I assume I get to be a substance in some sense, that I am not less real than my mother was because my existence is dependent on her having existed. — Srap Tasmaner
Which is fine, provided that our evaluations are not mistake for how things are. — Banno
Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident... — Leontiskos
Probably down to Hume, I don't see as that matters much. But values can be stated with certainty and measured.'What is', as distinct from 'what ought to be', in Hume's context, is what is precisely measurable and can be stated with certainty. Which doesn't even extend to causal relations, as it turned out. — Wayfarer
I do really like the idea of trying to come up with a continuous graduation reality concept, which isn't an accuracy of a representation, or a way of counting things that already apply, or a way of saying how individuated an entity is. But I don't think it's possible, honestly. — fdrake
It's basically levels of ontological dependence (whether per se or per accidens). — Leontiskos
A sign or symbol has an identity that transcends the material constituents from which it is composed. — Wayfarer
I am going to answer your deep question with a simple: no. Is the spectrum of reality continuous, my answer is no. The other option is yes? Maybe in one direction it can be continuous....I'll go one step further. A deeper question is whether the spectrum of reality is continuous. As Einstein inferred, the moon exists - and our imaginations exist. What is in between? — jgill
As Einstein inferred, the moon exists - and our imaginations exist. What is in between? — jgill
three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ...At its root, the idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.
This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.
Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.” — Quantum Mysteries Dissolve....
Gravity
Kings
Justice
I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is "more real" than kings and that kings are "moral real" than justice.
There's an extensional component to "gravity" that "justice" doesn't have (unless Platonism is correct), and there's an intensional component to "kings" that "gravity" doesn't have. — Michael
At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. — Wayfarer
Well, one definition of "real" is "existing or occurring in the physical world; not imaginary, fictitious, or theoretical; actual". — Michael
If the imaginary could be summed up as the result of a physical specific state of our brain and its present energy distribution, would that not mean it is also existing? — Christoffer
Certainly my concept of justice exists as a physical brain state, but when we talk about justice we're not talking about people's brain states. — Michael
I distinguish sensations from concepts. Colour is like pain, not like justice. — Michael
Ideas exist in the physical world (ta-da). Justice is an idea. Ergo justice is real. — Pantagruel
In what way does your concept of justice distinguish itself from your perception of pain? The sensation of pain or perception of magenta is just as much a construct of your brain as your concept of justice. — Christoffer
ergo sum — Pantagruel
Well there's certainly a distinction between the concept of pain and the sensation of pain. They are both brain states but they're different kinds of brain states. — Michael
I don't think the concept of sight is of much comfort to a blind man. — Michael
I didn't say it isn't real. I said that I could see what someone would mean by saying that gravity is more real than justice. — Michael
Descartes was right in saying the most self evident reality is"cogito" or "Ich denke" in Kant. All other reality is based on it. Indeed one cannot doubt one is thinking. In Kant, all experience is based on Ich denke, so it is the a priori precondition for possibility of all existence. — Corvus
Degrees also seem like a quantitative concept - as if one thing can exist more than another, or exist harder in a given way. As opposed to a qualitative one - like an idea might exist in a different sense to a cup. The former corresponds to changes in degree of reality within a type, the latter corresponds to differences type. Compare heights and masses, two different quantitative axes, differences of degree. Ideality and materiality, two different seemingly binary properties, differences in kind.
By calling what we experience with our senses less real than the Forms, Plato is not saying that what we experience with our senses is simply illusion. The “reality” that the Forms have more of is not simply their not being illusions. If that’s not what their extra reality is, what is it? The easiest place to see how one could suppose that something that isn’t an illusion, is nevertheless less real than something else, is in our experience of ourselves.
In Republic book iv, Plato’s examination of the different "parts of the soul” leads him to the conclusion that only the rational part can integrate the soul into one, and thus make it truly “just.” Here is his description of the effect of a person’s being governed by his rational part, and therefore “just”:
Justice . . . is concerned with what is truly himself and his own. . . . [The person who is just] binds together [his] parts . . . and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate, and harmonious. Only then does he act. (Republic 443d-e)
Our interest here (I’ll discuss the “justice” issue later) is that by “binding together his parts” and “becoming entirely one,” this person is “truly himself.” That is, as I put it in earlier chapters, a person who is governed by his rational part is real not merely as a collection of various ingredients or “parts,” but as himself. A person who acts purely out of appetite, without any examination of whether that appetite is for something that will actually be “good,” is enacting his appetite, rather than anything that can appropriately be called “himself.” Likewise for a person who acts purely out of anger, without examining whether the anger is justified by what’s genuinely good. Whereas a person who thinks about these issues before acting “becomes entirely one” and acts, therefore, in a way that expresses something that can appropriately be called “himself.”
In this way, rational self-governance brings into being an additional kind of reality, which we might describe as more fully real than what was there before, because it integrates those parts in a way that the parts themselves are not integrated. A person who acts “as one,” is more real as himself than a person who merely enacts some part or parts of himself. He is present and functioning as himself, rather than just as a collection of ingredients or inputs.
We all from time to time experience periods of distraction, absence of mind, or depression, in which we aren’t fully present as ourselves. Considering these periods from a vantage point at which we are fully present and functioning as ourselves, we can see what Plato means by saying that some non-illusory things are more real than other non-illusory things. There are times when we ourselves are more real as ourselves than we are at other times.
Indeed, we can see nature as a whole as illustrating this issue of how fully integrated and “real as itself ” a being can be. Plants are more integrated than rocks, in that they’re able to process nutrients and reproduce themselves, and thus they’re less at the mercy of their environment. So we could say that plants are more effectively focused on being themselves than rocks are, and in that sense they’re more real as themselves. Rocks may be less vulnerable than plants are, but what’s the use of invulnerability if what’s invulnerable isn’t you?
Animals, in turn, are more integrated than plants are, in that animals’ senses allow them to learn about their environment and navigate through it in ways that plants can’t. So animals are still more effectively focused on being themselves than plants are, and thus more real as themselves.
Humans, in turn, can be more effectively focused on being themselves than many animals are, insofar as humans can determine for themselves what’s good, rather than having this be determined for them by their genetic heritage and their environment. Nutrition and reproduction, motility and sensation, and a thinking pursuit of the Good each bring into being a more intensive reality as oneself than is present without them.
Now, what all of this has to do with the Forms and their supposedly greater reality than our sense experience is that it’s by virtue of its pursuit of knowledge of what’s really good, that the rational part of the soul distinguishes itself from the soul’s appetites and anger and so forth. The Form of the Good is the embodiment of what’s really good. So pursuing knowledge of the Form of the Good is what enables the rational part of the soul to govern us, and thus makes us fully present, fully real, as ourselves. In this way, the Form of the Good is a precondition of our being fully real, as ourselves.
But presumably something that’s a precondition of our being fully real must be at least as real as we are when we are fully real. It’s at least as real as we are, because we can’t deny its reality without denying our own functioning as creatures who are guided by it or are trying to be guided by it.13 And since it’s at least as real as we are, it’s more (fully) real than the material things that aren’t guided by it and thus aren’t real as themselves.
From Robert M. Wallace - Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present
[Hegel] thinks he has demonstrated, in the chapter on “Quality,” that the ordinary conceptions of quality, reality, or finitude are not systematically defensible, by themselves, but can only
be properly employed within a context of negativity or true infinity...
Note: For instance, one cannot understand “red” atomically, but rather it depends on other notions such as “color” and the things (substances) that can be red, etc. to be intelligible. This notion is similar to how the Patristics (e.g., St. Maximus) developed Aristotle in light of the apparent truth that even "proper beings" (e.g., a horse) are not fully intelligible in terms of themselves. For instance, try explaining what a horse *is* without any reference to any other plant, animal, or thing. This has ramifications for freedom as the ability to transcend “what one already is,”—the “given”—which relies on our relation to a transcendent absolute Good—a Good not unrelated to how unity generates (relatively) discrete/self-determining beings/things.
[Hegel] has now shown, through his analysis of “diversity” and opposition, that within such a context of negativity or true infinity, the reality that is described by apparently merely “contrary” concepts will turn out to be better described, at a fundamental level, by contradictory concepts. The fundamental reality will be contradictory, rather than merely contrary. It’s not that nothing will be neither black nor white, but rather that qualities such as black, white, and colorless are less real (less able to be what they are by virtue of [only] themselves) than self-transcending finitude (true infinity) is…
From Robert M. Wallace - Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God
Substance
Not that aspect, more that the individual as the arbiter of value, and that all individuals are equal in principle. Within an heirarchical ontology, there are also degrees of understanding, where individuals might have greater or lesser insight. I had a rather terse exchange about that in your other thread from which this one was spawned (here). That said, I hasten to add that I support the aspect of liberalism as the ability to accomodate a diversity of opinions, but not necessarily that it means that every opinion is equal, just because someone holds it.
...]we begin by considering how unity (resistance to division) and its essential properties become the principles and measures that are the proximate cause of all species. Here, we must recall that Aristotle distinguishes between magnitude (continuous) and multitude (discrete) vis-à-vis quantity. This is, however, not the only distinction Aristotle makes re quantity. He also has a more basic metaphysical distinction between dimensive quantity and virtual quantity.2
Both magnitude and multitude are species of dimensive/bulk quantity. This is most obvious with magnitude given its obvious relation to figure. Bodies in our world have length, width, and depth. Yet multitude is also dimensive in that it relies on the distinction between different bodies (or numerous distinct parts in a part/whole composite).
By contrast virtual quantity emanates intensively from a substance’s form, rather than extensively from its matter, and is “caused by the accidental form ‘quality,’ not the accidental property [of] dimensive ‘quantity.’” As St. Thomas puts it: “virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection of that form or nature… just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection.”3
Virtual quantity is thus a measure of the degree to which an entity perfects its form (i.e. a measure of completeness, self-governance, and unity), becoming fully “what it is.” We can think of privation (absence) and possession (presence) as orienting the “number line” upon which such quantity manifests. We might also consider possession in this sense to be a greater degree of participation in the ideal to which a thing aspires by nature (e.g. in St. Maximus)*.
We can see a parallel of this idea in Plato, with the concept of entities being able to be “more real as themselves,” and man being becoming more fully real(ized) when he is unified by the rational part of the soul and the desire for what is truly good.4 I would argue that we can even see a vestigial element of this notion in Nietzsche and other existentialist philosophers. There, the focus is on becoming “more fully what one is.”5
At the outset of Book II of the Physics, Aristotle identifies proper beings as those things that are the source of their own production.1 Beings make up a whole—a whole which is oriented towards some end. This definition would seem to exclude mere parts of an animal. For example, a red blood cell is not the source of its own production, nor is it a self-governing whole. Lymphocytes, for example, can be seen as being generated and destroyed in accordance with a higher-level aims-based "parallel-terraced scan," despite being in some sense relatively self-governing.
On this view, living things would most fully represent “beings.” By contrast, something like a rock is not a proper being. A rock is a mere bundle of external causes. Moreover, if one breaks a rock in half, one simply has two smaller rocks (an accidental change). Whereas if one breaks a tree in half, the tree—as a being—will lose its unity and cease to exist (i.e. death, a substantial change).
Aristotle’s mention of Empedocles' elements early in Book II might suggest that all “natural kinds” possess a nature (e.g. carbon atoms as much as men). Yet a lump of carbon or volume of hydrogen gas are both in many ways similar to a rock in that they are mere “bundles of external causes. ”Yet there is also a clear sense in which something like an water molecule is a more unified than a volume of water in a container, the latter of which is easily divided. Hence, we might suppose that unity exists in gradations.2 We can also think of the living organism as achieving a higher sort of unity, such that its diverse multitude of parts come to be truly unified into a whole through an aim.
Now, if we step back and try to consider our original question: if being is “many” or “one,” it seems to me that the most readily apparent example of the multiplicity of beings and of their unity is the human mind itself. We have our own thoughts, experiences, memories, and desires, not other people’s. The multiplicity of other things, particularly other people, and the unity of our own phenomenal awareness is something that is given.3
1 i.e. “possessing a nature.” Actually, at the very start of Book II, Aristotle gives us a brief list of things that might constitute proper beings possessing their own nature, namely animals and their parts, as well as simple elements (i.e., Empedocles’ five elements). However, Aristotle revises this estimation in the second paragraph.
2 Very large objects like stars, nebulae, planets, and galaxies are an excellent example here. These are so large that the relatively weak force of gravity allows them to possess a sort of unity. Even if a planet is hit by another planet (our best hypothesis for how our moon formed), it will reform due to the attractive power of gravity. Likewise, stars, galaxies, etc. have definable “life cycles,” and represent a sort of “self-organizing system,” even though they are far less self-organizing than organisms. By contrast, a rock has a sort of arbitrary unity (although it does not lack all unity! We can clearly distinguish discrete rocks in a non-arbitrary fashion).
3 Hume, Nietzche, and many Buddhist thinkers have challenged the notion of a unified self. I don’t think we have to entirely disagree with their intuitions here. Following Plato, we might acknowledge that a person can be more or less unified. Indeed, we can agree with Nietzsche’s description of himself—that in his soul he might indeed find a “congress of souls” each vying for power, trying to dominate the others. But on Plato’s view (and many others) this would simply be emblematic of a sort of spiritual sickness. This is precisely how the soul is when it is not flourishing, i.e. the “civil war within the soul” of Plato’s Republic, or being “dead in sin” (i.e. a death of autonomy and an ability to do what one truly thinks is best) as described in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (Romans 7).
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