My own existence is certainly a fact - cogito ergo sum - but not of the kind that was mooted in the post I was responding to. After all, even Descartes himself noted that the existence of the world might be a spell cast by an evil daemon.

//I suppose to expand on that a bit, I find @Relativist’s defense of physicalism is very much grounded in the ‘Cartesian division’ typical of modern physicalism generally.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. (Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, pp. 35-36)

And another:

The scientific revolution took its impulse from what the philosopher Bernard Williams called the Absolute Conception of Reality. This is a conception of the world as "it really is" entirely apart from how it appears to us: a colorless, odorless value-free domain of particles and complexes moving in accordance with timeless and immutable mathematical laws. The world so conceived has no place for mind in it. No intention. No purpose. If there is mind — and of course the great scientific revolutionaries such as Descartes and Newton would not deny that there is mind — it exists apart from and unconnected to* the material world as this was conceived of by the New Science.

If modern science begins by shaping a conception of the cosmos, its subject matter, in such a way as to exclude mind and life, then it shouldn't come as a surprise that we can't seem to find a place for them in the natural order so conceived. — Alva Noe, Review of Mind and Cosmos, quoted by Edward Feser

*while being explainable in terms of

My own existence is certainly a fact - cogito ergo sum - but not of the kind that was mooted in the post I was responding to. After all, even Descartes himself noted that the existence of the world might be a spell cast by an evil daemon. — Wayfarer

Yep. I had in mind that for those who argue that "all is consciousness" this is amounts to a brute fact - they'd be claiming that consciousness is the foundational reality, beyond which there are no further explanations—it's simply taken as given. I would think that Kastrup, amongst today's more prominent idealists, might argue along these lines. But I think the term 'brute fact' is a bit on the nose and so people seem to talk more about the primacy of consciousness.

I like this thread because it brings up a lot of philosophical questions, rather than scientific questions -- a common problem when physicalism is the topic.

But then, to avoid hypocrisy, the door should be open to alternative metaphysical commitments that don’t have any direct bearing on the conducting of the scientific method, no? — Baden

I suppose I am advocating for a kind of radical agnosticism as to the ultimate nature of things — Baden

The ultimate nature of things had already been announced way back when the pre-socratics didn't have the scientific method, let alone physics yet. The universe, according to them, is made up of "stuff" (What stuff is, is not important at the moment. We just want to point out that they, too, saw reality as physical). So, the humans' recorded conception of the world predates any scientific method.

But first, I will segue here and talk about the reason why the scientists (I mean scientists, not philosophers) do not have a well-defined explanation of how memories formed in the brain is because they discovered that the human brain is much more complex than previously thought when it comes to determining where exactly the memories are stored. We don't store complete images or stories in the brain. When we try to remember something that happened in the past, it's the network systems that get activated and neurons talk to each other by sending signals in the form of electrical pulses (not to be confused with electricity) and chemicals. These are encoded signals, as they explained, during our experiencing. The formal name for this process is synaptic plasticity.

Going back to the metaphysical view of physicalism, it is necessary that we have to resort to an explanation of how our experiences get stored in the brain. The 'subjective' experiences that we refer to is at the heart of the hard question of philosophy, after all. Because it is here where we assign the place of the consciousness. Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses. The differences in our recollection and our feelings (differences, therefore we say they are subjective) are due to the fact that our brain cells are not pre-mapped so that everyone who eats an apple would have in their brain the same exact set of neurons talking to each other. I could be missing a taste bud for sweets, for example, or tartness. I could be deficient in some vitamins, for example.

So, the point I was trying to make is, there really isn't a gap between the subjective and the material component of our experiences. The million pulses that have to happen in order to retrieve an image of an apple or a tree is not magic. It's just misunderstood, I think. Our consciousness of the world is in the form of a picture or story, but that's not how our brain stored it.

they'd be claiming that consciousness is the foundational reality, beyond which there are no further explanations—it's simply taken as given — Tom Storm

Still can't go past Schopenhauer:

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is.

It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility—that is knowledge—which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality.

Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only 'the subject that perceives matter'; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.

Thus the tremendous petitio principii (=begged question) reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, is empirically given—that is to say, is substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.

Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction).

But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained.

To the assertion that 'thought is a modification of matter' we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that 'all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject' - as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism. The recognition here of the obvious impossibility of such a system establishes another truth ...the truth that all science properly so called, by which I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach its final goal, nor give a complete and adequate explanation: for it is not concerned with the inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea; indeed, it really teaches nothing more than the relation of one idea to another.

It's well set out. I wonder how translations vary with him.

Usually many less paragraph breaks, which I added. But his prose on the whole is very lucid.

Are laws of nature natural? They’re never actually observed, only their effects can be discerned by measurement and observation. But the question why nature is lawful or what natural laws comprise, is not itself a question that naturalism has answers for. Naturalism assumes an order in nature, but it doesn’t explain it, nor does it need to explain it. That, I suppose, is what you’re getting at by saying that the existence of the world is ‘brute fact’ - which effectively forecloses any attempt to understand why things are the way they are, whether they are as they seem, and so on.

Well the Physics is a study of phúsis, "natures," by which things do what they do and are what they are. I think it's only a particular sort of naturalism that dispenses with natures.

On the one hand you have the tyranny of efficient causation, on the other atomism, which justifies that former, and on a third hand(!) you have representationalism which says that one cannot explain nature in terms of intelligible natures because the intelligibility of things must (axiomatically) by the constructions of minds, not intrinsic features of the things in question.

Yep. I had in mind that for those who argue that "all is consciousness" this is amounts to a brute fact -

It could be framed thus, but it need not be. Hegelianism has no brute facts for instance. Arguably, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a hallmark of many systems, seems to rule out brute facts.

Or as Kenneth Gallagher puts the metaphysical notion of causation: "that the order of becoming and existence must be intelligible; that no phase of the process of contingent existence is intelligible in itself; and that therefore contingent existence is always relative existence, essentially referred, qua existing to another.”

But yes, on the view that the universe is just "mental substance," as opposed to "physical substance," and where the "laws of nature," the "initial conditions of the universe," and the universes spontaneous generation are all inexplicable bare facts, the two would essentially be the same.

Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses.

On that view, wouldn't flight also not be a thing, since it is just "cells in wings responding to chemical signals." The same for "running," or "life" itself (and so also for each instance of living things?) Yet, since we have already successfully mastered heavier than air flight, we know that the principles of flight were not to be found in studying the organelles of cells in the wings of all flying animals, nor in their DNA, etc. (at least not most easily). Indeed, one can build a flying machine while being largely ignorant of the biology of flying animals so long as one understands the principles of lift, etc. that all those animals physiology takes advantage of. The same seems true of running and swimming, or even language production, and perhaps it is even so for conciousness.

I suppose we could define conciousness as a process and not a thing. But it seems to be a process carried out by and possessed by a thing. Of course, one could argue that life is also just a process, and living just an action, akin to running or swimming. Yet then this "processification" would seem to follow for all contingent being(s) since everything is always changing and only has the properties we attribute to it because of how it interacts with everything else.

But then we are at risk of dissolving all things and having only a single universal process. IMO, the solution here is to realize that things (substances) have relative degrees of unity. Break a rock in half and you have two rocks. Break a cat in half and one no longer has a live cat. Some things work to organize themselves and maintain their form, and these have a higher degree of unity. On this view, a unifying reflective self-awareness would be the highest measure of unity and thus thing-hood.

Also, physics seems to show us there are no truly isolated systems, and that energy, cause, information, etc. flow across the boundaries of discrete things as if they didn't exist. This being so, it would seem all there is is the frenetic seething of a few quantum fields (and perhaps even these might be unified eventually, as the electro-weak force, and we'd have just one thing). But then it seems that conciousness is the wellspring of all multiplicity and discrete identity, in which case, the mind seems to be the thingiest thing! The very principle of thinghood!

The million pulses that have to happen in order to retrieve an image of an apple or a tree is not magic.

Well, this is a problem in the literature on conciousness. Very few people state that the answer to the problem of understanding consciousness is that it is "magic." Yet I see no shortage of writers on this topic dragging out the battered corpse of Descartes fairly magical theory of substance dualism as the counter example that must be refuted to prove their own case (e.g., I just reread the Moral Landscape and Harris seems to think refuting the thought of a controversial thinker from the 1600s is the gold standard for supporting one's arguments).

In my reading, it seems that objections to physicalist theories of mind tend to largely center on the appeal to the physical being used to drag along other suppositions, e.g. a sort of reductionism (synapses for instance don't sustain conciousness on their own, nor do whole brains for that matter, or even heads removed from their bodies). For instance, Jaworski's survey text and the Routledge Contemporary Introduction introduce hylomorphism as a competitor to physicalism, but those theories certainly do not deny the connection between the mind and the body, neither does occasionalism for that matter.

Occasionalism is particularly interesting because representationalist versions of physicalism seem to undermine the case for rejecting it.

Arguably, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a hallmark of many systems, seems to rule out brute facts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't the 'brute fact' at the end of this one a necessary being or a circularity? Is this an idea you believe has merit?

"that the order of becoming and existence must be intelligible; that no phase of the process of contingent existence is intelligible in itself; and that therefore contingent existence is always relative existence, essentially referred, qua existing to another.” — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know what this means. I wonder if meaning and reason are human constructions or frameworks, how can we know that they are a part of 'reality' - whatever that might be.

Are laws of nature natural? They’re never actually observed, only their effects can be discerned by measurement and observation. But the question why nature is lawful or what natural laws comprise, is not itself a question that naturalism has answers for. Naturalism assumes an order in nature, but it doesn’t explain it, nor does it need to explain it. That, I suppose, is what you’re getting at by saying that the existence of the world is ‘brute fact’ - which effectively forecloses any attempt to understand why things are the way they are, whether they are as they seem, and so on. — Wayfarer

I am representing David Armstrong's metaphysics, which I believe is the most comprehensive physicalist metaphysics out there.

"Are laws of nature natural? "
Yes. If they weren't, then all forms of naturalism would be false.

"Naturalism assumes an order in nature, but it doesn’t explain it, nor does it need to explain it."
The order in nature needs to be accounted for- and this theory does account for them: as relations between universals*. This portion of the theory is called "law realism" (Law realism was independently proposed by Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa). Universals*, and the relations between them, are indeed part of the physical world. This as axiomatic to Armstrong's metaphysical system, but it's
(arguably) the best explanation for what we observe and measure.

"Why is nature lawful?" That's easy: it's because laws of nature exist, and a law is a necessitation (i.e. an effect follows necessarily, not contingently). If you're asking, "why do laws of nature exist?" It's brute fact that they exist: it happens to be the way the world is.
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* A universal is anything that exists in multiple instantiations. Examples: proton and electron are universals. The attractive force between them is a relation between these universals.

This just strikes me as mapping the common presuppositions of physicalism onto "what a complete metaphysical theory should be." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course. But What's wrong with that?

It seems to presuppose the subject - object dualism that a great deal of 20th and 21st century explicitly targets as the cardinal sin of early modern philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What makes you think that? I'm referring to David Armstrong's ontology- which accounts for everything that (unarguaby) objectively exists.

Such a definition surely defines subjective idealism out of contention from the get-go, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes and no. Subjective idealism is not consistent with physicalism, and vice versa. What is in contention are complete metaphysical systems, and we can each judge which system a a better, or more compelling, description of reality.

But of course, probably the number one critique of (mainstream representationalist) physicalism is precisely that it axiomatically assumes an unresolvable dualism that makes skepticism insurmountable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Please elaborate. I don't see how any sort of dualism fits into physicalism.

Ha! Isn't 'the observing subject who stipulates the axioms upon which it rests' another brute fact? — Tom Storm

No, because "observing subjects" are objects that exist as a consequence of the way the world is and the specific history that it has.

"Are laws of nature natural? "
Yes. If they weren't, then all forms of naturalism would be false. — Relativist

Not necessarily. They could be regularities which serve a descriptive, but not regulative, purpose. The idea that laws necessitate outcomes may presuppose more than physicalism can account for, as it implies a causal force binding outcomes beyond regularities. And the nature of the causation here is far from obvious.

Even if 'scientific laws' appear to be validated through observation, what is observed are instances or effects of them, not the laws themselves. For instance, we observe gravitational effects, but we don’t directly observe gravity, and the nature of gravity and electromagnetic fields is still an open question. I suppose a framework like Armstrong's can simply appropriate these as they come along, but that then falls victim to Hempel's dilemma e.g. definitions of 'physical' can be updated on an ad hoc basis as required, which dilutes their explanatory power.

All of this raises questions of whether universals in Armstrong’s view are really properties of physical systems or whether they reflect underlying, non-empirical constraints that dictate these regularities. If they are something like "necessitating forces," then Armstrong’s physicalism has to account for how these forces exist as part of the physical domain, especially if they are not physical objects themselves.

Furthermore appealing to the entities of sub-atomic physics presents difficulties for Armstrong's style of physicalism. This is because whether such entities are truly objective is still an unresolved question, subject of ongoing debates in philosophy of science. I don't know if Armstrong ever touches on the thorny question of interpretation in quantum physics, but I'm not sure it would support his overall approach.

"observing subjects" are objects that exist as a consequence of the way the world is and the specific history that it has. — Relativist

"observing subjects" are only 'objects' to other observing subjects who, it is hoped, will be sufficiently perceptive to recognise them as subjects, rather than regarding them as objects.

When Armstrong refers to "laws of nature", he's not pointing to scientific theories and equations in textbooks. He's referring to something ontological. Physics may approximate the law, or describe it in terms meaningful to us, but those descriptions and equations are not the law. The law is the physical relations that exist between (or among) types of things (a type of thing is a universal).

So when I said that laws of nature are necessarily natural, if naturalism is true, I was specifically referring to laws as something ontological, not descriptive.

Furthermore appealing to the entities of sub-atomic physics presents difficulties for Armstrong's style of physicalism. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. The standard model of particles physics is trivially consistent with his "states of affairs". The essential element of his ontology is that every thing that exists is a state of affairs (a particular with its attached properties and relations). Even quantum fields, or strings, fit this framework.

. I don't know if Armstrong ever touches on the thorny question of interpretation in quantum physics, but I'm not sure it would support his overall approach. — Wayfarer

He's agnostic to interpretations of QM, but I doubt there's an interpretation that isn't consistent with his model. Armstrong defers such matters to physicists.

observing subjects" are only 'objects' to other observing subjects who, it is hoped, will be sufficiently perceptive to recognise them as subjects, rather than regarding them as objects. — Wayfarer

From an Armstrong perspective, this is semantics, not ontology.

When Armstrong refers to "laws of nature", he's not pointing to scientific theories and equations in textbooks. He's referring to something ontological. Physics may approximate the law, or describe it in terms meaningful to us, but those descriptions and equations are not the law. The law is the physical relations that exist between (or among) types of things (a type of thing is a universal).

So when I said that laws of nature are necessarily natural, if naturalism is true, I was specifically referring to laws as something ontological, not descriptive. — Relativist

But if they're not the laws described by physics, then in what sense are those relations physical? What about the relationship between sign and interpreter? I question that declaring everything to be physical, without any reference to physics itself, is even meaningful.

The essential element of his ontology is that every thing that exists is a state of affairs (a particular with its attached properties and relations). Even quantum fields, or strings, fit this framework. — Relativist

But that is not true. Scientific realists, including Sir Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein, both criticize quantum physics precisely on the grounds that they provide no description of specification of what the 'state of affairs' of a quantum system is, prior to it being measured. This is why they both insist that quantum physics must be in some sense incomplete. Yet it has withstood every test that has been set for it. (I've published a Medium essay on this topic.)

But if they're not the laws described by physics, then in what sense are those relations physical? — Wayfarer

I'll try to explain with an example.

Consider two specific electrons in close proximity. They each have a -1 electric charge, which results in there existing a repulsive force between them. This force is a physical relation between these two specfic electrons.

The electron is a universal- all individual electrons have the exact same set of intrinsic properties. Similarly, any pair of electrons in the same proximity to each other will necessarily have the exact same repulsive force between them - the physical relation. This is what it means to be a law (under Armstrong's account): the physical relation necessarily exists in the instantiations of the universals. He describes this as a relation between the universal: electron-electron.

I question that declaring everything to be physical, without any reference to physics itself, is even meaningful. — Wayfarer

What Armstrong is doing is acknowledging a distinction between the actual laws of nature and the academic discipline of physics. Physicists endeavors to uncover laws of nature, and is likely correct in many cases, but ontology is not dependent on them getting everything exactly correct. Isaac Newton's theory of gravitation seemed to be a law of nature for quite a long time, but in fact - it had an error, one that was corrected by Einstein's theory. The law of nature didn't change, but the law of physics did change.

But that is not true. Scientific realists, including Sir Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein, both criticize quantum physics precisely on the grounds that they provide no description of specification of what the 'state of affairs' of a quantum system is, prior to it being measured. This is why they both insist that quantum physics must be in some sense incomplete. Yet it has withstood every test that has been set for it. (I've published a Medium essay on this topic.) — Wayfarer

The state of affairs of a quantum system is perfectly describable as a Schroedinger equation. In that respect, the quantum system evolves in a strictly deterministic way over time. A state of affairs exists at each temporal point of its evolution, and a relation exists between any two such temporal points. This is the case under all interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Where so-called indeterminism comes in is when we consider interactions between a quantum system and the classical world. An interaction results in a physical collapse of the wave function. Repeated measurements (each measurement is such an interaction) will produce a range of results corresponding to a probability distribution. Armstrong describes this as "probabilistic determinism": the "law" results in an interaction measurement that fits this probability distribution. So Armstrong's model fits.

It could be that the world is strictly deterministic. One way it could be strictly deterministic is if the actual world is a quantum system and so-called interactions result in "world-branching" such that all possibilities are actualized (a "many worlds interpretation"). Not a problem for Armstrong. It could be deterministic is if there is a "pilot wave" of the universe, or if there are othewise some remote, hidden variables that results in a specific outcome when the wave function collapses. Again, none are a problem for Armstrong's model.

There are many interpretations of QM, and a scientific realist could embrace any specific interpretation based on their own analyses of the physics, and they could still account for it in Armstrong's model. Armstrong is careful to avoid making scientific judgements, while also endeavoring to fit everything we do know about the physics.

Thanks for taking the time! Just for clarity, I will be upfront about my attitude towards Armstrong. When I enrolled at University (decades ago now), he was the Professor of Traditional Philosophy. I never studied under him, but I was aware that his magnum opus was 'Materialist Theory of MInd'. My quest was of a somewhat spiritual nature ('spiritual' is actually not a very good description of my interests, but there are not many alternatives in the current lexicon.) In any case, I identified scientific and philosophical materialism as the opponent, a philosophy that essentially devalued and misunderstood something fundamental about human existence. I've always argued against materialist theory of mind and have devoted time to reading and debating David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel and Bernardo Kastrup, notable critics of it. So that's where I'm coming from.

What Armstrong is doing is acknowledging a distinction between the actual laws of nature and the academic discipline of physics. Physicists endeavors to uncover laws of nature, and is likely correct in many cases, but ontology is not dependent on them getting everything exactly correct. Isaac Newton's theory of gravitation seemed to be a law of nature for quite a long time, but in fact - it had an error, one that was corrected by Einstein's theory. The law of nature didn't change, but the law of physics did change. — Relativist

But first, what we know of the 'laws of nature' is customarily understood to be the province of natural philosophy (precursor of today's science). So what 'actual laws of nature' there are, would be in science's court.

Secondly, whether there *are* 'laws of nature' is nowadays contested. See for interest Nancy Cartwright No God, No Laws, where 'laws' can be understood as being prescriptive and determinative of what exists in nature. She argues without them being underwritten by God, then they lack the capacity to 'make things happen' (hence the title. I don't particularly want to pursue that line of argument but it has Armstrong's conception of 'law' in its sights. Nowadays it is common to encounter opinions that the concept of natural or scientific law is obsolete, although I don't agree with that, either.)

And third, if Armstrong’s metaphysics is founded on the idea of scientific laws as real and necessary features of the world, then one would expect it to appeal to scientifically established theories. Yet by not “being bound by actual physics,” Armstrong’s conception of laws becomes somewhat abstracted from the very empirical framework that supposedly substantiates it. In a way, he’s attempting to have it both ways: appealing to the supposed authority of scientific realism to bolster his metaphysical position while remaining unanchored from science’s provisional and revisable nature (see also Hempel's Dilemma.)

About ontology - strictly speaking, it is 'the study of the nature of being'. 'Ontology' has uses in current English, for example in information technology, where it refers to the inventory of types of system in a network. But the original meaning was the study of the nature of being (derived from the Greek verb for 'to be'). I've had many a debate here about the implications of this term, because I seek to make a distinction between the 'nature of being' and 'the analysis of what exists'*. The former is nowadays associated with phenomenology and existentialism, while the latter is firmly in the province of the natural sciences. Armstrong would of course claim that the former can be reduced to the latter, which is a foundational move of scientific materialism.

The state of affairs of a quantum system is perfectly describable as a Schroedinger equation. In that respect, the quantum system evolves in a strictly deterministic way over time. — Relativist

You wonder why, then, Schrödinger published his notorious thought-experiment on the not-dead-or-alive cat. He sought to illustrate the fundamental indeterminacy that characterises the so-called 'fundamental particles' of physics by providing a hypothetical example of their absurd implications were they to manifest on the level of everyday experience. The fact that the equation is accurate is not at issue, as it is firmly established that the accuracy of the predictions of quantum mechanics exceeds anything previously discovered in history. It's what they say, or don't say, about the so-called fundamental constituents of reality that is the philosophical point at issue. In other words, it's the ontological implications that are at issue, not the practical effectiveness. The fact that Armstrong can blithely wave these away says something about his theories, in my view.
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*Regarding the distinction between the nature of being and the study of what exists, one of my opponents linked an apparently-classic article Charles Kahn 'The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Meaning of Being' which unfortunately for him tended to favour my side of the argument.

And third, if Armstrong’s metaphysics is founded on the idea of scientific laws as real and necessary features of the world, then one would expect it to appeal to scientifically established theories. — Wayfarer

Armstrong appeals to scientifically established theory as justification for his hypothesis that there are actually laws of nature, and he does agree that it is in science's court to determine what the laws are, but science makes mistakes - the laws of textbook physics may very well change over time. Let's assume General Relativity is 100% true - if so, it is a law of nature that was also true during Newton's time. The same thing could happen with other laws of textbook physics - so if his system were tied to current physics, his metaphysics would be falsified as soon some current law is falsified.

Sure, Armstrong's physicalist metaphysics could be wrong (perhaps the mind isn't physical, or perhaps there are no actual laws of nature), but the same is true of any metaphysical system that has been, or ever will be, proposed. My primary points are that his system appears to me to be the best physicalist system available, and that consequently, when we're discussing physicalism (as some of us have done in this thread) - it's appropriate to bring up his system. I believe it's coherent and that it accounts for most things in the world quite well.

You wonder why, then, Schrödinger published his notorious thought-experiment on the not-dead-or-alive cat. He sought to illustrate the fundamental indeterminacy that characterises the so-called 'fundamental particles' of physics by providing a hypothetical example of their absurd implications were they to manifest on the level of everyday experience. The fact that the equation is accurate is not at issue, as it is firmly established that the accuracy of the predictions of quantum mechanics exceeds anything previously discovered in history. It's what they say, or don't say, about the so-called fundamental constituents of reality that is the philosophical point at issue. In other words, it's the ontological implications that are at issue, not the practical effectiveness. The fact that Armstrong can blithely wave these away says something about his theories, in my view. — Wayfarer

Each interpretation of quantum mechanics corresponds to a hypothesis about the an important aspect of reality. It's interesting to discuss these, and their implications (as did Schroedinger), but I don't see any reason to hold this against Armstrong. If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them. So I really don't understand why you'd hold this against him. If one were to embrace his more generalized theory, it wouldn't preclude augmenting it with his favorite ontological basis for QM.

I'm not completely committed to Armstrong's theory, and I also don't think anyone ought to commit to any particular theory - because they are untestable. But in my opinion, physicalism is an appropriate starting point - because it's pretty clear that the physical world actually exists, and I also agree with Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa that there are laws of nature in the world and these are a better account of causality than the alternatives I'm aware of.

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. The struggles don't seem fatal. Non-physical theories of mind also have issues. But as far as I'm concerned, this is the area where the most interesting discussions are.

I would disagree about which work is Armstrong's magnum opus. His life's work was his comprehensive metaphysical system, so I'd vote for "Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics", which outlines his comprehensive system, as does his earlier "A World of States of Affairs". Both of these books subsume his theory of mind and most of his other various writings. It's rare for a philosopher to be as comprehensive as he was.

Armstrong's physicalist metaphysics could be wrong (perhaps the mind isn't physical, or perhaps there are no actual laws of nature), but the same is true of any metaphysical system that has been, or ever will be, proposed. — Relativist

That's not an argument, but an observation. If you're an idealist, then you believe that Armstrong's physicalist theory is wrong, and will argue accordingly. I've presented many arguments against physicalism, which I hope are persuasive. (But then, people do have their predispositions.)

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. — Relativist

I think its failure on that score is beyond reasonable doubt. The crux of that issue is logic itself, reason itself. I don't see how can there be any plausible physicalist account of the nature of reason, which inheres in the relationship of ideas, 'if-then' statements.

If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them — Relativist

Nor can philosophers then appeal to physics in support of what they describe as 'physicalism'. And if their physicalism is not supported by physics, then why does it deserve that designation.

Yes. If they weren't, then all forms of naturalism would be false.

I am not sure of this. The Physics, from which we get the term "nature" and other early forms of naturalism focus on "things acting the way they do because of what they are, i.e. because of their 'nature.'" So there are no extrinsic laws governing things and their behaviors, there is merely the natures of beings (however defined—in the Aristotlean tradition "being a being" is said primarily of organic wholes and only analogously of artifacts or accidental wholes such as rocks) and the nature of the cosmos as an ordered whole. Neither is there any chance or randomness in the sense of something being undetermined or uncaused, rather chance is the confluence of different (relatively) discrete natures acting according to their ends (Etienne Gilson's book notes how losing this conception had major consequences for understanding natural selection).

And in Hegel, we see the same denial of extrinsic laws. But it seems to me that this is now a fairly popular conception of what underpins scientific "laws"—laws are just descriptions or approximations of how things behave according to what they are. The "laws of nature" can be located squarely in ens rationis; they are an abstraction of the intellect, whereas natures are ens reale.

Of course. But What's wrong with that?

Well, in a comparison of ontologies I suppose it might be considered question begging. Or on the question of "how might physicalism best be reconceived or reformed," it also seems to include problematic presuppositions.

What makes you think that? I'm referring to David Armstrong's ontology- which accounts for everything that (unarguaby) objectively exists.

The idea that intelligibility and truth can be placed squarely into our consideration of the human mind, and not the study of being qua being.

To me, it seems fair to question if the intelligibility of the world and the beings in it can be sui generis creation of minds. Rather, might it be that minds are simply able to access this intelligibility?

Please elaborate. I don't see how any sort of dualism fits into physicalism.

Physicalism is monist, yes. But representionalism makes it so that we have to always ask "what of our understanding of the world is 'really real' and what is just the creation of the mind? Is light of such and such a color really light of such and such a wavelength? But then does color, number, and even the concept of "wave" have any correspondence to "the world in itself?"

See Tom's post above: "I don't know what this means. I wonder if meaning and reason are human constructions or frameworks, how can we know that they are a part of 'reality' - whatever that might be." But of course, if all reason, cause, quiddity, intelligibility, etc. are only on the mind side of the mind-world ledger, then we don't know anything about this "physical world" "as it really is." (See Kant on knowledge of the noumena).

This is the problem that led the anti-metaphysical movement to simply abandon any metaphysics, to claim that we simply deal with "reasoning about empirical facts," and leave off any metaphysical notion attached to the "physical."

Representationalism wed to physicalism makes it such that phenomenal awareness is mere appearance, whereas reality is the "objective," requiring a "view from nowhere." No doubt there are various solutions proposed to this problem (I have yet to see one I'd consider successful that doesn't simply abandon representationalism), but this problem has probably been the dominant issue of modern philosophy.

This is an unresolved dualism to the extent that representationalism's epistemic challenges cannot be overcome, leaving a hard dividing line between the subjective "in here" and the objective "out there," despite the system ostensibly being monist. Being is one... yet it is cleaved distinctly in two.

Isn't the 'brute fact' at the end of this one a necessary being or a circularity

Not all necessary facts are brute facts and not all circles are vicious circles.

As for merit, no one accepts "it's a brute fact, some things simply are for no reason at all," if they have any sort of a good answer. We won't accept it in the vast majority of cases, an airplane crashing, our tire being flat, the death of a relative, etc. We might not be able to figure out why these things happened, but we don't thereby assume they happened "for no reason at all."

The proffering up of brute fact claims strikes me as primarily a manifestation of the inability to acknowledge mystery. Lots of things have been said to be brute facts. The Big Bang was said to be a brute fact, yet now we have a fairly popular theory of inflation that falls prior to it and explains many observations, so the brute fact view no longer looks acceptable. The extremely low entropy of the early universe gets thrown out often as a "brute fact," but no doubt if any of the theories that attempt to actually explain it bear out, hardly anyone will bother trying to assert that it is "simply is." It's the sort of explanation that always collapses as soon as a real explanation arrives on the scene. And people have an extremely bad track record of judging what will prove "absolutely inexplicable."

I mean, what are we to do if we do accept the brute explanation, cease all inquiry?

The proffering up of brute fact claims strikes me as primarily a manifestation of the inability to acknowledge mystery. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that's the case for my claim, because I argue that reality there is a brute fact by logical necessity. Here's my reasoning:

If (1) each temporal state of the universe was caused by the temporally prior states, AND (2) the past is finite, then there is necessarily an initial, uncaused state that exists by brute fact. (A metaphysically necessary brute fact, not a contingent one).

Where's the flaw in this reasoning? How can there be a reason for an initial state? The desire for a reason is not grounds for believing there is necessarily a reason.

↪Relativist


Yes. If they [laws of nature] weren't [natural], then all forms of naturalism would be false.


I am not sure of this. The Physics, from which we get the term "nature" and other early forms of naturalism focus on "things acting the way they do because of what they are, i.e. because of their 'nature.'" So there are no extrinsic laws governing things and their behaviors, there is merely the natures of beings, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I defined "laws of nature" as extrinsic relations between universals, but intrinsic to the natural world. It indeed entails "things acting the way they do because of what they are". If there were unnatural laws of nature, then it would mean there exists something unnatural - thus falsifying naturalism.

Representationalism wed to physicalism makes it such that phenomenal awareness is mere appearance, whereas reality is the "objective," requiring a "view from nowhere." — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Mere appearance"? I'll grant that our perceptions don't necessarily reveal the world exactly as it is, but I'd argue that they do present us with a reflection of reality. It also appears to me that we are indeed able to discern many aspects of reality, both directly through our senses, and indirectly through scientific investigation. How we discern and describe this is intellectually and semantically grounded in our own nature (this is inescapable), but that doesn't make it either invalid or untrue. If you are suggesting objective reality is completely indiscernible to us if physicalism is true, I don't agree. If you mean something else, then please elucidate.

Regarding a "view from nowhere": the best available description of the fundamental layer of material reality is the standard model of particle physics. Objects are made of these particles, and each particle has a well-defined set of properties. The existence of these particles were deduced, not perceived by the faculties of our "phenomenal awareness", but over time - their existence has been confirmed through measurements in particle accelerators. So tell me in what sense is this NOT objective reality.

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. — Relativist


I think its failure on that score is beyond reasonable doubt. The crux of that issue is logic itself, reason itself. I don't see how can there be any plausible physicalist account of the nature of reason, which inheres in the relationship of ideas, 'if-then' statements. — Wayfarer

Logic is semantics, and entails meaningful relations between statements. Computers demonstrate that logic can be mechanized, so I don't understand what you see as a problem.

If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them — Relativist


Nor can philosophers then appeal to physics in support of what they describe as 'physicalism'. And if their physicalism is not supported by physics, then why does it deserve that designation. — Wayfarer

What's the problem with the way Armstrong appeals to physics? (i.e. the basis for believing there exist laws of nature).

Your objection was based on interpretations of QM - and an interpretation isn't really physics, it's metaphysics - ontology. It would be physics if it were testable and falsifiable, but by all accounts I've seen, it is neither.

:up:

Computers demonstrate that logic can be mechanized, so I don't understand what you see as a problem. — Relativist

Computers don’t come into existence de novo. They are artefacts built by humans according to human aims and purposes. In other words, whatever purposes they pursue are extrinsic.

Armstrong advocates 'central state materialism' which claims that thought contents simply are brain states - a form of brain-mind identity. But brain states have physical properties (neuron firing patterns, biochemical reactions), whereas propositional content possesses semantic properties (meaning, truth-value). I don't think physicalism can explain how semantic properties emerge from, or are identical to, these physical states without appealing to, or assuming, non-physicalist explanations of meaning. As Feser says 'Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes.' And the attempt to infer the relationship of brain states and inferential content can't proceed without relying on the very faculty that you're seeking to explain.

What's the problem with the way Armstrong appeals to physics? (i.e. the basis for believing there exist laws of nature). — Relativist

It's this:

When Armstrong refers to "laws of nature", he's not pointing to scientific theories and equations in textbooks. He's referring to something ontological. Physics may approximate the law, or describe it in terms meaningful to us, but those descriptions and equations are not the law. The law is the physical relations that exist between (or among) types of things (a type of thing is a universal). — Relativist

What is that 'something ontological', and how can it be described as physical, when it's not described by physics? It's a bit disingenuous to appeal to science whenever it suits your aims, but then disavow it when it doesn't.

Besides, physics assumes the order of nature - it doesn't explain it, nor need to explain it. As A N Whitehead puts it in Science and the Modern World, science itself depends on the belief that the natural world follows a regular, coherent structure. This regularity allows science to generalize from specific observations and to formulate laws that describe the behavior of natural phenomena. But, he says, this assumption of natural order is itself a metaphysical commitment, one that exceeds the bounds of empiricism, but is essential for science to proceed. In other words, science assumes the universe is not chaotic or random but instead governed by principles that are discoverable and consistent over time*. All of which is patently obvious in Armstrong.

This assumption is grounded in the history of Western philosophy, particularly in medieval and early modern thought, where thinkers like Aquinas and Newton envisioned a rational structure to the cosmos, often influenced by theological ideas of a divine order. Whitehead notes that even as science moved away from explicitly theological explanations, it retained this foundational belief in an orderly universe. I think Armstrong's philosophy is built on this ground - a divinely-ordained cosmos sans divine intellect.

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* Hence the purportedly 'brute facts' of empiricism - those elements for which further explanations ought not to be sought.

Objects are made of these particles, and each particle has a well-defined set of properties. The existence of these particles were deduced, not perceived by the faculties of our "phenomenal awareness", but over time - their existence has been confirmed through measurements in particle accelerators. So tell me in what sense is this NOT objective reality. — Relativist

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics. The Copenhagen interpretation says it's pointless to second-guess what lies behind these measurements as it is indeterminate. The many-worlds interpretation attempts to deflate that mystery but at the cost of infinitely many proliferating universes.

There's an anecdote, told by Werner Heisenberg, of Neils Bohr giving a lecture to the remaining Vienna Circle positivists in the 1950's (some of their principals having died or retired by then.) Bohr laid out the basics of quantum physics, in line with the 'Copenhagen' approach which he helped define. At the end of his talk, the audience applauded politely but had no questions. It was this that prompted Bohr to say 'if you're not shocked by quantum physics, then you can't have understood it!'

Computers don’t come into existence de novo. They are artefacts built by humans according to human aims and purposes. In other words, whatever purposes they pursue are extrinsic. — Wayfarer

My point is that there's nothing about the application of logic that is inconsistent with physical mechanism, so the mere fact that we can apply logic doesn't falsify physicalism. How we evolved the capacity to do this is a different matter and a different discussion.

I don't think physicalism can explain how semantic properties emerge from, or are identical to, these physical states without appealing to, or assuming, non-physicalist explanations of meaning. — Wayfarer

We interact with the world to survive. Successful interaction is dependent on our pattern-recognition capacity which enables us to distinguish types of objects and activities. We also have the physical capacity to make and hear various sounds also fitting recognizable patterns. Relating a recognizable sound (a word) to a type of object or activity doesn't seem at all problematic. The word then "means" the object or activity.

What is that 'something ontological', and how can it be described as physical, when it's not described by physics? — Wayfarer

A universal exists immanently- in its instantiations, so the "something ontological" is the instantiations of a law of nature.

I may have made Armstrong's metaphysics sound more detached from physics than it really is. A law of physics that is actually identical to a true law of nature, has no detachment at all. I was simply trying to convey that the metaphysics is not dependent on the current state of physics, which is never 100% correct.

But, he says, this assumption of natural order is itself a metaphysical commitment, one that exceeds the bounds of empiricism — Wayfarer

I disagree that this exceeds the bounds of empiricism. Empiricism in science leads to theories, established by abductive reasoning. By extension, we can abductively conclude there are laws of nature, on the basis that this best explains the success of science.

thank you for your explanations. I have learned something more about D M Armstrong.

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics. — Wayfarer

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present, as is the fact that they emerge when measured, and that the set of measureable properties is unique to each type of elementary particle. This isn't a matter of phenomenology giving us a questionable view of objective reality- which is what I was addressing.