You misunderstand me: the concept of good refers to whatever 'good' means, not what or how one can predicate something to have it. Viz., the concept of value does not refer to what may be valuable. One must first understand, explicitly, what 'value' even means, not just as a word but as a concept, to determine what has it. — Bob Ross

You seem to be unaware of the fact that there are hundreds of different concepts of moral good depending on which theory you are looking at. Whatever definition you choose as your definition, it wouldn't be the only one, and definitely not the final one either.

I have given out the inferred definition from Aristotle's idea. It is clearly saying what moral good is, even if it sounds indirect and informal.

It wouldn't be right to force down a randomly selected concept of moral good to someone who is looking for a basic method to build the moral code.

The problem I was raising is that the OP is asking:

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make?

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics.

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend....

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend.. — Bob Ross

OK, fine. What is goodness according to you?

We can talk about what we mean by "good" without worrying about moral realism

:chin:

What meaningfully is there to talk about other than whether goodness is objective; whether judgments about what are good are cognitive and some of them are true; and so forth? Sure, we can venture into metaethics without explicitly dealing with realism vs. anti-realism, but there core tenants of each are going to be addressed irregardless...

Dude. That's your answer?

The reason I am being so harsh with you, is because you obviously cherry-picked one sentence from my most recent post to someone else......

When I said that, I said:

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.


That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly.

It isn't productive to cherry-pick peoples' responses and address something utterly irrelevant to the conversation.

Yes...... :brow:

PS: I refer you back to this comment, because you never actually addressed it.

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging @Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up.

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up. — Bob Ross

I think we each learn about goodness viscerally through experiences with grief, fear, and anger. But prove me wrong. What's your favored definition of goodness?

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

I don't think I said to analyze happiness. I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

If you ever read any Ethics book, most of them start from the story of Socrates who asked, "How should we live?". He doesn't talk about what good is. No one really starts with what good is. Because like Moore said, and I agreed, good is not an entity. It is a property and quality. It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly. — Bob Ross

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position. It seems more likely you have someone disingenuous assumed that's all there was to respond to, in my mind which is not the case.

If your harshness is borne out of what's there in the full post i've quoted above, that is a misunderstanding on your part. I have adequately responded to your position. Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not. Unless you're actually obfuscating, in which case, maybe take a bit of time before replying (but i assume this is not hte case)

I should say, the two elements don't seem mutually exclusive - which is why i've been saying unhelpful rather htan unreasonable. It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting. At least, with respect to what I asked about, you haven’t shown that by which you understand what good is, yet you’ve presupposed goodness as a qualitative judgement of it.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.

Which immediately requires you to separate the empirical contingency of the one from the a priori necessity of the other.

Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates. — Mww

b-b-b-bingo.

Tictoktictok???

As my ol’ buddy Billy Gibbons might say to Bob….got (you) under presssssuuurre….

Good isn't something decided by others. Good can be concerning groups or somebody alone, and their seeking of positive outcomes for their group or for the self.

I don't disagree with that: I think we learn about all concepts through experience; but that doesn't mean that we can skip steps and put the horse before the cart.

My answer of what the concept of good is, is found in this post:

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc. — Bob Ross

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

My understanding of the Principia Ethica, when I read it a while ago, was that his whole critique was, first and foremost, that ethics hitherto had not even thought to question what the concept of good even is and, instead, skipped over it to a discussion of what can be predicated to have it. This is not to say that Moore, upon conducting (what he considered to be) the necessary investigation into the nature of goodness (as opposed to what The Good is—what can be said to be chiefly good), concluded that we can define it accurately. In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point.

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

“Ethics since 1900” was not written by Moore. If you want to understand Moore, then you need to read The Principia Ethica:

But our question ‘What is good?’ may have still another meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how ‘good’ is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first.

-- (Principia Ethica, Ch. 1, Section 5)

I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

Even if I grant your point, my point still stands:

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

The OP is asking where to start to understand what is good, and I am merely pointing out that you are trying to have them start with Aristotelian ethics (at best); and starting with an already existing, robust theory is not the proper way to start. One needs to start by studying what the nature of goodness is: that is the beginning of metaethics.

It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

That’s all fine: the OP is about where should a person start. Do you think they should just skip over asking themselves “is good definable?”? Do you just want them to skip that step?!?

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position

No, one would not think that AmadeusD; because for anyone who actually read my posts, I took a Moorean position on the nature of goodness which is not circular. Again, you just quoted me out of context when I was talking about how goodness is objective.

Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not.

All you said was this:

This is tautological. This is unhelpful. This is not an answer to any of the questions. What's good is *insert definition* is the correct form of this statement. Everyone has their own. And that's absolutely fine. — AmadeusD

All you did is address that, when taken literally, “what is good is good” is tautological and doesn’t give a real definition. You absolutely did not address anything about my idea that goodness is objective. Now you are just trying to ad hoc rationalize your laziness.

AmadeusD, I try to be charitable; but on this one I can’t...it’s too painfully obvious what you did. You read a tiny snippet, which had nothing substantial to do with the post in which it was, that said “what is good is good” and assumed I was trying to define goodness as goodness.

It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is about God and God’s relation to any objective goodness to demonstrate that God can’t really be the standard for it; and does not provide any reason to believe that an objective morality cannot exist.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

Perhaps I misread, then: I thought you asked about what is good—no? Goodness is just the property of being good.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting

I am just advocating that a person who wants to begin understanding what is good must start with analyzing what they think the concept of good is; then what can be said to be good. That’s it. I don’t think the person in the OP should start with our understanding of what we think goodness refers to.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.
…
Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

Well, this just opened up a can of worms (;

Now we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism again haha. The question you raise, is an interesting, Kantian one—viz., if we cannot know how the things-in-themselves are, then how can we know what is in-itself good?

In short, I think this falls prey the same issue that transcendental idealism has with its in-itself vs. “for-us” distinction: by ‘in-itself’, I take Kant to really be meaning (whether he likes it or not) how a thing exists independently of any experience of it; and there’s another common meaning for ‘in-itself’, which is just the nature of a thing (and this can be based off of conditional knowledge of it). I find no reason to believe that I cannot have indirect knowledge of reality as it were in-itself in the second sense of that term.

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. All we need in order to grasp what is good (conditionally), is the intellect. That is, I guess, the “a priori sense of good itself”—although I am certainly not referring to exactly what you meant here (since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality). Or are you thinking that by concept of good, I am referring to an a priori concept of good?

EDIT:

It is also worth mentioning that moral non-naturalists will nod their approval your way on this one; and say that we do have some sort of extra sense for morality that allows us to sense the supersensible or that God gives us divine revelation.

In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point. — Bob Ross

It is good that you admit your misunderstanding Moore, and your claim was wrong. :cool:

“Ethics since 1900” was not written by Moore. If you want to understand Moore, then you need to read The Principia Ethica: — Bob Ross

Warnock was a professor of Philosophy, and the book is a good introduction to modern Ethics. I don't think you need to read The PE, in order to understand Moore, unless you are specializing in his Ethics.

That’s all fine: the OP is about where should a person start. Do you think they should just skip over asking themselves “is good definable?”? Do you just want them to skip that step?!? — Bob Ross

I am easy with that. If you think the concept of Good is intensely relevant to the topic, by all means carry on with unfolding and elaborating on it. Your question on whether to skip the step should be asked to the OP, not me.

Warnock was a professor of Philosophy, and the book is a good introduction to modern Ethics. I don't think you need to read The PE, in order to understand Moore, unless you are specializing in his Ethics.

:lol:

It is good that you admit your misunderstanding Moore, and your claim was wrong. :cool:

:roll: I find it interesting that the person who has never read Moore, who doesn't see a need to, thinks they are understand Moore better than someone who actually has.

This conversation is a waste of my time.

:roll: I find it interesting that the person who has never read Moore, who doesn't see a need to, thinks they are understand Moore better than someone who actually has. — Bob Ross

It seems to be the case, that your reading the original text was not very through or accurate. The academic commentaries are for helping you to understand the original texts better, and they could correct the misunderstandings you make from your readings on the original texts. They are not being written so that they can be ignored or treated as not useful. Therefore I would advise you not to ignore the academic commentaries and introductions to the topics and original texts.

This conversation is a waste of my time. — Bob Ross

I thought it was not a waste of time at all, because it helped someone to correct his misunderstanding on Moore. :D

It seems to be the case, that your reading the original text was not very through or accurate.

How do you know? You've never read it lmao.

I thought it was not a waste of time at all, because it helped someone to correct his misunderstanding on Moore. :D

Nothing was corrected about what I said: I refer you back to my response. I have maintained the same position throughout this discussion, and you are merely confused about Moore and my claims (as they relate thereto) because you haven't read him.

EDIT: I also refer you to your original post that I was responding to <here>.

Goodness is just the property of being good. — Bob Ross

I reject that good has properties, like most balls have a round property and gasoline has a fluid property. Good is an ideal of pure practical reason, that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
————-

we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism — Bob Ross

Don’t have to, there are plenty of other kinds. But if that happens, then Kant yes; idealism, yes; transcendental philosophy…..no. Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

how can we know what is in-itself good? — Bob Ross

Because the subject in his moral philosophy uses a different aspect of his understanding, judgement and reason for his moral determinations, than are used for his knowledge claims. An in-itself from the strictly moral perspective or domain, is such insofar as it is a construct completely internal to the subject himself, and its relative goodness is known with apodeitic certainty because it is measured against how good the subject feels about it, rather than whether or not he contradicts himself.

The understanding is prudential rather than cognitive; the judgement is aesthetic rather than discursive, and pure reason is practical rather than transcendental.

From the human point of view, a pure dualist intelligence is necessary to appreciate that…..
…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.
————-

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. — Bob Ross

Maybe not so much as what is a car, but we certainly do have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise. As well, with this, for you, it is impossible to explain those fundamental conditions by which we can all have the same sense of what a car is, but we do not all have the same sense of what good is.
————-

….since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality — Bob Ross

There ya go. Others may differ, of course.

Nothing was corrected about what I said: I refer you back to my response. I have maintained the same position throughout this discussion, and you are merely confused about Moore and my claims (as they relate thereto) because you haven't read him. — Bob Ross

In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point. — Bob Ross

Well you have agreed with my point succinctly in your post, but then for some mysterious reasons you seem to have changed your mind again.

Now I agree, that this discussion is a waste of time.

Harris gets some crucial things right. However, he knows he has serious problems. In particular he:

-Wants to define science broadly such that it is continuous with philosophy. This certainly justifiable, but then he has no theory for how the sciences hang together and form a unity. This is a problem, particularly because different sciences have different measures that are roughly analogous to "goodness." For instance, medicine has health and economics has utility, but people often derive utility from things that are bad for their health, and it is not always obvious which metric is to be preferred.

-He equivocates on what he means by "science" so as to exclude philosophy he doesn't like from consideration (also a general tendency to rely on incredulity rather than actually making arguments).

-Has no real answer to collective action problems, prisoners' dilemmas, or free rider problems, which are all over ethics, because he has any such unifying vision of well-being, goodness, and the sciences. Hence, he has trouble explaining why it is good to be virtuous.

-His exclusion of freedom on incredibly flimsy grounds (i.e. freedom must mean "uncaused action" and something like substance dualism), robs him of the ability to explain why virtue is good and some "forms of well-being" deeper, because they lead to self-determination. Self-determination is, however, a prerequisite for actually turning moral philosophy into real action.

I think his project could really benefit from reading Aristotle and even more so St. Thomas, but given his prejudices, that seems unlikely.

I'm actually writing a paper on this because, from my experience in government, it seems that something like Harris view is dominant amongst policymakers and economists (less the religious bigotry, which most don't share). Yet there is a lot in Harris that is said better in earlier thought.

Harris makes a lot of excellent points:

My critics have been especially exercised over the subtitle of my book, “how science can determine human values.” The charge is that I haven’t actually used science to determine the foundational value (well-being) upon which my proffered science of morality would rest. Rather, I have just assumed that well-being is a value, and this move is both unscientific and question-begging. Here is Blackford:

If we presuppose the well-being of conscious creatures as a fundamental value, much else may fall into place, but that initial presupposition does not come from science. It is not an empirical finding… Harris is highly critical of the claim, associated with Hume, that we cannot derive an “ought” solely from an “is” – without starting with people’s actual values and desires. He is, however, no more successful in deriving “ought” from “is” than anyone else has ever been. The whole intellectual system of The Moral Landscape depends on an “ought” being built into its foundations.

Again, the same can be said about medicine, or science as a whole. As I point out in my book, science is based on values that must be presupposed—like the desire to understand the universe, a respect for evidence and logical coherence, etc. One who doesn’t share these values cannot do science. But nor can he attack the presuppositions of science in a way that anyone should find compelling. Scientists need not apologize for presupposing the value of evidence, nor does this presupposition render science unscientific. In my book, I argue that the value of well-being—specifically the value of avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone—is on the same footing. There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it. To say that the worst possible misery for everyone is “bad” is, on my account, like saying that an argument that contradicts itself is “illogical.” Our spade is turned. Anyone who says it isn’t simply isn’t making sense. The fatal flaw that Blackford claims to have found in my view of morality could just as well be located in science as a whole—or reason generally. Our “oughts” are built right into the foundations. We need not apologize for pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps in this way. It is far better than pulling ourselves down by them.

Yet he sometimes makes them very poorly, and St. Thomas is the prime candidate I can think of who makes this same point far more lucidly and in the context of an incredibly tight system.

No, one would not think that AmadeusD; because for anyone who actually read my posts, I took a Moorean position on the nature of goodness which is not circular. Again, you just quoted me out of context when I was talking about how goodness is objective. — Bob Ross

You're beginning to come across genuinely incapable of having this type exchange - the amount of genuinely unreasonable statements you're making is quite distracting from anything of substance you might be sandwiching in there. This response makes absolutely zero sense in the face of what I have said. That makes it close to impossible to respond adequately.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is about God and God’s relation to any objective goodness to demonstrate that God can’t really be the standard for it; and does not provide any reason to believe that an objective morality cannot exist — Bob Ross

This is a prime example. IF you were being charitable, it would be painfully obvious (and, i've checked this by running the set of exchanges by a third party who has no skin in the exchange) that what I have said there is exactly what it says - an example that ab objective Good would need to be circular. As every single thing you have posited shows, clearly. Your assertion to the opposite is simply false.

Suffice to say all my responses stand on their own two feet. You can respond how you want :)

This response makes absolutely zero sense in the face of what I have said.

I already outlined in this post; and of which you didn’t respond at all.

IF you were being charitable, it would be painfully obvious (and, i've checked this by running the set of exchanges by a third party who has no skin in the exchange) that what I have said there is exactly what it says - an example that ab objective Good would need to be circular.

The euthyphro dilemma refers to whether or not God is determines what is good or if what God determines is good because it is good: this has nothing to do with my position, nor anything I have said.

You seem to think that the euthyphro dilemma refers to objective goodness being circular (or needing to be circularly defined): it doesn’t.

I will say it one last time: my definition is not circular, and I agree with Moore that it cannot be defined properly.

The problem with our conversation is that you birthed it out of half-assedly wedging yourself into my conversation with someone else. Again, your first quote in this exchange was an abysmal attempt at engaging in conversation.