My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present — Relativist

And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question.

See Quantum by Manjit Kumar, which is a very detailed account of the Bohr-Einstein debates. Whilst there are many arcane details, the basic point that comes through very clearly is that Einstein held to scientific realism, pretty well exactly in Armstrong's sense, while Bohr challenged that realism, saying things like 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature', and 'No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon.' John Wheeler said of Bohr: 'The dependence of what is observed upon the choice of the experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the view that the universe exists "out there" independent of all acts of observation. In contrast, Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature, to be welcomed because of the understanding it gives us. In struggling to make clear to Einstein the central point as he saw it, Bohr found himself forced to introduce the word "phenomenon". In today's words, Bohr's point - and the central point of quantum theory - can be put into a simple sentence: "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon".

there's nothing about the application of logic that is inconsistent with physical mechanism — Relativist

As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it? Charles Darwin himself expressed doubt - 'But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?'

We interact with the world to survive. Successful interaction is dependent on our pattern-recognition capacity which enables us to distinguish types of objects and activities. — Relativist

Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason?

Empiricism in science leads to theories, established by abductive reasoning. By extension, we can abductively conclude there are laws of nature, on the basis that this best explains the success of science. — Relativist

I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism. I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist. There's another Armstrong, Karen, who has an excellent book, The Case for God, on the way the modern belief in natural law grew out of the faith of early modern science, but eventually gave rise to atheism.

I think you might have logical, metaphysical, and nomological (physical) necessity mixed up.

"The universes spontaneous generation is a brute fact," does not seem to be of the mold "all triangles have three sides," A = B and B = C, thus A = C.

If it was a logical necessity we probably wouldn't call it a brute fact.

As for metaphysical necessity, it just seems hard to argue that in all possible worlds the universe must both have a begining and its beginning must be unexplainable. Plenty of physicists think the universe is cyclical and thus without beginning or end, and it seems hard for metaphysics to convincingly settle this question. If we had strong empirical support for a cyclical universe would we still insist on this? (see the post to Tom above on how brute fact explanations are always abandoned when competition arrives).

But the larger issue I see is that this only deals with efficient cause from some time zero. But why does the universe progress from state to state as it does? Why did it have the initial conditions it did? If these are all brute facts then isn't everything that has ever happened necessary and all possible worlds identical with our own? But this seems to be a hard case to make. You have modal collapse, every true statement is necessarily true.

Plus, if things can just start existing, for no reason at all, why don't we ever see anything else just randomly start to exist? Is it also a brute fact that spontaneous brute existence only occurs once? And it only produces whatever we happen to observed? That just seems a little too convenient.

First of all, it is incorrect to suggest that an initial state entails "spontaneous generation". "Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

The initial state of reality necessarily exists uncaused, because causes temporally precede their effects*, and it is logically impossible to temporally precede an initial point of time.

Could this brute fact of an initial state be contingent? No, and here's why.

Classical (non-quantum) physics entails strict determinism: a specific type of cause will necessarily produce a specific effect. If all laws of nature were of this sort, there would be no contingent things in the universe.

Contingency in the universe arises only with quantum systems when the wave-function collapses (i.e. quantum indeterminacy). This is the only known source of contingency in the world. The initial state of the universe is not temporally preceded by a quantum system that collapses, hence there is no source of contingency for the initial state. Therefore it exists out of necessity. This is not strict logical necessity; it is metaphysical necessity because it is the logical consequence of the metaphysical principle that contingency requires a source of contingency*.

If there is a divine creator, the initial state of reality consists solely of this divine creator, existing uncaused, and with no temporally prior state. Therefore it exists as a necessary brute fact (brute fact, because there's no explanation for the specific, actual creator existing rather than not). This creator is a source of contingency for whatever it creates, and it implies everything, other than itself, exists contingently (at the will of this creator).

If there is no divine creator, then there is no source of contingency for the universe, so the universe (the totality of reality) itself exists out of metaphysical necessity. So my analysis doesn't preclude a divine creator, but it clearly shows that a creator is not entailed. It simply implies that something exists uncaused, and that its existence is metaphysically necessary.
---------------------
* Notice that I have stipulated two metaphysical axioms:

1) causation is temporal (causes temporally precede effects). This is not an arbitrary first principle, it is consistent with everything we know about reality.
2) Contingency requires a source of contingency. Also not arbitrary: the only known contingency in the world is a consequence of quantum indeterminacy.

The many-worlds interpretation of QM entails no contingency at all: all possible outcomes of a (seemingly) indeterminate quantum effect are actualized. It could entail an initial state of a quantum system, that is comprised of a multitude of eigenstates- each of which evolves into a "universe" (a system of stars, galaxies, etc), causally isolated from each other, except they share a common initial, quantum state.

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

No it doesn't, per your own explanation. There is a state before which there are no prior states. Call it S1. Now you claim that some thing or things had an S1 for no reason at all. They existed in S1 having not existed in any prior states. Now, why can't anything else have an S1, starting to exist when it has existed in no prior state, for "no reason at all?"

You are trying to read some prior time before S1 back in, which is a strawman.

Anyhow, you have entirely ignored the question of why any certain thing should begin to exist in S1 rather than any other.

This seems to me like a God of the Gaps solve it all to be honest.

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present — Relativist


And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely true. Consider position and momentum: it is not that they lack a value at all, it is that the they don't have a precise value. Position and momentum are examples of complementary variables. There is a distribution of possible values that the pair will have when a measurement occurs. This distribution constitutes objective information about these particles, and it hints at something weird about fundamental reality that is beyond what we'd expect from our ordinary perspective. My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality.

Also, consider that quarks and antiquarks have a color charge, while leptons and antileptons do not have a color charge. Even if the value of the color charge is a complement of another property, it's still an objective fact that color charge is a property that that quarks have, but leptons do not. It's also an objective fact that everything in existence is composed of the elementary particles identified in the standard model (I'm setting aside the fact that the standard model may not be complete, and that it may not actually be the most fundamental basis of reality. I embrace the spirit of structural realism, so that the standard model points to something objectively true about reality, even if not completely accurate).

As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance. Arguments from ignorance can be corrected by recasting as an abductive case, arguing that the chosen hypothesis is a better explanation than alternatives. But it seems to me that any non-physical account will be at a clear disadvantage, because it will depend on ad hoc assumptions that raise more questions than answered.

What seems more likely?: 1) that intelligent minds would gradually develop in isolated instances (as few as once), somewhere in a vast universe that's evolved in a myriad of ways over the billions of years of its existence, or 2) that an intelligent mind (with a vast store of magical knowledge that just happens to exist without cause) would just happen to exist by brute fact?

I haven't seen a case for the latter, whereas the former is consistent with statistical entropy.

Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason? — Wayfarer

It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking. Humans differ from most by the fact that they have language and a more fully developed ability to think abstractly, but it's aligned with such behavior.

Why trust reason? Because we each intrinsically trust our sensory perceptions and the inherent reasoning we are born with. Were it not effective, we would not have survived.

I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism. — Wayfarer

The existence of laws of nature can't be deductively proven, but their existence seems the best explanation for what we observe. We could test that if you'd care to offer an alternative.

The existence of laws IS evidence for physicalism, in the general sense. I think you mean that the existence of laws does not entail physicalism, which is true. However, abductive reasoning entails determining the best explanation for a set of facts - the set of facts are "evidence" for any of the proferred explanations. Explanatory scope is one aspect of abductive reasoning, and it entails explaining more facts, so all facts are potentially relevant - they are evidence.

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist. — Wayfarer

It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God. Alchemists also got some things right. Human endeavors, including science and philosophy, advance by building on - and correcting- past achievements, not by starting afresh.

Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing more. I've examined traditional arguments for God, and found none of them at all compelling. They invariably depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions (which seem carefully contrived), and often make the unjustified assumption that magical knowledge is plausible (i.e. knowing things without developing the knowledge, and having this knowledge exist without being encoded - it's just there).Perhaps worse, none of them make a case for a God of religion. Even if sound, they only make a case for deism- a potentially indifferent creator.

↪Relativist

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

No it doesn't, per your own explanation. There is a state before which there are no prior states. Call it S1. Now you claim that some thing or things had an S1 for no reason at all. They existed in S1 having not existed in any prior states. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't undercut anything I said.

Now, why can't anything else have an S1, starting to exist when it has existed in no prior state, for "no reason at all?"

The state of affairs didn't "start to exist", because it exists at all points of time. Rather, time begins as the state evolves.

You are trying to read some prior time before S1 back in, which is a strawman. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I'm not. Time begins; the foundation of reality does not begin.

I'll try to make this clearer. I'll assign a label to whatever exists at S1: F (standing for the foundation of existence).

F can have failed to exist only if it exists contingently. But F is contingent IFF there exists something to account for it being contingent. If F were the product of quantum indeterminacy, it would be contingent: F could have failed to obtain, while an alternative F' obtained instead. But this can't be, in our case, because quantum indeterminacy entails a quantum system existing prior to the indeterminate outcome. Nothing precedes F.

F could be a quantum system, such that what follows is the product of quantum indeterminacy. In that case, what follows from F is contingent (F accounts for what follows), but F itself is not contingent.

Let's consider contingency more broadly. Here's a general approach to accounting for contingency*:

x is contingent IFF there exists A, which accounts for x, and A can also account for ~x.

IOW: A accounts for (x or ~x).

But F is uncaused, so there is nothing that accounts for its existence. Therefore there can be no A that accounts for (F or ~F).

You seem to be conflating conceptual possibility with metaphysical possibility: you can conceive of F', so you erroneously assume F' is metaphysically possible. This ignores the need to account for contingency.

Anyhow, you have entirely ignored the question of why any certain thing should begin to exist in S1 rather than any other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've answered that now. F did not begin to exist, and F does not exist contingently.

This seems to me like a God of the Gaps solve it all to be honest.

Then you haven't followed.

"God of the gaps" is a form of argument from ignorance. I've made no such argument. My position is consistent with both deism and naturalism, and it follows logically from the premises I stated as axioms (first principles). Your error seem to be: 1) conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, and 2) ignoring the stated need to account for contingency. I hope I've sufficiently clarified these points.

You can reject the metaphysical axioms I've stated: I haven't claimed they are logically necessary. But I do think they are a better explanation than the alternatives, and I think I've shown that. We can discuss that further, once you accept the coherence of the framework I've stated.

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* I've tried to convey my view of contingency in my own words, as clearly as I can - but if it's still unclear - here's an alternative description, taken directly from Amy Karofsky's book, A Case for Necessitarianism:

"A theory of contingency offers a metaphysical explanation for ways things could have been and for the possibility that some actual thing might have been otherwise than it is by explaining why an entity is such as it is rather than not. Such a metaphysical explanation of contingency describes: that in virtue of which a contingent entity could have failed to have existed (obtained, held, happened, etc.); what it is that provides for the possibility that an entity could have been otherwise than what it is; and that which accounts for the ways in which an entity could—and the ways it could not—have been different.

"Metaphysical explanation is often tied to the concept of grounding. Kit Fine explains that “philosophy is often interested in questions of explanation—of what accounts for what—and it is largely through the employment of the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be pursued.”… Thus, a metaphysical explanation for a contingent entity provides the reason why the contingency is such as it is, rather than not, by pointing to an ontologically prior entity that is that in virtue of which the contingency could have been otherwise.”

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

Suppose B is a brute fact, meaning that it exists for no reason and therefore lacks any further ontological grounding. B exists, and (trivially) B is therefore possible. But is B necessary or contingent? Contingency implies ~B is possible. But B doesn’t fit the above: there is no explanation for B, and thus no explanation for B & possibly(~B). So if a brute fact exists, it exists out of metaphysical necessity because there’s no ontological basis that accounts for possibly(~B).
.

My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality. — Relativist

Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent. That is where quantum physics undermines the intuitive sense of the objectivity of the external world. I'm not denying that there are objective facts - that would be out-and-out relativism - but that objectivity can ever be complete. Consider the titles of three of the popular books I've read about it - Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar; Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science, David Lindley; and What is Real?: The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics, Adam Becker. Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that.

Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance. — Relativist

No, it's an argument from epistemic humility.

It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking. — Relativist

It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively over the period from the early australopithecus until the arrival of h.sapiens approximately 100,000 years ago. The neural capacities that this provide are exponentially more powerful than anything possessed by other animals including our simian forbears. My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory, as we have realised 'horizons of being' that are simply not available to other animals. These include abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality, that are all uniquely human. They indicate a qualitative leap, a difference in kind, rather than a mere quantitative increase in cognitive ability.

(Interestingly there's a 1950's book by one of the founders of the modern neo-darwinian synthesis, Theodosius Dobzhansky, called The Biology of Ultimate Concern, one of many books that address this theme, but notable because of Dobzhansky's status in the formulation of modern evolutionary science. (It was Dobzhansky who coined the phrase 'nothing in biology makes sense except for in the light of evolution'.) This book contradicts Dawkin's type of argument that there is an irredeemable conflict between evolutionary biology and religious philosophy.)

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist.
— Wayfarer
It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God. — Relativist

I think it's unarguable that Armstrong's belief in the power of natural law is a natural outcome (pardon the irony) of the trajectory of Western religious and philosophical thought.

Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing more — Relativist

The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief?

Personally, I don't evangalise faith in God, but as I am critical of the philosophy of secular humanism it sort of puts me in the camp of those who do.

The neural capacities that this provide are exponentially more powerful than anything possessed by other animals including our simian forbears. My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory, as we have realised 'horizons of being' that are simply not available to other animals. These include abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality, that are all uniquely human. They indicate a qualitative leap, a difference in kind, rather than a mere quantitative increase in cognitive ability. — Wayfarer

I think the throughline through all this is a self-awareness.. a sort of Russian Doll Effect, whereby a sort of awareness of "something" is gleaned, but never obtained. Art, Beauty, Elegant Theories of Math and Science, yet none of it is sustainable. It appeals to a sensibility that is aesthetic, but there is always a remainder leftover. This may be akin to Schopenhauer's Will.. We feel it most acutely, whereas other animals only feel the acuteness of perhaps at most boredom. They don't have the Russian Doll Effect though, which amplifies it. We have anxieties foisted upon ourselves, mental disorders even, and then we have ANGST. It's reflected in literature going back to Egypt and Babylonia, ancient China, India, and anywhere where man could write more than a few thoughts down beyond the transactional.

We have anxieties foisted upon ourselves, mental disorders even, and then we have ANGST. It's reflected in literature going back to Egypt and Babylonia, ancient China, India, and anywhere where man could write more than a few thoughts down beyond the transactional. — schopenhauer1

It's existential angst, isn't it? That's the subject of John Vervaeke's 52-episode lecture series on Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, which I'm part way through.

It's existential angst, isn't it? That's the subject of John Vervaeke's 52-episode lecture series on Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, which I'm part way through. — Wayfarer

Here's the thing, the angst-driven "What do I focus my attention on?" precedes everything. Even someone who represents naive physicalism, someone like say a "Dawkins type", someone who supposedly "only cares about facts", has to "care about" something, that precedes the "facts" that are deemed most important.

The supposedly hard-nosed person who admonishes the baroque-types and their fancies, still found a VALUE and PRIORITIZED, this is all prior to any "facts of experience" or "facts of nature" or "facts of reality".

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics. — Wayfarer

Nothing is defined until it is in some sense "measured". It does not follow that the properties of particles do not exist until measured.

And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason? — Wayfarer

How could you possibly know that crocodiles have no capacity for logic? If reason is an evolutionary adaptation we can place trust in it because it has stood the test of time—the ultimate test.

Personally, I don't evangalise faith in God, but as I am critical of the philosophy of secular humanism it sort of puts me in the camp of those who do. — Wayfarer

In other words you don't have a standpoint other than your personal dislike of secular humanism and your constant attempts to marshal, arguments from (imagined) authorities to try to prove that it is self-defeating and/ or to explain it away by psychologizing it.

I wonder when the penny is going to drop for you that everything beyond what is directly observable is a matter of faith with the only arbiter being coherence and plausibility.

Here's the thing, the angst-driven "What do I focus my attention on?" precedes everything. Even someone who represents naive physicalism, someone like say a "Dawkins type", someone who supposedly "only cares about facts", has to "care about" something, that precedes the "facts" that are deemed most important. — schopenhauer1

:100:

One of the bits of terminology I've picked up from Vervaeke is 'relevance realisation', which operates right from the inception of organic life. However in human life, the requirement is extended beyond the requirements of survival into the domain of meaning.

It does not follow that the properties of particles do not exist until measured. — Janus

Then read some of those refs I mentioned. That is *exactly* what is being said.

One of the bits of terminology I've picked up from Vervaeke is 'relevance realisation', which operates right from the inception of organic life. — Wayfarer

Otherwise known as reason or meaning.

You can reject the metaphysical axioms I've stated: I haven't claimed they are logically necessary. But I do think they are a better explanation than the alternatives, and I think I've shown that. We can discuss that further, once you accept the coherence of the framework I've stated.

Ok, from your initial post I thought you were making the claim that this was logically necessary, as in tautological.

Does it follow? IDK, maybe. Those are pretty complex terms in the premises and metaphysical necessity can be defined in various ways.

Do I find it convincing? No. I mean, suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line?

But cosmology has had many sea changes in the past century, and many presumed "brute facts" have turned out to have explanations (or at least have plausible theories explaining them that need more observational data to bear out). Black Hole Cosmology has some legs, it fits the data, but it would suppose an explicable cause prior to the Big Bang. Eternal varieties of cosmic inflation suppose the universe is without beginning or end, as does Penrose's cyclical universe. In Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis the universe and its attributes are intelligible and explicable. I don't see metaphysics as having much of a role here in deciding the issue as simply brute fact.

It seems to me like the inverse of more the simplistic theistic arguments on the origins of the universe TBH. Each bottom out in the ineffable and unintelligible while making broad pronouncements on open empirical questions in the natural sciences that have promising leads.

Anyhow, this is pretty off topic so I'll leave it there.

Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by"refute"? Do you simply mean the objectivist claim hasn't been proven logically impossible? That would be an unreasonable standard. A better question is: how does an objectivist justify believing what they do?

What we believe ought to be based on evidence and reasoning. So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief.

Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly reasonable to believe there are aspects of reality we will never figure out, and it's also true that a metaphysical theory can never be verified, but it could be falsified if there's some known aspect of the world that is incompatible with the metaphysical theory.

So...is there something incompatible with Armstorong's theory? If so, then what is it?

...just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.
— Relativist

No, it's an argument from epistemic humility. — Wayfarer

Are you suggesting remaining agnostic to the existence of the unnatural? What is a reasonable attitude toward something that is merely logically possible?

It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively ...My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory... — Wayfarer

I don't see how you could justify such a claim. It's true that a retrospective analysis of our evolutionary history tracks with increasing brain size. I imagine the evolutionary history of giraffes tracks increasing neck size. But how can you evaluate how long a feature should take to evolve? Evolution proceeds through such things as genetic mutations, genetic diversity within the populations, changing environmental pressures, population size, and gene flow between populations - all of which would influence the time for adaptive change. We don't have data about these factors to form the basis of a fair judgement. So, again, I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes.

I get it, that to a committed theist, God's involvement is always a live possibility - but how can one apply this, in practice, without getting in the way of actual scientific advance? Couldn't God be sufficiently clever to simply get the ball rolling when he created the universe, without needing to intervene along the way? Did he also kill the dinosaurs, who's continued existence would have changed the subsequent paths evolution took? I suggest that the most intellectually honest position to take is to simply assume God is responsible for everything, but in unknown ways- rather than inserting him as the answer to any scientific unknown.

The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief? — Wayfarer

Thanks. The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence. Instead, she criticizes religious fundamentalist and polemical atheists. Good for her. I agree with both sets of criticisms.

Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses. — L'éléphant

On that view, wouldn't flight also not be a thing, since it is just "cells in wings responding to chemical signals." The same for "running," or "life" itself (and so also for each instance of living things?) Yet, since we have already successfully mastered heavier than air flight, we know that the principles of flight were not to be found in studying the organelles of cells in the wings of all flying animals, nor in their DNA, etc. (at least not most easily). Indeed, one can build a flying machine while being largely ignorant of the biology of flying animals so long as one understands the principles of lift, etc. that all those animals physiology takes advantage of. The same seems true of running and swimming, or even language production, and perhaps it is even so for conciousness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess we can a draw a Venn diagram and show that all of the above would be inside the circle of consciousness. It goes without saying that all of that would require consciousness.

In philosophy, depending on what philosopher you subscribe to, a thing is something that has 'wholeness' and perceptibility as its core features. No one, at least that I know of, has defined consciousness as a thing.

But then we are at risk of dissolving all things and having only a single universal process. IMO, the solution here is to realize that things (substances) have relative degrees of unity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If by dissolving all things and having only a single universal process you mean 'reductionism', there is no risk associated with using the view of physicalism, in my opinion. I understand that there are some members on this forum that detest the word reductionism. I myself do not care about this idea. I don't support it. Physicalism is not a reductive theory. It is a foundational theory that purports to show that the world cannot exist without matter or the physical components.
And I say this, gravity is there because of the forces of masses. Yet, we cannot see or touch gravity.
So, the only thing one is risking by holding the view of the physical is, they let go of the ideas of the magical phenomena, about which an explanation is impossible. Gravity is not magic. Consciousness is not magic. They can be explained and traced back to the origin.

In my reading, it seems that objections to physicalist theories of mind tend to largely center on the appeal to the physical being used to drag along other suppositions, e.g. a sort of reductionism — Count Timothy von Icarus

Vide supra.

So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief. — Relativist

It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay.

I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes. — Relativist

I didn't say it wasn't due to natural processes. I said it opened up horizons of being and cognitive skills that are different in kind to other species, including abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality. I would have thought this a completely unexceptionable empirical claim, although the implications may not be obvious to empiricist philosophy. I say that amounts to an ontological distinction, a different kind of being. You seem to assume that I am therefore appealing to a 'creator God' but this is something even acknowledged by existential philosophers who are not in the least theistic in orientation.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence. — Relativist

Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God.

I said it opened up horizons of being and cognitive skills that are different in kind to other species, including abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality. — Wayfarer

None of which are incompatible with physicalism and evolutionary theory.

But they're not explained by it, for reasons I won't try and articulate again. :angry:

They are not explained by it, just as history, evolutionary theory itself, sociology, etc, etc are not because they are all different paradigms of inquiry. Physicalism is a metaphysical standpoint and just like the other metaphysical standpoints does not explain the abovementioned. So, your "argument" is trying to set fire to an asbestos tiger.

As I've said many times I'm not arguing for physicalism but rather against your simplistic idea that it is self-refuting or that the existence of areas of inquiry where physics is of no use is sufficient to refute physicalism.

That is where quantum physics undermines the intuitive sense of the objectivity of the external world. I'm not denying that there are objective facts - that would be out-and-out relativism - but that objectivity can ever be complete. — Wayfarer

There are quantum interpretations which are entirly objective.

Alas, such interpretations don't afford sell-able book titles as the ones you suggest.

I'm not arguing for physicalism — Janus

It’s never clear what you’re arguing for but I do know that you enjoy an argument, regardless. ;-)

Check out The Timeless Wave.

I suggest that the interference pattern is not caused by a physical wave — because, as we shall see, no conventional physical wave can account for the actual observations. So what the “wave” is, is one of the greatest conundrums posed by quantum physics, and the philosophical implications are profound. Let’s explore them.

Physicalism is not a reductive theory. It is a foundational theory that purports to show that the world cannot exist without matter or the physical components. — L'éléphant

I don't think you can have your cake and eat it. Physicalism is reductionist by definition. Why? Because it methodically excludes or reduces what may be deemed anything other than the physical to the physical. Physicalism is 'the view that all phenomena, including complex processes like consciousness, emotions, and social behaviors, can be explained without residue in terms of physical components and laws—typically those of physics and chemistry—without requiring additional principles or explanations'. It is of course true that when it comes to phenomena such as gravity and the composition of massive bodies, then physicalism is a sound assumption (which is the 'methodological' aspect). But the extension of that methodology to the problems of philosophy is what is objectionable about it.

It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I'll read it, and respond in that thread.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.
— Relativist

Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God. — Wayfarer

I read some addition reviews. This one says, "Armstrong is not presenting a case for God in the sense most people in our idolatrous world would think of it...Armstrong promises that her kinds of [religious] practice will make us better, wiser, more forgiving, loving, courageous, selfless, hopeful and just. Who can be against that?"

So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence. If you've read the book and see something these reviewers missed, please identify it.

suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line? — Count Timothy von Icarus

My objection to an infinite past is not based on cosmology. Rather, I am persuaded that an infinite past is logically impossible.

I first came to this view after analyzing William Lane Craig's defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. His defense of a finite past wasn't persuasive but it got me thinking. I landed on the fact that an infinite past entails an infinite series being completed in a sequential, temporal process. That seems logically impossible.

I don't know that cosmology can necessarily establish this. The big bang doesn't: it just raises the scientific question of what conditions led to the big bang.

Perhaps a theory of the nature of time could support it - if it could be shown that time (as we know it) is an emergent aspect of something more fundamental. I understand that Sean Carroll is working on something like this.

↪Apustimelogist Check out The Timeless Wave.

"I suggest that the interference pattern is not caused by a physical wave — because, as we shall see, no conventional physical wave can account for the actual observations. So what the “wave” is, is one of the greatest conundrums posed by quantum physics, and the philosophical implications are profound. Let’s explore them." — Wayfarer

Not sure what you are trying to convey here.

If by dissolving all things and having only a single universal process you mean 'reductionism', there is no risk associated with using the view of physicalism, in my opinion.

Actually, I was thinking of mereological nihilism, that there are no true part whole relations, and that arrangements of them are ultimately arbitrary. Thus, the world contains no cats, trees, stars, etc. These only exist in the mind. There are only a few fundemental fields (perhaps unifiable, in which case there is just one thing). This seems to make "saying true things about things" virtually impossible.

I would say reductionism is problematic though, at least in its most popular form, as smallism—i.e. the belief that all facts about larger wholes are totally explainable in terms of facts about smaller composite parts, and that "smaller = more fundemental."

There is no prima facie reason for this to be true. Bigism, where all parts are only definable in terms of wholes, works just as well and flows better with information theoretic accounts of nature, QFT, and process metaphysics. But then there also isn't good empirical evidence for reductionism either. How many reductions have been successful? Thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is the canonical example and I (having asked this question many times in many places) don't know if there is a single other example. More than a century from the high water mark of reductionism, chemistry, even the basics of molecular structure, still hasn't been reduced to physics. That doesn't mean it's wrong, but it does seem like it shouldn't be something that is assumed to be true until proven otherwise (in part because it is probably unfalsifiable).

There is an interesting section in either the SEP article on the philosophy of chemistry or on emergence that references a good paper on how quantum phenomena:

1. Don't jive at all well with the early, conventional accounts of emergence but also;
2. Don't jive well with reductionist accounts either

My guess, which is mostly based on how other "problems in the sciences," have progressed, is that the terms currently applied need to be radically rethought. That's just a guess though.

So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence. — Relativist

Yes, I think that's reasonable. She's focussing on religious practice as a different mode of being, not as propositional knowledge. But that also has considerable bearing on the question of 'what is the nature of being'.

Not sure what you are trying to convey here. — Apustimelogist

That Ψ is not inside space-time.

That Ψ is not inside space-time. — Wayfarer

Well this is interpretation dependent. It isn't a fact that quantum mechanics formally, or otherwise, entails inherent subjectiveor non-objective universe. There are interpretations where the wave function is not a real object but the world is still perfectly objective in the sense of pre-quantum classical kinds of physics.

Well this is interpretation dependent — Apustimelogist

It's supported by an argument based on the double-slit experiment. That argument is that the interference exhibits the same wave-like pattern even if photons are fired one at a time. So the 'wave' is nothing like a physical wave, and it doesn't inhere in any medium so far as science can determine. (I put this to PhysicsForum, which said 'Don't be ridiculous, the particle interferes with itself' :lol: )

This is why the nature of the wave function is contentious - its true nature is a lacuna that appears at the basis of fundamental physics. Sir Roger Penrose can't accept that due to his convictions about the way the world 'should be':

It doesn’t make any sense, and there is a simple reason. You see, the mathematics of quantum mechanics has two parts to it. One is the evolution of a quantum system, which is described extremely precisely and accurately by the Schrödinger equation. That equation tells you this: If you know what the state of the system is now, you can calculate what it will be doing 10 minutes from now. However, there is the second part of quantum mechanics — the thing that happens when you want to make a measurement. Instead of getting a single answer, you use the equation to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes. The results don’t say, “This is what the world is doing.” Instead, they just describe the probability of its doing any one thing. The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesn’t.

Why should it? :brow:




(It's OK not to answer, it's a rhetorical question.)