You can withdraw from the world, but you cannot withdraw from yourself and your own existence. — Corvus

Yeah sorta my OP. What’s your point other than cliches? Read my op as I don’t think you grasped what I was conveying,

Yeah sorta my OP. What’s your point other than cliches? Read my op as I don’t think you grasped what I was conveying, — schopenhauer1

The point is that, your seeking to withdraw from the world, society and yourself will be futile and unrealistic.

The point is that, your seeking to withdraw from the world, society and yourself will be futile and unrealistic. — Corvus

Queue Hollywood movie.

So you didn't really read my post. You don't get what I am conveying about Schopenhauer. Do you know what a charitable reading is? Before you critique, breakdown something in what you think the intended idea is.

That being said, I claim that the best course of action in almost all cases as a human to comport with the best life, is to live a life of withdrawal. — schopenhauer1

I did read it. The title "withdrawal", and your comments in the OP like above give strong impression that you were suggesting the best way to live your life is escaping from the society, avoiding social activities, the world, and withdraw from even your own existence.

I did read it. The title "withdrawal", and your comments in the OP like above give strong impression that you were suggesting the best way to live your life is escaping from the social activities, the world, and even your own existence. — Corvus

Ok, what about it? You can't escape from yourself is not a response to the idea I am proposing. Are you familiar with ascetic practice? Schopenhauer et al? There are more complex ideas at play here. By just saying it like that, you present a cliche as philosophical critique. Which is why I "withdraw" much critical response to it.

edited for more explanation

Ok, what about it? You can't escape from yourself is not a response to the idea I am proposing. Are you familiar with ascetic practice? Schopenhauer et al? — schopenhauer1

When you are suggesting even fasting and starvation for the bare minimum bodily existence, you are escaping from yourself too. Schopenhauer was into Buddhism. That is what the Buddhists practice, and their aim is escaping the world, and even try to escape from their own existence too.

When you are suggesting even fasting and starvation for the bare minimum bodily existence, you are escaping from yourself too. Schopenhauer was into Buddhism. That is what the Buddhists practice, and their aim is escaping the world, and even from their own existence too. — Corvus

So, are you critiquing Schopenhauer, Buddhism, or asceticism in general? If you have a specific issue with these philosophies, lay it out- I'm genuinely curious. Too often, people throw around vague criticisms to be contrarian or they have a bone to pick, without really engaging with the core ideas, or any number of unknown reasons why people like to argue. If you think there’s a flaw in Schopenhauer’s or Buddhism’s approach to transcending the self, make the case. Give me more than an overused cliché about escape—show me there’s substance behind your argument. Present to me that you know what Schopenhauer (or Buddhism if you want) says about asceticism and then debate the point.

Give me more than an overused cliché about escape—show me there’s substance behind your argument. Present to me that you know what Schopenhauer (or Buddhism if you want) says about asceticism and then debate the point. — schopenhauer1

I have nothing to criticise on either Buddha or Schopenhauer. But again the point is, that because their claims are not supported by objectively verifiable concrete evidence, therefore there is not much to argue against their points and claims, apart from making personally opinionated views on them, which may sound like cliches. You either take it or leave it from your own personal judgement, or have chat about it.

@I like sushi

Imagine an analogy relating to social relationships and the concept of withdrawal. Picture existence as having a kind of "trickster" element.

The common idea is that we must find balance in our engagement with life- too much indulgence leads to an unhealthy lifestyle, and excess brings pain. This aligns with the "Golden Mean" approach, where moderation is the ideal.

However, the ascetic perspective is more radical, challenging the common viewpoint. The ascetic views the world as a kind of addictive drug: the more you engage with it, the more entangled you become. The attachment grows, and it grips you more tightly. True liberation, from this perspective, comes from withdrawing and reducing engagement with what ensnares us. Thus, the usual wisdom that advocates social engagement becomes, paradoxically, like a drug- poisonous over time.

In this light, the progression of loneliness to non-being becomes a journey away from attachment: Loneliness > Aloneness > Solitude > Stillness > Non-being



Just like an addictive pleasure, social attachment may initially seem beneficial, but it brings unintended consequences. Though you may not feel it right away, the effects will eventually surface. Learning to live alone and detach from the need for constant interaction brings a different kind of freedom.

I understand the counterargument: “But there's freedom and fulfillment in good friendships, challenging relationships, and the dramas of life.” Yet, this perspective, while valid, is also a justification for engagement that often leads to suffering. It's a departure from a “eusocial” outlook, and I realize this can be unsettling.

In a Buddhist sense, this process involves releasing attachment. Schopenhauer goes further, suggesting that at the point of complete detachment, an unmotivated “grace” arises, leading to a state beyond will- even to the point of embracing starvation. Though this concept is difficult to fully comprehend, it reflects Schopenhauer’s extreme view. Here’s a quote from the final pages of Book 4 in The World as Will and Representation:

Before us there is certainly only nothingness. But that which resists this passing into nothing, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which we ourselves are as it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so greatly, is simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously will life, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing besides it. But if we turn our glance from our own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained to perfect self-knowledge, found itself again in all, and then freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with the body which it animates; then, instead of the restless striving and effort, instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition, and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man who wills, we shall see that peace which is above all reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have represented it, is an entire and certain gospel; only knowledge remains, the will has vanished. We look with deep and painful longing upon this state, beside which the misery and wretchedness of our own is brought out clearly by the contrast. Yet this is the only consideration which can afford us lasting consolation, when, on the one hand, we have recognised incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the manifestation of will, the world; and, on the other hand, see the world pass away with the abolition of will, and retain before us only empty nothingness. Thus, in this way, by contemplation of the life and conduct of saints, whom it is certainly rarely granted us to meet with in our own experience, but who are brought before our eyes by their written history, and, with the stamp of inner truth, by art, we must banish the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as children fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways—is nothing. — Schopenhauer -WWR Book 4

That being said, I claim that the best course of action...is to live a life of withdrawal. — schopenhauer1

I hear you saying social engagement is overrated because it causes more problems than it solves. I wonder if human nature might forestall isolation as antidote. I expect that in the situation of protracted solitude, human nature internalizes social engagement. The two-way conversation of social engagement becomes the mock two-way conversation within the mind of the solitary.

If the solitary isolates beyond internal mock social engagement -- assuming that's possible -- I wonder if a strengthening tendency towards hallucination arises. This wonder on my part is funded by the notion life, by its definition, militates against isolation. I base this natural anti-isolationism of life upon the idea consciousness is inherently social. My basis for this claim is the understanding consciousness is rooted within a self/other binary. This binary, I think, presents so essentially that even the self becomes object.

If you think there’s a flaw in Schopenhauer’s or Buddhism’s approach to transcending the self, make the case. — schopenhauer1

I wonder if the flaw might be: "...even the self becomes object." That being the case, there may be no transcendence of the self possible. Also, there might be the issue of a logical puzzle: how can the self transcend itself if it's the self doing the transcending?

If self-transcendence can somehow transcend the logical puzzle of itself, then where does it arrive? Let's suppose it arrives at the position of pure observer: always seeing, never seen.

Isn't that the God position: purely generative, not at all derivative?

A problem attaching to the God position -- at least from the human perspective -- presents as the origin narrative of the God position. We know from Russell's Paradox there's a logical problem with all-inclusive set comprehension, a necessary pre-requisite for the God position.*

If a human somehow arrives at a God-position point of view, isn't it likely human nature will inflate the ego to an extreme exaggeration featuring omniscience, an ultimate resultant of hubris?

*Perhaps Russell's Paradox suggests a reason why the super-nature of God needs the nature of humanity: not even God -- being conscious -- exists free of the self/other binary.

You might be interested in my last post as this kind of addresses some paradoxes/questions you raise.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/945569

Your Schopenhauer quote says interesting things in the way of clarification: self transcendence -- as I'm getting it at the moment -- entails a journey to a state of mind of total acceptance, which plays as a human possessing the neutrality of a rock, or any other such insentient.

However, there's a big however; the human as a rock, retaining cognition, sees himself attaining to rock neutrality and approves. Goal attained. Job well done. Cognition cannot escape self interest. And self-interest, by definition, precludes transcendence of self.

There is no life in absence of self.

So, at the moment, I'm thinking self transcendence is an ego-stroking mind game. Why else would the saints, if they had really merged into non-existence, leave behind their writings?

I think withdrawal being counterintuitive is similar to other counterintuitive things. You might not see on the surface that withdrawing leads to greater happiness.. You become content with yourself and you will see the tremendous amounts of strife in interactions. As with withdrawing from a drug, at first it seems to be quite the opposite, until one becomes simply content. — schopenhauer1

Sure, withdrawing is fine and "leads to greater happiness" as long as someone else is paying your bills (such as in the case of Buddhist monks), or at least as long as your job is comfortable enough and you can earn money with relative ease.

But if such is not the case, one has to stay in the rat race, and be a rat, or be defeated.

So, at the moment, I'm thinking self transcendence is an ego-stroking mind game. — ucarr

Or a way to control the weak and gullible into submission and generosity.

"You should transcend yourself ang give me your hard earned money so that I can live comfortably" is basically the message of all those religious/spiritual people who teach that one should transcend oneself.

So, at the moment, I'm thinking self transcendence is an ego-stroking mind game. Why else would the saints, if they had really merged into non-existence, leave behind their writings? — ucarr

Two things to note about Schopenhauer's approach, or as I tentatively see it (it is complicated):

1) I think there is an idea of "grace" in Schopenhauer's approach to non-being. That is to say, it is not striven for, but received, but only as a final salvo of one's original isolation and denial of the senses:

Having regard, not to the individuals according to the principle of sufficient reason, but to the Idea of man in its unity, Christian theology symbolises nature, the assertion of the will to live in Adam, whose sin, inherited by us, i.e., our unity with him in the Idea, which is represented in time by the bond of procreation, makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolises grace, the denial of the will, salvation, in the incarnate God, who, as free from all sin, that is, from all willing of life, cannot, like us, have proceeded from the most pronounced assertion of the will, nor can he, like us, have a body which is through and through simply concrete will, manifestation of the will; but born of a pure virgin, he has only a phantom body. This last is the doctrine of the Docetæ, i.e., certain Church Fathers, who in this respect are very consistent. It is especially taught by Apelles, against whom and his followers Tertullian wrote. But even Augustine comments thus on the passage, Rom. viii. 3, "God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh:" "Non enim caro peccati erat, quæ non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat" (Liber 83, quæst. qu. 66). He also teaches in his work entitled "Opus Imperfectum," i. 47, that inherited sin is both sin and punishment at once. It is already present in new-born children, but only shows itself if they grow up. Yet the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him; Adam became miserable, and in him we have all become miserable. Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore Jesus Christ ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live, but never as an individual, whether according to his mythical history given in the Gospels, or according to the probably true history which lies at the foundation of this. For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy us entirely. It is merely the vehicle of that conception for the people, who always demand something actual. That in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true significance, and degenerated into dull optimism, does not concern us here.

It is further an original and evangelical doctrine of Christianity — which Augustine, with the consent of the leaders of the Church, defended against the platitudes of the Pelagians, and which it was the principal aim of Luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish, as he expressly declares in his book, "De Servo Arbitrio," — the doctrine that the will is not free, but originally subject to the inclination to evil. Therefore according to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally, these works can never save us, but faith alone, a faith which itself does not spring from resolution and free will, but from the work of grace, without our co-operation, comes to us as from without.

Not only the dogmas referred to before, but also this last genuine evangelical dogma belongs to those which at the present day an ignorant and dull opinion rejects as absurd or hides. For, in spite of Augustine and Luther, it adheres to the vulgar Pelagianism, which the rationalism of the day really is, and treats as antiquated those deeply significant dogmas which are peculiar and essential to Christianity in the strictest sense; while, on the other hand, it holds fast and regards as the principal matter only the dogma that originates in Judaism, and has been retained from it, and is merely historically connected with Christianity.[28] We, however, recognise in the doctrine referred to above the truth completely agreeing with the result of our own investigations. We see that true virtue and holiness of disposition have their origin not in deliberate choice (works), but in knowledge (faith); just as we have in like manner developed it from our leading thought. If it were works, which spring from motives and deliberate intention, that led to salvation, then, however one may turn it, virtue would always be a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism. But the faith to which the Christian Church promises salvation is this: that as through the fall of the first man we are all partakers of sin and subject to death and perdition, through the divine substitute, through grace and the taking upon himself of our fearful guilt, we are all saved, without any merit of our own (of the person); since that which can proceed from the intentional (determined by motives) action of the person, works, can never justify us, from its very nature, just because it is intentional, action induced by motives, opus operatum. Thus in this faith there is implied, first of all, that our condition is originally and essentially an incurable one, from which we need salvation; then, that we ourselves essentially belong to evil, and are so firmly bound to it that our works according to law and precept, i.e., according to motives, can never satisfy justice nor save us; but salvation is only obtained through faith, i.e., through a changed mode of knowing, and this faith can only come through grace, thus as from without. This means that the salvation is one which is quite foreign to our person, and points to a denial and surrender of this person necessary to salvation. Works, the result of the law as such, can never justify, because they are always action following upon motives. Luther demands (in his book "De Libertate Christiana") that after the entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from it entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; yet by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and gratuitously. So we also hold that from the ever-clearer penetration of the principium individuationis proceeds, first, merely free justice, then love, extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally resignation or denial of the will. — WWR Book 4

2) I think Schopenhauer's version of non-being is almost necessarily accompanied by a physical death because at that point of salvation, how does one go back to "willing" again? Willing is so intertwined with physiological living for Schopenhauer, I cannot see how the final "salvation" can be anything different (like a Buddhist might believe with the Middle Path):

There is a species of suicide which seems to be quite distinct from the common kind, though its occurrence has perhaps not yet been fully established. It is starvation, voluntarily chosen on the ground of extreme asceticism. All instances of it, however, have been accompanied and obscured by much religious fanaticism, and even superstition. Yet it seems that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for the support of the natural life. This kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the will to live, that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live because he has already altogether ceased to will. No other death than that by starvation is in this case conceivable (unless it were the result of some special superstition); for the intention to cut short the torment would itself be a stage in the assertion of will. The dogmas which satisfy the reason of such a penitent delude him with the idea that a being of a higher nature has inculcated the fasting to which his own inner tendency drives him.

...

It might be supposed that the entire exposition (now terminated) of that which I call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the earlier explanation of necessity, which belongs just as much to motivation as to every other form of the principle of sufficient reason, and according to which, motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes, upon which the character unfolds its nature and reveals it with the necessity of a natural law, on account of which we absolutely denied freedom as liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ. But far from suppressing this here, I would call it to mind. In truth, real freedom, i.e., independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs to the will only as a thing-in-itself, not to its manifestation, whose essential form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element or sphere of necessity. But the one case in which that freedom can become directly visible in the manifestation is that in which it makes an end of what manifests itself, and because the mere manifestation, as a link in the chain of causes, the living body in time, which contains only phenomena, still continues to exist, the will which manifests itself through this phenomenon then stands in contradiction to it, for it denies what the phenomenon expresses. In such a case the organs of generation, for example, as the visible form of the sexual impulse, are there and in health; but yet, in the inmost consciousness, no sensual gratification is desired; and although the whole body is only the visible expression of the will to live, yet the motives which correspond to this will no longer act ; indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and in this way the greatest check to the natural will, is welcome and desired. Now, the contradiction between our assertions of the necessity of the determination of the will by motives, in accordance with the character, on the one hand, and of the possibility of the entire suppression of the will whereby the motives become powerless, on the other hand, is only the repetition in the reflection of philosophy of this real contradiction which arises from the direct encroachment of the freedom of the will-in-itself, which knows no necessity, into the sphere of the necessity of its manifestation. But the key to the solution of these contradictions lies in the fact that the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will, but from a changed form of knowledge. So long as the knowledge is merely that which is involved in the principium individuationis and exclusively follows the principle of sufficient reason, the strength of the motives is irresistible. But when the principium individuationis is seen through, when the Ideas, and indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, as the same will in all, are directly recognised, and from this knowledge an universal quieter of volition arises, then the particular motives become ineffective, because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to them is obscured and thrown into the background by quite another kind. Therefore the character can never partially change, but must, with the consistency of a law of Nature, carry out in the particular the will which it manifests as a whole. But this whole, the character itself, may be completely suppressed or abolished through the change of knowledge referred to above. It is this suppression or abolition which Asmus, as quoted above, marvels at and denotes the "catholic, transcendental change;" and in the Christian Church it has very aptly been called the new birth, and the knowledge from which it springs, the work of grace. Therefore it is not a question of a change, but of an entire suppression of the character; and hence it arises that, however different the characters which experience the suppression may have been before it, after it they show a great similarity in their conduct, though every one still speaks very differently according to his conceptions and dogmas.

Sure, withdrawing is fine and "leads to greater happiness" as long as someone else is paying your bills (such as in the case of Buddhist monks), or at least as long as your job is comfortable enough and you can earn money with relative ease.

But if such is not the case, one has to stay in the rat race, and be a rat, or be defeated. — baker

Absolutely. But I did say this:

However, being that food limitation and bodily starvation are near impossible for most, withdrawal is the next best thing. It is not going to solve the ultimate problem of disturbance laid upon us by existence itself, but it limits overall drama and harm caused to others. Withdrawal is preventative, but also a statement about not allowing oneself to inflict harms upon others. The key is to ensure that any contact is purely transactional- just enough to meet the basic requirements of existence, without letting it spiral into further emotional entanglements. — schopenhauer1

That is to say, the best some might be able to do is limit engagements, not completely eliminate them.

That being said, I claim that the best course of action in almost all cases as a human to comport with the best life, is to live a life of withdrawal. — schopenhauer1

And yet it appears to be possible to come up with such a set of values and goals, and thus priorities, accompanied by sufficient pride, that the vicissitudes of life are a minimal problem or source of suffering. This way, one is still engaged with the world (and not minimally), and yet doesn't suffer. Pride and priorities.


It's telling that people generally prefer to think in black and white, all or nothing terms, rather than reconceptualizing the situation entirely.

And yet it appears to be possible to come up with such a set of values and goals, and thus priorities, accompanied by sufficient pride, that the vicissitudes of life are a minimal problem or source of suffering. This way, one is still engaged with the world (and not minimally), and yet doesn't suffer. Pride and priorities. — baker

I am not quiet sure what you are saying. If the ascetic follows it all the way through, they kill themselves through starvation. If not, I guess minimizing the addiction (the delusion of what's good that is really not.. like social interactions), is a good start. And thus my post here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/945569

It's telling that people generally prefer to think in black and white, all or nothing terms, rather than reconceptualizing the situation entirely. — baker

To be fair, the most common view for almost anything is "balance". I'm actually bucking that advise with what you may call "black-and-white" thinking. It's extreme and unsettling (when we usually think in terms of common advise terms like Golden Mean-type / Taoist koan "balance" or modern self-help stock strategies) for sure, not necessarily wrong.

That is to say, the best some might be able to do is limit engagements, not completely eliminate them. — schopenhauer1

But there is better than merely limiting engagements (while thinking eliminating engagements altogether would be best): to prioritize them according to one's values in life.

In modern politcally correct culture, it's not acceptable to be ruthlessly selective in whom one associates with and for what purpose. And yet anyone who has ever achieved anything great has been doing just that: being ruthlessly selective in whom one associates with and for what purpose.

In modern politcally correct culture, it's not acceptable to be ruthlessly selective in whom one associates with and for what purpose. — baker

This would be completely anathema advice to the what the ascetic viewpoint. It precisely leans into the attachments and that which causes more pain. The goal-seeking here, and the many sources for entanglements in drama/disappointment will be part of any human interaction. Even the calculative aspect of selection you speak of already sets the stage prior to the engagement.

Even the calculative aspect of selection you speak of already sets the stage prior to the engagement. — schopenhauer1

Only for someone with a too fragile ego.

The politically correct madness has reached the point where we aren't supposed to distinguish between a sociopath and a person with a strong character.

To be fair, the most common view for almost anything is "balance". I'm actually bucking that advise with what you may call "black-and-white" thinking. It's extreme and unsettling (when we usually think in terms of common advise terms like Golden Mean-type / Taoist koan "balance" or modern self-help stock strategies) for sure, not necessarily wrong. — schopenhauer1

The "middle way" is probably one of the most misunderstood terms when referring to Buddhism. For old-school Theravadans, the "middle way" actually means living a monk's life -- with eating only one meal a day, wearing only robes, not engaging in sex, and all the other rules of a monk's life.

For those Buddhists, death alone doesn't solve anything (regardless whether it's by starvation or gunshot wound). It's rebirth that needs to be ended, in order to end suffering.

The "middle way" is probably one of the most misunderstood terms when referring to Buddhism. For old-school Theravadans, the "middle way" actually means living a monk's life -- with eating only one meal a day, wearing only robes, not engaging in sex, and all the other rules of a monk's life.

For those Buddhists, death alone doesn't solve anything (regardless whether it's by starvation or gunshot wound). It's rebirth that needs to be ended, in order to end suffering. — baker

You misinterpret me. First off, I am proposing an even more extreme version in the Schopenhauer brand of asceticism. I am claiming that in his version, even the Middle Way of the Buddhist (Theravadans or otherwise), is not enough. Rather, that in his conception, whereby Will is extricabley tied up on physical existence, I see no way that the ascetic is physiologically still alive after their "grace" of salvation (spiritual redemption into non-being). It seems in his way, even the monk is not going to get there. And it is doubtful a Buddha who stays around to teach his enlightenment has actually become non-being.. Perhaps on their way.. I get the impression that the ascetic death is basically one of the only occasions.. perhaps a sort of grace before death and then (to us, the people left), a dead person.

You misinterpret me. — schopenhauer1

I didn't even interpret you.

First off, I am proposing an even more extreme version in the Schopenhauer brand of asceticism. I am claiming that in his version, even the Middle Way of the (Buddhist- Theravadans or otherwise), is not enough. Rather, that in his conception, whereby Will is extricabley tied up on physical existence, I see no way that the ascetic is physiologically still alive after their "grace" of salvation (spiritual redemption into non-being). It seems in his way, even the monk is not going to get there.

Schopenhauer didn't believe in rebirth and didn't see the problem with it, did he?



See here on the Buddhist idea of the cause of suffering and how to end it:
https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN10_92.html

And here an excerpt of the relevant text from the above link with easier to read formatting:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12050/page/p1

Social engagement leads to more attachments, and more conflicts, and more frustrations, litigations, manifestations, allegations, contortions,
and complications, in short, drama and disappointments, all of which serve only to entangle the individual further in the suffering. — schopenhauer1

Generally this seems to be a buddist type argument.
P1. Desire breeds suffering
P2. Suffering is bad and ought to be reduced
C. Therefore, we ought to eliminate our desire
Not an entirely invalid argument, but alot of people reject the 2nd premise, including me.

However, there doesnt seem to be any reason for why suicide isn't the conclusion here, since non-experience will always have less suffering compared to the little in withdrawl. If you factor in the value of others, then it implies efilism (action towards human extinction). The fact you dont come to these conclusions suggests to me that you either dont realise this is the logical conclusion, or that you do have some value for desire aswell, although I dont know how that factors into your belief that withdrawl is still positive (seeing as that seems to imply suffering is valued more than desire).

Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. — WWR Book 4

Therefore according to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally, these works can never save us, but faith alone, a faith which itself does not spring from resolution and free will, but from the work of grace, without our co-operation, comes to us as from without. — WWR Book 4

It seems to me that, given the above, Christianity's Gospel cannot be served up to the masses (as we are taught); salvation cannot be be reeled in like a fish on a hook; there is no learning how to fish for salvation, as it comes unbidden to the elect, in accordance with a mysterious divinity. If this is true, then Jesus came to earth to greet those already divinely chosen for the afterlife in heaven.

If it were works, which spring from motives and deliberate intention, that led to salvation, then, however one may turn it, virtue would always be a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism. — WWR Book 4

...salvation is only obtained through faith, i.e., through a changed mode of knowing, and this faith can only come through grace, thus as from without. This means that the salvation is one which is quite foreign to our person, and points to a denial and surrender of this person necessary to salvation. — WWR Book 4

I see here that faith is a type of knowing, perhaps divine knowing. In our language, "knowing" is a verb, an action. Is there a divine knowing possible in the form of an existential reality that can be practiced within the natural world?

Luther demands (in his book "De Libertate Christiana") that after the entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from it entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; yet by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and gratuitously. So we also hold that from the ever-clearer penetration of the principium individuationis proceeds, first, merely free justice, then love, extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally resignation or denial of the will. — WWR Book 4

I see here that good works become operational when the faithful cease to obstruct their activation due to exercise of self-serving will.

I think Schopenhauer's version of non-being is almost necessarily accompanied by a physical death because at that point of salvation, how does one go back to "willing" again? Willing is so intertwined with physiological living for Schopenhauer, I cannot see how the final "salvation" can be anything different (like a Buddhist might believe with the Middle Path): — schopenhauer1

What comes to mind as a possible alternative to non-existence is something akin to the virtual body of Jesus on earth.

Yet it seems that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for the support of the natural life. This kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the will to live, that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live because he has already altogether ceased to will. No other death than that by starvation is in this case conceivable (unless it were the result of some special superstition)... — Schopenhauer

I wonder if the passage described here might better be characterized by some label other than "suicide." What about the idea of replacing "suicide" with "ascension"? Might Jesus' total surrender of his will to God have been the form of his ascension from the cave?

I've thought of ascension as a type of explosion that creates instead of destroys. In this context it might be the creative explosion of the will. With its explosion, the will merges into the Divinity.

However, there doesnt seem to be any reason for why suicide isn't the conclusion here, since non-experience will always have less suffering compared to the little in withdrawl. If you factor in the value of others, then it implies efilism (action towards human extinction). The fact you dont come to these conclusions suggests to me that you either dont realise this is the logical conclusion, or that you do have some value for desire aswell, although I dont know how that factors into your belief that withdrawl is still positive (seeing as that seems to imply suffering is valued more than desire). — Ourora Aureis

I am an ardent antinatalist- not so sure about "efilist". As for suicide, indeed if you read how I'm interpreting Schopenhauer, the ascetic man's final demise is suicide-through-starvation, with a moment of "grace" beforehand. That's how I interpret how he foresees any redemption of Will. Being that Schopenhauer's conception of will-to-live is tied so thoroughly to the subject/object and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the physical manifestation would surely cease functioning (to us, the still living), it would seem. Thus, I don't think Schopenhauer's version of "grace" (redemption) would be fully realized by a Buddha that is "enlightened" yet is still living. I think it would fully be someone who died a sort of "ascetic's death". That's just my interpretation of his notion of ascetic saintliness though.

As far as the OP, well, it was a milder version of all this really, recommending that we are not all going to be ascetic saints. Schopenhauer thought only certain characters were up to this, most weren't. But, as practical advice, I thought it such that social entanglements are a good place to start to reduce drama and the convoluted disappointments and despair that comes from it. It also provided a launching point for explaining how social engagements- despite popular opinion/media are not as fully conducive to flourishing as we may think. The conventional wisdom is to find good friends and partners/lovers. But perhaps this is like a mirage, an illusion that in the end brings more baggage than good. Contra popular wisdom, social entanglements almost always lead to worse outcomes, despite the initial "highs" one gets from their initial engagement- in preventing the "lonely" feelings of the isolated individual.

As with most of my threads that come to a few pages, I recommend reading from the beginning to see how the conversation has unfolded, which might inform more of the ideas and the dialectic already at play.

Philosophy pants :lol:

That one made me laugh.