, I don't think so, at least not logically/mathematically.
Infinites require careful treatment; they're not numbers.
The non-positive integers, {..., -2, -1, 0}, for example, is infinite yet does not contain the number 1.

1. in an infinitude of numbers, there are every kinds of numbers
2. there are infinite whole positive numbers {1, 2, 3, ...}
3. therefore there are negative numbers among them
4. contradiction, 1 is wrong

But it goes further than that.
As it turns out, ∞ is ambiguous if you will; in fact, there are infinite different kinds of ∞, of all things.
Additionally, the rationals and the reals are dense; between any such two different numbers, there's a third number different from both.

On the other hand, if we're talking nomological (or physical), then who knows; things are suddenly much more complex.
Regardless, both an infinite past, and a definite earliest time, have counter-intuitive implications.


EDIT: I read this snippet roughly as "if the universe has an infinite temporal past [...]", which may have been a misinterpretation.

if the universe were eternal [...] — Wayfarer

It is an argument that I read somewhere once - linked from a Forum post. Basically the gist was, if the universe had existed eternally, then everything that could have happened, would have happened already, as everything that happens is of finite duration.

It makes intuitive sense, but as we now believe in the so-called Big Bang, it's probably irrelevant, as the BB doesn't posit a universe of endless duration. It seems likely to me that the BB model is one of eternal cycles of expansion and contraction. That also seems intuitively appealing to me, not least because it has precedents in some traditional philosophies. (The Hindu Purana refer to the 'inbreathing and out-breathing of Brahma').

In any case, in respect of 'the first cause', I also think it might be incorrect to conceive of the whole idea in terms of temporal sequence i.e. what comes first in a sequence. In Platonistic Christianity, the 'first cause' is not so much 'at the beginning' but 'at the source of being', which is present, right at this moment - the 'ever-present origin' in Gebser's phrase 1. I think in the esoteric traditions. 'creation' is understood on a micro- as well as macro level, i.e. creation (and destruction) are occuring moment by moment, as well as over billions of years; and 'the source' of that is something that is 'revealed' or realised in contemplation:

It is a perennial philosophical reflection that if one looks deeply enough into oneself, one will discover not only one’s own essence, but also the essence of the universe. For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else. For that reason it is thought that one can come into contact with the nature of the universe if one comes into substantial contact with one’s ultimate inner being.

SEP entry on Schopenhauer.

, well, are whatever aspects of our universe anything like a (dense) continuum?
If yes, then there might be infinitudes of different "almost alike" changes among, say, different expansions and/or contractions ('inbreathing and out-breathing of Brahma', as you put it).
Even finite (definite) constraints might allow infinite possibilities; over an infinite duration, no two identical "states" may ever have been.
Anyway, I think these considerations can easily become rather complicated.
Peripherally related: No-cloning theorem

are whatever aspects of our universe anything like a (dense) continuum? — jorndoe

I still cling old-fashionedly to the notion of 'universe', 'uni' meaning 'one'.

Premise-1: Everything in the world has a cause. — Brian A

Disclaimer, I haven't read the rest of the thread and I don't know where it's gotten to by now.

I did happen to look at William Lane Craig's cosmological argument a while back. His first premise is:

* Everything that begins to exist must have a cause.

Eventually his argument gets around to saying that there must be something that never BEGAN to exist ... it has always existed. That must be God.

Now this is a very disingenuous argument. The phrase "begins to exist" sounds a little odd and most people just dismiss it. But it is actually a sneaky rhetorical maneuver. Because there are now two classes of things in the universe: things that "began" to exist, and therefore have causes; and things that exist but never actually "began" to exist. That thing would be an uncaused cause, which we call God.

That in effect is Craig's argument, and frankly it's silly. The conclusion is baked into the premise. If you right away distinguish between things that "began" to exist and things that didn't; it's easy to wave your hands and obfuscate around for a while and then end up proving the existence of something that exists but did not "begin" to exist.

Your paraphrase misses all of this and it's therefore not Craig's argument.

As far as whether there can be a chain of things infinite to the left, I like the simple mathematical example of the negative integers: ..., -3, -2, -1. This anti-sequence or backwards sequence has an order type called *ω, pronounced "star omega." That's because ω is the order type of the natural numbers; and *ω is the reverse of ω.

*ω provides us with a perfectly sensible mathematical model of a system in which each thing has a predecessor and there is no firstmost element. I'm not saying that's how the universe works. I"m just saying that Craig can't say it doesn't. If people would contemplate the negative integers, they would gain insight and familiarity with infinite regress. It's really no more complicated or strange than the fact that if you have a negative number you can keep on subtracting 1 as many times as you like, and you'll never get to the beginning. Because there is no beginning.

Craig's argument is just sophistry. I'm astonished that anyone takes his argument seriously.

On the other hand your own argument or paraphrase is not Craig's argument; and I haven't looked at yours in detail. So I can't tell if you mean to give your own version of the argument or are inaccurately paraphrasing Craig.

Either way, infinite regress ain't no thang. Just subtract 1. Or take one step left on the number line. And here's another mathematical model. Start with 1 and keep dividing by 2. You get 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, ... Once again, there is no first element. Although you can take the limit and say that 0 is God. If that makes anyone happy.

I still cling old-fashionedly to the notion of 'universe', 'uni' meaning 'one'. — Wayfarer

Hey hey, I don't want to be one with Stalin. Gross. :D

Because there are now two classes of things in the universe: things that "began" to exist, and therefore have causes; and things that exist but never actually "began" to exist. — fishfry

hey fishfry, what kinds of things exactly don't 'begin to exist'? I think if you look at any object in the known universe, then all of them 'began to exist' at some point in time, didn't they? Even atoms began to exist, we are told. So, without any hand-waving, what kinds of things, generally speaking, don't begin to exist?

hey fishfry, what kinds of things exactly don't 'begin to exist'? I think if you look at any object in the known universe, then all of them 'began to exist' at some point in time, didn't they? Even atoms began to exist, we are told. So, without any hand-waving, what kinds of things, generally speaking, don't begin to exist? — Wayfarer

I'm stating William Lane Craig's argument in order to characterize it as disingenuous and silly. Was that unclear in my post?

"Premise one: "Whatever begins to exist has a cause."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument

I'm stating William Lane Craig's argument in order to characterize it as disingenuous and silly. Was that unclear in my post? — fishfry

It was clear enough, but my question stands. You say that 'dividing the world into things that don't begin and things that do' is a 'sneaky rhetorical maneuver'.

So I asked the question: what is an example of the types of things that don't have a beginning? Because I can't really see why an argument based on this is 'disingenuous'.

So I asked the question: what is an example of the types of things that don't have a beginning? Because I can't really see why an argument based on this is 'disingenuous'. — Wayfarer

The uncaused cause is God. That would be Craig's point. If you find it sensible I guess we'll agree to disagree.

The uncaused cause is God. That would be Craig's point. If you find it sensible I guess we'll agree to disagree. — fishfry

How does the fact that the premise used is specifically picked to make the argument work make the argument any less valid or sound? Let's say that Craig admits that he made his version the Kalaam argument by working backwards from more basic cosmological arguments in order to avoid criticisms and point towards God. What exactly is wrong then? Most philosophical arguments develop that way. The entire point of the rephrasing is to avoid the problem with saying "everything has a cause," as God would have no cause. That's it. Beyond that, the argument is a pretty standard fare cosmological argument, just with a lot more science to discuss.

↪Cavacava

"If you have assumed causality is necessary, you have already assumed god."

Brian:
This seems too good to be true. Is it true that if we assume the existence of causality in general (which, incidentally, seems to be a common-sense view), and trace it back, "God exists" is the necessary conclusion? So then, non-theists necessarily hold that causality is unreal?

No the anti-thesis is that causes are necessarily contingent, only probabilities, contingent events that could have always been otherwise, that's all that is available to us.

So I asked the question: what is an example of the types of things that don't have a beginning? Because I can't really see why an argument based on this is 'disingenuous'.
— Wayfarer

The uncaused cause is God. That would be Craig's point. If you find it sensible I guess we'll agree to disagree. — fishfry

By definition, a first cause is not 'sensible', insofar as by definition it is not perceptible by sense. All of these arguments are broadly speaking rationalist and abductive, i.e. arguing from perceived effect to probable causes.

And the question still stands - what kinds of actual things - existing objects, not numbers - do not begin in time? It seems categorically true that all phenomena begin and end in time and are composed of parts. If anyone has an exception I would be interested to hear it.

No the anti-thesis is that causes are necessarily contingent, only probabilities, contingent events that could have always been otherwise, that's all that is available to us. — Cavacava

Yes. Naturalism would oppose supernaturalism as immanence vs transcendence. So the first cause or prime mover would have to be understood as a self-organising tendency arising "within", instead of some externally imposed agency.

Thus it makes more sense to talk of a first accident rather than a first cause. Or in modern technical parlance, a first fluctuation that spontaneously broke a symmetry. An accident clicked and turned out to be the first step in a chain of events - like whatever random thing happened to tip a first domino and send the rest rattling flat.

This still leaves the question of creation rather unsolved. But it is a better place to start. Instead of needing the overkill of an all-powerful supernatural agency - a big daddy in the sky - it says the first cause was the very least of all things, a random fluctuation. Zero agency, zero identity. Any slight push of any kind could have done the trick because ... "things were poised".

Maybe the cat's tail brushed the waiting dominos. Maybe it was a puff of breeze or the rumble of traffic. The point is that it never mattered and is antithetical in being non-agential - merely the kind of accident that was inevitably going to happen.

How does the fact that the premise used is specifically picked to make the argument work make the argument any less valid or sound? — Chany

Oh I see. Yes I agree that my objection applies pretty much to every logical argument. After all if I prove that the order of a subgroup must divide the order of a finite group, that's only because of the way I defined a group! (That's a mathematical example for those unfamiliar with group theory).

So yes I do concede that my objection that Craig's conclusion is baked into his premises is no objection at all, since it applies equally to any logical argument.

I suppose what I mean here is that some of the moral or persuasive force of Craig's argument is weakened. The phrase "began to exist" carries within it the fact that the universe must have had a cause (if we believe the universe began to exist) hence there must be an uncaused cause which is the all-powerful benevolent God of Christian theology. Although why it couldn't just be the Uncaused Flying Spaghetti Monster, Craig doesn't say.

Naturalism would oppose supernaturalism as immanence vs transcendence. So the first cause or prime mover would have to be understood as a self-organising tendency arising "within", instead of some externally imposed agency. — apokrisis

The 'inside vs outside' or 'immanent vs transcendent' division doesn't have to be understood in terms of a sky-father, indeed in Platonist philosophy it generally was not understood in those terms at all. That came later, when the Greek-speaking theologians tried to reconcile Biblical revelation with Greek philosophical speculation. But there was always a tension in that enterprise, 'what does Athens have to do with Jerusalem', 'folly to the Greeks', and so on.

From the Greek perspective, it is more the point that the intelligibility of the Universe seems always a given - there is a logic to the way things inter-operate, which was one of the original meanings of 'logos' (before, again, that was hijacked to mean 'God's word.) But it's more akin to that saying of Einstein's -

“We are in the position of a little child, entering a huge library whose walls are covered to the ceiling with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written those books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books, a mysterious order, which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of the human mind, even the greatest and most cultured, toward God. We see a universe marvelously arranged, obeying certain laws, but we understand the laws only dimly. Our limited minds cannot grasp the mysterious force that sways the constellations.”

He says elsewhere that he sees this as being more like 'Spinoza' than like theistic religion, which he too associates with 'sky-father' religiosity, something he never accepted. But there's a lot of blurry lines around this topic.

"The following argument seems to be a convincing argument for holding that it is more probable that God exists than that God does not exist. The argument derives from my understanding after reading Aquinas and listening to some secondary Christian resources. Is there something flawed in it?

Premise-1: Everything in the world has a cause.
Premise-2: If we trace the causes back, we arrive at the big bang, and the cause of the big bang.
Premise-3: Even if God was not the cause of the big-bang, and something natural was, still, it is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is very probable that a non-contingent first cause exists; and this must be God, since there is nothing greater than the non-contingent first cause."


Two BIG problems with this are:

1) If "EVERYTHING" has to have a cause then it is a given that "God" (whatever he/she/it or even they are has to have a cause as well, however since "God" aka. the unmoved mover by normal definition doesn't and can not have a cause then it is a given that in a universe (or multi-universe if such things are possible) where "EVERYTHING" must have a cause then it is a given that a "God" who is also the one and the same as the unmoved mover can not exist in such a universe or multi-universe.
2)As soon as a theist or someone claims "God" aka. unmoved mover is an exception to this rule, then it is a given that it is plausible that if "God" to be an exception then it is plausible that A) "God" isn't the only exception b) there could be some kind of process or thing which is uncaused cause even if "God" doesn't exist.

In reality whether or not there is uncaused causes or there isn't it doesn't really matter since it involves stuff that is WAY outside of the field of useful philosophy and serves more as a form of intellectual and/or academic "chest puffing" for those not dealing with other matters. Centuries ago the concept of the unmoved mover/uncaused causes was sometimes used theists to help their arguments, but those who know something of medieval philosophy/logic usually understand the fallacies of such positions.

The 'inside vs outside' or 'immanent vs transcendent' division doesn't have to be understood in terms of a sky-father, indeed in Platonist philosophy it generally was not understood in those terms at all. — Wayfarer

Yes, Platonism, or better yet Aristotelianism, is more sophisticated. Instead of just being anthropomorphic, the larger cause of being is assigned to top-down formal and final cause. Or what in the systems approach we would call constraints. Forms and purposes place limits on the scope of accidents.

But still the transcendent vs immanent distinction remains central. Platonism wanted to place the forms in a transcendent realm of ideas. Aristotle was striving after a more immanent naturalism. Modern holism would talk about form and telos - as the globalised constraints - being what evolve and so emerge to regulate their worlds in determinate fashion. Law grows as its shape is already logically necessary.

So Greek metaphysics was largely organic and immanent in spirit. The early dudes spoke about logos and flux, peras and apeiron - or regulating constraints and chaotic degrees of freedom. Being became determinate by potentiality becoming self-restricting or shaped by a common trajectory.

But then Plato stood apart in asserting that the forms of nature did not emerge in time, rather they stood apart as eternal. And somehow from there - Platonia - they managed to shape the Chora, the materiality that was somehow the receptacle or whatever could take such an impression.

That doesn't makes sense. Although it does start to make more sense once you start talking about emergent structure mathematically - as symmetry-breaking maths does. So that does cash out Platonic form in a self-organising way. Once you have constrained dimensionality to just three spatial dimensions, there are only a limited set of completely regular polygons or Platonic solids. It is just a timeless inevitability that cubes, tetrahedrons, etc, will emerge given a temporal process which limits the dimensionality of chaotic being to flat 3D space.

So we can work our way back to Plato. But only by showing how forms are emergent and therefore immanent rather than transcendent. They come after the fact as an actuality, even if they were already present latently at the beginning as an as yet unexpressed potentiality.

This is nitpicking, but I would slightly modify Premise 1: Not everything in the world has a cause, if we include the first cause as part of the world (part of the things that exist). Rather, everything that begins to exist has a cause, due to the ex nihilo nihil fit principle. That way, the first cause conclusion does not contradict premise 1, and it follows that it has no beginning.

I concede that if causality is not assumed, the cosmological argument dissolves. So I will just assume the existence of causality. This seems reasonable given that the same assumption is made in science, I think. Tallis' views cannot cohere with the methodology of many sciences, since these sciences often presuppose it: eg. these icebergs are melting because of XYZ reasons.

Also, it seems that the word "God" has a lot of baggage along with it. Some posters have referred to "sky-father" or some type of objectified thing -- and understandably so, given the religious claims that exist in the world -- whereas the God to which the cosmological argument points is beyond objectification/space/time. So I will use the term "X" to refer to this thing.

And after some thought, it seems to me that the cosmological argument does indicate something (say, X), about which the use of the term God is, incidentally, reasonable. For, if one holds the view that space and time began with the big bang (mainstream cosmological view, I think), then that which was responsible for the big bang must have transcended time and space. Admittedly, X is thereby inferred to be merely supra-spatiotemporal, and not all-good or all-loving. X is something quite amazing, though, since X was responsible for all the matter and energy in the universe.

But I can think of two arguments showing that if X is beyond time and space, X must be good.

1. If X is beyond time, then X cannot change.
2. Evil implies change.
3. Goodness is essentially static, and tied up with the nature of being.
4. Therefore, X is good.

1. Love is of the nature of unity.
2. If X is the cause of the universe, then X is something unified.
3. Therefore, one of the predicates of X is "love-nature."

Therefore, adopting mainstream scientific views on reality (namely, assuming the existence of causality, current cogency of big-bang theory), it seems that the cosmological argument points to cause-of-the-universe X, where X = (i) beyond time and space, (ii) something so amazing that all the matter and energy came from it.

Regarding causality: Isn't the existence of causality necessary anyways? Everything that begins to exist necessarily requires a cause outside of itself for its existence. And we observe that some things begin to exist; therefore causality necessarily exists.

Regarding your first argument on X being good: Can you expand on premise 2: Evil implies change? It seems to me it is possible for a thing to be evil and unchanging; and conversely, for a thing to be good and changing, that is, changing for the better. As such, this unchanging X could be unchangingly evil.

My intuition is that actions are evil, either intrinsically or due to their consequences. But mere existence, unchanging, cannot be evil, since it is action-less. If some object doesn't do anything (if it is beyond action), then there is no basis for calling it evil. Mere existence must be good. Therefore since X is beyond change (being beyond time), it must be good.

Premise-1: Everything in the world has a cause
....
Conclusion: Therefore, it is very probable that a non-contingent first cause exists; — dclements

The conclusion violates premise 1. Therefore the chain of reasoning must be wrong.

Also what do you mean by saying that "is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever?" Why is that improbable? What is the probability? Define your probability model and show your calculations.

The conclusion violates premise 1. Therefore the chain of reasoning must be wrong.

I agree. My aim is to show that the universe must have a cause. Perhaps I can change P1 to, "All contingent things have a cause/explanation." Since the universe is a contingent thing, I would be enabled to proceed toward the "cause of the universe" in the latter premises.

Also what do you mean by saying that "is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever?" Why is that improbable? What is the probability? Define your probability model and show your calculations.

The term "improbable" just refers to my rudimentary intuition. It is not at all sophisticated. I am not equipped to furnish a probability model or calculation. But I think the intuition points to something; that actual probability models/calculations might exist. But I admit that my intuition might exist merely because an infinite chain is counter-intuitive, not impossible. Perhaps someone who agrees with the conclusion "God exists" can help me out at this juncture of the argument.

Understood. First I thought that by 'unchanging', you meant 'does not change its mind', not 'action-less'. But now I have two objections to this new meaning:

(1) An action-less thing is not 'good' but neutral. Not moral or immoral, but amoral. A rock comes to mind. I think good acts are required to be a morally good being.
(2) This argument points to deism, not theism. A passive being, not the passionate being that I have heard being described by Aquinas.

Occam's razor would judge that a hypothesis involving finite things is simpler than one involving infinite things. As such, until it is refuted, we should stick the simpler 'finite chain of causes' hypothesis.

Better yet, I think gave a pretty good argument here (point #2).

We can use Occam's razor to dismiss it: A hypothesis involving finite things is simpler than one involving infinite things. As such, until it is refuted, we should stick the simpler 'finite chain of causes' hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe

If causal chains must be finite then there must be a first cause, who is God.

Now if Occam leads to the conclusion that it's simpler to believe in an imaginary supernatural being than it is to believe in a naturalistic explanation of the universe ... then Occam's razor needs a new blade.

Hmm... Good point. So our choices are (1) a simpler hypothesis with a more complex conclusion, or (2) a more complex hypothesis with a simpler conclusion. It appears that Occam's razor is not effective here. I'll take that card back.

We agree that a 'finite chain of causes' is to be preferred. And this premise leads to the conclusion that the first cause is beyond space and time. Now, to be disinclined to accept a 'supernatural' cause of the universe based in an innate predisposition favoring naturalism, seems unreasonable, given that the empirical evidence points towards a supernatural first cause. An 'imaginary supernatural being' is not being postulated; but simply some 'supernatural cause' where 'supernatural' means 'beyond space and time.' It seems that a predisposition towards naturalism, in this case, leads one to accept uncogent conclusions, and to be illogical.

if Occam leads to the conclusion that it's simpler to believe in an imaginary supernatural being than it is to believe in a naturalistic explanation of the universe ... then Occam's razor needs a new blade. — fishfry

In current cosmology, the big debate on whether 'the universe' is 'only one' of a possibly infinite number of 'multiverses', which might forever be undetectable, even in principle.

I'm sure Ockham will be rolling in his grave.