simply observing that your reason tells you that killing a person is wrong (and that the location of the person doesn't matter).

Well, that isn't really evidence that abortions are wrong; it's evidence that if abortions are what you believe them to be, they'd be wrong.

By contrast, if abortions seemed wrong 'without' you assuming that the developing entity is a person, then that'd be quite good evidence that they are wrong (and that the developing entity is a person....for why else would they be wrong?).

Likewise, if abortions seem morally permissible to those who have no firm views about whether the developing entity is a person or not, then that's quite good evidence they're morally permissible.

What we should really be asking - if this approach has merit - is not whether the developing entity is a person or not, but which side's moral intuitions are a product of making assumptions about the matter and which side's moral intuitions seem independent of such assumptions.

This is the process used in the sciences, where theories are compared not just against each other but against how things are. — Banno

And science is the process where we inquire about what a human being is, what a pregnancy is, comparing newborns to adults to zygotes. Science, like metaphysics, physics and biology, theory of mind, psychology, but in the context of abortion, really mostly biology and medicine.

In ethics we compare the theory against how things ought be. The point of doing ethics is that how things are never tells us how things ought to be. We have to decide that for ourselves. — Banno

I agree that morality and ethics are a separate inquiry, where we take what science tells us, whatever we now agree is most rational/factual/state of affairs, develop our ethical/moral/legal norms, and apply them to the state of affairs. We say “this a pregnant woman and as a human being, she is entitled to many rights, and ought be treated as all human beings ought be treated.”

So how should things be? Well, for one thing, a bunch of cells ought not be evaluated as of the same worth as Mrs Smith. Mrs Smith has qualities not had by the cyst that qualify her as of greater value. If a theory does not agree with this evaluation, it has gone astray. — Banno

Mrs. Smith is a bunch of cells. Calling a human zygote a bunch of cells or a cyst doesn’t say anything.

Saying Mrs. Smith “has qualities not had by the [zygote cyst creature you call it]” is an assertion about what a human being is, but it’s not an argument.

Are you saying that only entities who demonstrate certain “qualities” that are of “greater value” shall be recognized as human beings? (That’s a scientific question.)

Or are you saying that a human zygote is a human being, and Mrs. Smith is a human being, but because Smith at the later stage has these high value qualities, and the zygote human doesn’t, we can kill the zygote anyway due to some moral law manipulation and exception creation surrounding the prohibition against killing human beings? (That’s the moral/legal question?)

The monotony of this for all of us is that some pretend the science to talk about ethics, and others pretend the ethics to talk about science. No one is attempting to simply get it right.

And we should do the science first. Who cares about abortions in the first month if we metaphysicians and biologists can say “a 4 week old human fetus can’t be a human being because all humans must have A, B, and C, and a zygote doesn’t have any of those.”??

The answer to when in the unfolding of time does a new human being come into being (such that we can no longer kill it morally) is an essential part of this debate, because only after there is any human being can there possibly be a life of any sort or value that could be be treated immorally.

So let me ask you the scientific question: Does a brand spanking new born baby have enough of the same high value qualities as Mrs. Smith, that it makes sense to protect them both as human beings, as persons (which the whole world already does)?? Why are new babies more special than “cysts” or the human zygote stage? What are the qualities of living bunches of cells that cross the threshold and have to be called “human beings” and when in the history of any of us adult humans does that threshold get crossed?

I’m hoping you to choose some behavior and functioning (some qualities is better) occurring after conception and before natural, adult death.

I’d be surprised if the human qualities you state, beyond having human DNA, will include both a newborn baby (which is more like a plant, or like a fetus without its needed uterus/ life support system) and Mrs. Smith? What human qualities cover the adult and the newborn but leave out the human zygote? Maybe some abortions do not involve killing human beings (at 3 weeks) while others do (at 8 months)? So what are the high value qualities of human being that cover both? Or should we be making it legal to kill unwanted baby children? I’m open to those discussions if the science takes us there.

My approach, then, is not to try and settle the issue of whether the developing entity is a person or not and then extract the moral implications of this; rather it is to take what our reason tells us about the morality of abortions and extract from this a conclusion about the status of the developing entity. — Clearbury

Hi Clearbury, welcome.

I could easily be misunderstanding, but I think I have to disagree. I don’t think you can reason about morality without some concrete matter in hand to be moral about. And to have a concrete matter in hand, you must have already defined for yourself certain terms (such as “human being” and even “new human being”).

Morality is the morality of actions, and actions are in a physical, shared world that requires us to define objects and transact with those objects among other human beings. We need multiple human beings, individuals interacting, before we can make moral statements about, for example, killing them as good or bad, or stealing from them as good or bad, etc. I don’t see how you start by evaluating what our “reason tells us about the morality of abortion” without already defining the objects involved in an abortion. Just saying “abortion” shows we already started somewhere that is clearly specific and full of definitions and objects; “abortion” delineates as distinct: women, pregnancy, fetuses, removal before birth, and fetuses that would otherwise become a baby. If we don’t define these terms in some way (and I suggest the clearest and most precise manner we can muster), how would we know how to apply any moral analysis at any stage in a pregnancy? As an example, If the developing entity is not a person, no moral question even arises to evaluate. We don’t wonder about the morality of killing a kidney (at least not in the same way as the morality of aborting an 8-month old human fetus).

I do think we can stipulate the question “what is a person?” We can say for sake of argument, a fetus at 4 weeks is not a person but a fetus at 8 months is a person. We can then create our morality around all the permutations that might arise within those definitions. Or we can try to refine our definitions…and then refine our moral reasoning…

But we always need the definitions of the involved parties and objects and processes, or some general parameters for each, in order to develop the morality. Otherwise, to me, we may only be using bad facts to develop a bad morality.

I feel that P2 is incorrect because I deny the *idea* behind P1.

A baby does not have value within itself, it only has value within the context that it will eventually become valuable and there exists no distinct line by which to seperate those states. As a baby develops, it becomes valuable as it turns into a person with personality, desires, ideas, etc. However, a baby at birth is nothing but an animal, and its conciousness is no more complex than one.

Theres no moral difference between an internal and external baby, but theres a big pratical difference.

I dont believe there is any moral issue with taking the life of something that does not understand life. Others simply project their emotional state and values upon the baby, or act as if their future values should be considered in the now in some strange retrocausal argument about valuing "potentiality". However, the fundamental remains that a baby cannot understand their life, and so cannot value their life, and I care not for those who wish to impose their values upon others.

One can choose to say that they value consciousness outright, but then they'd have to become vegan and be supportive of animal rights aswell. Otherwise their position would be hypocritical. Such people should see abortion and animal farming as equally morally bad processes. Of which theres no argument but to simply disagree on that value and question why consciousness is to be valued.

You might as well ask when an embryo pops into existence. It doesn't. There's a single-celled organism which we label "zygote" that gradually develops into a simple multi-cellular organism which we label "embryo" that gradually develops into a more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "foetus" that gradually develops into an even more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "human" or "person".

Some might use the label "human" earlier in the development cycle than others, but that's a personal linguistic convention with no philosophical or moral relevance. — Michael

So then what are we saying when we say, "human rights"? Is anyone free to decide when you are a human or not and deserving of "human rights"? Are we free to decide when you are a "Michael" or "Mary"?

I’ve tried “a member of the species Homo sapiens” or “a biologically distinct human organism”. — NOS4A2

These definitions are circular.

Mrs. Smith is a bunch of cells. Calling a human zygote a bunch of cells or a cyst doesn’t say anything. — Fire Ologist

Mrs. Smith is a bunch of cells and a mind. Any minded organism trumps any mindless organism, like a zygote.

Mrs. Smith is a bunch of cells and a mind. Any minded organism trumps any mindless organism, like a zygote. — RogueAI

So the equation is bunch of cells plus a mind equals a human being? Is that the magic formula? No mind, no human being?

So the equation is bunch of cells plus a mind equals a human being? Is that the magic formula? No mind, no human being? — Fire Ologist

Yes, this is why parents can order life support removed from brain-dead children and have their organs harvested.

brain-dead children — RogueAI

So, by your logic, you are saying a brain dead child is not a human being. Is that right?