This is similar to your premise that if a picture is being used as a picture then it must not be being used as a sign. — Leontiskos

Maybe my next reply covered that.

Is a picture already a sign, albeit a non-arbitrary sign? — Leontiskos

Generally, although I think children need to learn to see pictures as pictures of things. It doesn't seem to be quite automatic and may be more culture-bound than we think.

"leaf" and a picture of a leaf are both signs of a leaf; one arbitrary and one non-arbitrary. — Leontiskos

And the shadow a leaf casts is also a sign of a leaf.

The arbitrariness of the sign, per Saussure, refers to the conventional nature of the linkage between the signifier and the signified, iirc. But there are some famous studies suggesting that might be overstated a bit (bouba/kiki for starters).

Is it not language unless the meaning relation is conventional rather than natural? The traditional answer is obviously "yes" but I'm not so sure. Especially if you wonder how language could get started in the first place.

If it's not absolutely essential, then what's the relation here? Is it the other way? That is, conventional meanings as a subset of linguistic meaning? That looks to be the story with writing. (Or with the use of natural gestures, like folding your arms, to indicate an attitude.) Are there counterexamples? Any cases of conventional but non-linguistic meaning? --- I'm having trouble coming up with something, but I'm not even sure what the criteria would be.

conventional but non-linguistic meaning — Srap Tasmaner

The obvious example was right in front of me: cartographic symbols. While there is obviously structure in the way these are placed on the map, that structure is not grammatical.

Just look. It is not hard. There is some disagreement, but many linguists are fine with it.

fdrake seems stuck on non-necessary norms of interpretation, such as spacing and punctuation. I would suggest that he think about coded language, such as encryption or the hidden signs involved in a football game or military strategy, where the linguistic matter is supposed to be unrecognizable according to standard norms. — Leontiskos

I never intended to say groups of symbols were necessary for something to count as language, I think it's essentially a sufficient condition to be able to recognise units of meaning. In the context of the discussion, I was showing a sufficient condition for recognising the presence of units of meaning without there being an understanding of the underlying language. Which was a counterpoint to the idea that one cannot hope to recognise whether something is a language unless one already speaks it.

Just look. It is not hard. There is some disagreement, but many linguists are fine with it. — I like sushi

No, they're not. Anyone, linguist or not, may use the term "language" in a metaphorical sense, but linguists of all people know the basic literal definition and it doesn't extend to bee communication. Non-linguistic forms of communication have been categorized extensively. Your mistake is similar to claiming Zoologists think dinosaurs are mammals.

Thanks. That's helpful. I hope everyone reads your post, clarifies to themselves what the literal definition is (the wiki page would be a good start), and then thinks about how that might be problematized or examined. That could be fruitful. Insisting, as a starting point, that folk or metaphorical notions of language just are what language is isn't though.

I guess people can either believe me or you.

Or they can just look it up and see that I am correct :D

Why isn't it language? You used a sign intentionally to communicate something to others. You folded your arms "to communicate." This looks like a form of sign language or body language, in a non-metaphorical sense. — Leontiskos

I understand why you might think that, but sign language just is language. Children who are deaf will, if put together in groups, develop sign language just as they would regular language, in the same way, along the same developmental axis, and with the same resulting richness of potential expression. Body language is nothing like sign language or spoken language. It doesn't fulfil the basic criteria I provided earlier, but sign language does (including e.g. distinct linguistic units that can be recombined to produce new meanings, and indicate grammatical categories, such as case, tense, voice, mood etc).

You can demonstrate that to yourself by trying to write a post on here by taking a video of yourself in various "body language" poses, posting a link to it, and seeing if we have any idea what you're talking about.

I guess people can either believe me or you.

Or they can just look it up and see that I am correct — I like sushi

I think most posters here will be willing to read, e.g. the WIki page on language. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language

"Language is a structured system of communication that consists of grammar and vocabulary. It is the primary means by which humans convey meaning"

"Communication systems used by other animals such as bees or apes are closed systems that consist of a finite, usually very limited, number of possible ideas that can be expressed. In contrast, human language is open-ended and productive, meaning that it allows humans to produce a vast range of utterances from a finite set of elements, and to create new words and sentences. "

Your claims are just based on a lack of basic knowledge of what language is. That's fine. But I don't know why you keep insisting on them.

Children who are deaf will, if put together in groups, develop sign language just as they would regular language, in the same way, along the same developmental axis, and with the same resulting richness of potential expression. — Baden

This is also speculation. No one has been cruel enough to test this out. The one comparable instance in Nicaragua has since been looked at more closely and showed that many of the children had already been exposed to sign languages and simply passed on their knowledge.

Like I said. They can decide.

I think if you read this, you will see it's consistent with the wording in my post. (Maybe we could add a few caveats, but that's about it).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language

Edit: In any case, leaving that aside, under normal circumstances sign language develops in the same way as regular language and is of an entirely different category to body language.

I'm glad it was helpful. One way of "problematizing" the concept of language would be to step back and ask, "What am I/we trying to do by offering the Wikipedia page definition of language?" I think the answer would involve Haslanger's first approach, the conceptual one. The person who refers to the Wiki page is saying, in effect, "We do have a common understanding or definition of what language is, and this understanding is captured by the Wiki page. Our task, then, is to compare possible instances of language to the definition given, and decide whether they fit."

In addition, a possible clarification here would involve asking whether we cite the Wiki page because it captures the meaning of the concept "language," a meaning which we already know and can see reflected on the page; or whether we cite the page because we believe that Wikipedia gives or states correct definitions of concepts, by some sort of fiat or authority. I'm guessing we're not that trusting of Wikipedia, so probably the first idea is what we mean: We already (believe we) have a proper understanding of the concept of "language," and we note with pleasure that the Wiki page captures it well, and so we refer others to it as a basis for discussion. And of course a middle ground is possible: We may not trust Wikipedia implicitly, but we may be swayed by a given page's excellent sourcing and references, so that, if there is a discrepancy between what we think language is, and what the page says, we may give ground to the implied expertise of the page, and modify our concept accordingly.

Do you think this is pretty good picture of your intent here, when you refer us to Wikipedia?

No. I know what language is because I've worked in the area most of my adult life. I cited the wiki page because other academic sources were ignored as were the explanations of the few here who have some background knowledge of the subject. But it looks like another of these conversations that may go nowhere due to being swamped in misunderstandings that people for some reason cannot let go of. That's fine. I think I've done what I could. If the conversation becomes sensible, I may be back.

Another reason it doesn't make sense to see their behaviour as language. You watch the video, it's a series of perceptual and sensory exercises. There are sounds made for their own purpose, for how they're heard and relate to background sounds. Objects are tasted, just for how they relate to the tongue and mouth. Objects are nuzzled, just for how they relate to the face and neck. It's at best a language metaphorically, and I think construing it as a language makes you lose so much specificity of description it's a damn shame.

There aren't any symbols, there aren't any words, there isn't an attempt to communicate, how they've expressed themself doesn't convey a content that's durable in time, no one could have a conversation with the series of actions unless it was already codified as a language through extant norms. Some of this even comes from the video - the "language" is nonsignifying , it cannot be representational or symbolic - and has no linguistic community associated with it.

There are so many interesting things you could describe about stimming routines. eg Baggs is pitch matching background noises with humming, but is a nonspeaking autist, why? What's the phenomenology there? What's the expressivity?

Calling it a language with a spoken component (the humming) when it's produced by someone who as a premise of the video cannot communicate in spoken language is hopelessly reductive and easily refutable. And for the purpose of normalising autism no less.

Also, for what it's worth, Baggs used to speak, went through something like normal language acquisition, got all the way to college before they started to lose their speech, I think. So we're not dealing with a "feral child" situation. And they continued to write even after they stopped speaking. It's complicated.

The arbitrariness of the sign, per Saussure, refers to the conventional nature of the linkage between the signifier and the signified, iirc. But there are some famous studies suggesting that might be overstated a bit (bouba/kiki for starters).

Is it not language unless the meaning relation is conventional rather than natural? The traditional answer is obviously "yes" but I'm not so sure. Especially if you wonder how language could get started in the first place.

If it's not absolutely essential, then what's the relation here? Is it the other way? That is, conventional meanings as a subset of linguistic meaning? — Srap Tasmaner

The relation between the signifier and signified has become an object of a rigorous research and critique in some postmodernist theories of language. They discover the insufficient and even illusionary character of the conventional appearance of linguistic meanings. Instead, they emphasize the critical role of organizations of power, indirectly entertaining coercion and enforcement. For example, a gender theorist, Judith Butler, frames her project as an attempt to negotiate and relax the linguistically shaped ‘assignment of gender’ at an early age. “An utterance brings what it states into being (illocutionary) or makes a set of events happen consequently (perlocutionary)… A diffuse and complicated set of discursive and institutional powers comes with primary inscriptions and interpellations of others. In the case of gender, they affect us in uncontrollable ways, animating and structuring our responsiveness.” (Butler ‘Notes toward a performative theory of assembly,’ p. 29) In a more general manner, some thinkers assert that language entertains an essential link between implicit and coercive norms and an overall processes of socialization and identification.

Is it not language unless the meaning relation is conventional rather than natural? The traditional answer is obviously "yes" but I'm not so sure. Especially if you wonder how language could get started in the first place. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I agree.

If it's not absolutely essential, then what's the relation here? Is it the other way? That is, conventional meanings as a subset of linguistic meaning? That looks to be the story with writing. (Or with the use of natural gestures, like folding your arms, to indicate an attitude.) Are there counterexamples? Any cases of conventional but non-linguistic meaning? — Srap Tasmaner

The obvious example was right in front of me: cartographic symbols. While there is obviously structure in the way these are placed on the map, that structure is not grammatical. — Srap Tasmaner

Here "conventional" does come apart from "arbitrary." The cartographic symbol is conventional but not arbitrary. Is it natural?

In any case, I think we are in agreement that a sign need not be arbitrary or purely stipulative.

-

One way of "problematizing" the concept of language would be to step back and ask, "What am I/we trying to do by offering the Wikipedia page definition of language?" — J

Right.

-

I understand why you might think that, but sign language just is language. Children who are deaf will, if put together in groups, develop sign language just as they would regular language, in the same way, along the same developmental axis, and with the same resulting richness of potential expression. Body language is nothing like sign language or spoken language. It doesn't fulfil the basic criteria I provided earlier, but sign language does (including e.g. distinct linguistic units that can be recombined to produce new meanings, and indicate grammatical categories, such as case, tense, voice, mood etc). — Baden

First it is worth noting that intentionally folding one's arms to convey some meaning is not "body language" in the normal sense, and therefore dismissing such intentional gesturing as mere "body language" is not really accurate.

But it seems that your argument is as follows: <Language has grammar; folding one's arms to convey meaning has no grammar; therefore folding one's arms in that way is not linguistic>.*

My first objection to this idea is that it requires that atomic linguistic units are not language. For example, something like, "Stop!," or, "Yes," or, "Why?," or, "Platypus," are not linguistic given that they lack grammar. Similarly, the arm-folding could be represented as, "I am nervous," or, "I am reticent," and yet the arm-folding sign itself represents this same reality in a grammarless way. How is it that, given two intentional signs which mean the same thing, one can be linguistic and one not? And is the heart of language communication or grammar?

Second and relatedly, wielding a natural sign as an intentional sign is not metaphorically linguistic in the the sense that a claim like, "emotions are a language," is metaphorically linguistic. As indicated, robust language may never have developed at all without the intentional appropriation of natural signs. And grammar itself may not be as straightforward or stipulative as one supposes. For example, if the person intentionally signaling their reticence by crossing their arms moves one hand to their chin, has a grammar developed? In that case we have a sign-juxtaposition which could be translated as something like, "I am reticent but also willing to hear more of what you have to say."


* And the question here related to @Srap Tasmaner's post asks whether grammar is arbitrary or merely conventional.

Which was a counterpoint to the idea that one cannot hope to recognise whether something is a language unless one already speaks it. — fdrake

Okay, but in that case it seems like your argument only reaches the weaker conclusion, <Sometimes we can recognize a language we do not speak>.

Calling it a language with a spoken component (the humming) when it's produced by someone who as a premise of the video cannot communicate in spoken language is hopelessly reductive and easily refutable. And for the purpose of normalising autism no less. — fdrake

I agree. Again, I see no reason to believe that Baggs is engaged in a linguistic activity.

Also, for what it's worth, Baggs used to speak, went through something like normal language acquisition, got all the way to college before they started to lose their speech, I think. So we're not dealing with a "feral child" situation. And they continued to write even after they stopped speaking. It's complicated. — Srap Tasmaner

How complex.

I’m posting that video here because I think it challenges us to re-consider what constitutes language. To what extent is an immediate relationship with our non-human surroundings a language? — Joshs

This causes me to want to better clarify what non-essentialism entails. It does not entail an abandonment of definition entirely. It just means there is no one element required to define what langauge is, but it does not suggest that language can be whatever you want it to be. The person in the video was not engaged in any language that could be deciphered from watching her. She seemed to be interacting with her environment to be sure, but that is not langauge. I might skip around and hum and animals of all sorts might do things that explore and feel the things around them, but that's not langauge.

We needn't do a disservice to what it means to engage in langauge in order to show respect to those who think and interact differently than the most of us. That person might lead a life richer in experience and joy than the vast lot of us, but she doesn't engage in langauge, at least not in that video.

Here "conventional" does come apart from "arbitrary." — Leontiskos

Yeah I think Sausaure's phrase is a little misleading.

On the one hand, as I said, it refers to the conventional nature of the linkage between signifier and signified.

On the other, it's also intended to convey that there's nothing special about the signifier that makes it the right signifier for the job. The structuralist approach is to see the signifiers as forming a system, the whole group of them, and what's important is just that they can be and are distinguished from each other, a "system of differences" .

This is especially clear in phonology, I think, where you can draw up a table of possible phonemes. What you also get from phonology though is that this perfect system of phonemes is not quite real: in practice we accept a considerable range of allophones as a specific phoneme, and we rely on context to make the assignment.

The cartographic symbol is conventional but not arbitrary. Is it natural? — Leontiskos

Not natural, no.

On the typical road maps I look at, towns and cities are indicated by circles, filled circles of different sizes and stars (for capitals).

There's no resemblance there, not even stylized "iconic" resemblance. It's "arbitrary," if you like. We might have used squares or triangles or whatever.

But in general I think "arbitrary" carries the wrong connotation. What matters is that it's one of many available Nash equilibria, so it's a possible solution to a coordination problem, i.e., a possible convention. Why it's this signifier rather than another is usually a matter of chance, of history.

She seemed to be interacting with her environment to be sure, but that is not langauge. — Hanover

I still think there's a divide here.

If you look at formal approaches to language -- Frege, Tarski, Montague, that sort of thing -- language is a system for representing your environment. That could, conceivably, be just for you. A language of thought.

And it is only because you can put the world, or some part of it, into language, that it is useful for communication. When you communicate, you put part of the world into words (or claim to) and pass those words to someone else. Language as descriptor of the world underlies language as means of communication.

I happen to think that's wrong, for various reasons, but I think it's a fairly common view, maybe more common among philosophers but maybe not.

The structuralist approach is to see the signifiers as forming a system, the whole group of them, and what's important is just that they can be and are distinguished from each other, a "system of differences" . — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, understood. I suppose I am seeing the essence of language as bound up with communication, not distinct signifiers. Distinct signifiers obviously aid communication, but a single signifier can still do the job, and is the basis of a multiplicity of signifiers. (Though I realize there will be disagreements about the primacy of multiplicity.)

On the typical road maps I look at, towns and cities are indicated by circles, filled circles of different sizes and stars (for capitals). — Srap Tasmaner

Sure - I thought that by "cartographic" you were referring back to your symbols of Mt. Rushmore and the Eiffel Tower.

If you look at formal approaches to language -- Frege, Tarski, Montague, that sort of thing -- language is a system for representing your environment. That could, conceivably, be just for you. A language of thought.

And it is only because you can put the world, or some part of it, into language, that it is useful for communication. When you communicate, you put part of the world into words (or claim to) and pass those words to someone else. Language as descriptor of the world underlies language as means of communication. — Srap Tasmaner

I think there is a third option, where language is bound up with thought. On this view one could develop a private language and, say, keep a diary in that language and thus in some sense "communicate" with their future self. "Representing your environment" is not quite the same as thinking. Or as Williams says:

One way of telling the story of Western philosophy over the last few centuries is to present it as the rise and fall of a particular view of language. Gradually, piecemeal, the idea of language as primarily a matter of accurate naming and information-sharing has yielded to a recognition of language as what we could call a matter of orienting ourselves in our world—developing a range of diverse strategies for collaboration in finding our way around. The more complex the world we encounter (in introspection as well as observation), the more diverse and sophisticated will be those strategies, and the less they will have to do with carving up our environment into bite-sized pieces with definitive labels. Whatever a still over-con dent popular scientism claims, coping adequately and sustainably with our environment requires more than a catalog of isolated substances with fixed attributes. — Rowan Williams, Romantic Agenda

There are so many interesting things you could describe about stimming routines. eg Baggs is pitch matching background noises with humming, but is a nonspeaking autist, why? What's the phenomenology there? What's the expressivity?

Calling it a language with a spoken component (the humming) when it's produced by someone who as a premise of the video cannot communicate in spoken language is hopelessly reductive and easily refutable. And for the purpose of normalising autism no less. — fdrake

@joshs Curious what your take on all this is given you posted it with a provocative question.

All perception is conceptual. This means that we don’t hear acoustic frequencies, we hear the train whistle. Furthermore the meaning of that train whistle is linked to its relevance within a larger mesh of involvements that define our interests in a given context of purposeful activity. The whistle signifies for us, it is significant, meaningful only in relation to our larger concerns. We are used to thinking of language as communication with other persons. Of course, we also use language to communicate with ourselves And there are many kinds of languages we can use, such as music , visual art, dance, etc. An autistic can create a sort of art by interacting with the physical surroundings and with their body, producing sensations that they sculpt into intricate patterns by which they communicate with themselves. It s a language of thought using sensation rather than verbals symbols.

It s a language of thought using sensation rather than verbals symbols. — Joshs

Were you meaning to construe the sensations as symbols?

Were you meaning to construe the sensations as symbols? — fdrake

If I recognize a visual pattern as a a unitary object of some sort , I am construing it conceptually. Does this mean that the elements of the image are symbols referring to the recognized meaning? Not exactly. I don’t think they refer so much as enact. I think the same is true of words.

Interesting. Thanks.

Not exactly. I don’t think they refer so much as enact. — Joshs

What do the sensations enact?