Take two people and ask them to point to tiny marks or blemishes on the surface of a table, for example, and they will point to the same things. — Janus

But put them in a physics lab.....

What are the implications of the fact that the characteristics of the microphysical do not accord with the characteristics of the macrophysical? I think that is unknowable. If it is ever to be known, it will be science that explains it. The point of my example is that what is to be explained is the fact that people see just the same things down to the smallest detail. The most plausible explanation I can think of is that there is something there independent of the human that we are all seeing. How would you explain that?

What is important to note though, is that materialism is reducible to a form of idealism, not vise versa. This assigns logical priority to idealism over materialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

If experience comes from organized matter, then it comes from the brain of certain organisms.

I don't see these terms as polar opposites. I'm a scientific realist and a manifest idealist: I believe the ordinary everyday world of tables and chairs are mind-dependent. I don't think physics is, despite it being formulated through minds, it still exists absent us.

The only way a strict separation is possible is if you assume that matter cannot be mental in any respect, or that mind is above matter, which is not coherent until someone says what matter is, and where it stops.

You defer to science as the arbiter of reality, saying that anything that can't be known by science is a matter for faith. Yet the observer problem or measurement problem has long since undermined the ideal of absolute objectivity. This has been known for a century, since the famous Fifth Solvay Conference. It is the nub of the debate between the realist Einstein, who upheld just the kind of realism you're appealing to, and the discoverers of quantum mechanics, Bohr, Heisenberg and others. Their view was considerably more nuanced. 'Physics does not show us nature as it is in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning'.

The most plausible explanation I can think of is that there is something there independent of the human that we are all seeing — Janus

A number of others have already addressed that - we're equipped with the same senses and inhabit a world of shared definitions, so we tend to see things the same way. But not always. People can reach radically different conclusions when presented with the same evidence.

I tried to explain before the distinction between empirical and metaphysical realism, which you dismissed as 'wordplay'. It really isn't.

Sorry I overlooked this. I am not following.

It could be thought of as a localised intensity of energetic bonding in a field that gives rise to chracteristic functions and interactions. — Janus

So, some microphysical thing?

You defer to science as the arbiter of reality, saying that anything that can't be known by science is a matter for faith. — Wayfarer

You are putting words in my mouth. I don't say that at all. Almost everything we know is known by direct observation and science is just an augmenting extension of that.

A number of others have already addressed that - we're equipped with the same senses and inhabit a world of shared definitions, so we tend to see things the same way. — Wayfarer

This does not explain the problem. Seeing things in the same way and seeing the same things are not the same. We can see the same things in different ways.

So, some microphysical thing? — Manuel

Why not a microphysical thing? Must the physical be different than the metaphysical other than definitionally?

Why not a microphysical thing? Must the physical be different than the metaphysical other than definitionally? — Janus

I was not evaluating your comment, I was asking if this structure is what you think is the same for all creatures - as I did not understand your specific description.

Not a fact—a mere assumption. — Janus

I can explain how "matter" is merely a conception. It is something that is assumed to underlie the reality of sensible objects, which accounts for them apparently maintaining their similarity as time passes. In the physics of motion, matter is represented by inertia.

Now, it's your turn to explain how you believe that "matter" signifies something other than an idea.

If one notices something, ask the other if they also notice the same thing—that would be a proper test. — Janus

As I said, that is explained by the power of suggestion. I guess you didn't read the rest of my post. That we agree to call what we see in the same situation, by the same name, does not prove that we are seeing the same thing. We readily agree about things like that simply because it facilitates communication.

The only way a strict separation is possible is if you assume that matter cannot be mental in any respect, or that mind is above matter, which is not coherent until someone says what matter is, and where it stops. — Manuel

I believe that when a person develops a good understanding of the concept of "matter" it is inevitable that mind will be understood as above matter. This is because "matter" is assumed as a principle, to represent things which we do not understand, about the way that we perceive the world. So "matter" represents something peculiar and fundamentally unintelligible about our perceptions. And this is very significant, because as fundamentally unintelligible, it does not fit into our conceptions of an independent world. Matter transcends the supposedly independent world, and this evident even in the most vulgar conception of "matter" as that which the world is made of. But it is only that way because the mind makes it that way, simply because the mind needs that principle. So the mind creates the idea of something which transcends the world, matter, but it's just an idea.

Cheers.

...as it is...

Tell me, what does this simple, deceptive phrase do?

What sort of thing is the world as it is?

What sort of thing is the world as it is? — Banno

I've often said before that there is a convergence between cognitive science and idealism (or constructivism) insofar as the former recognises the centrality of the mind in the construction of understanding. So it differs from empiricism in recognising that the mind is not tabula rasa, and reality not something that exists just so, independently of it. But ultimately, the question you're asking is a very deep question indeed. Isn't that the subject matter of the Parmenides, and much of the philosophy that followed it? It's easy to make glib statements about it, but it's really not so easy.

Seeing things in the same way and seeing the same things are not the same. We can see the same things in different ways. — Janus

But the point is, physics itself, which one would expect to have the most definitive answer to that in the general sense, cannot arrive at a conclusion as to whether there is any fundamental thing which is the same for all observers.

I was not evaluating your comment, I was asking if this structure is what you think is the same for all creatures - as I did not understand your specific description. — Manuel

I thought you were asking me to speculate as to what the structures we perceive as objects might be. It seems animals will not conceptualize structures in the ways we do or even conceptualize them at all. Perhaps I don't understand your question.

Now, it's your turn to explain how you believe that "matter" signifies something other than an idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

'Matter' is an idea. If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea.

Meaning, you can't have any idea of it. :wink:

Matter' is an idea. If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea. — Janus

That's not true. As I explained, "matter" signifies the reason why perceived things maintain similarity, from prior time to posterior time, as time passes. This principle of temporal continuity provides the foundation for the conception of an independent world, as well as being the basis for "inertia" in the physics of motion. As "the reason why", "matter" signifies an idea.

I thought you were asking me to speculate as to what the structures we perceive as objects might be. It seems animals will not conceptualize structures in the ways we do or even conceptualize them at all. Perhaps I don't understand your question. — Janus

I thought you were saying that all creatures had access to same basic structure. If so, then I was going to reply by saying what you just said "animals will not conceptualize structures in the way we do...".

If so - then I think we are on the same page on this specific topic. Which may be good or maybe it's problematic, I dunno. :cool:

But that is a stipulation that mind is above matter. What does that mean? Why can't mind be a specific configuration of matter? Is there a principle in nature that prevents mind from arising from certain combinations of matter? Not that I know of.

I agree that, in very crucial respects, we don't know what matter is. We only know a very specific configuration of it - the rest are postulates to make sense of the world.

OK cool it seems we agree. I think we and the other animals have access to the same basic structures.

Meaning, you can't have any idea of it. — Wayfarer

Why would that be? We experience matter in an almost infinite variety of forms including our own bodies—why would you say we can have no idea of what we experience?

Your own words:

If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea. — Janus

I'm using the word 'idea' in the philosophical sense that anything that we recognise and perceive is 'idea', something we can form a concept of. So if you perceived something but have no idea what it is, then how could you know it was material in nature? In order for to be recognisable at all, it has to have some form.

Why can't mind be a specific configuration of matter? Is there a principle in nature that prevents mind from arising from certain combinations of matter? Not that I know of. — Manuel

I’ve been reading Hans Jonas and Evan Thompson on the phenomenology of biology. They’re dense and complex, so I wouldn’t claim mastery, but one idea stands out: life and mind might be isometric—that is, wherever there’s life, there’s also something like mind, even if it’s not conscious or sentient in the way we think of it. This is because organisms, by their nature, maintain themselves and distinguish themselves from their surroundings; without this, they’d just be subject to the same physical and chemical forces as everything else. This is evident even in the most rudimentary forms of organic life - they're in some basic sense, intentional, in a way that, crystals, say, cannot be.

Which raises an interesting possibility: could this self-maintenance be the earliest appearance of mind, even if in a rudimentary form? If so, then complex minds in higher organisms wouldn’t just be the product of matter—mind could also be understood as a causal factor. The fact that mind is not something that can be identified on the molecular level is not an argument against it - as everyone knows, identifying the physical correlates of consciousness is, famously, a very hard problem ;-) .

We have ideas of what we perceive. The things we perceive are not ideas.

that is, wherever there’s life, there’s also something like mind, even if it’s not conscious or sentient in the way we think of it. — Wayfarer

That's fine. I call the stuff that the world is made of "physical stuff" or matter, you can call it "energy" or "idea" if you wish. It could cause terminological issues down the line, but content wise, there's not much of a difference.

If so, then complex minds in higher organisms wouldn’t just be the product of matter—mind could also be understood as a causal factor. The fact that mind is not something that can be identified on the molecular level is not an argument against it - as everyone knows, identifying the physical correlates of consciousness is, famously, a very hard problem ;-) — Wayfarer

They could be correlative - maybe.

Yeah, the "hard problem" (which is misleading, imo) is real. Because our understanding is just way too to know how matter could lead to mind - Locke pointed that out many years ago, quite correctly as I see it.

It's something akin to asking yourself does a dog understand itself? Well, not very well. We know more about dogs that they do about themselves, as it were, and we still don't understand completely at all - far from it.

To understand how brain leads to mind would require exponentially more intelligence than we have. I just don't see why I have any reason to deny that experience comes from modified physical (world, immaterial, neutral, whatever you want to call it) stuff.

The things we perceive are not ideas. — Janus

We say 'the things we perceive are not ideas' because we instinctively think of ourselves as separate from the world. We see the apple or chair and think the 'idea' of it is something that occurs internally in the mind, distinct from the external object itself. This is the outlook of John Locke's representative realism: external objects cause ideas in our minds, and perception is the mental awareness of those ideas.

But Kant and Schopenhauer challenge this. For Kant, the object as perceived is not the thing-in-itself but a phenomenon—what appears is a product of the mind’s structuring activity. The 'idea' is not something separate from the act of perception; the perceived object is itself the idea, or more precisely, a phenomenon shaped by mind.

Schopenhauer takes this further, describing all perceived objects as representations (Vorstellungen), inseparable from the perceiving subject. Thus, the apple or chair is not a separate 'thing' causing an internal idea; it is a perceived idea, always within the phenomenal realm. This dissolves the divide between external objects and internal ideas that representative realism assumes.

Those kinds of themes are greatly expanded and explored in later phenomenology and existentialism.

there's not much of a difference. — Manuel

On the contrary, it's a difference that makes a difference!

I just don't see why I have any reason to deny that experience comes from modified physical (world, immaterial, neutral, whatever you want to call it) stuff. — Manuel

Because it's materialism, and I reject materialism.

Because it's materialism, and I reject materialism. — Wayfarer

Because you equate it with scienticism. It does not need to be so equated.

If you reject the scientistic association, then many problems go away. The only remaining issue then, would be if matter came before mental properties, or if mental properties came before material ones.

There is no point lecturing me. I have no doubt I've read more Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty than you. I think your interpretation of Kant is off the mark anyway.
You simply cannot address the objections I make to your position. You don't even try...you just keep intoning the same mantras and citing the same "authorities". I'm done with responding to you...it's a waste of time.

But that is a stipulation that mind is above matter. — Manuel

It's not a stipulation. What I explained is that it is the result of, a conclusion drawn from understanding the concept of matter.

Why can't mind be a specific configuration of matter? — Manuel

The concept of matter is not compatible with the concept of mind, to allow for this. That is because matter is a principle assumed to account for the apparently deterministic aspects of the world, i.e. temporal continuity, while mind and free will are things requiring exception to that, i.e. temporal discontinuity.

Matter cannot be configured in a way other than what is allowed for by determinist causation. This I believe is the importance of understanding the relation between "matter" and Newton's first law. Newton assigns to matter itself, a fundamental property, which is inertia, and this renders all material bodies as determined. So mind, which has the capacity to choose, cannot be a configuration of matter.

Which raises an interesting possibility: could this self-maintenance be the earliest appearance of mind, even if in a rudimentary form? If so, then complex minds in higher organisms wouldn’t just be the product of matter—mind could also be understood as a causal factor. The fact that mind is not something that can be identified on the molecular level is not an argument against it - as everyone knows, identifying the physical correlates of consciousness is, famously, a very hard problem ;-) — Wayfarer

What I do is separate "mind" from "soul", in the way described by Aristotle. Soul is the base, so that all the potencies, capacities, or powers of the various life forms (self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and even intellection), are properties of the soul. This allows that mind, or intellect, in the human form, as a power of the soul, can come into existence through the process of evolution. But soul itself is prior.

The power to choose, to select from possibilities, which is very evident in human free will, may well be the most basic power of the soul. It appears to be required for all the basic living capacities. In this way, what you call here "the earliest appearance of mind", or the "rudimentary form" of mind, is the capacity to select form possibilities. And when we understand what it means to select, or choose, we see that intention is necessary for this, as that which causes one possibility to be actualized rather than any other. So this puts intention (final cause) as the basic property of the soul, as what is required for that basic power, the capacity to choose.

It seems we are an impasse here for the time being. I propose to park the conversation here and we can pick it up in some other thread, maybe by then we could understand each other better,

But I suspect we agree on something like 70% of the main topics, that is, if you still maintain some agreement with some version of Kant (albeit modified), if not then we may have drifted apart, which is fine.

I'll leave the proposal for you to decide.

What I explained is that it is the result of, a conclusion drawn from understanding the concept of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who understands matter? What we have are theories of physics about matter in microphysical states. Once you enter biology, our understanding of matter decreases exponentially - we don't understand how matter could have the properties we experience in everyday life. That's lack of understanding.

That is because matter is a principle assumed to account for the apparently deterministic aspects of the world, i.e. temporal continuity, while mind and free will are things requiring exception to that, i.e. temporal discontinuity.

Matter cannot be configured in a way other than what is allowed for by determinist causation. This I believe is the importance of understanding the relation between "matter" and Newton's first law. Newton assigns to matter itself, a fundamental property, which is inertia, and this renders all material bodies as determined. So mind, which has the capacity to choose, cannot be a configuration of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean matter as in physics or matter as in everything that is? Because physics does not show determinism, it at best suggests probabilities, which are very foreign to our debates on free will.

If there is emergence - brute emergence, "magical emergence" - which I believe happens all the time, then there is no problem in mind arising from matter, any more than anything else arising from it.

Because physics does not show determinism, it at best suggests probabilities, which are very foreign to our debates on free will. — Manuel

Newtonian laws are deterministic, and they still play a large role in modern physics, especially when mass (matter) is being dealt with.

You simply cannot address the objections I make to your position. — Janus

I do address them, and you object to my objections. I'm not lecturing you, just making my case. You don't like, fine. You can't say I don't make an effort.

The only remaining issue then, would be if matter came before mental properties, or if mental properties came before material ones. — Manuel

I think it's rather deeper than that, but I'll leave it at that.

What I do is separate "mind" from "soul", in the way described by Aristotle. Soul is the base, so that all the potencies, capacities, or powers of the various life forms (self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and even intellection), are properties of the soul. This allows that mind, or intellect, in the human form, as a power of the soul, can come into existence through the process of evolution. But soul itself is prior. — Metaphysician Undercover

I could go along with that. I always find the translation of 'On the Soul' as 'D'Anima' very suggestive of that - an 'animating principle.

It seems we are an impasse here for the time being. I propose to park the conversation here and we can pick it up in some other thread, maybe by then we could understand each other better,

But I suspect we agree on something like 70% of the main topics, that is, if you still maintain some agreement with some version of Kant (albeit modified), if not then we may have drifted apart, which is fine.

I'll leave the proposal for you to decide. — Manuel

I thought we were in agreement. It's not clear to me where you think we are still not in agreement.

I do address them, and you object to my objections. I'm not lecturing you, just making my case. You don't like, fine. You can't say I don't make an effort. — Wayfarer

OK, I'll try one more time. You say the fact that have the same sense organs can explain why we can see the same details down to the smallest visible scale. The example I gave was the surface of a table—let's say it's a wooden table with little knots and patterns of figuration. We will agree on the exact locations of the knots and the patterns, and we can confirm this by pointing to them. Now if there were nothing there determining the positions of those details on what basis could we explain our precise agreement?

Don't say it is because we see things in the same way. As I already pointed out seeing things in the same way and seeing the particular things are not the same. We know we both see the particular things in their precise positions and patterns, and we know we see them roughly the same way in terms of colour, and tone and size, but we have no way of determining whether we see them in precisely the same way in terms of the latter qualities.

Don't give me a lecture about the history of ideas or Kant or Schopenhauer—just try to address tis simple point in your own words.

As I understand, I asked what you meant by structure you told me:

"It's a general idea of form or configuration. Not qualia and shape is kind of abstract whereas structure suggest concreteness and boundedness (however loose). It could be thought of as a localised intensity of energetic bonding in a field that gives rise to chracteristic functions and interactions."

I replied by saying that I did not understand this as stated but guessed you could have meant a "microphysical structure".

Which you replied by asking: "Why not a microphysical thing? Must the physical be different than the metaphysical other than definitionally?"

I said I was not evaluating your claim in any manner, but merely wanted to know if the structure was microphysical. This then brought up a problem to my mind, namely that if we say there is a microphysical structure that exists which is common to all creatures, then there is a tension, which you anticipated by saying:

"I thought you were asking me to speculate as to what the structures we perceive as objects might be.It seems animals will not conceptualize structures in the ways we do or even conceptualize them at all. Perhaps I don't understand your question."

I agreed with this bold part, and I thought this meant we agreed on there being real microphysical things in the world.

But then I got confused when you said:

"OK cool it seems we agree. I think we and the other animals have access to the same basic structures."

Because for reasons you gave previously, animals can't access this microphysical structure.

In short, using Sellar's terminology, I am a realist when it comes to the "scientific image" (with important caveats), but am an idealist when it comes to the manifest image.

I don't know what part of idealism you know think holds true - if any of it. It seems to me you think qualia and other facets of the world are ideal, but others are real.

That's how I see it anyway.