all it does is show that an awareness of said relevance isn't necessary to produce a desired result. — KantRemember
Insofar as Y exists, and X is relevant to Y, Y will always be relevant to X due to the connection X has with it. — KantRemember
I know how Wayfarer thinks of "higher". He thinks we moderns have lost, not merely an older set of cultural attitudes, beliefs and dispositions, but some actual higher knowledge and understanding of a transcendent nature—an understanding of reality itself which has been lost to the modern psyche. — Janus
He doesn't want to accept that it is really just faith, even among those who are supposedly enlightened or "born again". — Janus
As the old saying goes "there is no accounting for taste". — Janus
Well, for those presupposed to doubt it, there are plenty of grounds for doubt. For those predisposed to believe it, there are plenty of grounds for belief. The difficulty is, that it is not a question that is easily adjuticable, at least by objective measures. But I do say that, absent the 'dimension of value', philosophy tends to devolve into disputes over the meaning of propositions, rather than a life-changing wisdom, which I believe was its original intent. — Wayfarer
I want to return to this loose end. Am I right that we can avoid the conclusion in (8) by denying (4), the symmetry of relevance? — J
The only way I see that we can get "relevance" to be symmetric here is to define it as such, so it means something like "possibility of making eventual connections." But that seems much too broad, and misses the interesting questions about why we care about relevance in the first place.
First, just some housekeeping: We considered whether "Why?" was the actual recursive question, and raised some problems about that. But the way you've formulated it here is better, and still allows a robust sense of relevance, unlike the "What would Kant have thought of that?" example. So let's say that Q( X ) asks, "What is your justification for X?" — J
You point out the danger that we've done some definitional fast-footwork here. Philosophy (or the context Phil) is being construed as "the demarcation between a fixed set of Q and other sets." Does this mean that the fixed set of Q is only unique in this way? "Why does asking [the Q question] eventually lead to philosophy?" you want to know, and the suspicion is that is does so because we have defined it thus; there is no other reason. — J
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That's a good point, and my example was loosely worded. Better to have said, "An acoustician conducts their research in complete independence of what theory may do with it, and it will not be possible to find any relevance for that theory to their work." Is it still clear that relevance isn't symmetric? I suppose this wording is slightly more deniable, because by shifting modal ground and talking about what is and isn't possible, we have to meet a higher bar. But let's not get caught up in extreme and/or unlikely cases. The idea was to question whether relevance is symmetric in a much more powerful and common way -- so that @fdrake's conclusion about what we've calling the Q recursion is true. I think his argument necessitates a near-perfect match of symmetries in order to go through. But perhaps he'll weigh in on this.
Well, that's the question, and I think you need to do more than restate it as a conclusion. At issue would be "the connection X has with it" -- how does that show the relation must be symmetrical?
But philosophy, as also zen, is a practiced discipline, a way of looking, more than a theory in a book. — unenlightened
Funny you should mention that. After I wrote the post you responded to, I realized that what philosophy is for me is a practice, like meditation or exercise. — T Clark
This would be a good OP idea. Philosophy as practice, and perhaps praxis. When I try to explain to friends why I do phil., I usually wind up talking in those terms, but not with much clarity. — J
If an experiment demonstrated a theory conclusively, you might end up saying "The experiment demonstrated the theory" - which may be the final relevant word on the matter of justifying the claim if "The experiment demonstrated the theory" is justified by the standards of the discipline. — fdrake
The question was posed to J. — Janus
Well, for those presupposed to doubt it, there are plenty of grounds for doubt. For those predisposed to believe it, there are plenty of grounds for belief. — Wayfarer
"To each there own philosophy" I say, because that takes proper account of human diversity. Would you have it any other way? — Janus
One of J's first moves in the OP was to take philosophy and the sciences (and maybe history, I don't know) all together as "rational discourses," or something like that. I don't think that will work. I don't think philosophy can allow itself to be defined by some external perspective — Srap Tasmaner
(Such a move is even more untenable if you think of "rationality" as one of the areas philosophy is concerned with, and perhaps is authoritative on. Presumably then it would be up to philosophy to decide whether philosophy falls within its own purview, to decide whether this discourse is rational ― but not if it's already defined as "rational".) — Srap Tasmaner
We’re all familiar with the idea that philosophy operates at a level of discourse than which there is no higher, in some structural sense. What does this claim actually amount to?
First, a clarification: The idea I’m referring to doesn’t denigrate poetry, or fiction, or prayer, or paying compliments, or any other non-discursive uses of language. — J
I certainly recognize that philosophers attempt to address everything and anything that was, is, will be, actually or potentially, in reality and in illusion, for all persons and other things, be they mindless or omniscient Gods or somethings else; and philosophy incorporates logic (math and language), poetry (aphorism), fiction (thought experiments), physical objects and theoretical impossibilities, and more in order to do its work. — Fire Ologist
If philosophy takes up the question of whether philosophy is rational, and even if it judges that it is, this is merely a result. It may even be descriptive of philosophy's practice in reaching that very conclusion, but it cannot be constitutive of that practice. — Srap Tasmaner
Philosophy is the activity that invents, for its own use, the very idea of rationality — Srap Tasmaner
demonstrating, in the very act of obtaining this result, that this is the only way philosophy can proceed. — J
phil. gives itself the (rational) law — J
we have the result that "philosophy is rational." — J
I'm asking the kind of question intended just to prompt thinking, to make you wonder if the answer that comes immediately to mind is right, to make you pause and wonder what other answers might be available. — Srap Tasmaner
stop worrying about whether and how phil. and rationality overlap — J
I certainly would. I mean, the theoretical end goal of philosophy is for everyone to believe the same thing, that thing being the truth. In my opinion this idea of private justification instead promotes a static kind of diversity, where a bunch of dogmatists each stay in their respective camp and engage in discourse only performatively. — goremand
IF philosophy proceeds rationally, and can give a definition of what rationality is, THEN all of these consequences seem to follow. I'm more unsure than perhaps you imagine about whether the IF is correct. — J
What is rationality other than consistent thinking from some foundational premises or other? — Janus
OK, but specifying the premises, and determining how foundational they are, has been the longstanding task of philosophy, with no obvious right answer in sight. It's like saying, "Move the world? Sure, no problem, just give me a very large lever . . ." — J
Only once you have your preferred premise can rationality definitively enter the fray and it consists simply in being consistent with your premise in the elaboration of your thinking. — Janus
You speak as though that purported "end goal" is a given. — Janus
How would any philosophical truth ever be demonstrable such as to gain universal assent? — Janus
Discussion would still allow for folk to be influenced by others. — Janus
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