I am not sure what you mean by a transcendent law. What do you mean by transcendent reality?

Admittedly, “transcendent reality” is a double positive; but a transcendent law is a law—viz., a rule of conformance with strict necessity—that is in reality as it were in-itself (“transcendent”).

I am just noting the difference between that which is transcendent and that which is transcendental, as a general dichotomy: the difference between what completely transcends consciousness and what transcends consciousness but pertains to how that consciousness is constructed.

Define transcendent.

By “transcendent”, I mean that which completely transcends consciousness; whereas “transcendental”, I mean that which transcends but pertains solely to the way consciousness is constructed. Wouldn’t you say that is Kant’s standard distinction?

And transcendent cannot be defined as that by which the brain cognizes reality into a coherent whole, without sufficient justification that pure transcendental reason hasn’t already provided the ground for exactly that.

I would say that by which the brain cognizes reality is transcendental; and that which is sensed, whatever it be, independently of that sensing, is transcendent.

I presume the OP is not talking about the Kantian transcendental law.

The OP is about a law which pertains to reality as it were in-itself—i.e., a transcendent law. A transcendental law would be a strict rule of conformity for how things are cognized.

Which is possible iff the relevant definitions are inconsistent with each other.

I didn’t follow this: what do you mean?

And there hasn’t yet been mention in the thesis, of principles, under which the transcendent laws would have to be subsumed.

I was thinking of natural laws which exist in reality as it were in-itself: what they would exactly be and why they are there are separate questions (in my mind).

Wouldn’t you say that is Kant’s standard distinction? — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t, myself, no. In Kant, transcendent is juxtapositional to immanent, with respect to experience, whereas transcendental merely indicates the mode in which reason constructs and employs pure a priori cognitions, which, of course, have nothing to do with experience as such, but only with those conditions by which it is possible. It’s complement is reason cognizing in its empirical mode, the difference being the conceptions of the former mode represent ideas, but in the latter the conceptions represent things or possible things.

So it is that in Kant, transcendent relates to experience, not consciousness. Besides, and I’m surprised you’d do such a thing….you can’t use the word being defined, in the definition of it. I get nothing of any value from transcendent being defined as that which transcends.
————-

On related definitions being inconsistent with each other, I just mean the conceptions in one represent a thing under these conditions, but the same conceptions are said to represent a different thing under those conditions.

For instance, when you say, “that by which the brain cognizes reality is transcendental”, is the inconsistency wherein it is reason alone that cognizes anything at all transcendentally, the brain being merely some unknown material something necessary for our intelligence in general.
————-

Not that I don’t admire your proclivity for stepping outside the lines. It’s just that you’re asking me to upset some rather well stabilized applecarts, but without commensurate benefit.

The OP is about a law which pertains to reality as it were in-itself—i.e., a transcendent law. — Bob Ross

I am not sure if reality works from a law. There are certainly observable and provable regularities in reality. However, there are also huge part of its operation which are random and chaos e.g. the weather changes, some part of human behavior and psychology and some of the principles in QM etc.

So it is that in Kant, transcendent relates to experience, not consciousness

What’s the difference between the two in your view?

Besides, and I’m surprised you’d do such a thing….you can’t use the word being defined, in the definition of it. I get nothing of any value from transcendent being defined as that which transcends.

The definition was not circular—e.g., the property of goodness is the property of being good. If you just mean that it is vague, then sure: I can rewrite it. Instead, I would say that that which is transcendent is that which is beyond our experience of reality as opposed to that experience or the preconditions for constructing such an experience.

For instance, when you say, “that by which the brain cognizes reality is transcendental”, is the inconsistency wherein it is reason alone that cognizes anything at all transcendentally, the brain being merely some unknown material something necessary for our intelligence in general.

This seems like a technicality though: the brain is the representation of what is ontologically “responsible” for reason.

Not that I don’t admire your proclivity for stepping outside the lines. It’s just that you’re asking me to upset some rather well stabilized applecarts, but without commensurate benefit.

:smile:

In Kant, transcendent is juxtapositional to immanent, with respect to experience, whereas transcendental merely indicates the mode in which reason constructs and employs pure a priori cognitions

And what is “immanent”? What you defined as “transcendental” here is the exact same as how I defined it, no? I am not seeing any differences here.

. There are certainly observable and provable regularities in reality. However, there are also huge part of its operation which are random and chaos

The OP is not arguing that reality has to be completely ordered; so that is a mute point. Further, like the OP mentioned, without any laws then it is all chaos—and there would be no observable regularities.

the weather changes

Change is not per se an example of randomness: the weather changing changes according to natural laws.

some part of human behavior and psychology

Human behavior is not regulated completely by natural, transcendent laws; but certainly is (at least partially) regulated by transcendental ones. E.g., one cannot decide to do something through reason without deploying principles reason (no matter how poorly deployed it may be).

The brain, however, is constrained by natural laws.

some of the principles in QM

Sure. We have evidence to support that there is randomness in reality—how does that negate the OP?

Sure. We have evidence to support that there is randomness in reality—how does that negate the OP? — Bob Ross

Law means it works 100% as laid out without fail. If there was 1 fail out of billions of events, then it is not a law. It then is a rule.

Is any law transcendent? In what sense? All laws are the product of human reasoning. Reality don't care about laws, or even be aware of laws. They just operate as they have done for millions of years. There is no guarantee that reality might operate totally different tomorrow from your expectation.

Change is not per se an example of randomness: the weather changing changes according to natural laws. — Bob Ross

They say that the weather changes has been much more unpredictable recent times, so it is harder to predict the weather effects. And there are the other natural phenomenon such as volcano eruptions, hurricanes and earth quakes etc. You cannot predict the date, time and location of these phenomenon, and how they would unfold themselves on the earth by some law.

E.g., one cannot decide to do something through reason without deploying principles reason (no matter how poorly deployed it may be). — Bob Ross

This sounds circular. You are deciding something through reason but you also deploy principle reason? It sounds ambiguous and tautology.

Many believe that human reasoning is just a nature for its survival. Deployment of principles reason? Is it not natural capacity which evolved for thousands of years via the history of human survival, civilization and evolution?

The brain, however, is constrained by natural laws. — Bob Ross

What do you mean by this? Could you elaborate more on the detail and ground for the statement? Does everyone's brain then all works exactly the same way to each other when confronted an event?

What’s the difference between the two in your view? — Bob Ross

Experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions; consciousness is a natural human condition, represented as the totality of representations. Sometimes called a faculty, but it doesn’t have faculty-like function, so….not so much in T.I..

transcendent is that which is beyond our experience — Bob Ross

That definition works well enough.

…..constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

….describes empirical cognitions…..

…..the preconditions for constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

…..describes transcendental cognitions, which covers not only experience but possible experience.
—————-

….the brain is the representation of what is ontologically “responsible” for reason. — Bob Ross

This is a kind of categorical error, in that when talking of the brain, the discourse is scientific, in which representation has no place, but when talking of representation, the discourse is philosophical, in which the brain has no place.

Nothing untoward with the fact the brain is necessary for every facet of human intelligence, but there remains whether or not it is sufficient for it. Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—————-

Immanent has to do with empirical cognitions, hence experience; transcendental has to do with a priori cognitions, hence possible experience. Transcendent, then, has do to with neither the one nor the other, hence no experience whatsoever.

Law means it works 100% as laid out without fail. If there was 1 fail out of billions of events, then it is not a law. It then is a rule.

Not quite. What you described is not the nature of a law but, rather, how we pragmatically determine what we think is a law.

Is any law transcendent? In what sense?

In the sense that it pertains to reality in-itself as opposed to the way we cognize it.

All laws are the product of human reasoning

No laws which pertain to reality as it were in-itself are the product of human reasoning. Our understanding of them is a product of human reasoning.

They say that the weather changes has been much more unpredictable recent times, so it is harder to predict the weather effects. And there are the other natural phenomenon such as volcano eruptions, hurricanes and earth quakes etc. You cannot predict the date, time and location of these phenomenon, and how they would unfold themselves on the earth by some law.

In principle you can. Just because it is hard, does not negate science.

This sounds circular. You are deciding something through reason but you also deploy principle reason? It sounds ambiguous and tautology.

This is an incoherent thought: do you think it is circular, or tautological? It can’t be both. Either way, it is neither: reason has an a priori structure, which contains principles and laws, of which one is using when thinking. It is impossible to think without deploying, e.g., the law of non-contradiction.

Many believe that human reasoning is just a nature for its survival. Deployment of principles reason? Is it not natural capacity which evolved for thousands of years via the history of human survival, civilization and evolution?

Principles of reason are a part of the faculty of reason; so this makes no sense and is a false dichotomy.

What do you mean by this? Could you elaborate more on the detail and ground for the statement?

I meant like laws in science, such as F = MA, and formal laws, such as A = A. These laws are estimations of laws which exist independently of our thinking of them.

Does everyone's brain then all works exactly the same way to each other when confronted an event?

If you are stipulated that they have the exact same brain, their brains have had the exact same experiences, and they both experience the same event at the same time, place, etc.; then, yes; but this is just to say that they are the exact same being (and that there really isn’t two people)….

If you just mean to ask if two people with, e.g., different brains interpret the same events the same; then no.

Experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions; consciousness is a natural human condition, represented as the totality of representations. Sometimes called a faculty, but it doesn’t have faculty-like function, so….not so much in T.I..

I didn’t follow this: that still sounds like they are the exact same thing…

This is a kind of categorical error, in that when talking of the brain, the discourse is scientific, in which representation has no place, but when talking of representation, the discourse is philosophical, in which the brain has no place.

They are two sides of the same coin. This makes it sound like neuroscience is a philosophical field of study….

Nothing untoward with the fact the brain is necessary for every facet of human intelligence, but there remains whether or not it is sufficient for it. Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.

What do you mean? We’ve already determined that the brain is responsible for cognizing reality into the ‘experience’ that you have.

Immanent has to do with empirical cognitions, hence experience; transcendental has to do with a priori cognitions, hence possible experience. Transcendent, then, has do to with neither the one nor the other, hence no experience whatsoever.

Ah, I see. What I am saying is that the transcendental argument—viz., the argument from the given consciousness for the necessity of something else—demonstrates that beyond all cognition there truly are laws.

Not quite. What you described is not the nature of a law but, rather, how we pragmatically determine what we think is a law. — Bob Ross

I disagree with all of your points, but I am not going to try to change your views. It would be futile and fruitless endeavor trying to do so, because you don't sound like you would change your views no matter what the objective truths are on these points. So we agree to disagree on the points, and carry on with the journey of life on this earth. Life is too short for everyone on the earth no matter wherever they are, and whoever they are, and there are a lot to catch up in the readings and reasoning exercises ahead. Thank you for your interaction with the points. :)

Shouldn’t the discussion bear on the OP? Maybe present some theory-specific examples of transcendent laws?

Even if we’re limited to their necessity, but without examples, then we’re just doing noumenal imaginings, which have nothing to do with the possibility of consciousness of reality.
————-

Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—Mww

What do you mean? We’ve already determined that the brain is responsible for cognizing reality into the ‘experience’ that you have. — Bob Ross

Nahhh…you may have stipulated something like that as part of your thesis, but I never agreed with it. Cognizing reality into experience is a metaphysical process, using conceptions thought, relating them to things perceived. The brain, on the other hand, even if it is the mechanism by which metaphysical processes are possible, has no part to play in the tenets of such process.

Humans do not think in terms of natural law. The certain number of phosphate ions required, at a certain activation potential, as neurotransmitters across certain cleft divisions, in some certain network or another, never registers in the cognition, “black”-“‘57”-“DeSoto”.

No problem at all! I look forward to our next conversation :smile: .

Maybe present some theory-specific examples of transcendent laws?

I can only give a priori representations of them—in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it—but examples would be:

F = MA
A = A
!(A && !A)
F = G([m<1> * m<2>] / r ^ 2)
!(1 > 2)


Really anything that describes a necessary relation between things as it were in reality in-itself as opposed to rules by which our brains cognize it.

The brain, on the other hand, even if it is the mechanism by which metaphysical processes are possible, has no part to play in the tenets of such process.

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul?

Humans do not think in terms of natural law. The certain number of phosphate ions required, at a certain activation potential, as neurotransmitters across certain cleft divisions, in some certain network or another, never registers in the cognition, “black”-“‘57”-“DeSoto”.

Sure, but it seems like, there are natural laws; would be my point here. The most fundamental would be logical laws; I mean, do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself?

….in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it…. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws? If so, I can get on board with it, in a rather loose conceptual assignment anyway. Understanding certainly is very far from experience, but I’d not so much say understanding is transcended by it.
————-

The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.
————-

there are natural laws — Bob Ross

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

The most fundamental would be logical laws — Bob Ross

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself? — Bob Ross

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is. I cannot say that about any thing as it were in itself, which is merely the glorified rendition of the ding an sich we’ve all come to know and love. From a distance.

Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws?

I am saying, viz., that there are laws which exist that constrain and regulate the ontological groundings of those transcendental principles, judgments, conceptions, etc.; and these laws are, then, transcendent because they are do not pertain to way we cognize reality but rather how reality is in-itself.

The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.

That isn’t an answer to my question: I agree that reason is epistemically responsible; but what is ontologically if not the brain?

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. For me, the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason.

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

These are transcendent, no?

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

Because of this:

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is.

The law of non-contradiction, which you noted here, as it relates to external objects presupposes the law of identity; and doesn’t just pertain to just how we cognize objects. Otherwise, you are admitting the actual possibility of an object that exists in reality which is not identical to itself….or/and identical and not identical to itself…etc.

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. For me, the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason. — Bob Ross

Bob, I appreciate the clarity of your position, but it seems to presuppose that correlation implies causation or identity. While a functioning brain is undeniably necessary for reasoning, it doesn't follow that reasoning is reducible to or explainable as neurophysiological processes. This assumption overlooks the qualitative distinction between physical states (which are describable in third-person terms) and rational states (which involve first-person intentionality). If we take seriously the goal-directed nature of reason, as aiming at truth, it seems to transcend the purely mechanical processes of the brain, which are indifferent to truth. It is undoubedtly the case that a functioning brain is required for the exercise of reason, but that doesn't mean that reason is grounded in neurophysiological processes (which is the general assumption of materialist philosophy of mind.) The vicious regress is that to establish the identity of any purported neurological processes with the exercise of reason, itself requires the exercise of reason. We can't see reason 'from the outside' as it were, but only from within the process of rational inference itself, 'if this, then that', etc. Reason is goal- directed with respect to arriving at a true outcome, hence an intentional activity.

Edward Feser puts it thus:

Now the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes.

and Thomas Nagel:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts [i.e. by describing them in terms of neurological activities], one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions.

The long and short is, though we know that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for reason, this doesn't establish that reason is meaningfully a product of the brain. It might be something that having a good brain enables us to recognise - but we recognise it, because it was already the case. Hence, transcendendental!

@Mww

While a functioning brain is undeniably necessary for reasoning, it doesn't follow that reasoning is reducible to or explainable as neurophysiological processes — Wayfarer

Useful post.

But think of the brain as a computer.



There needs be no vicious regress between reason and neurology if reason is the purpose of the neurology. In the same way, there is no vicious regress between the truth that 1+1=2 and a logic gate that calculates the sum of 1+1 if the purpose of the logic gate is to calculate the sum of 1+1.

The brain is required for reason, as the logic gate is required for the truth of its calculations.

The computer is indifferent to the truth of its calculations, yet the purpose of the computer is to arrive at the truth.

The logic gates have an intentionality, which is to arrive at one consistent output when given two inputs

Edward Feyser wrote that brain processes are devoid of meaning, yet our thoughts have meaning , concluding that thoughts cannot be identified with brain processes. Yet his argument is circular, in that he starts by assuming that the brain is separate to meaning and concludes that the brain is separate to meaning. As the meaning of a logic gate is the process it undertakes, the meaning of a neurological process is the very process itself.

Thomas Nagel wrote that one can only understand reason from within reason, meaning that one cannot understand reason from outside reason, ie from neurology. Yet again his argument is circular, in that he starts by assuming that one can only understand reason from within reason and concludes that one cannot understand reason from outside reason, ie neurology. As the reason for a logic gate is the process it undertakes, the reason for a neurological process is the very process itself.

As the logic gate is necessary for logic, logic is a product of the logic gate. Similarly, as the brain is necessary for reason, reason is the product of the brain.

(Leaving whether transcendental or not for another day)

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. — Bob Ross

I’m not interested in what is not; I wouldn’t say reason is not grounded in the brain. I work with what I know, and how reason is a product of the brain, while being a deduction logically consistent with experience, cannot itself be an experience. And if I cannot learn the operational parameters of a physical thing with sufficient certainty using my internal non-physical means, I am entitled to dismiss it, at least temporarily, along with its other, related originating notions, re: soul, mind, deity, spirit, and assorted abstracted whatnots, in conjunction with what I may or may not eventually come to know.

In which case, then…..

“….. the proud name of an ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding…”

….which is to say, whatever the brain is doing is not contained in my internal analysis of my own intelligence. I already opined as much, in that the human subject in general does not think in terms of natural law.

And is found here the inconsistency regarding the notion and subsequent application of transcendent law, that which even if the idea of which is thought without self-contradiction, can give no weight to the possibility of empirical knowledge, the attempt in doing so is where the contradiction arises. It follows that I am not, or, have no legitimate reason to be, properly interested in such laws, insofar as they do not and cannot support the method by which my knowledge is deemed possible.
—————

“There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.
— Mww

These are transcendent, no? — Bob Ross

How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent? Observation of natural relations is certainly within the purview of universality and necessity, that is to say, in order for there to even be natural relations given by observation they must be given universally and necessarily….

(you can’t look outside here today and see rain falling then look outside there tomorrow and see rain rising)

…..and while universality and necessity are pure a priori transcendental deductions of pure reason which are the form of principles in general by which laws as such are determinable, they are not from that called transcendent.

Are they transcendent with respect to the possibility of experiencing a priori deductions, is a nonsense question, insofar as experience is only of synthesized representations of real physical things by means of intuition, which conceptions themselves never are. From which follows such conceptions while certainly not experiences, are not because they do not arise from intuition, rather than because they are transcendent.
————-

Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is.
—Mww

The law of non-contradiction, which you noted here…. — Bob Ross

A = A and its negation A /= ~A is the law of identity. The LNC, on the other hand, states that simultaneously A =/ B. I disagree one presupposes the other, but grant that either one presupposes their respective content, re: A and B, or any other general conception represented by A or B.

The law of non-contradiction (…) doesn’t just pertain to just how we cognize objects. Otherwise, you are admitting the actual possibility of an object that exists in reality which is not identical to itself….or/and identical and not identical to itself…etc. — Bob Ross

So if I claim the LNC just does pertain to how we cognize objects, I have no need of admitting any such possibility? Parsimony suggests and experience confirms I don’t hold with that admission. The root caveat being, of course, how we cognize objects consistently with respect to time and, by association, change.

Now I readily admit the possibility of underlaying causality for our intellectual manifestations. But I won’t admit transcendent law as being contained in that causality, for it is the case I cannot be made conscious of how such law would be possible, hence I cannot be conscious of them as having the authority necessary to overthrow, insofar as they must contradict the very rules to which I’ve already granted sufficient functional integrity.
————-

From this armchair, you’re foisting on me, not an emperor in new clothes whose authority I might accept insofar as I don’t care what this guy is wearing, but rather, an entirely new emperor, whose authority I wouldn’t even begin to accept until I can comprehend his methods.

That being given, rather than…..

the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason. — Bob Ross

….I’d posit that the brain is the organ necessary for all human intellectual functionality, but it is in no way clear how it is responsible for all by which its subjective condition occurs. Furthermore, it may just be that it never can be clear just how that organ is responsible for anything at all, that isn’t strictly contained in the same empirical domain as physical object itself.

I appreciate your response! Philosophy of mind is an intriguing topic indeed. The problem I am facing is that I think you are absolutely right to point out that physicalism, and methodological naturalism, have not and probably will not sufficiently explain consciousness (in the strict sense of the word) but you seemed to focus on the wrong points. Awareness is easily explained through the brain and its processes (i.e., seeing, hearing, moving, thinking, intending, etc.); however, consciousness is not insofar as we mean qualia. Chalmers rightly pointed this out: we can explain, e.g., intentionality just fine through brain processes; but where the issue is lies in the fact that there is something it is like to be us and that there is a qualitative experience which we subjectively have. E.g., that our brains can cognize colors based off of wavelengths and cones does not entail any sort of adequate explanation why, on top of deciphering those colors, the brain creates a qualitative experience such that there is something it is like to be one having it. This is what I was anticipating you would use as your objection, and not that we cannot explain these things neurobiologically (like intentionality). Even if we could not explain intentionality now, it is, in principle, plausible that we will in the future in naturalistic terms; but what, in principle, cannot be is qualia. There is no way to explain why there is a subjective, qualitative experience on top of our brains being aware of and judging reality.

By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning

This is just a misunderstanding of how the brain works: it is like a super-computer. By analogy, think of an AI that intends to pick of a banana because a human asked it to. According to Feser, that was not intentional, then, because the physical and software activity is “meaningless”.

As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts [i.e. by describing them in terms of neurological activities], one loses contact with their true content

Of course, when one describes physically anything at all one loses some of the meaning; because words and concepts cannot grasp 100% what was experienced. I am failing to see why that is a big deal.

The long and short is, though we know that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for reason, this doesn't establish that reason is meaningfully a product of the brain. It might be something that having a good brain enables us to recognise - but we recognise it, because it was already the case.

Even if I grant that we can’t ever explain through methodological naturalism how or why a brain has qualia, wouldn’t the idea that it is produced by the brain fit the data better?

I want to hear what alternative theory you have for what is facilitating our ability to reason, intend, etc. ; It would have to be some sort of dualism or idealism. If you go the idealist route, then I don’t see how the brain isn’t the external representation of the thing which is facilitating it—even if that be in-itself an immaterial mind. If you go the dualist route, then I have no clue how one would explain how the brain and the “whatever is” (perhaps a mind) interacts with each other.

By positing the mind, or what not, as separate (but perhaps inextricably related to) the brain you seem to create more conceptual problems for yourself.

@Mww

I’m not interested in what is not; I wouldn’t say reason is not grounded in the brain. I work with what I know, and how reason is a product of the brain, while being a deduction logically consistent with experience, cannot itself be an experience

But you were denying this before. So to clarify: you do, in fact, believe that the brain is the ontological grounding for reason?

which is to say, whatever the brain is doing is not contained in my internal analysis of my own intelligence. I already opined as much, in that the human subject in general does not think in terms of natural law.

I agree that we do not think in terms of natural law; because we think in terms of the laws of reason. This doesn’t negate the fact that the brain is ontologically what facilitates that reasoning.

And is found here the inconsistency regarding the notion and subsequent application of transcendent law, that which even if the idea of which is thought without self-contradiction, can give no weight to the possibility of empirical knowledge, the attempt in doing so is where the contradiction arises

What do you mean?

How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent?

It is a map of the territory. We use math, e.g., to model laws which do not pertain to way we cognize (e.g., law of gravity). You would have to deny this.

I disagree one presupposes the other,

That A and !A cannot both be true presupposes that A = A.

So if I claim the LNC just does pertain to how we cognize objects, I have no need of admitting any such possibility?

That is exactly why you would be admitting such a possibility; because you are restricting LNC to only what we experience as opposed to what exists in reality. Therefore, if LNC only applies to our understanding of reality, then it plainly follows that it is at least logically and actually possible for an object in reality, independently of our understanding of it, to both be and not be identical to itself. That is absurd.

.I’d posit that the brain is the organ necessary for all human intellectual functionality, but it is in no way clear how it is responsible for all by which its subjective condition occurs

But it seems to fit the data well, right? The alternatives are much less plausible. The brain seems to be the external representation of whatever ‘thing’ is doing the cognizing. That seems pretty clear (to me).

you were denying this before. So to clarify: you do, in fact, believe that the brain is the ontological grounding for reason? — Bob Ross

No, I wasn’t. To clarify, even if I cannot deny or affirm that it is, if I cannot know how it is, I don’t care that it is. That is to say, even if I think it inconceivable that it isn’t, is not in itself tacit authorization that it is. This is expandable to, even if it is absurd to suppose the brain isn’t the ontological origin of reason, unless I know how such is the case with apodeitic certainty…..it is a waste of my time to give a damn.

This doesn’t negate the fact that the brain is ontologically what facilitates that reasoning. — Bob Ross

It also doesn’t affirm that it does.

That A and !A cannot both be true presupposes that A = A. — Bob Ross

I don’t know what !A represents. If it is not-A, then A and not-A can both be true, when not-A is B. The presupposition is invalid. If !A cannot be re-written as not-A, then never mind.

if LNC only applies to our understanding of reality, then it plainly follows that it is at least logically and actually possible for an object in reality, independently of our understanding of it, to both be and not be identical to itself. — Bob Ross

Account for this is already given, at least in Enlightenment metaphysics and probably elsewhere, the end being it makes no difference at all, insofar as anything independent of our understanding, which is….theoretically….predicated on the laws of logic generally and the LNC in particular, cannot be said to abide by the same laws.

In addition, to be logically possible does not imply the empirical proofs by which the truth of the logic is determined and from which the actual is given or not. Not to mention, “actually possible” is superfluous, insofar as actually possible just is conceptually equivalent to possibility itself. It is enough to say a thing is logically possible without the additional qualification that it is also actually possible.

So what??? Why would we even consider any methodology relevant, if it isn’t ours? If it isn’t the one we’re convinced we have and thereby the one we unconditionally use?

The brain seems to be the external representation of whatever ‘thing’ is doing the cognizing. That seems pretty clear (to me). — Bob Ross

It shouldn’t, in that no representation is external. As well, the brain doesn’t cognize, I do. The brain does absolutely nothing but employ natural conditions in accordance with natural law, which somehow manifests as me cognizing that the brain does absolutely nothing but…...

Brain is a thing in the same manner as a dump truck is a thing. Dump trucks as things do not cognize, therefore brains as things in the same manner, do not cognize.

“Dump truck” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing, “brain” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing. Intuitive things, re: phenomena, irrespective of their individual form, have no power of their own for cognition, therefore brains do not cognize.

“How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent?

It is a map of the territory. We use math, e.g., to model laws which do not pertain to way we cognize (e.g., law of gravity). You would have to deny this. — "Bob

I think the math used to establish the laws that represent perceived natural relations….is exactly how we cognize empirical events. It is now called mapping the territory, which is merely embellishment of what was once just plain ol’ understanding, but it’s only euphemistic language for a representational system of cognition.

Not sure what I'm denying here. Which of the map/territory relation is transcending the other?