• Brenner T
    4
    To preface, I am new to philosophy as a whole so apologies for obvious gaps in understanding of the literature. As an extension of this preface, the argument presented below was one I made as a high schooler with under three weeks of philosophy readings under my belt... it's accordingly pretty rough.

    In a random philosophy class I took in Junior year of high school the professor introduced Berkeley's Subjective Idealism- df. "a philosophy based on the premise that nothing exists except minds and spirits and their perceptions or ideas." I, being an energetic kid new to philosophy, tried to build some sort of syllogistic argument to rebuke the theory. I was looking through my notes app recently and saw this argument and, after reading it in amusement, wondered if it can be extended as a rebuttal of classical theism as a whole (specifically the theory that there was a conscious being that preceded other forms of perceptible existence).

    Here is a rough outline of the argument I posited against subjective idealism:
    1. According to Berkeley, all that is are ideas and minds.
    2. Ideas are mind-dependent; perceptions require a perceiver.
    3. Thus, according to Berkeley, a mind had to exist before or come to existence simultaneously with ideas.
    4. Non-existence cannot be perceived and something imperceptible cannot be perceived.
    5. Minds have no perceivable structure of their own.
    6. Thus, minds cannot be perceived or perceive themselves (from (4) and (5)).
    7. Thus, all that can be perceived are ideas (from (1), (4), and (6)).
    8. A mind cannot perceive something if there is nothing to perceive (from (4)).
    9. For ideas to exist, a mind had to perceive (from (2))
    10. Ideas exist
    11. Thus, the first mind(s) had to be able to perceive (from (2), (7) and (10)).
    12. Therefore, ideas had to exist before minds.
    13. According to Berkeley, a mind had to exist before ideas (from (3)).
    14. But since ideas exist, they had to exist before minds (from (12)).
    15. Thus, there is a contradiction in Berkeley’s theory.

    I also posited another argument to back this up, which intended to state that a mind cannot exist without some (presumably material/mechanistic) mechanisms for sensory or computational abilities.

    1. To perceive itself, a mind needs some sensory and computational abilities.
    2. Sensory abilities are useless without anything to sense.
    3. The perceiver can only sense their own perceptions.
    4. But to have perceptions it must have some sensory abilities (from (1)).
    5. But sensory abilities are useless without any perceptions to sense (from (2)).
    6. Thus, sensory abilities and perceptions are contingent on each other, and so they cannot arise simultaneously.
    7. Thus, a mind alone cannot perceive itself.

    Obviously rough around the edges but there seems to be some intriguing validity in the conclusion that it make no sense for a mind to exist without there also existing i) something that is perceivable and ii) the ability to perceive/sense. I am curious if you believe theres any validity in the argument against Berkeley but mostly curious if you believe this logic can be extended to rebut classical theism. This conclusion seems to imply that a conscious "God" that arose before all of creation is impossible because a) he would have nothing to perceive and thus have no content of thought or qualia, and ii) he would have no mechanism to perceive or sense.
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    This conclusion seems to imply that a conscious "God" that arose before all of creation is impossible because a) he would have nothing to perceive and thus have no content of thought or qualia, and ii) he would have no mechanism to perceive or sense.Brenner T

    Welcome aboard.

    As we're discussing Berkeley, a limerick known to generations of philosophy of students ought to be mentioned:

    "There was a young man who said "God
    Must find it exceedingly odd
    To think that the tree
    Should continue to be
    When there's no one about in the quad."

    Reply:

    "Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
    I am always about in the quad.
    And that's why the tree
    Will continue to be
    Since observed by,
    Yours faithfully,
    God."


    I don't know if the absence of there being anything to perceive would be necessarily a hindrance for God, although there are tropes that the reason anything exists at all, was because He experienced a sense of incompleteness without there being something other than Him to contemplate. (There is an early Buddhist text which presents an idea like this by way of satirising the idea of a personal God.)

    Secondly, quite what 'conscious' means in this context is far from obvious. Many of the aspects of our own consciousness are, in fact, unconscious, as 20th c psychology has shown, in that we can't necessarily be introspectively or directly aware of them, while they still comprise the basis on which our conscious experience is founded. So there is no reason to presume that, were a Divine Intelligence to be real, that the kind of consciousness it possesses would be like that of humans (although hopefully there is some kind of commonality.) Isn't it the case that a conscious intelligence can be self-aware even in the absence of any external stimuli? Consciousness is something that knows of its own being even in the absence of stimuli. As René Descartes said, even if all belief in an external world is suspended, one will still retain a sense of one's own being, 'cogito ergo sum'.

    There's a lot more I might say, because, as it happens, I'm generally an advocate for philosphical idealism, but it's a deep topic, so I'll leave it at that for now.
  • T Clark
    13.8k
    6. Thus, sensory abilities and perceptions are contingent on each other, and so they cannot arise simultaneously.Brenner T

    Sure they can. That's how evolution works. Some little organism 2.5 billion years ago just happened to react in a particular way to a stimulus. That reaction provided a survival advantage and was carried on in the organism's descendants. And now here we are. Minds didn't just appear fully formed by the wave of a wand. They grew up with the universe.

    7. Thus, a mind alone cannot perceive itself.Brenner T

    My mind is here perceiving itself right now. There... and again... Maybe you should clarify what you mean by "perceive.

    And welcome to the forum.
  • Ourora Aureis
    50
    5. Minds have no perceivable structure of their own.
    6. Thus, minds cannot be perceived or perceive themselves (from (4) and (5)).
    Brenner T

    I am not equated with Berkeley's theory, but within this theory couldn't a mind be equated to the perceptions it holds? If all that exists is qualia, then the mind must *be* the totality of such qualia, right? It side-steps the issue with assuming they are seperate and that both must precede the other. (I think your argument works well against the seperated position though).
  • Gnomon
    3.7k

    I don't know if the absence of there being anything to perceive would be necessarily a hindrance for God, although there are tropes that the reason anything exists at all, was because He experienced a sense of incompleteness without there being something other than Him to contemplate.Wayfarer
    If G*D is sentient, in a manner similar to human perception, then a feeling of incompleteness might be imputed. But, if G*D/Nature is purely rational, Spock-like, then emotions & feelings may not be included in its super-natural constitution. These are big "ifs" though, and we will never have enough evidence to allow a conclusive "then".

    However, why would an eternal boundless necessary Being create just one fleeting instance of temporal existence? For example, a modern non-theistic conjecture beyond the scope of real-world evidence is the Multiverse hypothesis. A random roiling of matter/energy that accidentally produces a self-sustaining world every few uber-zillion Earth-years. In that case, there is no "why?"

    Yet, if we can equate an eternal world-creating ALL with traditional notions of Deity, then perhaps G*D occupies and amuses He/rself with the hobby of creating temporary universes with various physical settings in anticipation of learning how each 'verse will work out. That would give God something to Perceive, to Contemplate, and to have something like parental feelings for. Hence, not a "Mind Alone". You could guess that G*D passes the timelessness, before & after space-time, with unlimited Creativity*1.

    Is that speculative scenario any less plausible than any other conjectures into the unknown? It presumes that the Creator-mind must have at least the Potential for every Actual feature of He/r creations. :smile:


    *1. Creativity : the use of the imagination or original ideas, especially in the production of an artistic work. ___Oxford dictionary
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    If the g/G of "classical theism" is eternal, then its "ideas" are also eternal, and therefore whatever exists – "whatever it perceives to be" – is also eternal from g/G's pov (even though from a not-g/G (e.g. human) pov whatever exists seems temporal (which is a "stubbornly persistent illusion" according to A. Einstein)). So, imo, refuting Berkeley does not itself refute "classical theism" (vide Spinoza / Epicurus).

    Btw, I'm a p-naturalist (i.e. anti-supernaturalist ... anti-antirealist) with a speculative affinity for pandeism.
  • Paul
    78
    "Something from nothing" at the start of the universe is problem inherent in our understanding of linear time, whether you agree with Berkelean idealism or not. Theists often cite it as proof of god, because it seems impossible and attributing the impossible to god makes sense to them. But while they're wrong about it proving god, you can't use it to disprove god either. The universe's beginning simply doesn't make sense to our normal way of thinking, we can only conclude that it doesn't work like the rest of time, not whether there could or couldn't be a god involved.
  • RussellA
    1.8k
    3. Thus, according to Berkeley, a mind had to exist before or come to existence simultaneously with ideas.Brenner T

    It depends on the relationships between mind, perceiving, sensing, ideas and thoughts.

    For example, for Berkeley, what exactly is the relationship between mind and ideas.

    Is it the case that the mind has ideas or is it the case that the mind is ideas. For example, is it the case that an object has extension in space or is it the case that an object is an extension in space.

    As an object having no extension in space would be a contradiction in terms, for a mind not to have ideas would perhaps also be a contradiction in terms.

    Does the mind have intentionality about ideas, or is the mind intentionality of ideas?

    In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. (SEP - Intentionality)

    For Berkeley, what is the relation between the mind and ideas.
  • Brenner T
    4


    Consciousness is something that knows of its own being even in the absence of stimuli. As René Descartes said, even if all belief in an external world is suspended, one will still retain a sense of one's own being, 'cogito ergo sum'.Wayfarer

    What theory of consciousness allows the statement "you could be conscious even without an external world" to be true? Doesn't epiphenomenalism hold that consciousness is reliant on the physical brain (or some structure of integrated matter at least), and thus if the physical does not exist then there could, by definition, be no consciousness? Or, put another way, there would be "nothing it is like to be something without a brain." Physicalist theories of consciousness seem to inevitably make the same deduction. And I cannot see how Cartesion-like dualistic theories of consciousness would posit anything different. Yes, I can infer that "I am" based on the realization that "I think," but that doesn't imply that "thinking" is a process that can exist independently of an external world. Aren't I just conscious of the thinking processes that are wholly produced by the brain? In other words, how would I "think" if I have no brain, or no physical system full of sensory and computational processes that my consciousness can be aware of?
  • Brenner T
    4

    7. Thus, a mind alone cannot perceive itself.
    — Brenner T

    My mind is here perceiving itself right now. There... and again... Maybe you should clarify what you mean by "perceive.
    T Clark

    I don't quite know how to word this it's such a weird thought experiment. But I think what I meant to say was something like this:

    So, I imagine you are, in some way, a conscious entity. There is something it is like to be you. That's roughly how I will define consciousness. Now, imagine you could conceptually remove your brain from the universe, as well as all matter and space. If you were a physicalist then I imagine you would believe the bits of consciousness you had would also disappear along with matter and space, if you were an epiphenomenalist I imagine you would see the possibility of consciousness collapsing as there is no more integrated biological system for it to "see through" or be logically supervenient to, and if you were a Cartesian dualist I imagine you would now imagine a vacuum devoid of time and space but with your "distinct conscious substance" still in existence. We'll call this "a mind alone." For clarification, I'll call the "conscious substance" your mind (in opposition to your brain, which is a purely physical system). Now, with no brain for your mind to "interact through," no brain to produce thoughts and ideas, and no external perceptible world, I can't see a way your "mind alone can perceive (be conscious of) itself." Or worded a different way, I don't see how there could be somehting-it-is-like-to-be a "mind alone."

    Don't know if that cleared up anything...

    But in short my line of reasoning then is that if there is nothing it is like to be a "mind alone," then the idea of a primordial God that preceded his creation would infer that he was once a "mind alone," and if there was nothing it is like to be that God, then it seems equivalent to nothing existing at all.

    If consciousness is the "what-it-is-like-to-be"ness of something, then if there is nothing-it-is-like-to-be, then it is functionally not conscious. And if all that exists is consciousness in that scenario, then it is equivalent to nothing existing at all. And thus saying "a conscious entity (God) existed before all of creation, matter, space, and time, seems equivalent to saying "nothing existed before all of creation, matter, space, and time."
  • Brenner T
    4
    5. Minds have no perceivable structure of their own.
    6. Thus, minds cannot be perceived or perceive themselves (from (4) and (5)).
    — Brenner T

    I am not equated with Berkeley's theory, but within this theory couldn't a mind be equated to the perceptions it holds? If all that exists is qualia, then the mind must *be* the totality of such qualia, right? It side-steps the issue with assuming they are seperate and that both must precede the other. (I think your argument works well against the seperated position though).
    Ourora Aureis

    Great point- I definitely agree.

    I feel intuitively that the argument could be extended to the equated position of mind and perceptions. I commented on it a little bit in a reply I just made to someone else's response, but it would require some sort of argument that states that the idea of "qualia" in a subjective idealist cosmology is akin to saying "nothing comes from something." What would be the cause of perception (qualia) if there's nothing that is perceptible and no pre-existing ideas with which the perception can build off of.

    Perhaps all of metaphysics all boils down to irreducible guesses that something comes from nothing, and for that reason it can be a pursuit of theoretical simplicity instead of correctness.
  • Gnomon
    3.7k
    "Something from nothing" at the start of the universe is problem inherent in our understanding of linear time, whether you agree with Berkelean idealism or not. Theists often cite it as proof of god, because it seems impossible and attributing the impossible to god makes sense to them. But while they're wrong about it proving god, you can't use it to disprove god either. The universe's beginning simply doesn't make sense to our normal way of thinking, we can only conclude that it doesn't work like the rest of time, not whether there could or couldn't be a god involved.Paul
    The Big Bang hypothesis didn't "make sense" to atheistic naturalists, back in the early 20th century. For example, Einstein included a dimensionless "cosmological constant"*1 in his theory of relativity, specifically to force the numbers to describe the static eternal universe, that he believed was necessary. He later abandoned that attempt to make the numbers "make sense", after Hubble provided evidence that the universe was not static, but expanding, and not eternal, but temporal. Also, the origin of that expansion has been calculated as a dimensionless-spaceless-timeless-matterless Singularity, from which space-time-mater-energy suddenly appeared . . . . much to the surprise and chagrin of those who assumed the universe was eternal & self-existent & godless.

    Since, then several scientists & philosophers have searched for some other Ontological Necessity*2 that is not traditionally theistic. So, our materialistic "normal way of thinking" may not be able to "make sense" of anything (being or entity) immaterial & preternatural. So, the non-empirical (mythical) notions of eternal Multiverse and infinite Many Worlds have been postulated as explanations of our temporal & spatial existence, that make more sense than the equally non-empirical Theistic theories of traditional religions. Unfortunately, they "make sense" only if you accept metaphysical Materialism & Naturalism as the axiom of your belief system. But are just as un-provable as any god-hypothesis. :smile:


    *1. The "Einstein cosmological constant" refers to a term added by Albert Einstein to his theory of general relativity, represented by the Greek letter "lambda" (Λ), which was initially introduced to force a static universe model by counteracting gravity with a repulsive force, but later considered by Einstein as his "biggest blunder" when evidence emerged showing the universe is expanding.
    ___Google AI overview

    *2. Ontological Necessity :
    René Descartes also defended a similar argument in the 17th century. Descartes compared the ontological argument to a geometric demonstration, arguing that necessary existence is as obvious as the fact that a triangle has angles that equal two right angles.
    ___Google AI overview
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    What theory of consciousness allows the statement "you could be conscious even without an external world" to be true?Brenner T

    Franklin Merrell-Wolff was an American mystic and esoteric philosopher. After formal education in philosophy and mathematics at Stanford and Harvard, Wolff devoted himself to the goal of transcending the normal limits of human consciousness. Franklin Merrell-Wolff’s philosophy of consciousness centers on the idea of "Consciousness without an object," a term he coined to describe a fundamental state of awareness that transcends the ordinary subject-object duality of experience. In Merrell-Wolff’s view, this state represents the pure essence of consciousness, existing independently of any perceptual content, thoughts, or objects to be aware of. It is an experience of pure awareness or self-luminous being, which is foundational and inherently beyond the usual categories of mind and matter.

    Merrell-Wolff asserts that this "Consciousness-without-an-object" is the ground of all experience and cannot be fully grasped through intellectual or sensory means. It is instead encountered in a state he describes as "introception," a kind of direct, non-dual awareness that bypasses the conventional processes of thinking and perceiving. In this state, distinctions such as self and other, subject and object, dissolve, leaving only a unified consciousness that Merrell-Wolff equates with a transcendent reality or "unconditioned consciousness."

    For Merrell-Wolff, this pure consciousness is not merely an abstract concept but a living, experiential reality that one can realize through spiritual practice. He views it as the ultimate truth or reality, which can be known intuitively rather than through discursive reasoning. His philosophy therefore emphasizes inner transformation and the cultivation of a contemplative awareness that opens one to the experience of this unconditioned consciousness, which he describes as a state of profound peace, freedom, and insight beyond ordinary knowledge.

    This is essentially the same as what is conveyed by the yogic term 'nirvikalpa samadhi' which is from Sanskrit, where "nir-" means "without" or "devoid of," and "vikalpa" comes from vi- (a prefix indicating separation or distinction) and kalpa (which can mean "concept," "imagination," or "idea"). Thus, nirvikalpa literally translates to "without concepts" or "free from thought and distinctions." Samadhi refers to a state of meditative absorption or unity. Taken together, nirvikalpa samadhi refers to a state of consciousness in which there are no mental modifications, distinctions, or conceptualizations—only undivided, absolute awareness.
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