I didn't ignore it, I pointed out that your evidence to support your position is historically illiterate, listing colonial rebellions and literal staff work as "invasions." You then asked me to "do the homework," on if Russia has ever invaded Germany and France, which, given the relevance of the Napoleonic and World Wars, is frankly comic.

Also, arguing for "spheres of influence," what is this, 1938? You know who thinks Poland should be in Poland's sphere of influence? Poles. And the same sort of thing goes for Czechs, Finns, Ukrainians, etc.

If one takes historical subjugation to be a valid standard for wielding influence over one's neighbors that other countries should base their foreign policy around then China also should have a "sphere of influence," extending across virtually all its neighbors (including Eastern Russia). But then this cuts both ways because former German holdings in East Prussia overlap not only Poland, but the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and indeed into the Baltics as well. And Poland has historically ruled directly over the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine, and parts of Russia, Moldova, and Romania. Austria has some shared overlap here as well. The Turks likewise, further south. Even if "historical control and influence," were a valid standard, NATO's core membership had just as much, and often more of a history in the expansion states when compared to Russia.

Out East this same exact sort of thing holds. Japan has historically held Korea, large swaths of China, and land controlled by Russia. But I have never seen anyone claim that the US military alliance with ROK should never have been formed because it is an affront to Japan and China's historical domination of their smaller neighbor, nor that a US alliance with Poland is troublesome because Austria and Germany dominated that area in the past and should get to in the future. Such facile arguments only ever appear in the context of Russia.

But then the next question. Why then thumb your noses at China?

Just then leave China alone. Why all the fuss about Taiwan? Why not have good relations with China? Is Taiwan a reason to have war with China? They have nuclear weapons too. A lot more than North Korea and are making more of them as we speak.

Good point. The expansion states are in the German and Turkish historical spheres of influence and conquest, same for Austria as a member of PFP embedded in NATO, so the historical claims thing only seems to be cutting one way in this reasoning.

Should the UK have a right to dictate India's military alliances and attack India to prevent new ones? No one says this but they have a longer history of continuous control and management than Russia does in some of the areas in question.

The Dune Universe had the Bene Gesserit breeding program and Paul Atreides. What have we got? Donald Trump. . — BC

:lol: Why do we have to be a Three Stooges movie? Why can't we be Dune?

Something like the Security Council is what humans can possibly do. — ssu

We tried that. It didn't work.

US usually acts without at all thinking of the objectives of other actors. — ssu

The US military was built to deal with Hitler and Stalin. It's since been reduced to limited military engagements with non-state actors, so it's tried to morph from sledgehammer into surgical instrument. It will continue to morph, but not in the direction of ideal global arbitrator. Probably back toward sledgehammer of an isolationist state.

US usually acts without at all thinking of the objectives of other actors. They don't matter to you. — ssu

Speaking for myself, it's not that they don't matter, it's that they don't matter enough to undermine our own national security. Your countries' motivation was to make things better. The US's should have been not to make them worse.

Hence the US has it's own narrative of what is going on that is different from the reality on the ground. This creates a fundamental inconsistency, when the other side doesn't at all have the objectives the US thinks it has. — ssu

I agree that the US had the wrong narrative in Vietnam. It just wasn't worth it. Millions of people died. I also agree we had the wrong narrative in expanding NATO, but that doesn't mean the narrative we should have had is the same as yours. Your narrative might have been right for you, but it wasn't right for us.

This shows how absolutely delusional US leaders can be in believing their own narrative. — ssu

Agreed. That's what my position in this discussion is based on. Our leaders were delusional when we expanded NATO.

People forget what the discourse around NATO was in the 1990's was like. I do remember. It was that NATO was an old relic that had to renew itself to basically be a global actor (policeman). The Cold War was over. Having territorial defense and a large reservist army was WRONG, outdated, relic from a bygone era! — ssu

Are you suggesting this is a good reason for expanding NATO?

Yet for the countries applying to NATO is was Russia, Russia and Russia. It never was anything else. — ssu

Of course it was, and that is understandable.

This is totally and deliberately forgotten and ignored by those going with Kremlin's line, that the objective was to poke Russia. The US didn't think about Russia. Russia was done, it couldn't fight it's way out of a paper bag as it had severe problems just with Chechnya. That was the thinking at that time. — ssu

Saying the US should have acted consistent with our own national interest, including to promote stability in Europe, rather than the interests of nations formerly in the Russian sphere is not "going with Kremlin's line."

no you didn't know it. This is pure hindsight. — ssu

There was no excuse for not knowing. Lot's of people in the US did and said so. Even I knew it at the time. It was obvious to anyone who wasn't blinded by ideology.

Why then thumb your noses at China?

Just then leave China alone. Why all the fuss about Taiwan? — ssu

I agree completely. Taiwan is not worth war with a country with a huge military and nuclear weapons. I feel the same way about Taiwan that I do about Finland. No, that's not true, I feel a lot more sympathy and common cause for the people of Europe. Taiwan is a fake country occupied by the losers in the civil war in China with delusions of grandeur. The US should never have staked its "reputation" on supporting it.

There ought to be consistency in your actions. When the political discourse in the US isn't accurate about the situation abroad, then this creates a fundamental problem: what the US president says to be the objectives, will really be the objectives of the state and the US armed forces. Now, if that isn't close to the reality on the ground and is made up propaganda, because it's just something that reaffirms popular beliefs that aren't fixed in the real world, you will continue to lose. — ssu

Again, I agree. The difference is that I think it is a good argument for my position rather than yours.

Should the UK have a right to dictate India's military alliances and attack India to prevent new ones? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Would the UK even want that? I don't think so. Britons are past their Empire. They've accepted it. Even can laugh at it like Monty Python. Just like the Spanish understand well that they don't have the Empire they formerly had. But Putin doesn't think so. That's the huge difference.

Also, arguing for "spheres of influence," what is this, 1938? You know who thinks Poland should be in Poland's sphere of influence? Poles. And the same sort of thing goes for Czechs, Finns, Ukrainians, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly. This ought to be the point. And many past Empires have understood this.

Historical spheres are part of history. Those politicians referring to history and historical spheres are usually quite dangerous: when there isn't any current obvious link or relationship, you can then refer to history and things like "historical spheres of influence".

Dude. Putin wanted to join NATO in 2000.

I think you're underestimating what kind of cynical calculus takes place in Washington.

Taiwan is risking war with China. Just like Ukraine was risking war with Russia, South Vietnam was risking war with the North, etc.

Uncle Sam isn't risking anything.

Your countries' motivation was to make things better. The US's should have been not to make them worse. — T Clark

Why say that? You haven't made things worse. They would be far worse without you. Remember that the US is actually very popular in Europe.

I agree that the US had the wrong narrative in Vietnam. It just wasn't worth it. — T Clark

Was then defending South Korea from Northern attack worth it?

Your narrative might have been right for you, but it wasn't right for us. — T Clark

So just where do you put the line for defending democracy and your allies? Is the UK worth then defending? Is Canada? I am personally glad that for example the tiny nations of the Baltic could avoid the present situation of Moldavia, Georgia or Ukraine.

Are you suggesting this is a good reason for expanding NATO? — T Clark

Are you familiar with the actually discourse when NATO expansion happened? It was totally different from where NATO is now when Sweden and Finland joined. Look, there were no plans to defend the Baltics. That was too escalatory or offensive! A NATO member (likely Germany perhaps) saw making actual warplans to defend the Baltic States too escalating for Russia. NATO didn't train it's forces as it does now in the Baltic States. Russia had a special observer status in NATO. And as @frank pointed, people genuinely talked about the prospect of Russia joining NATO. Unfortunately, there is a route of application to the organization, which Russia wouldn't take. It would have to get the blessing from all other nations to join in and face a road the Sweden had. Russia simply then should have been controlled by democrats, not KGB people. In the end, war in Kosovo ended these hypothetical ideas. So in reality the "window of opportunity" to join NATO already ended during the Yeltsin years.

Saying the US should have acted consistent with our own national interest, including to promote stability in Europe, rather than the interests of nations formerly in the Russian sphere is not "going with Kremlin's line." — T Clark

But you did promote stability in Europe. Or do you think that without NATO and US involvement, that Russia would have been peaceful and not tried to get it's empire back? That is naive. This should be easy to understand when Putin says that the fall of Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy in the 20th Century. Russia would have simply far more easily taken back a lot more than it has now attempted. Likely the Baltic States would be Russian satellites and the Ukraine would be a rump satellite state with Novorossiya being a part of Russia (which btw the latter can still happen). Europe simply would be far more unstable than now! Does that help your national interest?

I agree completely. Taiwan is not worth war with a country with a huge military and nuclear weapons. I feel the same way about Taiwan that I do about Finland. No, that's not true, I feel a lot more sympathy and common cause for the people of Europe. Taiwan is a fake country occupied by the losers in the civil war in China with delusions of grandeur. The US should never have staked its "reputation" on supporting it. — T Clark

I think people who want to be independent ought to have their independence and simply the UN charter ought to be respected. It is as simple as that. NATO is an European security arrangement that works and it has created stability in Europe. SEATO and CENTO didn't work and these areas are still volatile. Alliances simply work. They aren't a burden, just as international cooperation isn't a hindrance.

Taiwan is risking war with China. Just like Ukraine was risking war with Russia, South Vietnam was risking war with the North, etc. — Tzeentch

Just like Poland was risking war with Germany in the late 1930's. Just like Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway were also risking war with Germany, for that matter. And not only did they risk it, they got the war Hitler. How badly done from them! Especially the Poles, didn't they get the memo (Mein Kampf) that they were Untermenschen and should move away somewhere else and give their lands to the German Übermenschen?

Just like Poland was risking war with Germany in the late 1930's. Just like Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway were also risking war with Germany, for that matter. And not only did they risk it, they got the war Hitler. How badly done from them! Especially the Poles, didn't they get the memo (Mein Kampf) that they were Untermenschen and should move away somewhere else and give their lands to the German Übermenschen? — ssu

Going straight to WW2 and Hitler comparisons isn't really a serious argument, and I was hoping for/expecting something better from you.

Hah! I wanted to use the Hitler card. :grin:

(Ok, sorry, back to having an interesting discussion...)

Yet the issue really is just what for example Ukraine did wrong? You can argue that it did the greatest mistake, as Mearsheimer pointed out, is that it gave it's nuclear weapons back to Russia. But back then I think the West and the US wouldn't have been happy for that. In fact the US was extremely happy that Ukraine also gave an enormous amount of shoulder fired SAMS (MANPADS) away too. Then the threat they posed was to get into the hands of terrorists! Cold war was over, you know. So Ukraine trying to hold on to a nuclear deterrent and put a lot of effort to make them into an effective weapons system (something that is totally possible for Ukraine), would have made Ukraine a pariah state in the eyes of the West. Besides, back then many Ukrainians loved Putin. Russians were brothers.

Baltic countries surely understood the writing on the wall: all of them have Russians / Russian speaking minorities. They are, just like Finland, extremely close to St. Petersburgh and Moscow, hence they are strategically close to the heart of Russia. And then they are tiny nations: Estonia has the population similar to Maine as is a bit bigger than Maryland. The city of Narva is as close to St. Petersburgh as Philadelphia is to Manhattan, New York. Hence without there being NATO, it isn't hard to tell how risky it would be to Estonia.

But large forces weren't needed because the great Rumsfeld said so

This is a fair critique. In particular, the widespread looting that occured during the second invasion poisoned public opinion against the US. The thought was "we tried to get rid of Saddam forever, the Kurds fought him, Iran fought him. The US can come in and effortlessly sweep him aside. Thus, if there is mass rioting and abuses, it is because the US wants it to happen."

But the idea wasn't entirely that you didn't need as many men. Certainly, you needed fewer in terms of the initial invasion, because Iraq's military had been badly battered by the Gulf War and sanctions and the US had already defacto partitioned the Kurdish third of the country. And so the idea was to use the Iraqi army for stabilizing unrest. That was the fatal flaw. There was a plan to have way more men involved, it just hinged on an extremely important factor that the US was powerless to guarantee.

Now, in their defense, militaries have often done this type of work after losing a war because order in defeat is still preferable to chaos (e.g. the French army being freed and rearmed to go fight the communards in Paris by Prussia). But they didn't in this case, and there was no backup plan. And the decision to stop paying the soldiers when they didn't show up (aimed at enticing them back) backfired monumentally.




Right, and by that point it was already becoming readily apparent that China would be the main rival the US had to contend with (whilst back in the 80s and 90s people did talk quite a bit about a reunified Germany and Japan's economic boom, something you still see in all the sci-fi of the era).

And this is precisely why a lot of foreign policy written at the time discusses what a wonderful ally a liberal, denocratic Russia would make, particularly if integrated into the EU. Such a move would:

—Put almost all the world's weapons production and knowledge base for weapons production, including nuclear delivery systems, into the liberal alliance.

—Offer a balance to Germany in the EU by adding another large economy/population (and recall that closer to unification and earlier in the EU the domination of Germany was a larger concern, although it is still a going concern, as it was in the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis).

—Russia, with the US, Canada, Mexico, etc. would represent a share of the world's energy resources to rival with OPEC, allowing for greater flexibility and insulation from instability in the Middle East.

—A Russia in NATO would give the NATO a giant land border with China, an absolutely massive asset in the current rivalry.

—The peace dividend from bringing Russia into the fold would be huge for Europe and even huge for the US given how expensive the nuclear deterrent is (on par with Russia's entire defense budget).

The idea that it was in US, or "Western" interests to pauperize or dominate Russia doesn't cash out. There was much to gain and the people making at policy at the time were extremely idealistic (and perhaps we can even say naive) vis-á-vis the ways in which they thought economic development would lead to liberalization and "win-win" situations for all.

For instance, China was never faced with something like Cold War containment doctrine as its meteoric rise really kicked off. The US (its firms and people) invested literally trillions in the Chinese economy, as did the EU. In particular, it moved the very heavy industry needed to wage wars over to China. What helped the US defeat Japan was its astounding ship building capacity. Today, the US makes about 0.1% of new tonnage. China makes almost more than the rest of the world combined. Commercial aircraft is another area where European and American investment and technology transfers have been very large.

Now, certainly generosity wasn't the main motivation here. This was done to exploit comparatively lower costs for production in China. And we might point out how this huge transfer of wealth and economic activity could actually have been said to hurt Western nations (while enriching some small segments of their population). But it also isn't the sort of policy one engages in if one is obsessed with preserving military advantage. And there is ample evidence to show that decision makers involved in this process really did believe that economic growth in China (and elsewhere) would result in liberalization and better relations.

People still make this sort of argument. "Take sanctions off Iran, they will develop a wealthy, educated middle class and liberalize." Whether one ought to believe such things given history is another question entirely.

NATO expansion happened in this sort of context, hope over an "End of History," and the idea that gradually all nations would liberalize.

Even W. Bush era policy contains a good deal of this idealism, which is why it made establishing liberal democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan war aims.

This was done to exploit comparatively lower costs for production in China. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Plus the price of access to the huge Chinese markets was that the goods sold had to be manufactured there. The US government was hostile to American business as exemplified by the Bell System divesture. There was no reason for American industries to remain in the US and every reason to transition to global entities.

Why do you think things broke down between the US and Russia? What went wrong?

You haven't made things worse. They would be far worse without you. Remember that the US is actually very popular in Europe. — ssu

Worse for you, perhaps and other small nations under the USSR's thumb. The US is now juking around in Europe with the military of a country that has 10,000 nuclear warheads.

Was then defending South Korea from Northern attack worth it? — ssu

I don't know.

So just where do you put the line for defending democracy and your allies? — ssu

But you weren't our allies. You were countries that we were friendly with but with which we had no binding military relationships. Do you expect us to send US troops to Finland if Russia decides to invade?

people genuinely talked about the prospect of Russia joining NATO. Unfortunately, there is a route of application to the organization, which Russia wouldn't take. — ssu

There was never any realistic chance of Russia joining NATO.

Russia simply then should have been controlled by democrats, not KGB people. — ssu

Yes. Wouldn't that be nice. What a surprise it didn't happen. Not.

...do you think that without NATO and US involvement, that Russia would have been peaceful and not tried to get it's empire back? — ssu

I'm not sure what would have happened. I don't think you are either. It was never realistic that we could somehow keep countries bordering Russia outside the Russian sphere of interest. It certainly doesn't work that way in the US. We have the Monroe Doctrine and haven't shied away from sticking our noses in our neighbor's affairs.

I think people who want to be independent ought to have their independence and simply the UN charter ought to be respected. — ssu

Sure, and I think Kamala Harris should be the president elect of the US.

Just like Poland was risking war with Germany in the late 1930's. Just like Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway were also risking war with Germany, for that matter. And not only did they risk it, they got the war Hitler. — ssu

When I said "risk" I meant risk to the US. What is the US's vital national interest in Taiwan? What was it in 1948?

I don't think you and I are going to get any closer to agreement. I'm all for leaving it at that.

This is a fair critique. In particular, the widespread looting that occured during the second invasion poisoned public opinion against the US. — Count Timothy von Icarus

From the experience of Bosnia and the Balkans, the US Armed forces understood what it would take. And Chief of Staff of the Army general Eric Shinsheki publicly stated how many troops would be needed in the post-war occupation. This was too high for the great visionary Rumsfeld, who fired Shinseki. Later at the so-called "Surge", the levels came to the level what Shinseki had originally stated. Iraq of course had internal problems being such a divided country with so much bloodshed and internal strife all of it's present history, so Divide et Impera could work. With Americans, this meant basically a Sunni insurgency and a separate Shia insurgency against the Americans. At least the Kurds were friends.

And so the idea was to use the Iraqi army for stabilizing unrest. That was the fatal flaw. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Was there this kind of thinking? Paul Bremer really didn't do so with his CPA order number 2:

After the invasion, several factors contributed to the destabilization of Iraq. On 23 May, L. Paul Bremer issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, dissolving the Iraqi Army and other entities of the former Ba'athist state. Ba'athists were excluded from the newly formed Iraqi government.

Yes. Why not simply fire tens of thousands of professional soldiers without no thought given to what they would do. It really was the Sunni's themselves that thought that they would at least as bureaucrats be used. But no. So Americans dissolved the security apparatus totally. Then riots ensued. As the great visionary Rumsfeld said in April 2003:

"The task we've got ahead of us now is an awkward one ... It's untidy. And freedom's untidy. And free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. And that's what's going to happen here,"

And it did happen: an insurgency and an Civil war ensued. And then happened something that shows just where the reasons lie for the US losing wars: The US forces in Iraq basically won the campaign against Al Qaeda in the Sunni heartlands. Without any direction from Washington politicians and left to their devices, the military itself took the initiative and used the ancient old tactic of simply picking part the insurgency by making deals with some of the groups. Hence there was the "Sunni Awakening" that basically pacified the Sunni areas with "Sons of Iraq", earlier insurgents. But here came the politicians, and not only American politicians to ruin the issue. While Obama had made it a campaign promise to get the pull the forces out, the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose power relied on secterian policies, decided that the "Sons of Iraq" were a threat and disbanded everything that the US military had worked so much to form. So now for the second time, now not Bremer, but al-Maliki, disbanded armed Sunnis and didn't integrate them into the security apparatus they were willing to join (under US military). So again another insurgency. As the US had left, then now just called ISIS emerged from the again unhappy Sunnis, who later rapidly occupied large parts of Iraq and Syria. Because why the Shia officers and soldiers try to fight Sunni insurgents in Sunni towns that weren't friendly places for them in the first place? Hence all that effort had been flushed down the toilet and the US military had to come back to Iraq to fight ISIS.

Something like this usually happens when the politicians don't have a long term answer on how to win an insurgency. It's something that happens so frequently in many places. The West "comes to the rescue" and stabilizes the situation for some time. The enemy regroups. Then the focus wanes, and then finally the Westerners leave. And the place is in worse place. And this then makes the idea of "forever wars" so tempting. But it doesn't have to be like this. Insurgencies can be won, but they aren't won militarily without political insight and dedication. This reminds me of how the British understood how deal with a war where the other side won't surrender: then simply make the insurgents part of your team. If the British put the Boer population into concentration camps, then they also put them into leading positions after the war. Hence it isn't an accident that prime ministers of the new South Africa were for a long time Boer leaders who had fought the British. And hence you got one of history's strangest political friends, Chuchill and Jan Smuts, who the latter had been the Boer interrogator of captured Churchill. Roles change.

(Former prisoner-of-war (Churchill) and his former interrogator (Jan Smuts))


But if the US military had the idea of "Sons of Iraq", did the US do like the British did with the Boers or Russia did in Chechnya and picked a former Taleban leader to lead Afghanistan? Hell no! They chose not only an Afghan that had worked abroad, but basically a person, Ashraf Ghani, that had lived for very long in the US would be a great example of an immigrant to the US, a person that made a great academic career in the right American academic places: studied in American University in Beirut and later in Columbia university, then taught in Berkeley and Johns Hopkins and finally landed on a job in the World Bank. Then after nearly a quarter of Century out of Afghanistan, Ghani landed in the now occupied Afghanistan in an UN position and finally made it through in the Hamid Karzai administration. So this kind of person was seen by American leadership as a person to deal with all the problems that Afghanistan had. Well, the end was exactly what could be assumed from such a person. The Taleban kindly asked him to go away and he kindly responded by quickly leaving Afghanistan with all the millions he could take with him. Which he naturally denies to exist.

Yet Ashraf Ghani isn't the first of these fluent English talking people, who could well survive in the cocktail parties of Washington DC and are seen as a crucial players, yet who would have huge problems in the actual politics of the country the US picks them for. Many can remember the charlatan Ahmed Chalabi, that played an important part for the Americans in Iraq. Didn't stay long in actual Iraqi politics.

(Oregon high school yearbook, places where Afghan presidents start earning their spurs)


(Ahmed Chalabi with the visionary secretary of defense, Paul Bremer behind the two)

Was then defending South Korea from Northern attack worth it?
— ssu

I don't know. — T Clark

Let's then just think about this.

South Korea produces a lot of stuff. I personally like K-pop. The country is finally a democracy after the 1980's and it's one of the most prosperous countries in the World.

North Korea suffered large scale famine in the 1990's. It's a totalitarian state where family members are prisoned of people who successfully defect. I remember a Finn that actually visited the country. Not only had he a "minder", a person that looked at just what he did and talked with North Koreans, he had TWO minders, who basically were looking at each other and wouldn't talk to the foreigner in fear that they would say something wrong. After all, you cannot leave a member of the security apparatus alone with foreigners. The Juche ideology would still reign and likely the ruling family too even if the whole Peninsula would be part of the People's Democracy.

So would it be better that there wouldn't be a South Korea? You see, if the US wouldn't have raised a finger when North Korea attacked, the whole "South Korea" would be a distant memory as the the Republic of Mahabad in Iranian history. We would happily consider Koreans these inhabitants of the Hermit Kingdom.

And since this war was actually fought by the United Nations and the US, it definitely shows that countries are worth saving from aggressors. Similarly in the case of the Gulf War. Would the World be a better place if Saddam could have simply taken Kuwait and had then equivalent oil reserves to Saudi-Arabia? If this would have been something that the US wouldn't have done anything about, then you likely would have a nuclear armed Iraq with one of the largest armies in the world. Because prior to the Gulf War, Iraq did have a functioning nuclear program. It didn't have after the war that, especially after Clinton's operation Desert Fox in 1998. So yes, the "war is a racket" thing comes to play with the 2003 invasion.

The fact is that sometimes the US does the right thing by intervention. And this is why it's alliance with Europe has survived through the times. Even if it has done things like the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

But you weren't our allies. You were countries that we were friendly with but with which we had no binding military relationships. Do you expect us to send US troops to Finland if Russia decides to invade? — T Clark

Your troops are here today. I saw US marines in the navy garrison I was in last Sunday at the mess hall in the food line. We are now a member of NATO and those marines were taking part in "Freezing Winds" exercise that is now ongoing. We weren't earlier your allies. And I remember the CIA yearbook having a picture of us being "likely allies" of the Soviet Union. So that much trust in our non-alignment. Yes, it was a culture shock for me some years ago (before we were in NATO) to see in the same garrison's soldier home full of young British soldiers waiting for their pizzas. The last foreign troops that you could see in Finnish garrisons were during my grandparents time, they were from the Wehrmacht and the SS. But they were in the North, yet in the summer of 1944 German soldiers camped in my now summer cottage, an old farmhouse built in 1914 by my great grandparents. During the Cold War my father told that the only foreign soldier that he saw in Helsinki was a US Marine in the US Embassy when he renewed his visa to the US. But many then thought there were Soviet soldiers in Finland.

There was never any realistic chance of Russia joining NATO. — T Clark

As I've said, you would have had larger than life politicians on both sides for that to have happened.

It was never realistic that we could somehow keep countries bordering Russia outside the Russian sphere of interest. — T Clark

With Finlandization, we got our everyday life to be out of the Russian sphere of interest. So defending your country and in 1944 preparing to fight an insurgency kept Stalin out. And the Finnish Communists were idiots btw, they couldn't stamp out Finnish democracy without the Red Army in the country. So as @Count Timothy von Icarus put it so well:

You know who thinks Poland should be in Poland's sphere of influence? Poles. And the same sort of thing goes for Czechs, Finns, Ukrainians, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I fully and wholeheartedly agree with this.

It certainly doesn't work that way in the US. We have the Monroe Doctrine and haven't shied away from sticking our noses in our neighbor's affairs. — T Clark

Well, you didn't go to war with the French when they had their adventures in Mexico. In fact, the French intervened in Mexico twice, in the 1830's and then in 1861–1867 again. The Monroe Doctrine was given in 1823, so the French didn't care a shit about your doctrines back then. (And of course, they still are all around the American continent btw, which the Monroe doctrine accepts.) Oh, the US did disapprove the French actions in Mexico during the second intervention. However Abraham Lincoln wouldn't want to go to war with France then, because it would have been too easy for the French then to give overwhelming support to the Confederacy.

So the idea that it's OK for Russia to meddle in affairs because you meddle in affairs isn't a counterargument. State meddles in other states things all the time, actually. But violence is something else than just the typical influencing attempts embassies make.

What is the US's vital national interest in Taiwan? — T Clark

In a larger sense, what is the vital national interest to see China as a threat? Last country it invaded was Communist Vietnam, a country the you had just fought with.

The main problem is that just as Domino Theory or the "We have to occupy this country or otherwise it will be a terrorist safe haven"-theory aren't really discussed. And not explained to those that would (or could) understand a complex politics.

The US should understand that basically it's very crucial for it to have the dollar in the role it has now. Those countries, who aren't friends of the US, aren't keen to use it as a "reserve currency". But those who are your allies are OK with the present system. Why not? They get safety and prosperity. The system works for them. Especially in the age of populists like Trump, it's actually difficult to reason the obvious, that global trade does bring prosperity. That if you cut the alliances, stop globalization, stop trade and so on, you will just create a World that sucks even more than the present.

We’re just going around in circles. I am all done.

It's quite understandable that countries that border Russia seek some form of protection against it.

Trying to join NATO was arguably the crudest and most risky way of doing so, and hedging the survival of the country on a distant maritime power was rather naive given the track record of said power, and that is a criticism that applies to virtually all NATO members.

We should know better than to trust Washington.

Trying to join NATO was arguably the crudest and most risky way of doing so, and hedging the survival of the country on a distant maritime power was rather naive given the track record of said power, and that is a criticism that applies to virtually all NATO members.

We should know better than to trust Washington. — Tzeentch

Finland and Sweden in my view waited for the right moment. Before 2022 there simply wouldn't have been a consensus to join NATO. If a conservative adminstration would have rammed through NATO membership, it would have become a right-left issue. Now it wasn't. Era of post-Finlandization ended when Putin attacked Ukraine on a wide front.

At least in NATO there are other countries too. Notice how the UK and for example Poland gave security guarantees for Finland during the application process to NATO membership. European NATO members aren't totally irrelevant.

And the "US allies" like South Vietnam, Afghanistan or present day Iraq aren't in the same category. The influencing attempts of the US go through the normal channels, not with some Finns that have lived all their life in the US making great careers in Washington DC then transcending to the country to solve our problems. And the US marines here on training aren't possibly attacked by some fringe Finnish group firing rockets at military bases.

Ukraine is really the odd one out, since the Russians have been proclaiming red lines vis-á-vis Ukraine since 2008. Therefore the route the Ukrainians have chosen was indeed much riskier than is the case for the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden.

However, my point remains that NATO leans completely on the American security apparatus, and at this point in time it is clear that the Americans will not commit to the defense of any nation in Europe, since it must focus on the Pacific and China.

Europe is in fact defenseless. And instead of acting accordingly, we do everything possible to follow Washington's line towards further confrontation with Russia.

Apparently people in Europe are under some sort of illusion that we can bluff the Russians into backing off, but that's obviously not working.

The Russians perceive our behavior as a clear sign that we are no longer interested in peace, and if we start treating them as 'the enemy', they will start treating us as 'the enemy', which is a position Europe can only lose from.


On the first page of the thread I wrote this post, arguing why America doesn't necessarily lose wars, but instead tends to fight wars in which a decisive military victory is not the goal.

We see another clear example of that in Ukraine, where even as Ukraine is starting to warm up to the idea of negotiations, the US continues to escalate the conflict in an attempt to drag things out.

Why do you think things broke down between the US and Russia? What went wrong?

You could go back and analyze a millions different variables, but IMO it really comes down to:
-the Russian invasion of Georgia (which didn't actually shift things as much as one might have expected, and wasn't a sea change)
-the Russian annexation of Crimea (where policy becomes overtly hostile but also pretty limpid, shying away from meaningful military aid)
-the Russian invasion of Ukraine (where US and EU policy becomes openly hostile)

I don't think these events are best explained by looking at US and EU policy. They're ancillary. Internal Russian politics, and Ukrainian politics are driving the bus. The mass uprisings in Belarus and in most of the Central Asian states that were once part of the USSR, and those Asian states' pivot into China's orbit also seen more relevant. US and EU policy is probably more relevant vis-á-vis Ukraine of course.

It's sort of like trying to analyze the Israel-Hamas war primarily in terms of US and Iranian policy. Are they relevant? Sure. Iran is probably significantly more relevant to Hamas' decision-making than the US is to Ukraine or Russia's, but the primary proximate decisions driving the current war seem to be very much out of Iran's hands.

Just for an example, the way the war was initially carried out, and what we now know about what was expected to occur, shows that the key variable driving decision-making on the pivotal event (the decision to invade) was a total disconnect between the Russian leadership's estimation of their military's capabilities and its actual capabilities, as well as the willingness of Ukrainians in general to resist, and specific Ukrainians' willingness to aid and abet them. The goal was a fait accompli with low loss of life, and Russian estimates for how the EU and US would have responded to that might have been over optimistic, but they probably weren't wildly off base. The real problem was an internal chasm between expectations and reality.

Ukraine potentially entering NATO is probably most relevant in that it would shut the door on reasserting control over Ukraine by force. If you read Putin's thoughts on the war and the history, I think it's really hard to come away with the idea that if NATO ceased to exist in say, 2020, the idea of reclaiming Ukraine would be a non-issue.

But isn't it true that Putin came to power in order to protect Yeltsin? Putin guaranteed that Yeltsin wouldn't be prosecuted for corruption. Putin in turn can't leave office without ending up in jail, so maybe he engineered the gutting of Russia by way of war with Ukraine in order to protect his position? Is that totally wrong?

What's the reasoning here, that Putin would have been forced out of power but for the invasion?

I don't think I've ever heard any analysis along that lines and it seems implausible to me given how much power Putin already wielded in Russia. In terms of his thinking, I would guess the key factors would be:

-His role in history/legacy and the relative success of annexing Crimea and the intervention to save Assad in Syria
-The conviction that it would be something like the "three day special military operation," that would quickly topple the government.
-The fact that Belarus had just had a popular revolt, requiring Russian forces to be moved in, and that they also had to send troops into Kazakhstan just a month earlier (and similar events had played out across the old satellites).

Stuff like gas resources and pipelines seem ancillary based on everything written about him. The historical narrative and prestige also takes center stage in his own speeches and writings.

But the conviction that it would be easy and low consequence seems like the big one. I am pretty sure the thought process wasn't "well, there is a decent chance I'll have to flee the capital and go on air giving a dire warning about civil war as an armored column led by an ex-catering chef pushes towards Moscow without resistance in a year," or "1,000 days in we'll have lost the better part of a million men and be making frontal assaults with Chinese golf carts with steel plates welded to them and dirt bikes."

My guess is that when the history is all written Saddam's decision to invade Iran will be one of the closer parallels.

Edit: or Bush II's decision to invade Iraq for that matter!

I guess I had that wrong then. :up:

However, my point remains that NATO leans completely on the American security apparatus, and at this point in time it is clear that the Americans will not commit to the defense of any nation in Europe, since it must focus on the Pacific and China. — Tzeentch

Don't think that Europeans aren't taking Trump seriously. They genuinely believe that Trump and his gang could take the US out of NATO. It's a genuine possibility that could happen: Americans could be perfectly capable of shooting themselves in the foot and breaking their strongest alliances, then wake up and notice that they aren't anymore the Superpower they used to be. If the US goes into isolationism, it simply will be a richer and larger version of Canada. People don't have anything against Canada, they might even know the name of the Canadian prime minister, but that's it. Who cares about the policies that Canada is pushing in it's foreign policy. It something quite irrelevant for Europeans.

Europe is in fact defenseless. And instead of acting accordingly, we do everything possible to follow Washington's line towards further confrontation with Russia. — Tzeentch

Isn't Poland acting accordingly? They are on the track to have the strongest military in Europe. Finland is arming itself and the military is excercising it's forces on a level not seen since the Cold War.

For Europe, the change happened actually in 2014. Then it change, as can be seen from this chart prior to the 2022 invasion:



From that lowpoint of 2014, the change on defense spending has been dramatic the closer the country is to Russia.



So the idea that lax Europe is just winging isn't current anymore. The change has already happened.

The Russians perceive our behavior as a clear sign that we are no longer interested in peace — Tzeentch

And some do think that Ukraine is lead by drug addicted nazis too! Yes, the propaganda works like a charm.

On the first page of the thread I wrote this post, arguing why America doesn't necessarily lose wars, but instead tends to fight wars in which a decisive military victory is not the goal. — Tzeentch

I'm sorry Tzeentch that I didn't notice your first reply as I guess the pages changed. But here's some comments. First of all, if military victory isn't the goal, then your talking about the "forever war" narrative.

Sorry, but if Osama bin Laden would have been in Sudan, the US would have attacked Sudan. And from Sudan of today, we can see what a similar quagmire it would have been once the US would have taken control of that large heterogenous country with multiple problems. And then I guess you would be making the same argument just why the US wants to disruption in Africa and the resources of Sudan.

But the simple truth is that OBL was in Afghanistan and since so many thousand Americans had been killed in the successful 9/11 attack, it couldn't be a job for the NYPD and the FBI to hunt down the ring of terrorists. As in the earlier bombing of the Twin Towers. Sorry, but that's the reality. That is the reason why the war and occupation of Afghanistan. Otherwise the neocons wouldn't have that opportunity to enlarge US dominance as they intended. Just like the successful operation of Hamas of breaching the wall and creating havoc gave the opportunity for the Netanyahu seemingly go with the "generals plan" in Gaza. Yet without "Al Aqsa flood", there wouldn't be plans to move everybody out from northern Gaza etc.

Hence US policy many times is a reaction to events that were made by others, and only then someone starts to think how this event can be used to further our own objectives and agenda. Still, it's a reaction to an event caused by others. And that is crucial here to understand.

Simple - the US is a maritime power that must dominate global trade and divide the Eurasian continent in order to maintain global dominance.

Being the most powerful maritime power and having strong maritime powers as its allies, domination of maritime trade is a given. However, the goal is to dominate global, and not just maritime trade. — Tzeentch

Yet notice one thing that has been true throughout the entire span of history: transport in trade by water is far more efficient and less costly than transport by land. One cargo ship can carry several cargo trains of produce. Ancient civilizations emerged on large rivers and the Mediterranean was such a lucrative sea for trade. It's just simply physics. Silk road and China's new land routes simply cannot compete with international shipping.

In terms of his thinking, I would guess the key factors would be:

-His role in history/legacy and the relative success of annexing Crimea and the intervention to save Assad in Syria
-The conviction that it would be something like the "three day special military operation," that would quickly topple the government.
-The fact that Belarus had just had a popular revolt, requiring Russian forces to be moved in, and that they also had to send troops into Kazakhstan just a month earlier (and similar events had played out across the old satellites).

Stuff like gas resources and pipelines seem ancillary based on everything written about him. The historical narrative and prestige also takes center stage in his own speeches and writings. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with this. Putin doesn't care a shit about economics or the economy. He didn't care when the Russo-Georgian war started, he doesn't care now. Command economy is his solution to everything.

, my apologies, sorry you read it like so. FYI, this stuff has been covered quite a bit in parallel threads (here, here, 2023dec31, 2024feb29, 2024mar21, ...), it's not so much that you're being ignored.

I have a fantasy that Europe will step up to take a bigger military and political role in the world, especially in Europe. — T Clark

Which you share with others, including:

So the EU should start its own military alliance separate from the US. — Benkei

EU defense focus has almost been lulled to sleep by NATO.

Americans could be perfectly capable of shooting themselves in the foot and breaking their strongest alliances — ssu

I think Trump might come to the aid of the British, but not the EU. Trump sees the EU as weak and unworthy of respect.

it's not so much that you're being ignored. — jorndoe

As I indicated, it wasn't that I was being ignored, it was that my argument was. My argument - Russia is paranoid, we knew it, and we should have worked to avoid provoking it. Your argument - Russia's paranoia is not justified, which is irrelevant.

:
Well, if the Kremlin circle is paranoid, then it's not about NATO in particular, but about anyone resourceful supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, etc, established in 1991.
Once the Kremlin decided that they couldn't let Ukraine be, losing some that control/influence (e.g. Crimea), then they'd already set the seemingly inevitable collision course.
Any paranoia on their part is due to Ukraine's independence, that they might increase the rent of Sevastopol or allocate it for something of their own or whatever, that they might look to the EU for cooperation/trade more so than Moscow, anything — in short, that they might go their own way.
Expressing that as supposed NATO-phobia has caught on (which was reasonably predictable).
Take into consideration that it's about control of a sovereign country — the present Kremlin circle's kind of control — and what would you have the rest of the world do?
The Ukrainians and most of the world said "No", which is reasonable.
OK, so, no Ukraine NATO membership, then what?
Besides, exactly how has grabbing Crimea and Donbas (and generous bombing) solved their supposed NATO-phobia?
It hasn't, couldn't, but has instead (predictably) increased Russo-phobia or whatever.
Anyway, that was part of the story above, adding to the discourse (with embedded reference links that I was too lazy to add here), not so much specifically giving a direct counter-argument to your comment, apologies if that was unclear.

You’re still not really paying attention to my argument. Expansion of NATO started in the 1990s. You’re talking about today’s situation which is, if my supposition is correct, the result of that action at least in part.

Don't think that Europeans aren't taking Trump seriously. They genuinely believe that Trump and his gang could take the US out of NATO. It's a genuine possibility that could happen: Americans could be perfectly capable of shooting themselves in the foot and breaking their strongest alliances, then wake up and notice that they aren't anymore the Superpower they used to be. If the US goes into isolationism, it simply will be a richer and larger version of Canada. People don't have anything against Canada, they might even know the name of the Canadian prime minister, but that's it. Who cares about the policies that Canada is pushing in it's foreign policy. It something quite irrelevant for Europeans. — ssu

Yes, I think we Europeans might be genuinely worried about Trump leaving NATO - much like how a fat private fears PT. Yet, PT is the only way to whip said private back into shape.

Now would be the best time, since there is no concrete threat to Europe yet.

The problem I have described in the past though, is that I fear that the US will use European militarization as a means to create more tension between Europe and Russia.

That is the exact opposite of what Europe should want.

This is why I welcome the departure of the Americans if it were to happen.


About NATO being the US' strongest alliance I am not so sure, though. It certainly is big and has potential, but Europe is currently without teeth. It is also situated on the other side of the globe from where the next real 'Cold War' is going to take place (the Pacific).

Controlling Europe costs resources, and perhaps Europe is proving too big to control in a time when the US cannot afford to waste resources.

Personally, I think Europe has dropped down on Uncle Sam's priority list, in favor of the Five-Eyes Alliance, Japan and South-Korea. These countries have a far clearer overlap with US strategic goals and challenges.

Isn't Poland acting accordingly? They are on the track to have the strongest military in Europe. Finland is arming itself and the military is excercising it's forces on a level not seen since the Cold War. — ssu

Indeed. This is both logical and desirable. However, my principal worry is the way the US may use European militarization as a method to create more tension between Europe and Russia.

Under the current circumstances, one could easily envision this spiraling into a direct conflict.

The Poles seemed to have wisened up to this, and have started to push back on attempts to drag them deeper into the conflict.

That awareness needs to be present in all of Europe.

Yet notice one thing that has been true throughout the entire span of history: transport in trade by water is far more efficient and less costly than transport by land. One cargo ship can carry several cargo trains of produce. Ancient civilizations emerged on large rivers and the Mediterranean was such a lucrative sea for trade. It's just simply physics. Silk road and China's new land routes simply cannot compete with international shipping. — ssu

Roughly speaking that's true, but we are talking about a scenario in which Chinese sea trade were to be completely cut off.

At that point, land-based trade would be all that is left.

In a US-China confrontation scenario, the Chinese economy would simply implode if it couldn't find alternative markets over land, and this hangs like a sword of Damocles above them.