Well, śūnyatā is often misinterpreted as a kind of monstrous void, but in reality it's much nearer to the phenomenological epochē of Husserl (who commented favourably on Buddhist Abhidharma.) — Wayfarer

The void is often misinterpreted as monstrous, instead of just being. The one.

I like to think of it as 'going beyond the word processing department' i.e. going beyond the part of your brain that encodes everything in language — Wayfarer

See, interesting, This conversation (these words) sits on an edge between what can be said, and what can’t. At the edge of logic and self. Where Parmenides says “it is the same thing to think and to be.”

I rather like to think that philosophy is concerned with reality as lived. It's in that sense that it is concerned with the nature and meaning of being rather than the study of what can be objectively assessess and measured. — Wayfarer

This is an interesting strand. I suspect that philosophy is unattainable for most people who lead lives where the barriers to philosophy are significant and sometimes insurmountable. We're never going to understand the difficult problems or comprehend works by significant thinkers. The barriers might be culture, time, priorities, available energy, disposition, lack of education, capacity to engage with the unfamiliar and the complex, etc.

There is something essentially elitist about philosophy, inasmuch as only those with sharp minds and time can really formulate theorised responses to the issues. And sure, all this doesn't stop people from doing the best they can with what they have, but there's a big difference between having read a Camus novel and having a substantive understanding of the subject. As we so often see on this site.

I'm not convinced that even having a smattering of philosophy is helpful. Dare I raise the lamentable matter of the Dunning Kruger effect... That said, I'm not arguing against philosophy, I'm just noting some limitations.

This is an interesting strand. I suspect that philosophy is unattainable for most people who lead lives where the barriers to philosophy are significant and sometimes insurmountable. — Tom Storm

There are many interesting practical philosophy writers on Medium and Substack. Too many to follow, really. Masimo Piggliuci is one. Many of those writers are going back to the classics - Marcus Aurellius other Stoic writers. And it's because the ancients were in their way much more practical - what's that word, 'phronesis', practical wisdom. There's an audience for it, even if it's not a mass audience.

Speaking of 'elitism', did you ever happen upon John Fowles foray into philosophy, The Aristos? I only read it once, many years ago, but it left an impression. Especially the compendium of sayings by Heraclitus at the end.

Where Parmenides says “it is the same thing to think and to be.” — Fire Ologist

There's a saying associated with Platonism, 'to be, is to be intelligible'. It took me a long while to understand that, but one of the books I mentioned cleared it up, Thinking Being, Eric Perl.

There is something essentially elitist about philosophy, — Tom Storm

That is true and that’s a shameful failure of philosophy. The way I see it, wisdom can and does come from anywhere, from anyone at any moment. It’s always a surprise. Wisdom is not merely some reward for the philosopher, or even the mystic. Philosophers, like scientists, usually (not always) seem to think only the long, methodical path of logic can justify any such claim of “knowledge” or “wisdom”; or the mystic will not settle until there is nothing left of themselves to be settled before claiming a glimpse at enlightenment. But these paths are only necessary because we philosophers and broken mytics make it this way. And then someone accidentally speaks wisdom. It’s the same wisdom whether you struggled to know it or find it given by accident.

Speaking of 'elitism', did you ever happen upon John Fowles foray into philosophy, The Aristos? I only read it once, many years ago, but it left an impression. — Wayfarer

Yes, thanks for reminding me. I read it in the mid 1980's and it made an impact.

That is true and that’s a shameful failure of philosophy. The way I see it, wisdom can and does come from anywhere, from anyone at any moment. It’s always a surprise. Wisdom is not merely some reward for the philosopher, or even the mystic. — Fire Ologist

Sure. When I said elitist, it wasn't meant as adverse criticism, more of a context.

I wonder if philosophy is too sprawling an enterprise to narrow it down to wisdom or self-awareness. Not that it can't be those.

I'm more interested in questions of epistemology and metaphysics and those are pretty much off limits unless you are a serious reader and thinker. How many people can truly gain a useful reading of Heidegger or Deleuze, say? Or Kant?

As for wisdom - most of the really wise I have known have not been big readers. They have tended to have a disposition that allows for accumulating wisdom directly through personal experience.

There is something essentially elitist about philosophy... — Tom Storm

I wonder if philosophy is too sprawling an enterprise... — Tom Storm

There are lots of niches in sprawling enterprises, and when everyone can set up shop in their own niche and be the resident expert there, pride finds root. This even extends to the question of whose niche gets to construe the topic at hand. It's no wonder that posters are at their best when they write an OP and are forced to creep out of their niche.

But to be fair, in this case Wayfarer asked you about metaphysics and mysticism. — Leontiskos

With regard to mysticism - there is a lot of different stuff called mysticism. If we regard mysticism as the experience of a reality that transcends our everyday reality, that is something I know nothing about. I have never had the experience of such a reality. I don't doubt that others have had an experience that they attribute to a higher reality, but I lack the measure by which to evaluate some of these claims as true and not others.

From a thread on Plato's metaphysics:

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.

Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.

In the Philebus, Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.

We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.

Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.

The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.

The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.

Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.

The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)

The Whole is by nature both good and bad.

The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.

The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.

I was taken aside by a kindly lecturer, David Stove — Wayfarer

As in Stove’s Gem notoriety, I presume.

How apropos, in a thread arguing pros and cons of elevated philosophical dialectics.

I suppose we could view Socrates as trying to block rational thought at these points of aporia, but I'm not sure that's his purpose — J

A bit more on this. The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself.

I'm not really sure what this reply is supposed to mean. Is the claim that Plato doesn't really buy into the psychology and means of self-determination he lays out across several dialogues (not just the Republic, but the chariot of the Phaedrus, the Golden Thread of the Laws, etc.)?

But even on a highly skeptical view Plato can still get you this far, because his psychology will apply even if we only asymptomatically approach the Good. The rule of reason is the ground for proper inquiry and the ability to transform knowledge or informed opinion into action (in turn allowing for better inquiry). It's a recurring theme that the sophists crash and burn in dialectic because they cannot reign in their passions, but are instead driven by them.

Indeed, later thinkers drawing on Plato would often present such an asymptotic view, e.g. St. Gregory of Nyssa's continual movement towards/into the Beatific Vision. Or they draw a distinction between the asymptotic approach of discursive reasoning and direct apprehension in the Beatific Vision (e.g. St. Maximus, St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysus, etc., and arguably St. Paul himself: "love never ends. As for prophecies, they will pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will pass away." I Corinthians 13:8 —For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face 13:12).

Skepticism can only threaten the psychology if we cannot actually approach the Good (and the True) at all, or if we can never know if we have approached it. But I think such skepticism would need an understanding of appearances/images and their relation to the absolute quite at odds with Plato's. The appearance/reality distinction collapses if we only have access to appearances, and we lurch towards Protagoras.

But isn't it also possible that traditionalist interpretation of Plato - the mystical side of Plato, if you like - has been deprecated by secular culture?

That's certainly part of "creative" readings. Philosophers want to translate an older thinkers work into a form that will jive with modern intellectual trends, or sometimes they do it in service of an ideological end. You see this quite a bit with Hegel, in part because he can be very obscure. So, you have charges that folks like Pinkhard "deflate" Hegel, removing or playing down aspects that would be objectionable to contemporary secular audiences. And there is merit to this approach because it is a way to recover what might seem most valuable in the modern context. Or you have stuff like Bloom's commentary on the Logic which is more obviously a particularly Marxist reading looking to build up Marxist theory.

But then there is also just the drive for "novelty" and "creativity" in scholarship, which can sometimes have a pernicious effect. The path to pointless conflict often runs though moving to assert that one's new reading is the correct one, "what the author intended." Such claims can sometimes be litigated well, particularly if we have a lot of correspondence from an author discussing their own work, but in other cases they seem interminable. Aristotle is a good example here because the exact way in which the works were written, or even who set down certain parts, is up for debate.

My view would be that some readings are better than others regardless of the author's intent. It is sometimes useful to try to analyze how an author saw their own work, but it can also be either pointless (when good sources don't exist) or just an exercise in trying to appeal to a "great name" to boost one's argument.

So, Seth Rosen was mentioned above. Here is a case where most of the criticism points out that even if we think that the overall reading is implausible as "Plato's intent," it is nonetheless interesting and might still get at something in his intent/motivation that has been underdiscussed (e.g. ruminations on his own failed adventure in governance). We can take parts of this without having to go along with the idea that a core concern of Plato is the threat of rule by ideology, a problem that is highly relevant to us in the modern era, but which wouldn't really be relevant for centuries and centuries after Plato's death. Likewise, the account in question relies on "taking Socrates at his word," except when it doesn't as respects the whole purpose of introducing the city (and the psychology here is situated in many other dialogues without the social context anyhow).

It's also a reading where we can see what happens to Plato if we want to stick to a more modern notion of the Good. But the claim that "knowledge of the Good isn't actually useful for leaders and their practical concerns," is going to hinge on a more contemporary notion of the Good, one with more equivocal notions of goodness between different goods (and where knowledge of what is good doesn't necessitate right action).

But "everyone got Plato wrong for millennia, even Aristotle who worked with him for a decent part of his lifetime?" I suppose it wins for being more provocative. It also makes Plato into an extremely poor writer who badly miscommunicates, such that Aristotle, writing of "the Platonists," within living memory of Plato's teaching can ascribe to this group views entirely at odds with the "real view."

Anyhow, to your earlier point re science, I suppose the separation between science and philosophy depends on how one defines science. If science is a virtue, an intellectual habit and excellence, as in St. Thomas, then science is key to philosophy and also a pillar of freedom and self-governance/self-determination (which are themselves prerequisites for proper inquiry).

More narrow definitions of science will vary more from philosophy.

I'm not really sure what this reply is supposed to mean. Is the claim that Plato doesn't really buy into the psychology and means of self-determination he lays out across several dialogues (not just the Republic, but the chariot of the Phaedrus, the Golden Thread of the Laws, etc.)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two things, first, the psychology is far more complex than the clear three part division makes it appear to be. How, for example, does the Symposium's erotic desire of wisdom fit in with this?

move past what merely "appears to be good," (appetitive) or "is said to be good," (spirited/passions) in search of what is "truly good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Second, it is not simply a matter of psychology but of epistemology. The movement in search of what is 'truly good" is still within the realm of what appears to be.

The lowest level of the divided line is not transcended or abandoned. — Fooloso4

Well, but it is. Unless you believe that the description of the divided line itself given in Book VI is mere image or opinion, on the grounds that we are only humans? It uses an image -- Socrates doesn't think there is a real Divided Line somewhere -- but it seems a strained reading to say that therefore nothing he goes on to teach can be taken as true, or as different from what we see in the city/cave. Allan Bloom's commentary sounds about right to me: "It [the Line] shows that reality extends far beyond anything the practical man ever dreams and that to know it one must use faculties never recognized by the practical man." To doubt this, I think, is to doubt the cave allegory as well -- or else give it a reading in which the one who returns brings back only another image.

I suppose we could view Socrates as trying to block rational thought at these points of aporia, but I'm not sure that's his purpose.
— J

It is not that he blocks rational thought but that it has reached its limit. — Fooloso4

Interesting distinction. It depends on how we judge Socrates' sincerity in these moments. I think the aporia is often constructed by Socrates himself, as a teaching tool. But again, we'd need to be more specific in each dialogue. Thanks for the references to your earlier discussions -- I'll have a look.

I don't see this as being about the Forms themselves.
— J

It is about knowledge of the forms, or lack of such knowledge. — Fooloso4

I read back, starting from the discussion about astronomy et al., and I can't find this. Where do you see the forms fitting in here?

And Socrates does not know it either. He knows only how it looks to him. — Fooloso4

Begging the question, no? It's the very thing we're debating.

Overall, I agree that there is a mystical element in Plato, and that there are aspects of what noesis shows that probably can't be considered "objective" in any modern sense. I'm just holding out for Socratic/Platonic philosophy as an attempt to achieve a view that is freed from the chains of shadowplay.

it seems a strained reading to say that therefore nothing he goes on to teach can be taken as true, or as different from what we see in the city/cave. — J

What aspects of the divided line do you take to be true? Is there a realm of Forms? Are there philosophers who know these Forms? Do you know the Forms themselves? I think there are things to be learned from the divided line, but they may not be the same things that you have learned. One thing that I learned is that we should not mistake what is said about the Forms as knowledge of the Forms. And without such knowledge the ontology remains is an image.

It [the Line] shows that reality extends far beyond anything the practical man ever dreams and that to know it one must use faculties never recognized by the practical man." — J

How does it show this? To assert that there is in not to show that there is.

Here is a quick amusing story about Alan Bloom from Seth Benardete a fellow students of Leo Strauss:

He was heading home after a conference with Stanley Rosen (another friend and student of Strauss) and Allan Bloom in the car. Bloom spotted some deer by the side of the road. They stopped the car. Bloom wanted to get out to see them. He asked: "Do you think they'll attack if I got out and approach them?" And Rosen said: "I don't think they've read Closing of the American Mind".

I think Bloom's translation and notes on the Republic is a good introduction, it was my introduction to Plato, but Benardete and Rosen go much deeper and much further.

... or else give it a reading in which the one who returns brings back only another image. — J

What else could he have brought back? He could not bring back what he saw. At best he could tell them what he saw, but that is an image and not the thing itself.

I think the aporia is often constructed by Socrates himself, as a teaching tool. — J

I agree that he sometimes deliberately confuses his interlocutor, but this does not do away with the problem.

I read back, starting from the discussion about astronomy et al., and I can't find this. Where do you see the forms fitting in here? — J

He is talking about the power of dialectic that:

... leads what is best in the soul upwards to the sight of what is most excellent among things that are ...

(532c)

Namely, the Forms.

And Socrates does not know it either. He knows only how it looks to him.
— Fooloso4

Begging the question, no? It's the very thing we're debating. — J

I don't think that the distinction between the truth as it appears to him and knowledge of the truth itself begs the question. If it were why would he not insist that it is actually so?

Bloom wanted to get out to see them. He asked: "Do you think they'll attack if I got out and approach them?" And Rosen said: "I don't think they've read Closing of the American Mind". — Fooloso4

:lol: I appreciate Bloom's scholarship while deploring his politics.

Clearly we're differing on how straightforward a reading we should give to the Republic. FWIW, my first wife was a Plato scholar who studied with Jonathan Ketchum at the (somewhat notorious) Oakstone Farm at SUNY-Binghamton. So I'm no stranger to reading Plato against the grain. Indeed, my current view may be in part a reaction against what I eventually decided was ironic or aporetic reading taken much too far.

Probably a good target statement to see where people land on this would be your "What else could he have brought back?" OK, the whole allegory is just that -- an allegory. So we have to read it allegorically, as Plato intended. Within allegory, of course we have nothing but images -- as you say, what else could there be? But this is not an allegory about images; it's a story that uses images to try to explain how knowledge may be attained.

So, to vastly oversimplify:

Socrates truly "knows" nothing = ironic reading of Plato
Socrates knows a great deal = straightforward/traditional reading of Plato
We can't decide until we understand more deeply what Plato thought about knowledge and dialectic = fair game for endless, interesting debate

I appreciate Bloom's scholarship while deploring his politics. — J

Me too .

Within allegory, of course we have nothing but images -- as you say, what else could there be? — J

The one who escapes the cave does not only see images. She sees the Forms. But she can't bring the Forms back to the cave for others to see. There is no knowledge of the Forms transmitted from her to others. It is a common mistake to here about the Forms and think that one has thereby gained knowledge.

But this is not an allegory about images; it's a story that uses images to try to explain how knowledge may be attained. — J

The cave is said to be "an image of our nature in its education and want of education". (514a)

I suspect that philosophy is unattainable for most people who lead lives where the barriers to philosophy are significant and sometimes insurmountable. — Tom Storm

At age 15 I developed ideas that I have been elaborating ever since. I hadnt read a word of philosophy at that time, and I wasnt to do so for another 15 years. I considered what I was doing to be psychology, and now call it philosophy, even though it is the same basic ideas. Did this transformation consist of some abrupt shift in method or vocabulary? No, it was a gradual change, which is why I have insisted here that the difference between philosophical and other modes of expression has to be understood in terms of a spectrum involving qualities auch as depth and comprehensiveness of articulation.

No, it was a gradual change, which is why I have insisted here that the difference between philosophical and other modes of expression has to be understood in terms of a spectrum involving qualities auch as depth and comprehensiveness of articulation. — Joshs

I understand. But you appear to have a high intelligence and an innate capacity for speculative thought and high theory. I'm not sure how common this is. Hell, you even know how to read Heidegger :wink:

As for wisdom - most of the really wise I have known have not been big readers. They have tended to have a disposition that allows for accumulating wisdom directly through personal experience. — Tom Storm

Do you mean those people were confident?

No

As in Stove’s Gem notoriety, I presume. — Mww

Yes, that David Stove, under whom I studied Hume. I didn't learn about his 'gem' until much later, but I can't say I think much of it. (See a critique. His Gem sounds awfully like most of what Banno says about philosophical idealism.)

Allan Bloom's commentary sounds about right to me: "It [the Line] shows that reality extends far beyond anything the practical man ever dreams and that to know it one must use faculties never recognized by the practical man." To doubt this, I think, is to doubt the cave allegory as well -- or else give it a reading in which the one who returns brings back only another image. — J

Is there a realm of Forms? Are there philosophers who know these Forms? Do you know the Forms themselves? — Fooloso4

Have you looked at the book I have mentioned, Eric Perl Thinking Being? The chapter on Plato in particular, in which he criticizes the customary idea of there being the 'separate realm' of Forms. ('The Meaning of Separation'). I don't want to launch into exegesis, other than to say I believe that Plato's metaphysics has become systematically misrepresented over time, due to the fact that modern philosophy and culture has no concept of there being degrees of reality, which was still visible in the 17th century philosophy of Liebniz, Descartes and Spinoza:

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. Given that there are only substances ('substantia', ouisia) and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality. — 17th Century Theories of Substance

I interpret this as a reference to the dying embers of the 'Great Chain of Being', which was to be extinguished by the scientific revolution. Whereas for modern culture, with its nominalist roots, existence is univocal: something either exists, or it does not. There can't be degrees of reality. Which again, is why it is necessary to put quotes around "higher". (Also recall the many discussions about the meaning of 'substance' in philosophy, see this acid comment by Joe Sachs.)

If science is a virtue... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, the key differentiator of modern science is the emphasis on quantitative data, measurement and prediction. Isn't that why physics has been made the paradigm for much of modern science and philosophy? Isn't that why, in philosophy of mind, the mind itself has been reduced to arguments about the significance of 'qualia' (merely a technical term for the qualitative nature of experience.)

The chapter on Plato in particular, in which he criticizes the customary idea of there being the 'separate realm' of Forms. — Wayfarer

If you are objecting to my use of the term 'realm' both Plato (in translation) and Perl use it. Perl says:

What is given to the senses, then, and hence the entire realm of the sensible ...

(36)

Plato:

... in the realm of reason, relates to reason and whatever is known by reason, so does the sun, in the realm of sight.

(Republic 508b)

As to separate, I agree that it is not another world. Perl points out, and as you note, there is a sense in which they are separate as discussed in the section 'The Meaning of Separation'.

due to the fact that modern philosophy and culture has no concept of there being degrees of reality — Wayfarer

Doesn't Heidegger's concept of world in Being and Time include the concept of reality?

See the newly-started thread Degrees of Reality, which will mention Heidegger in the forthcoming post.

OK. The passage caught my eyes, as I was just about to start re-reading some Heidegger books.

Have you looked at the book I have mentioned, Eric Perl Thinking Being? The chapter on Plato in particular, — Wayfarer

Thanks, I'll put it on my virtual nightstand.

If you are objecting to my use of the term 'realm' both Plato (in translation) and Perl use it. Perl says: — Fooloso4

Not yours, in particular, but the general tendency towards reification of 'forms' such that they are depicted as existing in a platonic realm. My revisionist interpretation is that forms can be understood as logical principles, arithmetical truths, and all the many elements of thought that can only be grasped by reason. So they're real in that sense, but not existent in the sense that objects are existent. This shows up in all of the arguments about platonic realism in mathematics:

Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate. — SEP

Note the irony of 'would be an important discovery', discussing something which was arguably well understood two thousand years ago ;-)

Frankly, I am surprised there are as many grants for philosophy as there are. — jgill

I wonder why there is no Nobel Prize for philosophy.