philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why. — Ludwig V

Might have something to do with the fact that not all behaviour involves using language. All linguistic behaviour does.

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
— Ludwig V
How would that be judged? — Patterner

Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them.

we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it. — creativesoul

OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer. I haven't worked out exactly how to argue the point, so I'm holding my peace until I've worked that out.
Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.

Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. — creativesoul

Language users express their beliefs etc. by talking (and in their other behaviour). Clearly, creatures without human language cannot express their beliefs by talking. But they can and do express their beliefs by their behaviour. Both language users and creatures without language have meaningful experiences, which, presumably, "consist of" correlations. (I'm setting aside my doubts about "consist of" and correlations.)

They do not draw correlations between language use and other things. — creativesoul

Insofar as they do not have human language, that seems obvious. But then, when I call out "dinner", my dog appears. Isn't that correlating language with something else? When I call out "sit", she sits and looks at me expectantly. Apparently dogs are capable of responding appropriately to something like 200 words, which is about the language learning level of a two year old human.

I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus. — creativesoul

I wasn't conflating those two descriptions. I was pointing out that the mathematical description of the trajectory of the ball does apply to the ball and that the dog (or indeed, human) is not applying that description. What beliefs and/or experiences can we discern in ourselves to explain how the ball is caught? Can we attribute those same beliefs to the dog or not? I think that skills like these are attributed to "judgement", which means either that the human "just sees" where the ball is coming and the same can be attributed to the dog. Both express their belief about where the ball is coming by positioning themselves to catch it.
We can legitimately expect that there will be some neurological activity which we are not conscious of and which that enables this to happen. This will be similar to the neurological activity that must underlie our ability to discern where a sound is coming from. We can also expect the same or similar activity to be going on in the dog.

What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them. — creativesoul

The difference between the autonomous salivation and the growl which is under the dog's control.

I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak. — creativesoul

I wasn't going so far as claiming that it is a canine speech act. However, my speech acts are meaningful to myself and others (including my dog), so there may well be something to the comparison.
As to conscious control, I cannot train my dog to salivate or not on my command (any more than I can train myself to salivate or not as I wish). But I can train my dog to stop growling on command. That suggests the growl is under the dog's control.

Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. — creativesoul

Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean?

The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do. — creativesoul

So we agree at least to some extent. I wasn't making any claim about equivalence of that function to our expressions of thought and belief. Though it does occur to me that when I feel threatened by someone, I will make placatory and/or self-confident signals, whether by body language or in speech in order to warn them off. That seems to me to be performing the same function as the growl. The difference, I would say, is the difference between the simplicity of the growl and the complexity of the messages we can convey through the complexity of language. There is similarity and difference.

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
— Ludwig V
How would that be judged?
— Patterner
Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them. — Ludwig V

I think we're having different conversations. I'm talking about whether or not we have abilities that language-less species do not have, and, if so, whether or not language is responsibile for those abilities.

I think you are talking about how we use those abilities.