The move from philosophical to scientific language is toward a thinner, more conventionalized and less synthetic account of the same or similar phenomena (Nietzsche vs Freud, Merleau-Ponty vs embodied cogntivism). — Joshs
I would add that empirical concepts are in their own way ‘high-fallutin’. But what does this mean? — Joshs
"You are presupposing a conscious mind, but I deny a conscious mind." So has this person stopped doing philosophy? Nope, in fact they haven't. The philosophy goes on. — Leontiskos
As I noted, for me, high-fallutin language grasps for an exalted level of significance, which I reject. — T Clark
By high-fallutin do you mean technically complicated language, such as that used by educated professionals? Or do you mean bullshit masquerading as insight? — Tom Storm
By high-fallutin do you mean technically complicated language, such as that used by educated professionals? Or do you mean bullshit masquerading as insight?
— Tom Storm
There's no reason it can't be both. In this particular case I think "bullshit masquerading as insight" is probably a bit strong. How about gilding the lily — T Clark
my primary argument is against setting philosophy up as some sort of pinnacle of human inquiry. I don't see it as all that special. For me, it is an exercise in self-awareness - more a practice than a study. — T Clark
In my view, philosophy in its most general sense refers to a mode of discourse melding comprehensiveness, unity, and explicitness. — Joshs
I don’t believe there is any domain philosophy tackles that science can’t venture into. I think we agree it’s just a matter of style of expression. — Joshs
I don’t think Conze says or implies that. — Wayfarer
The purpose of my quoting the Edward Conze text was simply an illustration of the idea of there being a higher truth - something for which I am generally criticized for suggesting. But to get down to basics, this is because I don't think our culture possesses a vertical axis along which the description of 'higher' makes any sense. — Wayfarer
It would help if you could give some concrete examples of highfalutin language in philosophy. — Joshs
Many of my favorite philosophers (Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida) have been accused of writing in an obscurantist style. It has been suggested that this is a deliberate strategy to attract a cult-like following of initiates into what appears to outsiders as a secret society. — Joshs
more precise than the engineering vocabulary associated with your profession. — Joshs
Now that I think about it, I don't think the ideas we bounce around in philosophy need to be all that nuanced and subtle. — T Clark
If so, then as Srap pointed out, I've stacked the deck heavily against, e.g., the Freudian who wants to opt out of that sort of discourse. — J
Srap's second point follows from this. He said, with disappointment, that what seemed to him the interesting issues raised by the OP never really got discussed. — J
For me, the deeper interest here is good old "thinking and being." The OP ended by bringing in Hegel and his dialectical concept of refutations, as an example of how an innocent recursion might point us to some very important truths. This was a gesture. — J
What we want to know, I think, is whether phil.'s lack of specialness is because a) the Q recursion isn't special to phil. at all, or b) this kind of recursive argumentation is indeed merely a gotcha! generated by a type of formalism we can look at and understand. — J
But can you think of anyone other than the OL philosophers whose ideas are not nuanced and subtle? — J
I think a lot of people were more interested in shooting down other planes than trying to fly their own. — Leontiskos
In my view, philosophy in its most general sense refers to a mode of discourse melding comprehensiveness, unity, and explicitness.
— Joshs
I like the sound of this, but I have to ask for more clarity. A great novel can be shown to meld all three of these qualities, but does that make it philosophy? What about a beautiful prayer? Perhaps you would say that the missing element in both examples is explicitness. What, then, are the discursive tools by which explicitness comes to be? I'm nudging you toward taking the "rational inquiry" idea a bit more seriously. And let's remember that rationality is not univocal. Two of the philosophers I've gotten the most from, Gadamer and Habermas, spent their lives trying to formulate better versions of what it means to be rational, versions that would provide an escape from the crushing scientific rationalism of the 19th century — J
I don’t believe there is any domain philosophy tackles that science can’t venture into. I think we agree it’s just a matter of style of expression.
— Joshs
Really? Unless you include both math and metaphysics within science, I don't see how this could be true — J
my primary argument is against setting philosophy up as some sort of pinnacle of human inquiry. I don't see it as all that special. For me, it is an exercise in self-awareness - more a practice than a study.
— T Clark
This is the question of the first part of the OP, and your answer may well be true. What we want to know, I think, is whether phil.'s lack of specialness is because a) the Q recursion isn't special to phil. at all, or b) this kind of recursive argumentation is indeed merely a gotcha! generated by a type of formalism we can look at and understand. — J
The final thing I find interesting about these quoted responses is that they all shy away from the idea that phil. is distinguished by its subject matter. — J
It is hardly outside the mainstream to think philosophy's mission might be principally if not exclusively critical. Starts with a guy called 'Socrates' ... — Srap Tasmaner
Supposedly Einstein said that if you can't explain it to a six year old, you don't really understand it. II know that if I can't put an idea in my own words, I don't understand it. Now that I think about it, I don't think the ideas we bounce around in philosophy need to be all that nuanced and subtle. Clearly you don't agree with that — T Clark
The final thing I find interesting about these quoted responses is that they all shy away from the idea that phil. is distinguished by its subject matter. — J
If so, then as Srap pointed out, I've stacked the deck heavily against, e.g., the Freudian who wants to opt out of that sort of discourse.
— J
As I said earlier, he holds that theories of motivation require justification, so he hasn't opted out. — Leontiskos
an argumentative pinnacle — J
We're not on different pages, we're in different books. — Leontiskos
In the example Srap imagined, he did opt out. Rather than supplying the justification for his theories of motivation, he puts on his Freudian hat and says, "Very interesting . . .Tell me more about the sorts of occasions you feel the need to justify yourself" or some such. The distinction matters, because what the Freudian holds, and would have to defend, is different from what he has to do. I would say that, if he continues in reason-giving, then you're right, he's doing philosophy with us. But what he may hold to be true is different from what he may or may not choose to justify. If he doesn't make that choice, then . . . well, I want to say he's no longer doing philosophy, but certainly others on this thread would disagree. — J
If the philosopher believes he's on firm ground demanding to know how the psychologist knows what he claims to know, the psychologist believes himself to be on ground just as firm in examining the philosopher's motives for demanding justification. — Srap Tasmaner
Aquinas does talk about the way that the intellect and the will are both infinitely recursive and intermixed, and you could think of "motive" as pertaining to the will and "justification" as pertaining to the intellect. That's fine as far as it goes, but that deep analysis of the will strikes me as philosophical, not psychological. It is certainly not psychological to the exclusion of being philosophical. The dispute between intellectualism and voluntarism has not historically been construed as a dispute between philosophy and psychology, even though it can truly be said that modern and contemporary philosophy are excessively intellectual. — Leontiskos
In happy moments, I see this restlessness as philosophical.
I participate in discussions like this one, in some part, in hopes of figuring out what hold philosophy has on me, why I keep doing it, what it is I'm doing. — Srap Tasmaner
If the philosopher believes he's on firm ground demanding to know how the psychologist knows what he claims to know, the psychologist believes himself to be on ground just as firm in examining the philosopher's motives for demanding justification. — Srap Tasmaner
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