Yes, obviously my post is using reason as well, that's not the point though. The point is that there is more than that to life - something valuable that reason cannot capture.

No, but reason does not play a role in it being captured - it is supra-rational. Certain experiences in life are extremely valuable to those who have them - amongst those mystical experiences, experiences of strong attachement/love/passion, etc.

But the entire decision to evaluate it betrays a doubt - a doubt about its value. After all, we only evaluate that which we think may not be good. So if someone ends up evaluating, this shows that whatever activity they are engaging in does not have a clear, indubitable value.

You are mis-reading me and projecting your own thoughts onto what I have said. To wit:
"We only evaluate that which we think MAY not be good" + "if someone ends up evaluating, this shows that whatever activity they are engaging in does not have a clear, INDUBITABLE value". Both these sentences mean that the decision to evaluate underlies an uncertainty about the value of something. To which your reply that "it does not show that the activity has no clear value" just misses the point. It's not supposed to show that, it's only supposed to show that "we can't be sure [...] about its value" as you state.

And to answer your new question. Take Heathcliff for example:

"He leant his two elbows on his knees, and his chin on his hands and remained rapt in dumb meditation. On my inquiring the subject of his thoughts, he answered gravely 'I'm trying to settle how I shall pay Hindley back. I don't care how long I wait, if I can only do it at last. I hope he will not die before I do!'

'For shame, Heathcliff!' said I. 'It is for God to punish wicked people; we should learn to forgive.'

'No, God won’t have the satisfaction that I shall,' he returned. 'I only wish I knew the best way! Let me alone, and I'll plan it out: while I'm thinking of that I don't feel pain.'"

Notice that he never bothers to evaluate whether his action is valuable. He is only concerned with how he can carry it out. Why? Because its value is indubitable to him - it doesn't require to be evaluated. In other words - we only evaluate when we have doubts about value. When we are certain - no need for evaluation.

"...minimized suffering, and maximized joy, a way of life founded and constrained by reason..."

Sounds... 'reasonable'.

Is the way to minimized suffering and maximized joy all guided by reason really open to everyone, or is this the preserve of the dispassionate few? Or, are most of us fortunate to at least manage an unsteady balance of inevitable suffering and none-too-plentiful joy? For most men, is there really an option of not leading lives of quiet desperation (per Thoreau)?

I have worshiped at the altar of Reason, and I shall continue to do so, but I also do honors at other altars as well. Like, I roll the sacred dice on the crap tables of fickle fortune, drop alms into the tin cups in the chapel of opportunities smothered in the cradle, and weep tears into the well of Deep Emotions. (I stop by the sacred brothel and barroom, too.)

The ordinary compromises of life are underrated, insufficiently honored. Take two people who have limited opportunity, given their time and place. The struggles of survival, feeding their children, keeping a roof over their heads and staying warm in the winter, and all that did not leave room for much joy at all but plenty of suffering. They lived a life of hard work and are worn out at the end of the day and at the end of their lives. They did their best for each other and their children, and now it is near the end.

They were entirely capable of subtle reason -- lots of ordinary people are plenty sharp. But the obligations they awoke to every day were humble and insistent: go to work; feed the children; obey the SOB boss (or do without an income); endure one's own illness or injury so that income keeps coming in and life goes on.

Not much room for philosophical subtly here.

That wasn't my life: I had options. No children, thrift, a good economy. I could afford to delve into philosophical aspects of life and experiment with different schemes of virtue. I didn't suffer too much and occasionally found joy. Usually I found pleasure--not quite the same thing as joy, but a reasonably satisfactory substitute.

If I could do it over (mercifully I can't) I'd still honor reason but I'd be more cognizant about emotions -- passions -- which seem to be underestimated by many philosophers. "A bunch of heady males" as one woman put it (she was including me in this damning assessment).

Emotions must be central from the beginning in our reasoned ethics deliberations, because reason is more governed by passion than we care to admit. It isn't reason that kept that couple's nose to the grindstone for the benefit of their children, it was emotion, and it was emotion that made them a model of ethical behavior. They did what needed to be done out of love more than reason.

Sorry, Heathcliff, Hamlet and the Don are just to far back in memory -- can't pry them out.

This is gonna be rather off the mark, but...

Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, having the lessening of evil or harm as its goal, and including what are commonly known as the moral rules, moral ideals, and moral virtues.

Ethics is the philosophical study of morality. It is divided into the general study of goodness, the general study of right action, applied ethics, descriptive ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, the metaphysics of moral responsibility, etc.

The former is the latter's subject matter. - Wolfman

I sort of felt compelled to post this definition and distinction.

It might be me, but I can't help but feel that these 'ethical systems or ways of living' are less particulars and more generalization, where the morality involved may or may not reflect the system or way of life on a consistent basis.

Indeed I find that such ethical systems or ways of life are founded upon reasoning, but I do not think that such ethical systems or ways of life are anymore than a set of 'guidelines' for actions and are not really the actions themselves.

With the ethical systems and ways of life being guidelines, this allows degrees of freedom within as variables not covered in the basic concepts present themselves. This allows adaptation and refinement of ethical reasoning, via moral application. Also, it does not 'disinclude' errors or what happen to be seemingly contradiction, as these would play a role in the adaption and refinement of an ethical systems as a guideline.

But isn't this whole approach founded on the assumption that a valuable life is a life in which suffering is minimised and joy is maximised? — Agustino

Well... isn't the assumption of value regarding what is suffering or joy relative to the context in which this vale is being fielded?

A rather trivial example of this would be eating food you like the taste of, in that how much is too much.

Indeed if you like that taste, it is a joy, but if you have to eat 20 times the normal amount then it is suffering. Depending upon if you are more or less hungry the amount of food intact of this tasty food would dictate where the line is between joy and suffering. Oh... and what if you happen to have another value in play... say weight loss? Indeed the food might grant pleasure in it's taste and this being part of the good life, but it is often amazing just how much of the good life can simply stick to your bones; thus not such a good thing in the context of weight loss.

Here's the fun bit when addressing ethical systems and ways of life... what is the context of intention and the specific standard of measure to decide of something if indeed good or bad or better or worse?

Personally I feel most all of these ethical systems and ways of life have a great deal to offer in possible structure to field a value notion, but they are simply the 'blue prints' and not the actual structure being built.

Perhaps these systems and ways of life offer up a logical and reasonable structure, but as unknown variables enter the picture, we are sort of force to 'think on our feet while running'; thus the logic and reasoning being adapted or even possibly ignored at times.

Let me know if any of this makes sense.

I suppose my rant in short form is that ethical systems and ways of life are 'blue print structures' founded upon logic and reasoning and moral action is based upon these systems, but is not always consistent with them as there are just too many unknown variables that alter the best intentions and plans.

I kind of got lost on the way to this point and I'm not too sure that's what I really mean either. Maybe you can fix it for me. :D

Meow!

GREG

It seems pretty similar to what Pierre Hadot states - theoretical discourse is useful only in-so-far as it can lead to the practice of a good life. Of course, one can never cover in theoretical discourse all the possible occurrences in life, but theoretical discourse gives one sufficient guidance to help them develop an instinct/habit of reacting spontaneously to whatever happens; or as you say it offers a structure to field value notions. And I don't disagree lol.

I guess my "ethical" question goes deeper - should reason be dominated by the passions, or should reason itself become a passion dominating all the others a la Epicurus, Spinoza, et al.?

This is why we need internal replies. This is one.

Honestly, every time some crap I rant about sounds like something someone said, who I've never read before (and who is indeed creditable), well... frankly... it spooks the hell out of me. :-O

Meow!

GREG

Hey Agustino, good to have you here. This all sounds very Nietzschean.

But, to say the point again, there are higher problems than all those of enjoyment, suffering, and pity, and every philosophy that leads only to these is something naive. — N

One of his ideas that I like is that there are 2 types of happiness. That of contentment, removing of suffering and this nice feeling in the stomach. In other words that of weakness, decline, passivity and stagnation. The other type comes from facing up to great challenges and overcoming them. To face up to great challenges is necessarily to struggle and suffer, so (at least a certain type of) suffering part of the good life.

The 'switch' should reason be dominated by the passions, or should reason itself become a passion dominating all the others derails the train. We do not have such a choice.

We have reason, and we have passions which are more deeply, firmly, and intimately established. They are not separated by a fire wall. Of the two, the passions have the greater power. Reason has no will of it's own. Nature established a relationship between Reason and Passion wherein Passion drives Reason.

"Reason" is not and will not become a "Passion", and Passion does not reason. Our passions are only governable, and that with considerable effort.

When we set out to fulfill goals: get a PhD; become the top Gestapo Leader; start a new congregation; live an ethical life; retire early; see that your children finish college or get married, or just survive childhood; obtain objects of high status... we do so because Passion drives Reason.

A paradox: The worship, elevation, and prioritization of Reason is at the behest of Passion.

We are wired that way by nature. Emotion has been and is the critical facility of survival. Reason will balance the books because Passion demands it.

Fear, anger, sadness, joy, trust, disgust, anticipation, aspiration, pleasure, surprise, elation, enmity, calmness, shame, indignation, love, envy, pride, contempt, calm... vs. reason.

How very Humean of you BC! It will remain mere wordplay unless we clarify what are the practical differences between Reason also being a passion and Reason being something different. When I say that Reason can also be a passion, I simply mean that Reason can restrain and overcome any other passion in individuals where it is the strongest passion. In my opinion, reason and the passions share the same essence. It is only a question of which is stronger in a given individual, since they all compete in governing them. There have been very few individuals in history in whom Reason became the strongest passion. Take an individual like Marcus Aurelius; in such a man, Reason dominates the passions; it means that the passions only occur if reason demands that they do in that particular context. Then take an individual like Hamlet, where a group of passions (love, hatred, anger) dominate and enslave his reason. In the former case, Marcus feels love towards his wife because Reason demands that he does (since they are married). In the latter case, Hamlet hates Claudius despite the fact that, rationally, whatever happened is already done with, and it is not affecting him anymore in any way -> thus his hatred has overpowered his reason, instead of the other way around.

Except that I would disagree about the "facing up to great challenges" bit. Heathcliff does not look at it as a "great challenge" to get back Catherine and destroy Linton. In fact, for him, it is no challenge at all -> even thinking about it gives him great joy. That is why he states "while I'm thinking of that, I don't feel any pain". Thinking of it as a challenge suggests to me that somehow there is a doubt about one's capacity to overcome it; one looks at it as a mountain of suffering one must bypass to get to what he desires. We're still thinking in terms of "can I do this or can I not?", and we're not very far from the question "should I do this, or should I not?". Notice that for Heathcliff, these questions never come up... he does not care whether he can do it or he can't; he will die trying if he must. For him it isn't a challenge - it's his life. He is not trying to surpass himself, or become better or anything like that. He is merely trying to become who he already is.

OK, I'm Humid.

I don't count Reason as a Passion (emotion) because I subscribe to the biological account of brain activity. Reason is situated in the pre-frontal cortex, emotion is seated in the limbic system. Hume, of course, didn't have any fMRI's to help him out, so his conclusions are impressive. That he agrees with me is even more amazing! >:)

If M. A. thought "the passions only occur if reason demands that they do in that particular context" then he was an idiot. Like as not he knew perfectly well that he could not FEEL ravenous hatred just because in context that emotion would be a good idea. He wouldn't be able to feel even moderately bored on command--and no one else would either. You can choose what to order for lunch, but you can not choose how you will feel about the food you get.

Reason can not summon emotions. Reason can make you behave AS IF you felt something, but you will know that it is fake. If Marcus did not love Annia Galeria Faustina Minor, he would not feel it. He could act as if he did, but he could not FEEL LOVE on reason's command.

That Reason can order our Passions about is a conceit that pro-reason partisans like to entertain. It's nonsense. The conceit works OK when you like what you are thinking, and doing what you like to do, and nothing is getting in your way. Then somebody comes along and trips you, kicks you in the balls, and shits on your head. You will rage and burn (at least for awhile) regardless of what your reason thinks you should feel.

The passions are of the body, the body is of nature, and nature always bats last.

I don't count Reason as a Passion (emotion) because I subscribe to the biological account of brain activity. Reason is situated in the pre-frontal cortex, emotion is seated in the limbic system. Hume, of course, didn't have any fMRI's to help him out, so his conclusions are impressive. That he agrees with me is even more amazing! >:) — Bitter Crank

But reason can certainly re-train the reactions of the limbic system, that is why it is possible to overcome fears, such that when exposed to the object of fear, one no longer feels the anxiety. It is part of the brain's neuroplasticity.

If M. A. thought "the passions only occur if reason demands that they do in that particular context" then he was an idiot. Like as not he knew perfectly well that he could not FEEL ravenous hatred just because in context that emotion would be a good idea. He wouldn't be able to feel even moderately bored on command--and no one else would either. You can choose what to order for lunch, but you can not choose how you will feel about the food you get. — Bitter Crank

Well, it seems to me that you are willing to call quite a few people idiots: Epictetus, Seneca, Spinoza, Epicurus, etc. And yes you can choose how you will feel about it (or rather how you will not feel about it). For example, you can do a stoic exercise, wherein you imagine that the food that will be served to you will be served rotten on purpose so that others laugh at you. Prior to getting the food, you can train your mind so that it doesn't react with anger when it receives the food in such a condition. Hopefully, this will be just an exercise, and your food will be alright tho :p

Reason can not summon emotions. Reason can make you behave AS IF you felt something, but you will know that it is fake. If Marcus did not love Annia Galeria Faustina Minor, he would not feel it. He could act as if he did, but he could not FEEL LOVE on reason's command. — Bitter Crank

I'm not sure. I think this isn't entirely true. You can make yourself fall in love with someone for example. All you have to do is repeatedly idealise them in your mind, bring them into your mind's eye, fantasize over them, create your own stories about them, imagine great adventures with them, imagine having sex with them, etc. If you do this repeatedly, you will start feeling in love with them. This is undeniable, I mean the whole of cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive behavioral therapy (REBT), mindfulness-based-cognitive-therapy etc. are based precisely on this point: we can decide how to feel about things.

That Reason can order our Passions about is a conceit that pro-reason partisans like to entertain. It's nonsense. The conceit works OK when you like what you are thinking, and doing what you like to do, and nothing is getting in your way. Then somebody comes along and trips you, kicks you in the balls, and shits on your head. You will rage and burn (at least for awhile) regardless of what your reason thinks you should feel. — Bitter Crank

Yes, I will probably rage about it, if I haven't prepared myself in advance. Having your reason dominate your passions is as difficult as it is rare as Spinoza put it.

The passions are of the body, the body is of nature, and nature always bats last. — Bitter Crank

I think Reason is of nature too; I mean I don't see why not!

From the point of view of philosophy, ethics will always look like a dictatorship or reason because we, in the act of philosophising about ethics, turn ethics into a project of "rational" prescription. Even if we assert we ought to follow our passion, we have captured the notion of human action in distant thoughts and set out a system of rules people are supposed to follow.

Ethical action, however, has a wider reach. People may behave ethically on instinct. Not everyone has to think about a set of rules and describe specially what ought to be done in a situation to behave ethically. Indeed, it could be said that, in most instances, such thinking is not used when making decisions and taking ethical action. In the moment of action, we frequently lack the time to consider the thesis of an upcoming action in philosophical terms. Philosophy of ethics is almost useless when it comes to ethical action. Our actions are what matters in such a context, not whether we theoretically know what ought to be done. Usually, we sort of rely on our almost automatic reactions in responding to a situation.

The "dictatorship of reason" is only useful in the sense it acts as an influence to how we treat to the world in terms of action. It can influence us to produce certain habits of behaviour when it comes down to making decisions. We use it to change our behaviour from a distance. By setting-up our values a certain way, the "dictatorship of reason" can produce people who think and respond to the world in more ethical ways. That's what philosophy of ethics tries to do.

Agreed.

I think all ethics presuppose themselves. So if you are a romantic then romanticism will just "appear right". Similarly, Epicurean values will just "appear right" if you are an Epicurean.

All ethics are questionable in this fashion. But I would hazard to guess that they are only questionable in light of another ethical stance. You have to complete the question "What if. . . ?", and propose another value, as you did in the OP.

I don't believe this is where a dictatorship of reason establishes itself. We can reason about ethics, but to reason about ethics is to bring in much more than pure reason, or any sort of notion like that. Our emotions are part of our reasoning about morality or ethics. Without emotions we are morally inept. Without any sense of reason we are equally so. They are interdependent upon one another, ethically speaking.

"Well, it seems to me that you are willing to call quite a few people idiots: Epictetus, Seneca, Spinoza, Epicurus, etc." You are right -- reckless accusation on my part. But...

Philosophers live in service to Reason. Of course they are going to laud, honor, and praise it, and give it pride of place. They aren't going to rise and say "Amen" when Freud says that man is not master of his own house.

Agustino, I want to continue this but I've got to turn off the computer and get on with some pressing tasks, and won't be able to get back to this until Thursday night or Friday. In the meantime, one could do much, much, much worse than believing in reason.

I think all ethics presuppose themselves. So if you are a romantic then romanticism will just "appear right". Similarly, Epicurean values will just "appear right" if you are an Epicurean.

All ethics are questionable in this fashion. But I would hazard to guess that they are only questionable in light of another ethical stance. You have to complete the question "What if. . . ?", and propose another value, as you did in the OP.

I don't believe this is where a dictatorship of reason establishes itself. We can reason about ethics, but to reason about ethics is to bring in much more than pure reason, or any sort of notion like that. Our emotions are part of our reasoning about morality or ethics. Without emotions we are morally inept. Without any sense of reason we are equally so. They are interdependent upon one another, ethically speaking. — Moliere

I disagree about all ethics presupposing themselves. That is just another ethic - the ethic of anything goes. Reason, and its ascendancy within an individual can and does differentiate between ethical theories. I see this in myself. The more I live, the more I see elements of truth in many ethical systems I study. Some more reasonable than the others, none is perfect. But a few are excellent guides, as they can subsume elements from other ethical theories under themselves. I have found pyrrhonism, epicureanism and stoicism in particular to be quite strong from a rational point of view. Epicureanism and stoicism, are for example, in practice, not even that far from each other; just different theoretical frameworks.

And when we reason about ethics, we reason about what our emotions ought to be in particular circumstances, not what they are. Since we can influence our emotions using our thoughts, it is only a matter of learning how to do this to determine ourselves to have those emotions in those particular circumstances. If you bring in emotions to your ethical reasoning, then you are merely rationalising some already pre-conceived ideals. Post fact rationalisations have no place in philosophy. Therefore ethics should be (hey, this is meta-ethics now :s ) a matter of pure reason once we have extracted sufficient knowledge from the natural world - if it is not, then it's ad hoc - it means nothing.

"Well, it seems to me that you are willing to call quite a few people idiots: Epictetus, Seneca, Spinoza, Epicurus, etc." You are right -- reckless accusation on my part. But...

Philosophers live in service to Reason. Of course they are going to laud, honor, and praise it, and give it pride of place. They aren't going to rise and say "Amen" when Freud says that man is not master of his own house.

Agustino, I want to continue this but I've got to turn off the computer and get on with some pressing tasks, and won't be able to get back to this until Thursday night or Friday. In the meantime, one could do much, much, much worse than believing in reason. — Bitter Crank

Well not all philosophers live in the service of Reason - I doubt Kierkegaard, Shestov, et al. would agree for example. Some philosophers have also stated that man is not master of his own house. The point is BC - that while the house named "Of Human Bondage" is very large and has many entrances, there is also another house, named "Of Human Freedom" - small is the gate and narrow is the road that leads unto it ;)

I don't believe anything goes, though, so unless I'm just inconsistent -- a possibility, but one which I don't see just now -- in my beliefs then it would seem that these two beliefs are not the same.

What I mean by "ethics presuppose themselves" is only that you can't prove an ethical system. You can reasonably reflect upon various ethical stances, beliefs, systems, or attitudes -- but you can't prove one or the other to yourself. You have to try them out to get a feel for them. And, as we see, some ethical beliefs will appeal to someone's intuitive reason more than others. The process is a good one, but it doesn't prove any ethical stance. Rather, upon coming to believe in an ethic the ethic becomes more reasonable in accord with its own values of judgment [insofar that we are dealing with a consistent ethic, at least].

This doesn't mean that anything goes, either. I certainly still have ethical convictions, but I don't have proofs of these convictions.

Perhaps my favorite quote from Wittgenstein can be found in the Tractatus. It seems to follow along similar lines of thought, though clearly we don't believe the same thing. It reads:

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the
problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long
period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been
unable to say what constituted that sense?) — W

So you say:

I have found pyrrhonism, epicureanism and stoicism in particular to be quite strong from a rational point of view. Epicureanism and stoicism, are for example, in practice, not even that far from each other; just different theoretical frameworks.

This is only natural. This is what I mean -- you have found these to be strong from a rational point of view[a value posited by which you can then evaluate other values]. You come from somewhere and discover the strengths of your ethics.

Anything goes not in terms of you personally (you have your own ethics), but in terms of human beings generally. It seems to me your (meta-ethical) position is quite relativistic (although maybe I'm wrong).

What I mean by "ethics presuppose themselves" is only that you can't prove an ethical system. You can reasonably reflect upon various ethical stances, beliefs, systems, or attitudes -- but you can't prove one or the other to yourself. You have to try them out to get a feel for them. And, as we see, some ethical beliefs will appeal to someone's intuitive reason more than others. The process is a good one, but it doesn't prove any ethical stance. Rather, upon coming to believe in an ethic the ethic becomes more reasonable in accord with its own values of judgment [insofar that we are dealing with a consistent ethic, at least]. — Moliere

But you can't "prove" anything, nor do you need to. The whole idea of "proof" is meaningless in the first place.

This is only natural. This is what I mean -- you have found these to be strong from a rational point of view[a value posited by which you can then evaluate other values]. You come from somewhere and discover the strengths of your ethics. — Moliere

I fail to see a "value" posited here. Reason cannot be a value, since reason is that which determines what is and is not a value in this case. (just like the criteria for truth, cannot be true itself; it would be a category error to say it is true).

There's a balance to be found I think. Sure, I would love to live unrestrained, and uninhibited. Wosret to the max! -- but prudence, and care for consequence gets in the way, and probably should. The premise is still framed in terms of suffering and joy. Perhaps the sages are wrong, and there is more suffering in domestication and sublimation, and more joy in Dionysian thrills. The ideal, the good that I've been taught, and enchants me is irrespective of my own suffering and joy. One does good, high quality behaviors, which are pro-social (read moral), because they are high quality, and pro-social behavior regardless of how much personal suffering or joy they engender. When meeting conventions is insufferable for you, and the conventions are unjust, there are pro-social means of reproach.

Everyone has a rebellious streak, and wish to do what isn't permitted, at least in play, but most care too much about social ties, and consequences to become too uppity, and although there may be great joys to be attained in the most anti-social of behaviors, this in no way entices me.

I would say that reason is judgmental. When one judges, one uses normative standards to judge. And so, given that reason is judgmental, reason must use normative standards, and therefore requires values. Is reason a value itself? I'm not sure. We could say it is, I suppose. It seems that we value reason. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that all ethical values are determined by reason.

I would say that truth can itself be true. In fact, it would be strange to say that truth is not true. It would be like saying good is not good.

Similarly to truth, going right back to the point, reason is, itself, quite reasonable. It is self-consistent -- and if we care for reason, then reason is the sort of standard which we gravitate towards. Reason presupposes reason by its own standards of judgment.


I would say that my meta-ethics are relativistic, yes. But that's still different from "anything goes", all the same. I would say, given what I've said so far, that nothing is good a priori -- but we can come to find the good by believing, testing, and seeing what seems to work for us. Perhaps all ethics are relative to a context -- but that does not then mean that anything goes. In a certain context, perhaps only one thing goes.

Just to add onto that thought --

I think that as one masters their ethics the number of possible choices begins to decrease. For a master of a particular discipline there are few questions in contexts -- but that's not necessarily the result of rules. It's more the result of practice. So the master of one's moral bearing won't be able to tell you exactly what to do, or some such, but will be very able to give advice [given what the master of said ethics stands for] succinctly upon knowing your circumstances, and very rarely encounters a context that can't be worked out adequately.

Perhaps the master believes in chasing a lover, as you note, or perhaps the master believes in joy. These two masters won't persuade one another. There is no argument to be had between them. But, similarly, they won't be hesitant either. The ebb and flow and originality of every moment won't overcome them with indecision.

This is also what I mean by "ethics presuppose themselves" -- I don't think there's a single answer out there that reason can give us. It seems quite plausible to me that one can be either a romantic or an epicurean. And the only way to really know what works is to try them out [perhaps the reason some of the great ethicists were actually penitent, having come from different walks of life than what they live when they become ethicicsts, is that they dared to try, and knew how each life felt because of that]

I would say that reason is judgmental. When one judges, one uses normative standards to judge. And so, given that reason is judgmental, reason must use normative standards, and therefore requires values. Is reason a value itself? I'm not sure. We could say it is, I suppose. It seems that we value reason. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that all ethical values are determined by reason.

I would say that truth can itself be true. In fact, it would be strange to say that truth is not true. It would be like saying good is not good.

Similarly to truth, going right back to the point, reason is, itself, quite reasonable. It is self-consistent -- and if we care for reason, then reason is the sort of standard which we gravitate towards. Reason presupposes reason by its own standards of judgment. — Moliere

To say that truth is true is a tautology; same as reason is reasonable. It's an empty, vacuous statement. Reason cannot be a value itself, and I have already outlined why. Reason is, as you say, that which judges between values. That which judges between values cannot itself be a value, simply because it is the criteria which decides what is and is not a value in the first place. The criteria for values cannot itself be a value, the same way the criteria for truth cannot itself be true (that is why there is no infinite regress on the criterion of truth question; we stop where we have no more reason to go on asking, pace Wittgenstein).

I would say that my meta-ethics are relativistic, yes. But that's still different from "anything goes", all the same. I would say, given what I've said so far, that nothing is good a priori -- but we can come to find the good by believing, testing, and seeing what seems to work for us. Perhaps all ethics are relative to a context -- but that does not then mean that anything goes. In a certain context, perhaps only one thing goes. — Moliere

Well my phrase "anything goes" is taken from Paul Feyerabend, so take it like he used it for science. Sure, it depends on context, but that doesn't contradict that, on the largest scale, "anything goes". And I disagree that the good is "what seems to work for us". The good has nothing to do with human idiosyncrasies - as such it is, and can be determined, by pure reason, pace Spinoza. That most of us have difficulty determining it, that many of us cannot see it, that many of us don't perceive it as good - that is all irrelevant; afterall,

all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare — Spinoza

.

Perhaps the master believes in chasing a lover, as you note, or perhaps the master believes in joy. These two masters won't persuade one another. There is no argument to be had between them. But, similarly, they won't be hesitant either. The ebb and flow and originality of every moment won't overcome them with indecision. — Moliere

The fact that each bird speaks its own language is not to say that there aren't great commonalities between the two in practice (such as between Epicureanism and Stoicism for example).

To say that truth is true is a tautology; same as reason is reasonable. It's an empty, vacuous statement. Reason cannot be a value itself, and I have already outlined why. Reason is, as you say, that which judges between values. That which judges between values cannot itself be a value, simply because it is the criteria which decides what is and is not a value in the first place. The criteria for values cannot itself be a value, the same way the criteria for truth cannot itself be true — Agustino

I agree that "truth is true" has a tautologous feel to it. Similarly so with reason being reasonable. And I don't disagree that the statements don't tell us much about their subject matter. But I would still say that truth is true, and that reason is reasonable.

I don't think reason judges between values, but that reason judges simpliciter -- and that judgment requires a normative standard by which to judge and is, therefore, at least partially a value. (I'm not committed one way or the other on whether or not reason is or isn't a value) I don't see why a value cannot be a criteria for values, though, or why the criteria for truth cannot be true. I would expect the criteria for truth to be true. (I've not always thought this, but I've changed my position). And I would expect to be drawn to certain values based on what I already care about.


The only argument in the above being: All Normative standards are values. Judgment requires a normative standard. Therefore, judgment requires values.

Well my phrase "anything goes" is taken from Paul Feyerabend, so take it like he used it for science. Sure, it depends on context, but that doesn't contradict that, on the largest scale, "anything goes". And I disagree that the good is "what seems to work for us". The good has nothing to do with human idiosyncrasies - as such it is, and can be determined, by pure reason, pace Spinoza. That most of us have difficulty determining it, that many of us cannot see it, that many of us don't perceive it as good - that is all irrelevant; afterall, — Agustino

When Feyerabend is talking about science I don't disagree with him. But I wouldn't take his philosophy of science and generalize it to ethics. This is, in some sense, what Feyerabend is actually poking fun at -- the moralizing of scientific inquiry, when there are so many other important parts of life that science doesn't touch upon [like dreams, relationships, and good conduct]. And he is a great anti-moralist, in this sense, given that his background was as a Popperian moralist, himself ;).

Also, I agree that the good is not "what seems to work for us" -- I stated that this is how one finds the good, not that this is what it is to be good.

I'm afraid I am unmoved by appeals to pure reason for determining the good. I can go as far as Kant in my thinking, which is already to concede a great deal of ground to reason, but unabashed appeals to pure reason just don't make any sense to me. Perhaps you are one of the lucky few who can, through reason, see the form of the good. Well, I am not. So what am I to do with this theory, then?

The fact that each bird speaks its own language is not to say that there aren't great commonalities between the two in practice (such as between Epicureanism and Stoicism for example). — Agustino

I'm afraid I'm starting to lose track of what you're driving at now. I thought the point of contrast was the romantic persona you brought up in the OP, and not the similarities between kissing cousins?

Maybe it's just a terminological disagreement. I would just say that the romantic is following the ethic of a romanticism. That is the type of person they are. And, sure, the romantic is good in accord with what the romantic cares about. But not in accord with what the Epicurean cares about. But does this make him against ethics? I wouldn't say so.

Perhaps the tl;dr version is --

Agustino: Emotions beg the ethical question
Moliere: Exactly!

:)