I'm trying to get at your reasoning here. — Harry Hindu
For you, who else? — Harry Hindu
If my description does not resemble what it is like for you, then please explain what it is like for you. — Harry Hindu
Only in distinguishing between the world and your experience do you become a realist and at the same time an indirect realist as the experience is not the same thing as the world. — Harry Hindu
For my philosophical purposes, I'm more interested in abstract Cosmic Potential than in concrete battery potential. A physical form of cosmic potential is Energy, in all its aspects*1 . But the universe has enormous abstract potential that is not-yet-actual. One example is the hypothetical Vacuum Energy. Potential energy is just knowledge of a possible future state.Our difference centers on whether or not a potential current embodied within a charged battery is physical whereas a potential current embodied within the mind's memory is abstract. In both cases the potential is tied to something physical: a) the charged battery and its difference of potential; b) the mind's memory and the difference of potential it represents abstractly. — ucarr
Potential exists only in our minds. Potential is Ideal, not Real. Potential is knowledge in a mind, not a material substance or physical force. Not-yet-real is also an idea in a mind, consisting of knowledge of a possible future state given specified conditions*1.How does saying that potential is not-yet-real differ from saying it doesn't exist? . . . . there is no such thing except within our minds — Harry Hindu
Likewise, when we experience seeing red, it's because that specific wavelength stands in contrast to other wavelengths of visible light. Therefore, within the neuronal circuits of the brain wherein we interpret the specific wavelength for red, there's nothing therein that's red because the relativistic effect that supports our experience of red exists within the context of the visual field of our eyes, not within the neuronal circuits of the visual cortex of our brain. — ucarr
But we can imagine and dream of red things. So it seems to me that the color red is the form visual information takes and stored as such for future use in making predictions about the world. For us to be able to apply what we predict to the world, our predictions need to be similar to what we attempting to realize in the world, or else how could we apply new ideas to the world? — Harry Hindu
Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what? — Harry Hindu
Okay but you can only access the code via a GUI. I can only access your neurons via my GUI. Your neurons and the code appear in my GUI as visual representations of what is "out there". The neurons and the code do not exist as represented by the GUI. As you said, the GUI is a representation, and not the neurons and code as it actually is. So maybe terms like, "neurons" and "code" are representations of how they appear in the GUI and not how they are in the world, and how they are in the world is simply information or process and we are confusing the map (GUI) with the territory. — Harry Hindu
However, there's a feeling in what it's like to see the cat, which is comparable with a feeling of what it's like to see the cat-picture. There's also a feeling in what it's like to imagine a cat. You can compare your feelings (via memories), and judge resemblances between them. — jkop
Correct. And that "whatever" is DNA. DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.So, similarly, I'm guessing that consciousness will turn out to be a property of living organisms exclusively. Why? Because whatever it is that makes an entity alive is going to be turn out to be what makes it consciousness. — J
you want to stipulate a meaning for "resemblance" that makes physical visibility more important as a criterion. I guess you can do that, but I think we need 1) an explanation for how the ordinary-language use became so common, and 2) a good argument for why this notion of "resemblance" is useful or clarificatory, in this context. What are you trying to ameliorate, with this usage? — J
there can be resemblance between two states of affairs such as seeing things and thinking about things. — jkop
I think that "view" is the wrong way to look at this. The central executive in a computer does not view the data it is working with. The data simply exists in memory and is manipulated in real-time by the central executive. What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. From our perspective it takes the form of silicon circuits, computer code and logic gates. From others' perspective the data in your working memory takes the form of neurons and the chemical and electrical signals between them. But from our own minds, we do not experience neurons and their chemical and electrical signals. We experience colors, shapes, sounds, etc. of which others' working memory is composed of. From our own perspective, our own working memory takes the form of colors, shapes, etc. and it is only by observing others' working memories that we experience something different. So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes?Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what?
— Harry Hindu
Viewed by the brain that constructs the simulation of the world within the visual field of the eyes. — ucarr
There just isn't any reason to make the visible/invisible comparison central to resemblance. — J
Your visible/invisible distinction seems irrelevant, at least for the one imagining the cat. — Luke
It makes little difference whether you reduce all seeings and imaginings to "feelings", or whether you call it a comparison between a seen cat and an imagined cat. — Luke
There just isn't any reason to make the visible/invisible comparison central to resemblance.
— J
I didn't. — jkop
A resemblance-relation requires at least two objects which can resemble each other. Granted that all objects resemble each other in the abstract sense of being objects, but how can anything invisible resemble something visible?
My point is that they can't, unless you somehow make both visible. — jkop
Our discussions about Consciousness have branched off into questions about "Potential" : what is it? In the quote*1 below, the postulated pre-existent "nothingness" consists of noumenal (ideal) Causal Laws*2 whose effects are what we call "real". Those pre-big-bang Laws & Energy may be what Aristotle postulated as Potential, and what Schopenhauer called WILL*3. :smile:How does saying that potential is not-yet-real differ from saying it doesn't exist? In your example, it seems that you are simply saying that potential is simply the current state of an electric battery before being connected to a system to supply it with energy. Some batteries are never connected to a system so it would be incorrect to say that they have the potential to do anything. It is our ignorance of what the future holds for the battery that makes us think of "potentials" and "possibilities" when, in a deterministic universe, there is no such thing except within our minds. — Harry Hindu
The central executive in a computer does not view the data it is working with. The data simply exists in memory and is manipulated in real-time by the central executive. — Harry Hindu
What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. — Harry Hindu
From our perspective it takes the form of silicon circuits, computer code and logic gates. From others' perspective the data in your working memory takes the form of neurons and the chemical and electrical signals between them. But from our own minds, we do not experience neurons and their chemical and electrical signals. We experience colors, shapes, sounds, etc. of which others' working memory is composed of. From our own perspective, our own working memory takes the form of colors, shapes, etc. and it is only by observing others' working memories that we experience something different. So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes? — Harry Hindu
What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. — Harry Hindu
So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes? — Harry Hindu
Surely that makes visibility "central to resemblance" -- indeed, it sounds like the criterion for it ("you can't, unless . . ."). — J
The invisible and visible can't resemble each other unless we make both visible. — jkop
Your visible/invisible distinction seems irrelevant, at least for the one imagining the cat.
— Luke
A cartoonist who imagines a fictional cat might find it relevant to also see visible cats. — jkop
In the sense that an imagination is invisible and a cat is visible, they can't be compared, — jkop
Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat. — jkop
Many forms of dualism are fallacies of ambiguity. — jkop
A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop
So perhaps the hard problem of consciousness is a fallacy of ambiguity? — jkop
Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat.
— jkop
Do you claim a cat seen via the virtual viewing of imagination is no less physico_material than a cat seen via the optics of the eyes? — ucarr
Language open to more than one interpretation falsely suggests two objective and parallel modes of being? — ucarr
A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity.
— jkop
I see the redundancy; I don't see the ambiguity. — ucarr
You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature? — ucarr
When you imagine a cat, however, there is no relation between the experience and a cat (neither physical nor mental cat). What you are experiencing then is your own creative use of memories and beliefs with the intent to figure out (by what it feels like) what the cat is like. — jkop
The visible properties of the cat fix what it's like for you to experience the cat. Your use of memories and beliefs about cats fix what it's like for you imagine the cat. — jkop
A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop
You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature? — ucarr
Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism. — jkop
As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. Separately or somehow coalesced. I find the dualism implausible and redundant. I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like. — jkop
Photons bounce off of something > hit a photon detecting device > the device responds by sending a signal to an information processing and storage unit.Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism.
As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. — jkop
What is the cat like when it is not being seen?I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like. — jkop
the subjective experience of knowing one is seeing things in the world, including knowing one is seeing oneself. — ucarr
What is the cat like when it is not being seen? — Patterner
...the subjective experience of knowing one is seeing things in the world, including knowing one is seeing oneself. — ucarr
That's several different experiences and objects stacked on top of each other. — jkop
What could that be like? — jkop
What is the cat like when it is not being seen? — Patterner
I would say the brain is more like the actual computer with a CPU, working memory and long-term memory, not just a CPU. Each part is necessary and cannot function without the other parts.If by central executive you mean CPU (central processing unit), then I say it's not an unreasonable stretch to construe "processing" as "views." In each case -- the CPU in one and the brain in the other -- a processor processes data in the act of constructing a world view. Furthermore, the brain also manipulates data that simply exists in memory. When you imagine or dream of the experience of seeing red, that's an example of your brain manipulating data that simply exists in memory. — ucarr
I'm not asking which one is real. I'm simply asking what form does the contents in any type of working memory take. We seem to have a problem with how we experience other's working memory compared to how we experience our own working memory. If it is simply a matter of perspective - of BEING your working memory as opposed to representing the working memory of others because it would be impossible to BE others' working memory so your only option is to represent it, then that is ok.
I guess you want to go from:
What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here.
— Harry Hindu
to:
So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes?
— Harry Hindu
I guess the passage is intended to be a narrative that elaborates two or more forms of "working memory."
Also, I guess you believe one form is real and the other not. — ucarr
I would say the brain is more like the actual computer with a CPU, working memory and long-term memory, not just a CPU. Each part is necessary and cannot function without the other parts. — Harry Hindu
I would distinguish between "processing" and "views" as a view being a type of processing where the information being processed is about the world relative to the one processing the information. This is why the world appears and sounds to be located relative to your eyes and ears and that all of our sensory perceptions are about the world relative to our locating in space-time. — Harry Hindu
We seem to have a problem with how we experience other's working memory compared to how we experience our own working memory. — Harry Hindu
I'm not asking which one is real. I'm simply asking what form does the contents in any type of working memory take... If it is simply a matter of perspective - of BEING your working memory as opposed to representing the working memory of others because it would be impossible to BE others' working memory so your only option is to represent it, then that is ok. — Harry Hindu
Let's use you as an example. If I see you, would you say my experience of you is like what you are like?I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like.
— jkop
What is the cat like when it is not being seen?
— Patterner
More or less like it is when it is seen (disregarding Schrödinger's cat). :smile: — jkop
If I see you, would you say my experience of you is like what you are like? — Patterner
I think I am missing every important quality/aspect of what you are like when I experience you. — Patterner
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