Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that.

I want to ask...

Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you?

If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that. — Ludwig V

Yes, clearly our standard measurements of time are meaningless to the dog.

Does it follow from the fact that the dog shows up at mealtime that it has a concept of time? I don't see how. That does not seem to be enough evidence/reason to warrant the conclusion. Does waking up at the same time count as having a concept of time? I suppose I wonder what the difference between any and all regularly occurring behaviours is regarding this matter? I mean, does all routine and/or habitual behaviour equally count as adequate evidence for drawing that same conclusion? If not what's the difference such that we're not special pleading? All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).

Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?

Here's what I'd ask: Can or do dogs think about time? Can or do they form, have, and/or hold any beliefs about time? Is time meaningful to dogs? By my lights, the answer is "no". I'm open to being convinced otherwise though. So, if anyone here thinks the answer to any of the three questions is "yes", then I would only ask how?

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
— creativesoul
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. — Ludwig V

Understandable. It's unconventional, and as such it goes against some long standing practices, or at least it seems to. It is commensurate with many, dovetails nicely with some, but certainly turns a number of practices on their head. I've been fleshing the application out and working through the problems for over a decade. Not alone, mind you. I'm very grateful to this site and many regulars here, for it has allowed me to do some things that cannot be done any other way that I'm aware of.

Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language?

Excellent question. Could not have imagined a better one at this juncture. Thank you for asking.

Banno and I have had any number of conversations in past talking about just such things. That tells me there's a bit of W underlying this avenue. It is only as a result of those discussions and others that I've been able to identify certain issues with saying certain things in certain ways. I know that that's vague, so I'll just say that I've adjusted and tweaked my position after being made aware of issues. This question allows me to put some of those to good use. There are several members here on this site who've helped me tremendously along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. Banno is one, but not the only one. Okay, enough blather. Back to the question...

Beer is existentially dependent upon language. Fridges are as well. Where there has never been beer, there could never have been belief about beer. The same is true of the fridge. So, the content of the belief(things correlations are being drawn between) is existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, so too is the belief.

Here we must tread carefully however, for it would be easy to apply unhelpful labels to this belief. Calling it a "linguistic" belief would be misleading and/or a bit confusing, because any and all candidates capable of drawing correlations(spatial reasoning/relationships in this case) between the beer and the fridge are most certainly capable of believing that there is beer in the fridge. This includes candidates who do not know that one is called "beer" and the other a "fridge". It does not make much sense to say that creatures without naming and descriptive practices could form, have, and/or hold linguistic beliefs. That would be a consequence of such labeling practices.

There's more to this than it seems at first blush...

Imagine a recently abandoned house with open beers in the fridge. Say that some teenagers were rummaging around in the house and left the fridge door wide open. They did not want the warm stale beer. They leave soon enough, and later on one of the mice living in the house comes out searching for food. It finds the beer in the fridge. Some mice really like beer! That mouse believed that beer was in that fridge. It shows(as compared/contrasted to 'expresses') that belief by virtue of climbing into that fridge and getting at that beer.

Belief as propositional attitude fails here. The mouse's belief does not consist of propositions. There is no propositional content within the mouse's belief. The mouse's belief consists of correlations drawn between the beer, the fridge, its own hunger/thirst, etc.. Such belief is existentially dependent upon language(because beers and fridges are), but not existentially dependent upon the ability of the believing creature to be capable of either naming and descriptive practices or metacognition. This reminds me of past experience...

At my own house, long ago, we were all at the dining table eating breakfast after a long birthday celebration the night before when a strange unfamiliar sound was heard by us all. It was written all over our faces. We looked at each other using each other as a means to double check our own ears. Someone spoke up and expressed what our faces had already... Did you hear that? Then we heard it again... a continuous faint but distinct scratching sound captured our attention. We were all like... what on earth is that??? It stopped. It started. Stopped again. Started. It did not take us too long to find the drunken culprit in the trash; a drunken mouse had unwittingly trapped itself at the bottom of an extra tall beer can deep inside a trash bag lining the can. Here, I'll give a nod to some things you mentioned earlier regarding our ability to locate the source of a sound.

Hilarious. Drunken mice. Of all things.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them. — Ludwig V

Care to elaborate?

I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true. — Ludwig V

The abandoned house mouse places all this in question. Although, it seems you admit that not all thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of that belief.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.

We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves. — Ludwig V

We're in agreement with the following caveat; not all things that affect how creatures behave are meaningful to the creature.

Gravity. So... just to be clear.

To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. — Ludwig V

Indeed. I am. I could be confidently wrong. :wink:

It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal. — Ludwig V

Sure, but it depends upon the situation and/or the specific thought and/or belief attribution(in this discussion). If having a concept of time requires thinking about it and thinking about it requires using naming and descriptive practices, then any and all creatures incapable of using naming and descriptive practices are incapable of having a concept of time. That's pretty cut and dry to me. Substitute "thinking about it" with "time be meaningful to the candidate" as well as "forming, having, and/or holding belief about time", and the same holds good...

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
— creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. — Ludwig V

The behaviour increased the likelihood of reproduction and mating.

I personally wonder if a male isolated from 'birth' would display the same behaviour as an adult, if it were placed in an aviary with a female for the first time in its life. That would tell us something about whether or not it is innate or learned.

"Trying to impress" another presupposes a candidate with a concept of mind(belief about what will impress another). That's a bit of a stretch. Although, I've been quite impressed by any number of different bird documentaries, in addition to my own personal experiences with both domesticated and 'wild' birds.

Wonderfully interesting animals.

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
— Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
— creativesoul
Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought? — Patterner

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.

Yes, this is a great place to come. Your words made me smile. :flower:

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do).
— creativesoul

Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point... — Janus

That does not follow...

May I suggest you reread that post?

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. — creativesoul

So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong?

There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some (arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that. — creativesoul

Forgive me, I thought that you believed that all belief is a matter of correlations. So what more do you want before accepting that Jimi believed he had done something wrong?

I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. — creativesoul

Ah, well, there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference.
However, if morality is essential for social life, then the fact that dogs have a social life - and especially have a social life that includes humans - then it would be reasonable to suppose that they have some moral (or at least proto-moral) concepts.

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either. — creativesoul

That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes.

We, each of us, have a "theory of mind" about others - We can understand the beliefs, emotions, intentions and thoughts of others. Such a capacity is vital for complex social interactions. — Questioner

Well, yes, we do indeed develop a concept of mind. I would expect that there is a substantial common core to all our concepts, for two reasons. First, because we learn our concepts from each other as part of learning to speak and secon because if there wasn't at least a common core, we couldn't communicate about minds - our own or others'.

But do I think a dog can interpret and make inferences about human thought? No. — Questioner

Well, my concept of mind enables me to interpret the thought of dogs and some other animals.

We do not just perceive – we perceive and interpret the mental states of others. — Questioner

I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach. — creativesoul

I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd.

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? Or, if you prefer, why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs?
Or, when another dog approaches her, and goes through their greeting ceremonies, how does she know that she needs to respond?
Or, when she is dashing across the park, how does she avoid running into other dogs, distinguishing between what she can do from what the other dogs who are also dashing about the place are doing?
I had two dogs for a long time. They never failed to distinguish their own food bowl from the other one's food bowl. (Nor did they ever fail to check that the other one's bowl was empty when the other one had finished and walked away.)

The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around. — creativesoul

Yes, it makes sense to sort one's methodology out before trying to answer the question - when one understands the question. The catch is that if one does not understand the question, the methodology may not be appropriate. Methodology and understanding both need to be sorted out before answers can be achieved. Otherwise, one may be trying use a hammer when what is required is a spanner.
If you are dealing with a fridge, the manufacturer can provide you with instructions how to deal with the various things that may go wrong with it. If you are dealing with an unknown disease, you need to find out what methods for dealing with it work.

Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you? — creativesoul

Yes. Not completely meaningless, but pretty much.

All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not? — creativesoul

I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it. Similarities and differences. Would you say that a philosopher who thinks that time is continuous and a philosopher who thinks that time is discontinuous have the same concept of time or different ones - or, perhaps, overlapping ones?
Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language. — creativesoul

That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. — creativesoul

I agree with most of that, especially the distinction between our report of a belief and the believer's formulation of it. I see this as the differences between "I believe that..." and "He/she believes that..." One of my unconventional views is that this distinction applies to all beliefs. So "..that p" is not a purely intensional context, nor a simply extensional context. It is perfectly true that conventional philosophy ignores this. (I know you won't freak out at an unconventional view!)
I would be happy to accept that the mouse does not think of the fridge as a fridge, but merely as a cool place. It doesn't understand the expansion of gases or electricity/gas. It would also be reasonable to recognize that it doesn't understand beer as we do, because it doesn't understand what alcohol is. But we can suppose that it understands beer insofar as it tastes good and has pleasurable effects - and presumably understands hangovers, though not necessarily the connection with drinking beer. (BTW It is not unknown for dogs to become extremely fond of beer. I read somewhere that even bees can get drunk when they happen upon nectar that has fermented.) Nonetheless it is perfectly reasonable to report that the mouse liked the beer in the fridge. The difference is not a question of truth or falsity, but of what pragmatically works in the context. The mouse doesn't have to understand how I report its belief to other human beings.

PS I have edited the above to put right an error in the formatting and restore the distinction between what I was quoting and what I was saying. My mistake. Sorry.

I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that — creativesoul

It's only a gesture at the complicated relationship between experience, beliefs and behaviour. When we close the fridge door, we act out (perhaps that's better than "express") what the fridge means to us. That's all.

Well, yes, we do indeed develop a concept of mind. I would expect that there is a substantial common core to all our concepts, for two reasons. First, because we learn our concepts from each other as part of learning to speak and secon because if there wasn't at least a common core, we couldn't communicate about minds - our own or others'. — Ludwig V

You have changed the terms, and with that have changed the definition. We are not talking about an understood “concept” but rather a “theory.” And the “theory of mind” is not an idea about what a mind is or does, expressed in generalities, but rather a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind.

I have a theory of mind for my mother, and one for my brother, and one for my friend….

Well, my concept of mind enables me to interpret the thought of dogs and some other animals. — Ludwig V

That doesn’t mean the dog can form theories about what is in your mind. You are human – yes, you have the capacity to form theories about what is in other minds. We can even form theories about what is in the minds of supernatural beings that do not even exist. The fact that we are storytellers supports this. “Theory of mind” allows us to inhabit the minds of the story’s characters, analyzing their thoughts, feelings, motivations, intentions and perspectives.

I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation? — Ludwig V

Sorry, I’m not sure what you’re asking.

What is a matter of interpretation?

What is the explanation for our inability to agree?

Whose is the better interpretation of what?

And the “theory of mind” is not an idea about what a mind is or does, expressed in generalities, but rather a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind. — Questioner

Oh, I see. I misunderstood. But now "a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" seems just like a belief, so what I'm hearing is "a belief you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind"

I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
— Ludwig V

Sorry, I’m not sure what you’re asking.
What is a matter of interpretation?
What is the explanation for our inability to agree?
Whose is the better interpretation of what?

I'm afraid I have misunderstood you again. You said:-.

We do not just perceive – we perceive and interpret. the mental states of others. — Questioner

My questions followed from that.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
— creativesoul
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, — Ludwig V

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Irrelevant. The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.

Ockham's razor applies.

I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd. — Ludwig V

Metacognition returns answers to you? Does it understand requests all by itself?

I'm confused.

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? — Ludwig V

I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.

...why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs? — Ludwig V

Who said she couldn't?

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
— Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first. — creativesoul

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done. — creativesoul

So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Why imagine an impossibility? Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. He trembled as a result. Involuntarily.

Ockham's razor applies.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. — creativesoul

Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.

But now "a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" seems just like a belief, so what I'm hearing is "a belief you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" — Ludwig V

Well, some “beliefs’ are more supported than others. “Theory of mind’ is what the psychologists call it. But, it’s true, you cannot have a belief in a supernatural being without having a theory about what is in their mind.

You can read about the connection between belief and theory of mind in Jesse Bering's book The Belief instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the Meaning of Life

I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
— Ludwig V — Ludwig V

Sorry, let me try this again. Yes, forming a theory of mind for another depends on making inferences. Yes, inferences may be wrong. Yes, two different people might have a very different theory of mind about the same person. Whose is better? The one that gets the closest to the truth?

The one that gets the closest to the truth? — Questioner

How is that determined?

How is that determined? — Patterner

Yeah, that would require we verify the thoughts of 8 billion people. Maybe in some weird sci-fi movie…

I think that’s why I had some trouble with the original question, which seemed to be calling for a prioritization of all human thought, an obviously unreasonable task.

I guess the most we can say is – was an understanding or a misunderstanding made? The reaction/response/behavior flowing from an understanding will be more aligned with reality, and the reaction/response/behavior flowing from a misunderstanding will be less aligned.

The one that gets the closest to the truth? — Questioner

How is that determined? — Patterner

Ask the person whose thought they were guessing. He may tell the truth about what he was thinking at that moment, or he may lie, or he may refuse to answer. Refusal to answer leads you to draw a new inference about his present state of mind, as well as about the thought that was in question. You may even draw inference, from context, about his reasons. If he does answer, you'll have to decide whether to believe him or not. That decision will depend on what you know of his character from previous experience, as well as his demeanour in the moment.
Each of these inferences and decisions, along with some other operations, is part of an overall theory of mind: a general ability to 'read' the body language, expression and tone, in the context of previous knowledge, of another's communication.
Anyhow, theory of mind is rather misleading and vague nomenclature, IMO.

a general ability to 'read' the body language, expression and tone, in the context of previous knowledge, of another's communication. — Vera Mont

I feel that you have ignored all that I have said about theory of mind and remain close-minded to understanding it. I repeat - it's not about reading outward signs - it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind.

theory of mind is rather misleading and vague nomenclature, IMO. — Vera Mont

That is because you don't understand it.

it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind. — Questioner

On what basis? You're right: I don't understand how telepathy comes out of a theory based on no experience and no sensory input.

I don't understand how telepathy — Vera Mont

It's not telepathy. it's your brain working.

telepathy comes out of a theory based on no experience and no sensory input. — Vera Mont

Who said it does not require experience and sensory input? Re-read my posts.

Right now, I have a theory of what is in your mind.

Who said it does not require experience and sensory input? — Questioner

I could have sworn you did.

it's not about reading outward signs — Questioner

Reading inward signs is telepathy. To form a guess, conjecture, theory or belief about what's in another mind, we first need to learn about something about the species and individual with whom who are faced. Infants respond to physical stimuli, but have no notions of the existence of minds or thoughts - and won't until they've interacted with others and learned to recognize patterns in their behaviour, from which they can deduce stimulus and response, cause and effect, similarity to their own feelings, etc. It's a long process of learning and associations before anything like a theory can form.

Right now, I have a theory of what is in your mind. — Questioner

From what? Words I typed are unequivocal outward signs.
Never mind. You have a theory I'm unable to validate.

...there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference. — Ludwig V

Might he? Exactly what would that take? What must also be the case in order for Jimi to believe he had done something wrong, but not see it as punishment?

I've set out what is required for all three possibilities(knowing he had done something wrong, seeing Janus's treatment of him as punishment and not). Jimi does not have what it takes. That explanation has been sorely neglected.

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
— creativesoul
That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes. — Ludwig V

The first part turns on what counts as "too much emphasis on universal differences". I'm unsure of what that phrase is referring to. It does not seem to address anything I've claimed, as best I can tell. I'll say this to the rest: We assess each case as it comes by using/practicing standards. What standard(s) do you practice while assessing whether or not this or that creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought and/or belief?

All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
— creativesoul
I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it. — Ludwig V

Different users/practitioners of naming and descriptive practices can have different notions/concepts/thought and/or belief about time. There are multiple sensible uses of "time". Not knowing some does not preclude one from the rest. Showing that this is the case does not shoulder the burden.

The contentious matter is whether or not it is even possible for a thinking/believing creature to have a notion/concept(thought and/or belief about time) without naming and descriptive practices. The move from comparing different sensible uses of "time" to "similarly, the dogs have a concept of time" is suspect.

Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand. — Ludwig V

Sure.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
— creativesoul
That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about. — Ludwig V

Here, you've used some of the same words in different ways than I do. I'll try to further clarify...

...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users. Those objects are part of the content of the correlations being drawn(the content of the candidate's belief).

The mouse can draw correlations including the beer(between the beer and other things). Beer is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all. That is the case regardless of whether or not anyone ever talked about it.

This is segue into similarity I think you and others may find interesting. I do.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of.
— creativesoul

Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then. — creativesoul

Even less now.

I could have sworn you did.
it's not about reading outward signs
— Questioner — Vera Mont

It's more than that.

Reading inward signs is telepathy. — Vera Mont

"Theory of mind" is a well-established and supported piece of psychological information that has been the subject of scientific research going back nearly 50 years. I invite you to google using the search words "theory of mind."

You have a theory I'm unable to validate. — Vera Mont

To deny that humans make conclusions about what is in other minds is blind indeed.

To deny that humans make conclusions about what is in other minds is blind indeed. — Questioner

I never denied that humans, as well as other species draw conclusions, or at least surmise, what another sentient being is thinking. I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs.

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive. — creativesoul

Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce. There no question of wondering what they think or of language-less behaviour.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
— Ludwig V
Care to elaborate? — creativesoul

I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals.

I see no ground for presupposing she (sc. Ludwig's dog) is comparing your (sc. Ludwig's) wants to anything. — creativesoul

I'm not at all clear what you mean about comparing wants to things. It was usually pretty obvious when she wanted something and when she had got it.

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts. — creativesoul

Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it.

The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes. — creativesoul

I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.

Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. — creativesoul

I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear?

But the really significant point about the story is that he never bothered another chicken. That was the lesson he was supposed to learn. What correlation do you suppose that is based on?

...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users. — creativesoul

Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all. — creativesoul

OK. So we agree. I suppose we might disagree about which bits they can hold beliefs about which they cannot, but perhaps we don't need to tease that out now.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. — creativesoul

You've said twice that on reflection you are not happy with this. I don't see what's wrong with it. Could you explain?

I feel that you have ignored all that I have said about theory of mind and remain close-minded to understanding it. I repeat - it's not about reading outward signs - it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind. — Questioner

I read both of the Wikipedia articles - which does not make me an expert.
Wikipedia - Theory of Mind[/url and Wikipedia - Theory of mind in animals
There's a lot of interesting empirical work here. Not much, I have to say, in the way of consensus agreements. The actual psychology under this heading seems very worth while. But the heading is very confusing.

Discussions of theory of mind have their roots in philosophical debate from the time of René Descartes' Second Meditation, which set the foundations for considering the science of the mind.

Quite so. Psychology seems to have more difficulty than any other science about escaping from its philosophical roots.

In psychology, theory of mind refers to the capacity to understand other people by ascribing mental states to them.

That seems to be clear. We do know that we understand other people. I'm not sure whether "by ascribing mental states to them" is a harmless paraphrase of "understanding other people" or something more substantial, philosophically speaking, and more controversial. But the question how our understanding works seems a sound starting-point for scientific research.

The "theory of mind" is described as a theory, because the behavior of the other person, such as their statements and expressions, is the only thing being directly observed; no one has direct access to the mind of another, and the existence and nature of the mind must be inferred. It is typically assumed others have minds analogous to one's own;

Philosophically speaking, this is indeed a theory. I read it as a philosophical theory of the mind. But that's not what is meant by "theory of mind" in this context, because each of us has our own theory. That's why I find the name for research in this area so confusing.
I'm not sure that it is wise to treat these propositions more or less as axioms when they are the focus of much philosophical debate. Perhaps it doesn't make any difference whether philosophical dualism or one of its variants is true, but if that's so, it makes a big difference to philosophy.