Olson provides the logical form so you can check its validity.

1. x)(x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)

2. (x)((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) x is thinking)

3. (x)((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair) x = you)

4. (x)(x is a human animal & x = you)

But I am not arguing that his argument is invalid, but that its second premise (and its third) has to be interpreted in a way that makes it question begging.

premise 2 is ambiguous, for it could be interpreted to mean (as it does in 'the box is 90kgs') that the human animal sitting in the chair has associated with it something that is thinking). And then 3 could be similarly interpreted to mean 'the thing that is thinking is you'. So interpreted, the conclusion does not follow.

So that cannot be the meaning that Olson has in mind. Instead we must interpret 2 as simply asserting taht the human animal is itself doing the thinking. That's question begging for that's precisely what's at issue.

So, if we interpret the relevant premises in a non-question begging way, the argument is indeed invalid. But if we interpret the relevant premises in a way that preserves the argument's validity, then the premises become question begging.

There's no dispute that we think. And there's no dispute that our bodies are human animals. The dispute is over whether the thing doing the thinking is the human animal or something merely associated with it. That dispute cannot be resolved to everyone's satisfaction by fiat.

and again illustrated by the post following

It's the person associated with the human animal who is doing the thinking.
— Clearbury
Not necessarily. — noAxioms

That's beside the point. The point is that this claim 'it is the person asociated with the human animal who is doing the thinking' is not question begging, whereas 'it is thet human animal that is doing the thinking' is.

Note, I am not arguing for or agaist the thesis that it is the human animal that is doing the thinking. I am pointing out that Olson's argument is question begging. Question begging arguments can still be sound.

magine there is a weightless box into which a 90 kg person has been placed.
— Clearbury
OK, to apply that directly to the OP:

(P1) Presently resting on the floor is a box.
(P2) The box masses 90kg
(P3) You are the contents of the box.
(C) Therefore, the box is you.

That doesn't seem to be begging anywhere, yet the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, — noAxioms

That is not an accurate rendering of my implied argument. I mentioned the ambiguity of the word 'is', yet you've removed that very word from the crucial premise.

The argument would go as follows:

1. The only think on the floor is a box that is 90kg
2. I am on the floor and I am 90kg
3. Therefore, I am the box

If premise 1 is interpreted one way - interpreted as meaning "the only thing on the floor is a box that may or may not contain something and that including whatever it may contain weighs 90kg" - the argument is invalid. For it does not then follow from my being on the floor and weighing 90kg that I am the box, for I may instead be something that is in the box (and is thereby responsible for its weight).

If premise 2 is interpreted much more literally - as meaning that a box alone - a box without any contents - is the only thing on the floor and weighs 90kg, then the conclusion does follow, but is clearly false.

The only possibilities in philosophy seem to be reductionism or emergentism. — Ludwig V

I don't think that's right, though that may accurately characterize the positions most (?) contemporary philosophers hold about the matter.

But another option - I think the one most of the great philosophers of the past held - is that our minds are distinct entities from our biological bodies. A dead human is still a human animal, it's just not got a mind anymore - the person has left the building.

The point is that this claim 'it is the person asociated with the human animal who is doing the thinking' is not question begging, whereas 'it is thet human animal that is doing the thinking' is. — Clearbury

My point was that even if it is accepted that the human animal is doing the thinking, the conclusion that animalism is true does not follow. Yes, the premise begs the animal doing the thinking (as any premise begs whatever it is positing), but it does not beg animalism.

What if 'you' includes the experiencer, the persisting fundamental addition that humans have and that bugs and robots don't. The animal part still does the thinking (explaining the expensive brain), but not the experiencing, and not the exertion of will, if that can somehow be separated from thinking, which it often is.
That's what I mean by P2 not begging animalism, but only begging that the animal does the thinking. A lot of dualists would deny that the animal part does either of the thinking and experiencing. It's not a view I particularly understand, so I cannot speak authoritatively for the opposing view.

Olson provides the logical form so you can check its validity.

1. x)(x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)

2. (x)((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) x is thinking)

3. (x)((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair) x = you)

4. (x)(x is a human animal & x = you) — NOS4A2

I actually don't follow the notation, but it seems illustrated by my attempt at applying something real to x.
P1. x)(x is a big toe & x is at the front of your shoe)
P2. (x)((x is a big toe & x is at the front of your shoe) x is thinking)
P3. (x)((x is thinking & x is at the front of your shoe) x = you)
C4. (x)(x is a big toe & x = you)

Clearly this seems wrong, but it is the logic being employed, is it not?
The bit about 'x is thinking' very much begs that it is the toe doing the thinking, and not 'you', which includes the toe but is not entirely consisting of the toe.


Nobody replied to my query asking if animalism is in any way distinct from physical monism. I support such a thing, but that argument totally falls flat. The toe-ism argument is typically countered by one of incredulity, that a toe has not the capability for thinking and therefore there must be something more. That's another poor argument.

Are each of us numerically identical to an animal? — NOS4A2

We are undeniably animals in bodily nature having the biological functions, desires and system.
However, we are also different from the other animals in respect of having sophisticated language and reasoning capacity .

Intelligence is not same as being rational. I was in deep shock finding out that some folks think those are the same in the other thread here. A dog can be intelligent in doing some tasks and chores and tricks when trained. But no other animals than humans can be rational. And even some humans aren't rational.

What a load of Philo-babble. :lol:

"Numerically identical to an animal" - this is the reason I can't take modern philosophy seriously. I scanned through the paper briefly, and maybe I missed it, but I couldn't even find the definition of 'animal' the writer uses to make his point.

Blame the analytics. Before that demon lord Ockham showed up we had perfectly intelligible gems like:

By way of the usual translations, the central argument of the Metaphysics would be: being qua being is being per se in accordance with the categories, which in turn is primarily ousia, but primary ousia is form, while form is quiddity and quiddity is actuality.