Dunno about Moore. The title asks for something to be said about good, not about what is good, not how it is good, not goodness.

Here is a decent start:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued [e.g. for the sake of the rider that we make saddles, or the golfer that we make good golf clubs]. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art.

https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.1.i.html

So, one might assume that whatever the Good is, it is sought for its own sake and that it must be a principle realized unequally in a disparate multitude of particulars (e.g. saddle making, painting, argument, health, etc.). One might also assume that other things are sought in virtue of the degree to which the perfect, possess, or participate in this principle.

Plato's image is of the Good as a light by which we see. I think this works in some ways. We can imagine a very bright spotlight, too bright for us to look directly at perhaps. But between us and the light are a vast multitude of variously colored panes of glass through which the light passes, as well as different sorts of mirrors reflecting the light, and all sorts of things lit by the light, which hang from the ceiling.

Depending on how the light travels to us, how we stand and turn our heads or move about, the objects hanging from the ceiling might look very different as refracted through the intervening panes and mirrors. The objects we see are of different sorts, just as the good of a "good car" is different from the good of a "good rifle." And some panes of glass we look at the objects through might be tinted dark, such that very little light gets through, whereas others might be clearer, allowing more of the light to reach us. Some of the things we can see might be larger, as "good health" is more relevant than "a good pen." Some of the mirrors might be fun house mirrors that manage to distort the light, so that we are confused about what we see. Small things might appear large, and large things small. In some cases, we might mistake the brightness of a mirror with the source of the light itself, just as people thought the Moon was the source of its own light for millennia.

Perhaps behind all the things hanging from the ceiling there are many different lights? But I should think just one.

So, one might assume that what the Good is sought for its own sake and that it must be a principle realized unequally in a disparate multitude of particulars (e.g. saddle making, painting, argument, etc.). One might also assume that other things are sought in virtue of the degree to which the perfect, possess, or participate in this principle. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand how the Good would be sought for its own sake. Does this imply, as many used to believe, that goodness is a kind of transcendental, independent of contexts and intersubjective agreements?

Seems to me that goodness varies greatly over time. While I don't think I'm a total relativist, I don't see how we can move beyond the culturally located nature of goodness. I get that many of us believe in moral progress and argue for various positions (which implies better and worse morality) but is it any more than just pragmatically trying to usher in our preferred forms of social order?

I assume that you adhere to some form of Platonism and view moral truths as existing beyond human experience?

This seems to put the OP in a box that isn’t needed though: why start with personal and social goods? Why not start with what it would mean for something to be good in the first place? — Bob Ross

I did.

What is the purpose of defining good? That is, Why do I need to make this distinction? To acknowledge that some things are good and some things are bad is to exercise judgment. Why do you want to exercise judgment? Why do other people? — Vera Mont

Once these questions are answered, you can go on to which kind of good you want explore.
'Start with' was a poor choice of words.

So it is good, then, for me to kill an innocent person to ensure my survival? That would be a “personal good”? — Bob Ross

In some situations, yes, and that's exactly what some people do, and that is where it comes into direct conflict with the social good. Hence the need to distinguish the one from the other.

So it is good, then, for me to avoid my duties to my children because it makes me happier? — Bob Ross

That, too, is the chosen path of many people.

So it is good for society, then, to torture one person in order to ensure its own survival? — Bob Ross

Most societies, at some level, think so - and do.

These definitions don’t accurately reflect what either an individual nor social good would be. — Bob Ross

According to a particular set of values.

Good is always relative to something. — Vera Mont

:up:

I don't understand how the Good would be sought for its own sake.

Aristotle's example of what is sought for its own sake is eudaimonia—roughly "happiness," "well-being," or "flourishing." This appears to be a strong candidate.

Does this imply, as many used to believe, that goodness is a kind of transcendental, independent of contexts and intersubjective agreements?

It can, but it need not. However, if the Good was properly "transcedent," then—by definition—it cannot be absent from that which it transcends (e.g. the contexts of intersubjective agreements).

Likewise, if the Good is absolute, then it is not merely "reality as set apart from appearances," but is rather inclusive of reality and appearances. Appearances are really appearances, and how a thing appears is part of the absolute context. This is why the Good cannot be a point on Plato's divided line, it relates to the whole. But appearances aren't independent of what they are appearances of, and whatever appears good must really appear good in some sense.

At any rate, it is one thing to say that the Good is filtered through or shaped by intersubjective agreements, it would be quite another to say that it is "intersubjective agreements all the way down," or not explicable in terms of anything other than such agreements. Since notions of Goodness apply seemingly everywhere, we might think it is an extremely general principle.

Aristotle, for instance, thinks happiness transcends one's own lifespan. If, for instance, one has lived a life centered around one's family, and one dies trying to save them from a flood, and yet they nonetheless end up drowning later that day, then this is not a "happy ending." "Count no man happy until he be dead," is the famous saying here (actually from Solon), but the Bible has its own version, Sirach 11:28:


Call no one happy before his death;
a man will be known through his children.

Seems to me that goodness varies greatly over time.

Does goodness change, or beliefs about what is good? Beliefs about everything vary by epoch, culture, and individual. Yet we normally don't want to say that the subjects of those beliefs change. For example, the cause of small pox didn't change when people began to believe it was caused by a virus. Rather they came to believe small pox is caused by a virus because it is so. Likewise, the age of the universe is normally not taken to change when beliefs about this fact do, and this holds even though the specific measure of time we generally use to present and understand "the age of the universe"—the year—is a social construct.

While I don't think I'm a total relativist, I don't see how we can move beyond the culturally located nature of goodness. I get that many of us believe in moral progress and argue for various positions (which implies better and worse morality) but is it any more than just pragmatically trying to usher in our preferred forms of social order?

Why prefer some forms of social order over others? Presumably because we think they are truly better. Pragmatism only makes sense if one has an aim in the first place.

What question should I make? — Matias Isoo

What matters to you? If defining things matters to you why?

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin?

Well in my opinion you should start with the realization that "good" ( and therefore "evil" as well) is a subjective descriptor. Thus good, to you, is whatever you deem it to be. Societies also decide what the common good is for the community.

Of course there are certain cases where the good option is almost universally agreed upon and many fall into the trap of concluding that "good" is therefore objective. Don't make that error as there are many more areas where there is no consensus on the good option whatsoever.

For example, matter being completely destroyed would be evil. But an atom breaking into electrons, that then interact with other atoms to create something more than an atom alone, is a greater existence and therefore more good. — Philosophim

Would this mean, then, that true evil is impossible, per Law of Conservation of Mass?

Do we allow new interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences? Then we are good. — Philosophim

Does that mean if we disallow cruel or violent (albeit new) interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences we are evil? Surely not?

--

Example. Going with the premise. Say, in the not too distant future, man has advanced in warfare and weaponry birthing the existence of a bomb whose yield would destroy the entire planet. Say it is somehow known, this weapon would inevitably be used. Would a hypothetical contagion that wipes out 99.9% of life on Earth thus preventing said weapon from ever being used not be 'good' in such a scenario under the above circumstances? According to this premise, it would, as it prevents a larger decrease in quantitative existence. Or wouldn't it?

Aristotle's example of what is sought for its own sake is eudaimonia—roughly "happiness," "well-being," or "flourishing." This appears to be a strong candidate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe. We're still left with the vexed act of interpreting what constitutes 'flourishing' and who gets to be a citizen in that model. For instance, does it fully include women? (Not looking for an answer to this)

On this one, I think I prefer Sam Harris' simplistic adaptation of Aristotle, which puts 'wellbeing' at the centre. Subject to the similar definitional and operational problems.

Why prefer some forms of social order over others? Presumably because we think they are truly better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, in my case because they please me and comport with my values. And I like predictability. Morality can greatly assist us to make plans.

it would be quite another to say that it is "intersubjective agreements all the way down," or not explicable in terms of anything other than such agreements. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can we demonstrate that this is not the case? Circular reasoning like this seems unavoidable throughout human experience. After all we use logic to prove logic. Isn't the very idea that - an action is morally right if it maximizes flourishing because maximising flourishing is what defines morality - circular?

Some might say that humans, as social, tribal animals have evolved behaviours (norms, codes) which benefit groups. Don't fuck your sister's husband, don't steal stuff and don't kill - would make sense in terms of the continuity and thriving of the tribe. But there are some tribes that don't have the injunction against stealing because there's no private property in their culture.

Does goodness change, or beliefs about what is good? Beliefs about everything vary by epoch, culture, and individual... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I get it - the usual arguments against relativism, which I have put up myself elsewhere. I may start a thread on nuanced relativism. I'm not necessarily a proponent, just an admirer...

I am not sure 'good' means much without context and milieu. I'm not sure this is a resolvable matter. Relativism doesn't have to argue that all moral claims are equal, just that their status depends on the given social, cultural and personal context.

Likewise, the age of the universe is normally not taken to change when beliefs about this fact do, and this holds even though the specific measure of time we generally use to present and understand "the age of the universe"—the year—is a social construct. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This may be true about the universe's real age - if age even has meaning at this level. But I think the idea that the universe is the product of a singularity at a particular time is an intersubjective agreement held by certain parts of the scientific community. Is it not possible that one of those fabled paradigm shifts (so 20th century) might uncover a different cause and timeframe sometime?

But the age of the universe and how viruses work are surely of a different category to whether something is inherently good or bad.

As an atheist by practice and agnostic by believe how can I define whats good from evil?
I have had this question for a long time, but only recently that I gave it serious thought. So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make? — Matias Isoo

For all practical intents and purposes, "good" is whatever those in a position of more power than you believe is "good".

Good is in the beneficence. Nobody is obligated to help others, though it may be a good endeavour. Making sacrifices for nothing can result in lots of pain, be sure to always make a sacrifice for something, even just to see your loved ones again.

My stance is that nobody ought negate their own good future by helping others for nothing in return, even if that something is small like positive attention or inclusion in the product of that endeavour.

Good is a positive outcome, whether that be by way of having a heart filled with beneficent opportunity or a mind apt with intelligence that can manage a good progression. Something you can truly say 'that was good', or 'I've got good chances'.

Would this mean, then, that true evil is impossible, per Law of Conservation of Mass? — Outlander

It means that the worst case evil scenario is impossible IF we are correct about the Conservation of Mass. Evil and good are relative quantifications. Meaning we can still have some serious evil like human life being wiped out.

Does that mean if we disallow cruel or violent (albeit new) interactions, inventions, ideas, and existences we are evil? Surely not? — Outlander

Lets translate it to, "Does that mean if we disallow evil interactions we are evil?" No. What we have to be careful is what we ascribe as 'evil'. For example, what if I say, "Trans women are not actual women?" Some might consider that idea cruel. Objectively though, its simply a thought that is needed to have a conversation. "Killing all trans people" is objectively evil, but talking about them is not. Even someone saying, "We should kill all trans people" is not necessarily evil, just repugnant. But if they kept those feelings to themselves, we wouldn't know about it and have the attempt to change their mind to be better.

An evil interaction is defined as something that lowers the totality of existence overall. There's no real benefit to it. For example, I decide to nuke a city for fun. The existence of one person's fun is objectively much less than the destruction of an entire city and its people, just from the basic standpoint of you are removing the fun from potentially thousands of people vs one.

Example. Going with the premise. Say, in the not too distant future, man has advanced in warfare and weaponry birthing the existence of a bomb whose yield would destroy the entire planet. Say it is somehow known, this weapon would inevitably be used. Would a hypothetical contagion that wipes out 99.9% of life on Earth thus preventing said weapon from ever being used not be 'good' in such a scenario under the above circumstances? According to this premise, it would, as it prevents a larger decrease in quantitative existence. — Outlander

Correct. But you know what would be even better? Having humanity not use the weapon and they all live. We can invent strange and horrific scenarios, but just because we get a better outcome in a very specific set of circumstances it does not eliminate that there are potentially better solutions if we expand the totality of the thought experiment to what is more realistic.

Even in this scenario, the optimal choices would be to either destroy the weapon, or convince the side that would use it to not do so. The optimal choice in almost all circumstances is to allow the most existence in harmony with other existences as much as possible.

How can one determine what is good without understanding what it would mean for something to be good in the first place? Isn't that putting the cart before the horse?

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

You could say it's Beyond Good and Evil, yea.

Then, you are not giving them a starting point for investigating ethics: you are giving them a Nietschien, moral anti-realist, position to explore.

The OP has a starting place. He or she is an atheist.

Sure: I don’t see your point. They were asking where to begin to understand what is good: being an atheist doesn’t preclude moral realism.

I caught that too.

No worries, and fair enough. You are right that the concept of ‘evil’ does arise out of religious ideologies, being closely connected to ‘sin’, but I don’t think we have to use it that way.

My understanding being: one 'likes' not suffering, suffering is virtually in de facto agreement by everyone to be unethical, ergo, the relationship between human ethics and what the subject of the whole matter's preferences are (what is liked, what is disliked, the fact inflicting suffering is unethical, etc.) is not without noting

I agree that most people would agree that suffering is bad, but this doesn’t provide the necessary connection to show that it is actually bad. E.g., if everyone thinks that red blocks are bad and blue blocks are good, then does that thereby make it so? Of course not: that’s just inter-subjective agreement.

What you would have to do, if you are a moral realist, in order to do proper ethics, is demonstrate how suffering is bad by way of explicating what badness is, how to assess something as bad or good, and apply that to suffering.

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc.

As a neo-aristotelian, I would say that objective goods, which are just ‘goods’ in their proper sense (as opposed to moral anti-realist concepts of it), and “bads” arise out of the teleology of things as relativistic to how the thing was supposed to be (as demonstrated by its Telos). E.g., a good farmer, a good human, a good clock, a good bubonic plague, a good lion, etc. These are not hypothetical goods nor are they non-objective—e.g., a good farmer is not hypothetically good at farming nor are they good at farming only because one wants them to be nor are they good at farming only because one thinks they are: they are, in fact, good at farming.

Suffering is generally bad, then, because it represents a (living) being not living up to their Telos properly (either voluntarily or by force) as suffering is normally the bodies way of telling itself what it is designed to do is not happening (and, on the contrary, what anti-thetical to it is happening). However, I would note that suffering simpliciter is not bad, because suffering is required in order to properly fulfill one’s duties, roles, and (utlimately) Telos.

I am not advocating that you need to agree with me on my analysis of what is good here; but I merely advocate that you do the same with respect to your theory. Otherwise, you are prone to many mistakes by venturing in muddied waters.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross

If you read my post again, it would be clear what the concept of moral good is from Aristotle. Good is a quality or property of actions which brings happiness to all parties involved.

If you are interested in the wider concepts of good, there are plenty available on internet searches. But is the OP asking for the concept of Good in general? It doesn't appear to be. The OP asks where to begin

to build my own set of rules and values — Matias Isoo

.

Discussing all the concepts of Good by different philosophers and systems in history would be too general, and not very relevant to the OP's question. Perhaps it could be a separate thread of its own?

Then, you are not giving them a starting point for investigating ethics: you are giving them a Nietschien, moral anti-realist, position to explore. — Bob Ross

It's my own view, home grown in my own little brain, but yes, it's echoed by Nietzsche, and it's in keeping with the essential teachings of Jesus. So it has that going for it.

: being an atheist doesn’t preclude moral realism. — Bob Ross

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.

He can’t. He just doesn’t know it, never stopped to think about it.

If you read my post again, it would be clear what the concept of moral good is from Aristotle. Good is a quality or property of actions which brings happiness to all parties involved.

You misunderstand me: the concept of good refers to whatever 'good' means, not what or how one can predicate something to have it. Viz., the concept of value does not refer to what may be valuable. One must first understand, explicitly, what 'value' even means, not just as a word but as a concept, to determine what has it.

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

:up:

It's my own view, home grown in my own little brain, but yes, it's echoed by Nietzsche, and it's in keeping with the essential teachings of Jesus. So it has that going for it.

Nietzsche’s thoughts on morality are completely incompatible with Christianity. Moral anti-realism is incompatible with Jesus’ teachings. Beyond good and evil is about creating one’s own values, which are non-objective, and imposing them on themselves and other people: how is that compatible with Christ’s objective morality which is (allegedly) grounded in divine law?

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.

That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

I would also mention that it is exceedingly difficult to actually justify moral realism with Christianity (although I understand that is a very hot take)….the euthyphro dilemma still holds to me. Also, even if God’s nature does facilitate some sort of (objective) goods, then it seems that it would only relativistically apply to God (teleologically) (no different then how the human good refers to humans—not God).

What is good is good — Bob Ross

This is tautological. This is unhelpful. This is not an answer to any of the questions. What's good is *insert definition* is the correct form of this statement. Everyone has their own. And that's absolutely fine.

You just randomly misquoted me to try and pick a low hanging fruit (without reading anything I said). Either engage in what I am saying and give a useful (or at least genuinely attempted) response, or don't wedge yourself into other people's conversations.

None of this is true. No idea where you're getting this from. I literally quoted you and responded to it. My comment is in line with all of your responses to a similar thing. Your view is that the Good, is the Good.

I would recommend not immediately getting defensive and difficult because someone has put you to something.

We can talk about what we mean by "good" without worrying about moral realism. Our heritage includes several different ideas about morality. Jewish, Persian, Roman, Greek. They're all in Christianity. I've had my fill of reading about all of that, though. That's not where I start in thinking about morality. I start with the content of my own heart.

What might your primary consideration be, for separating what good is, from what is good?

I don't think anyone can argue against that good is a positive outcome, it's why you say 'this is good' as a compliment to some product. It was a positive outcome, hence why I celebrated the moment.

Nobody is obligated to help others, though it may be a good endeavour. — Barkon

This is why I tend to think of helping others being a potential example of good. Good often comes at a price. Good may have a personal cost. Good may be difficult and painful. Hence the association of self-sacrifice with good. If good is simply what pleases you, you might be a con-artist and thief.