An evolutionary defense of solipsism

Clearbury

I am simply 'testing' this argument.

But I take it that simplicity is an epistemic virtue and that other things being equal, we have reason to think the simplest theory about reality that explains all the data is the correct one.

To suppose that there exists a mind and its own mental states is a very simple thesis, for not only is one kind of thing - a mind - supposed to exist, but only one of it is supposed to exist too.

I will suppose, then, that this is the sum total of what exists and see if, by making such assumptions, the job of explaining everything else can be done.

Assume that at first the mind is in random mental states - random sensations and thoughts occur in it. Over enough time a desire to look for patterns will arise and over enough time the thought that 'that which exhibits a pattern is default real' will arise too and will arise at the same time as the desire to look for patterns. And over enough time those two mental states will arise at the same time as two or more sensations - quite by luck - seem to exhibit a pattern. Yes, the odds will be vanishingly tiny - but that doesn't matter. It'll happen eventually. I take myself currently to be 'in reality' for about 16-18 hours at a go, but the first 'glimpse' would have been for a fraction of a second. It would have built, though....like a crystal.

At this point the mind in question will take those sensations to be of a reality and all others to be a dream it is having (which is what we mean by a dream - sensational experiences that we do not consider to be of reality but wholly a product of our own mind). When another sensation arises within the bubbling soup of sensations that seems to cohere with the sensations that the mind took to be of reality, that sensation will also be taken to be of reality and not part of the dreamscape.

Over enough time, the mind will sift those experiences that seem to exhibit a pattern and to cohere with previous experiences and call that set 'reality' (and it will just build indefinitely), and the others will be considered 'dream'.

So, is that possibly the situation we - I - am in? Those sensational experiences that are adaptive - that fit with the pattern I am looking for - will get selected for by my mind as parts of 'reality', whereas those that do not will be deemed dream.

I now take myself to have been in reality - in and out - for about 50 years. This will go on and on as, with enough time, more and more experiences arise that are adaptive - that is, that fit with the evolving narrative (all others continuing to be considered 'dream').

Interesting implication: we (I) will never die. We (I) will just get the impression we have been in reality for longer and longer and longer. You will experience death-like events. But those will be folded into the dreamscape and not considered part of reality. You will only consider those experiences taht continue the story to be reality. And so the story is going to be neverending.

And when we - I - sleep, it may be for trillions of years....eventually a sequence of experiences and thoughts will arise that replicate sufficiently those I had that I considered reality and that continue it....and that will be taken to be the point I awake. And on and on it goes.

it can be noted as well that once the crystal starts to form, it may affect the random flow of thoughts and other sensations, aiding its own building. that is, thoughts and sensations that tend to cause sensations and thoughts that cohere with them will be selected for (where 'selected for' just means 'considered part of reality').

What I have described is just evolution by natural selection, except that it is applied at the level of a mind's sensations, and 'not being selected for' is just a matter of something being considered dream rather than reality. Does the job, does it not?

And this thesis is simpler than supposing that there exists a mind-external physical reality in which evolution by natural selection is occurring.

180 Proof

Is "mind" disembodied?

Clearbury

Yes, I think simplicity demands it must be a mind without a physical body, as a physical body would be less simple than a mind that had no body.

Paine

↪Clearbury

You stand outside the problems of solipsism when you compare them to other conditions.

Banno

At the very least you have assumed that there is both mind and time. Time passes when you are asleep.

In what does this process of thinking take place?

And if seconds, days, years pass, then there must also be a clock or some other device external to mind, the periodicity of which can be contrasted with the series of mental events.

And to whom are you addressing this post?

Clearbury

↪Paine

I am not sure I follow your point.

Clearbury

↪Banno

I have certainly assumed a mind. And perhaps time too - though I am not sure it was essential that I do so, as I think time too can probably be given the same kind of analysis (not yet sure about it).

But it wouldn't matter if I was assuming time, for that wouldn't make the thesis more complicated than its non-solipsistic alternative. That is, I think that any theory about how things have come to be how they are, would probably need to assume time. And so that I have assumed time does not - not in itself - make the theory unnecessarily complicated.

Clearbury

Upon further reflection, I think this evolutionary vindication of solipsism can be simplified further.

All that needs to be supposed in order to be able to account for all else, is a mind that is having (initially) random experiences and a disposition in that mind for it to recall an experience - and thereby to have that experience again - when that experience seems to resemble sufficiently another.

Here's what I mean. Let's say the mind has experience A, and then experience B - and experience B seems closely to resemble experience A. Now the mind becomes disposed to experience B again if it ever experiences A again. Then later - and this will eventually happen, of course - the mind will have the experience of B and it will be followed by C, an experience that seems to resemble B. So now the mind has become disposed to experience B if it ever experiences A again (and it will, of course), and then to experience C (for this is what it is disposed to experience if it ever experiences B again, which it will). And thus when the mind next experiences A, it will experience A-B-C. And this sequence of experiences will closely resemble one another.

Over time the mind will develop a disposition to experience B, then C, then D, then E and so on, when it experiences A again. And that's what is going on - this sequence of experiences is just a very long chain. And there we have it: everything that needs to be explained has been explained by just positing a mind, a disposition, and random experiences.

Clearbury

I think this has the same implication as before though: that this is going to turn out to be a neverending story, though one that will start over and over and over, getting longer and longer every time it restarts.

RogueAI

I now take myself to have been in reality - in and out - for about 50 years. This will go on and on as, with enough time, more and more experiences arise that are adaptive - that is, that fit with the evolving narrative (all others continuing to be considered 'dream').

Interesting implication: we (I) will never die. We (I) will just get the impression we have been in reality for longer and longer and longer. — Clearbury

Why does the mind have a start, but not an end? Shouldn't it be infinite in both directions, past and future?

Clearbury

↪RogueAI

I don't think it does have a start. i admit that the idea of there being something that exists eternally is probably problematic. But I think the idea of there being something that came into existence is probably as, if not more, problematic (as that would involve the mind coming into being from nothing....which seems more problematic than the idea of something just existing forever).

As I see it, the account I am working on is not an attempt to explain everything. It is an attempt to explain as much as possible with as little as possible. So i posit a mind (which is unexplained) and a disposition to recall experiences that resemble one another sufficiently - which is also unexplained - and a process of the mind churning through random thoughts (a process that is also unexplained).

The account presupposes such things, rather than explaining them. And I don't deny that's a deficit as there's reason to want an explanation of those things too. But as i see it, the account nevertheless explains all else with those 3 posits, and so is simpler than competitors. Other things being equal, this is a simpler explanation of the nature of what's going on than, say, one that posits a physical world in which there is evolution by natural selection. There's more clutter with that explanation than there is with the solipsistic one, it seems to me, plus the physicalist explanation has us take our experiences to be 'of' a world outside, which is to make an assumption - one that introduces a lot of clutter - beyond what the solipsistic one does.

Clearbury

↪RogueAI

I should adjust my view a little, for if I am wrong and the idea of a mind coming into being is less problematic a starting assumption than the assumption of a mind that comes into being from nothing, or that somehow brings itself into being, then I will simply make those assumptions instead. I think that it still has the neverending story implication, though i admit that it would need to be framed as an 'other things being equal' implication - so, as long as the mind persists, this is what will happen. Having said this, that is probably the implication of the original thesis too, as even if the mind has always existed, that does not strictly entail that it always will. So I will modify the implication: other things being equal, this is a neverending story in that, so long as the mind whose experiences it is composed of persists, the story is fated to start over and over and get longer every time...potentially for an infinite amount of time.

RogueAI

I should adjust my view a little, for if I am wrong and the idea of a mind coming into being is less problematic a starting assumption than the assumption of a mind that comes into being from nothing, or that somehow brings itself into being, then I will simply make those assumptions instead. — Clearbury

I think that's not a bad assumption. Any theory competing with yours also has the problem of creation ex nihilo. I think mind is a better candidate for eternal existence or uncaused cause than a physical universe. Also, I wonder if this mind you're describing isn't going to eventually turn into a godly cosmic mind, as you shore up the theory.

Clearbury

↪RogueAI

I am not sure. As this is a solipsistic theory, then I am the mind in question and I do not seem to be a god. The theory would need to explain my apparent lack of power, not confer on me more power than I have.

In fact, on reflection this is an attempt to explain the appearance of order by appeal to random processes and a single disposition, and so like the more familiar evolutionary theories, it dispenses with the need for there to be a designer or any kind of guiding hand. Admittedly, there turns out to be a mind at the heart of it all, but the mind in question - my mind - seems as much a victim of its circumstances as it would be under a physicalist alternative. For my mind is just the venue in which random processes play out and become, due to the associative disposition, sufficiently similar to one another that they appear to me, the experiencer, to be describing a place.

Even the small amount of control that I seem to me to have over matters, will turn out to be illusory on this view. For my experience of, say, willing my arm (or 'arm', as there is no arm there in reality, just a certain sort of experience) to move, will not have caused the arm to move. As the only reason why I have the experience of the arm moving in accordance with my willing experience is that these two experiences have been had before and one seemed to be sufficiently similar to the previous one for my mind, having experienced one again, to recal the other and thereby to bring it to mind.

I turn out to be even more a victim of my circumstances on this analysis than I would be on a physicalist analysis, and so in a way even less godly, even though everything that exists apart from me myself, exists as states of my own mind. I am the venue for it all, but not the controller, for what's controlling matters is just that single associative disposition (which I have no control over having). It disposes me to recall similar experiences, but as I do not 'will' it to do so, I am powerless (though will appear, due to willings themselves being experiences and so capable of being similar to one another), though will appear to have some power.

jkop

And this thesis is simpler than supposing that there exists a mind-external physical reality in which evolution by natural selection is occurring. — Clearbury

The idea that only one mind exists is not simpler than the idea that only one substance exists. Any monism is simpler than the dualism assumed in a "mind-external physical reality".

But is mental monism simpler than physical or neutral monism? The latter two seem far more plausible, because of the genetic evolution required for background capacities to arise before anything resembling a mind could begin to identify objects and states of affairs.

Clearbury

But is mental monism simpler than physical or neutral monism? The latter two seem far more plausible, because of the genetic evolution required for background capacities to arise before anything resembling a mind could begin to identify objects and states of affairs. — jkop

I accept a case is needed for thinking that mind monism is simpler than physical monism, but I don't see that you've made a case there for thinking physical monism is simpler. Appealing to evolution is not going to do it, as I am appealing to that too. My account is an evolutionary one.

I will use the traditional terminology of materialist monism and immaterialist monism. The materialist monist posits one kind of substance: material substance. The immaterialist posits one kind of substance: immaterialist substance. So far, one is as simple as the other.

But in order to get the job done, the materialist monist needs to posit not just one kind of substance, but lots of particular instances of it. I am defending solipsist immaterialist monism, not just immaterialist monism. I am positing ONE mind. So, one instance of the kind of substance in question.

Perhaps this is what the materialist monist can do too, though it is hard to see how given that their whole story depends on material objects interacting with another. So it looks as if one needs at least two to get things going.

So immaterialist solipsist monism does seem to me to be simpler, and thus rationally to be preferred. It posits one instance of one kind of thing, not many instances of one kind of thing.

It can also be noted that what it posits - a mind, one's own - is a thing of a kind we know for certain to exist. By contrast, material objects are speculative. Yes, perhaps my own mind is such a thing, just one that has conscious states. I do not rule out the possibility. But that is all it is: a possibility (and disputed at that). Until the matter is settled, then positing that there is something more basic that my mind is made of is to go beyond the evidence.

I say this, because even if the two types of monism are in one sense no more or less complex than one another, the above consideration breaks ties.

jkop

Appealing to evolution is not going to do it, as I am appealing to that too. My account is an evolutionary one. — Clearbury

We don't appeal to evolution in the same sense. Your appeal to evolution omits the mind, as you just assume that it exists, and that experiences appear in it, and from then on you describe an evolution of experiences.

I will use the traditional terminology of materialist monism and immaterialist monism. — Clearbury

Skip the old terminology, because physical or neutral monisms do not only describe matter.

Perhaps this is what the materialist monist can do too, though it is hard to see how given that their whole story depends on material objects interacting with another. So it looks as if one needs at least two to get things going. — Clearbury

Electromagnetism, gravitation, and the weak and the strong nuclear forces are not discrete things that "get each other going". They're ubiquitous and continuous.

So immaterialist solipsist monism does seem to me to be simpler, and thus rationally to be preferred. It posits one instance of one kind of thing, not many instances of one kind of thing. — Clearbury

You forget the many instances of experiences that appear and evolve and form patterns in the solipsist's mind.

It can also be noted that what it posits - a mind, one's own - is a thing of a kind we know for certain to exist. By contrast, material objects are speculative. — Clearbury

It's speculative only for those who assume that they never see the world, only their own mental representations. Yet we don't usually doubt what we see. Under ordinary conditions of observation, I've never found a good reason to doubt the existence of what I see, nor the experience in my mind when seeing it.

..positing that there is something more basic that my mind is made of is to go beyond the evidence. — Clearbury

If you're interested in a physicalist account on the mind, try Searle on why he is not a property dualist in this online PDF.

Clearbury

We don't appeal to evolution in the same sense. Your appeal to evolution omits the mind, as you just assume that it exists, and that experiences appear in it, and from then on you describe an evolution of experiences. — jkop

Yes, but we are both appealing to evolutionary processes. You're positing billions of physical things, I'm positing one mind. In terms of simplicity, my theory assumes less than yours.

Skip the old terminology, because physical or neutral monisms do not only describe matter. — jkop

No. I don't understand what you mean. There are two types of thing possible: immaterial and material. That is, extended or unextended. If you think there's a third, then you need to tell me what you're talking about, as those seem to exhaust the logical space available.

Electromagnetism, gravitation, and the weak and the strong nuclear forces are not discrete things that "get each other going". They're ubiquitous and continuous. — jkop

We're talking about 'things'. Types of thing and number. You're either positing more kinds of thing than I am (if 'electromagnitism' is a thing - which it isn't, of course) or a greater number of one kind of thing. Either way, your theory is more complex than mine.

I am familiar with Searle's view. I don't think you've addressed my points. My theory posits a mind and a disposition in that mind to produce similar mental states to whatever mental state it starts out being in. That's incredibly simple. One kind of thing and just one of it. And one disposition. You're clearly assuming loads more. It seems - given that you think there are more than just two kinds of entity - that you're assuming (by your own view, not mine) numerous kinds of thing, and also very many instances of them. All of that is assumed 'before' the evolutionary processes are then invoked to explain all else. All I assume is one mind and one disposition.

You don't help your own cause by supposing that in addition to physical entities there is something called 'eletromagnitism' - that complicates matters and doesn't simplify at all.

Likewise, you have not simplified matters if you get minds out of matter, for we all have to start with something. I am starting with a mind. You're not. But it is no virtue to have been able to explain how minds arose by supposing a very complicated backstory involving the interaction two or more kinds of thing. That's a vice.

Janus

↪Clearbury

The simplicity of one thesis compared to another does not guarantee that the simpler is true and the more complex false.

Clearbury

↪Janus

That's a different point. My point is that my thesis is simpler than the alternative. That is what jkop is disputing.

Other things being equal, we have reason to suppose the simpler of two theses to be true. There is no claim there that this is a guarantee of truth. And we can wonder why the simpler would be more likely to be true. But that we have more reason to think the simpler of two theses is true is not what's in dispute here.

jkop

Yes, but we are both appealing to evolutionary processes. You're positing billions of physical things, I'm positing one mind. In terms of simplicity, my theory assumes less than yours. — Clearbury

No, I posit a physical world in which things evolve (including minds). You posit a mental world (the mind of the solipsist) in which experiences and patterns evolve. Neither is more simple than the other. Just think about it, it would take billions of experiences to evolve a mental world in the solipsist's mind. Unlike my appeal to evolution, you just assume that a mind exists without reason.

There are two types of thing possible: immaterial and material. That is, extended or unextended. If you think there's a third, then you need to tell me what you're talking about, as those seem to exhaust the logical space available. — Clearbury

That's a false dichotomy. A physical monism is not limited to descriptions of "extended" matter but also energy, time, space, information, processes, emergence, consciousness, intentionality, words etc. It makes little sense to categorize everything as either "extended" or "unextended". Do you understand this?

We're talking about 'things'. Types of thing and number. You're either positing more kinds of thing than I am (if 'electromagnitism' is a thing - which it isn't, of course) or a greater number of one kind of thing. Either way, you're theory is more complex than mine — Clearbury

The most simple world is one that contains practically nothing. A solipsist with an empty mind is a very simple "world", I grant you that. But also the physical world in a maximum state of cosmic inflation is simple in the sense that nothing happens, until it bursts into yet another big bang.

jkop

↪Clearbury

Speaking of cosmic inflation and the idea that things are either extended or unextended... Consider Roger Penrose's suggestion that the universe expands and eventually reaches a state in which all matter is dispersed so that there is practically no difference between things being extended hundreds of billions of light years away or unextended in the here and now. A sort of collapse of spacetime, which causes all of the universe's energy and forces to explode as yet another big bang, followed by yet another spacetime expansion etc.

On this account, physical monism may describe the existence of a state in which spacetime has no practical meaning, and the world is practically unextended and simple (in terms of "things", "types" and "number").

Paine

↪Clearbury

You are proposing various possible conditions for our experience. Solipsism imagines there is no way to verify other beings because they have to be produced by my activity.

Such a thought is not capable of comparison with other proposed conditions. Comparisons require standing outside of all the candidates in order to judge which is the case.

That 'standing outside' collapses the premise of solipsism.

Corvus

Yes, I think simplicity demands it must be a mind without a physical body, as a physical body would be less simple than a mind that had no body. — Clearbury

The OP is based on the assumption, it claims, but assumptions are only accepted as reasonable and intelligible when it makes sense or is supported by evidence.

Assuming mind without physical body is not a reasonable assumption, when it is impossible to imagine mind without its physical body empirically, medically, biologically, and scientifically.

Clearbury

You are proposing various possible conditions for our experience. Solipsism imagines there is no way to verify other beings because they have to be produced by my activity. — Paine

That's a strawman. Solipsism is the view that only one mind exists. What I am arguing is that we can explain what needs to be explained more efficiently using that minimal posit than we can by supposing there to be something non-mental, such lots of extended objects (perhaps the mind is an extended object - but the same applies)

Clearbury

↪jkop

But how can something unextended 'expand'?

On reflection, it doesn't even matter if we suppose only extended things to exist, for the solipsist thesis is still the simpler one. If the single mind I am positing is an extended thing (I see no reason to suppose it is, so this is just for the sake of argument), then nevertheless, by supposing that it has the disposition i described - the disposition for it to put itself in a mental state that closely resembles the one it starts out being in - then all the work can be done.

Clearbury

↪Corvus

The OP is based on the assumption, it claims, but assumptions are only accepted as reasonable and intelligible when it makes sense or is supported by evidence. — Corvus

I don't think that can be true as that generates an infinite regress. So unless we say that every assumption is as reasonable as any and all others, then some assumptions have to be acknowledged to be self-evidently true. That is, our reason represents them directly to be true, rather than us having to infer their truth from other representations of reason.

For example, the claim that, other things being equal, we have reason to believe a simpler thesis is true, is itself a self-evident truth of reason (or 'apparent' one, as we shouldn't rule out the possiblity it may be false). So, the assumption that the simpler thesis is true is more reasonable than the assumption that the more complicated theory is default true.

But these issues take us too far afield, I think. All I am doing is testing whether the solipsist evolutionary theory really is the simpler one. What status the epistemic virtue of simplicity has, how it vies with other virtues, is another matter.

Paine

Solipsism is the view that only one mind exists. — Clearbury

You are applying a definition not shared by the common sense of the word as the isolation of the individual from the world beyond their senses and representations. Your definition sounds more like an argument between "panpsychism" and "monism" .

Corvus

For example, the claim that, other things being equal, we have reason to believe a simpler thesis is true, is itself a self-evident truth of reason (or 'apparent' one, as we shouldn't rule out the possiblity it may be false). So, the assumption that the simpler thesis is true is more reasonable than the assumption that the more complicated theory is default true. — Clearbury

Mind without physical body assumption is not simpler than mind with body, because you must explain on how the mind ended up with no body. How can mind operate without body is far more complicated than starting with mind with body which is empirically and logically natural and sound.

Richard B

“As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.”

Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits

In summary, the idea of solipsism should not be taken seriously and should be rejected on different soil.

Clearbury

↪Paine

It's what the term means. And that's how I am using it. Solipsism is the view that one mind - and one mind alone - exists.

it's not even a view about what minds are made of, as it is entirely compatible with physicalism about minds.

Monism is the view that one kind of stuff exists. The two are not equivalent, for there is no inconsistency in holding that only one mind exists but that the mind in question is made of two kinds of stuff.

Simplicity speaks against that and so it is implicit in my case that the mind that is being posited is a simple thing and not a complex thing.

The point, though, is that solipsism has a very long and well established meaning: it is the view that only one mind exists. But please do not drive this discussion into a discussion of the use and abuse of the term solipsism. That is a linguistic matter and not a philosophical one and it is the philosophical case for thinking that there is one mind and one mind alone that I am interested in testing the credibility of.

An evolutionary defense of solipsism

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