it is nothing but contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It clearly, patently isn't, and you're just digging your feet in. That's not Dan's problem. He's being an absolute gentleman trying to walk you through this. Your refusal doesn't reflect anything on he or his arguments. All of my comments about your posts stand, entirely. Your responses are just re-assertions of the same tired cop-outs at this stage.

"Expert" implies a quality of understanding, 'goodness', and this excludes "misunderstanding, which is 'badness'. But when we say that the person is a specialist we just acknowledge that the person's attention is focused on a very specific aspect of a field, so it is implied that the person is possibly an expert in that specific aspect. An accurate judgement of "expert" though, is much more difficult than a judgement of "specialist", because the latter only requires that the person has specialized one's study, but the former judgement, "expert", is best reserved until after the person proves oneself through experience, practise. Notice the difference between theory and practise here. The judgement of "expert", if rigorous standards are employed, requires practise as acts of proof, to demonstrate the quality of the person's education. And this is why many fields employ apprenticeships and internships. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was with you until this part. This part is just incorrect. Expert implies a quality of understanding I agree, but this does not exclude misunderstandings. What I am saying is that those who are experts in their field, who have a strong understanding of it, can and do still misunderstand aspects of that field, even narrowly construed.

I know you think it's silly. You think adhering to strict rules of definition is unnecessarily pedantic, and doing such in the field of moral philosophy is a ridiculous way of proceeding. So you'd rather go around in your circles of vagueness and principles with self-referential definitions which lead nowhere. This enables your intention of hiding contradictory statements in your illogical endeavour of attempting to show how two incompatible systems of evaluation are compatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that adhering to the strict rules of definition is pedantic at all. I think that quibbling over the defintiion being used rather than addressing the point is sometimes pedantic. I have been clear and precise in how I have defined terms and am not hiding anything. The supposed incompatibility comes entirely from your misunderstanding. But your point here, that expertise is mutually exclusive with holding a misunderstanding in one's field, is just wrong. That's not how we define "expert" and, further, defining it in such a way would make the term essentially useless.

The fact that we make the general judgement that experts are not perfect, and all experts have misunderstanding, is irrelevant to the judgement of whether an individual with a known misunderstanding ought to be called an "expert". This is because the former is concerned with unknown misunderstandings while the latter is concerned with known misunderstandings. This makes the type of :misunderstanding of the two examples categorically different. Because of this difference it is acceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of unknown misunderstandings, yet unacceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of the person's known misunderstandings. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there isn't a substantive difference here. If we judge someone to be an expert knowing that they likely misunderstand something, then later on we find out what it is that they misunderstood, we don't say "oh, well they weren't an expert then". Also, there are people we judge as experts now despite judging them to be wrong on some aspect of the topic. When two experts in a field disagree about something, they don't no longer consider one another experts because they judge the other person to misunderstand. Expertise is not mutually exclusive with misunderstanding.

But we cannot do as you propose, and have it both ways, saying that the doctor's actions were both right and wrong, that in itself would constitute misunderstanding in the field of moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, that's not what I claimed. What I claimed was that (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective) the doctor's actions were wrong, yet those same actions would be right in most circumstances, so we may want to praise the doctor's actions in this case because we want to encourage future doctors to act the same way in the same (in terms of the relevant information they have available to them) situations.

Thanks, Amadeus. I have been endevouring to answer everyone's questions and criticisms, whether or not they are relevant. I am asking for help on a philosophical problem after all, so it seems the polite thing to do.

That's not Dan's problem. — AmadeusD

Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is?

Expert implies a quality of understanding I agree, but this does not exclude misunderstandings. What I am saying is that those who are experts in their field, who have a strong understanding of it, can and do still misunderstand aspects of that field, even narrowly construed. — Dan

I dealt with this already. I agree "expert" does not exclude misunderstanding, we all know that no one is perfect. However, "expert" implies the highest level of understanding, and that means no known misunderstanding. "Expert" signifies the highest possible level of understanding, and this means "no known misunderstanding, in the area one is an expert in.

And, "no known misunderstanding" is substantially different from "some known misunderstanding". If the misunderstanding is known, then the person cannot be judged as "expert", because this is not the highest level of understanding which is "no known misunderstanding". The fact that we know that no one is perfect, and even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, is irrelevant.

No, there isn't a substantive difference here. If we judge someone to be an expert knowing that they likely misunderstand something, then later on we find out what it is that they misunderstood, we don't say "oh, well they weren't an expert then". Also, there are people we judge as experts now despite judging them to be wrong on some aspect of the topic. When two experts in a field disagree about something, they don't no longer consider one another experts because they judge the other person to misunderstand. Expertise is not mutually exclusive with misunderstanding. — Dan

This does not address my post. There is a substantial difference between known misunderstanding and unknown misunderstanding. We readily allow that even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, because no one is perfect. However, if the person has a misunderstanding which is evident, and known, we do not judge the person as an expert.

You deny that there is "a substantive difference" between "known misunderstanding" and "unknown misunderstanding" but this is incorrect. There is a substantive difference because "unknown misunderstanding" allows for "no known misunderstanding" within that category, and this is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding". Therefore "unknown misunderstanding" allows within its category something which is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding", i.e. "no known misunderstanding". This opposition indicates a substantive difference between the two.

What I claimed was that (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective) the doctor's actions were wrong, yet those same actions would be right in most circumstances... — Dan

I already explained to you why this is incoherent. "Different circumstances" implies different acts. Therefore it is incoherent to refer to the same act in different circumstances. And when we consider the difference of circumstances we can understand why similar acts are judged in different ways, because they are not the same act, they are different.

You seem to have no respect for the law of identity. But of course, denying one of the three fundamental laws of logic incapacitates the other two, so this violation of the law of identity is a tool which enables your contradictory argumentation.

I dealt with this already. I agree "expert" does not exclude misunderstanding, we all know that no one is perfect. However, "expert" implies the highest level of understanding, and that means no known misunderstanding. "Expert" signifies the highest possible level of understanding, and this means "no known misunderstanding, in the area one is an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert.

And, "no known misunderstanding" is substantially different from "some known misunderstanding". If the misunderstanding is known, then the person cannot be judged as "expert", because this is not the highest level of understanding which is "no known misunderstanding". The fact that we know that no one is perfect, and even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not?

However, if the person has a misunderstanding which is evident, and known, we do not judge the person as an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it possible you are using "known" in a different sense here? Because my first thought it "yes we do, of course we do", but perhaps you mean "known" in some other sense. Perhaps you mean that if someone misunderstands something about their field, and everyone else in the field knows this to be wrong because it has been proven to be false a long time ago, then we wouldn't call them an expert? Is that what you mean?

I already explained to you why this is incoherent. "Different circumstances" implies different acts. Therefore it is incoherent to refer to the same act in different circumstances. And when we consider the difference of circumstances we can understand why similar acts are judged in different ways, because they are not the same act, they are different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details).

You seem to have no respect for the law of identity. But of course, denying one of the three fundamental laws of logic incapacitates the other two, so this violation of the law of identity is a tool which enables your contradictory argumentation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical.

Instead, I will say that the doctor's initial action, which we will say was proscribing Drug X (from an actual-consequentialist perspective) was wrong. However, we may want to praise the doctor for proscribing Drug X because in most cases of patients presenting the way the patient presented in this instance, proscribing Drug X would be the right thing to do. Is that easier to grasp?

Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is? — Metaphysician Undercover

And I'm not trying to unite two incompaitible principles at all. No part of the problem comes from the inconsistency you have imagined.

I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach.

As i said earlier, we have a significant difference as to the meaning of "understanding", which makes discussion extremely difficult. I should never have come back to this subject.

I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism

Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not? — Dan

Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you?

This distinction is very relevant to your example of the doctor. However, for some reason, you appear to have a mental block, or an attitude of denial, which seems to make you incapable of considering this very important distinction.

When a person makes a judgement, one is limited, restricted in one's freedom of choice, by the restrictions which are imposed as the limitations we express as "available information". Increase in information increases one's freedom of choice, by revealing more options.

Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information.

This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person.

Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details). — Dan

"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same".

Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical. — Dan

You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation.

Look, the predication is made relative to moral quality, and this is a judgement of two distinct types of act, "good", and "bad". The two predications of "type of moral act", bad and good, are opposed to each other, such that "good" is necessarily a different type of moral act from "bad". If an act at one time is judged as "bad", and an act at another time is judged as "good", these two distinct acts cannot be judged as "the same type" in relation to moral evaluation.

What you propose is that there is a type of act, which is sometimes good, and sometimes bad. The problem is, that moral standards of evaluation set "bad" and "good" as opposing, contradictory, and incompatible types of actions. Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction to say that the same type of act, in relation to moral judgement could be sometimes bad and sometimes good. Your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge them this way, indicates that your judgement "they are the same type of act" must be a faulty judgement.

However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act.

Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think at this stage I would be entirely justified in saying "please, stop, for your own sake".
I literally said it is not Dan's problem.

If you could, perhaps, not entirely change the subject to attempt a further pointless and badly-worded impugning of Dan's work... That would be nice. But, it speaks to exactly what i"m saying - that's not his problem. It's yours. He's being a gentleman even giving you the time of day. That this has gone on months baffles me, as it probably does both of you - but for me, its his patience and your density that's baffling.

I mean let's not pretend MU is not providing logical (and very intriguing, personally, I might add) points and arguments. I have been following this exchange for several weeks. Both are incredibly intelligent people who make indisputably rational points. Any denial of that places one's self in the proverbial "hot seat".

I think, at least as a reasonable starting point, a single agreed upon "point of contention" or "argument" should be framed/established where other people can jump in and say what they have to say based on empirical facts and basic truth, really. (Particularly some of the logically highly proficient mods)

What is the main "disagreement" here? Why? What does it keep being shifted to and why?

I've seen MU be a bit less than becoming of his intellect in stating Dan has "Wasted 10 years". Perhaps he means such in the truest earnest form of communication. Perhaps he's just frustrated. Perhaps a bit of both?

I just think this whole exchange is a marvel of human endeavor, no matter who is "more correct" or I suppose "ultimately wrong". That aside, truth must remain truth. So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? Just so perhaps others who are a bit less entrenched in one or the other's particular "view" might have a crack at sharing their own perspective on the matter.

Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't at all what I was saying was silly. I completely agree that we should think experts probably have some misunderstanding. The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all.

Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism — Metaphysician Undercover

That definitely isn't what I said or implied. There is a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about.

Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely.

Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, such an attitude does not by itself restrict someone's freedom of choice. Moreover, neither has much to do with the case of the doctor as searching for the information in similar circumstances is likely to get the patient killed and is exactly the kind of behaviour we want to discourage.

This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. Feel free to reread my earlier posts as to my views on this.

"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

The "same action" in this case refers to proscribing drug X in this case (or whatever set of medical tests and treatments are enacted in the initial case)

You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action.

Let me try to put this in a way that avoids the issues you having with the words I'm using:

Doctor Bob proscribing drug X to his patient. This action is bad (on an actual-value consequentialism view) and leads to the patients death. However, in the set of possible actions that includes all and only proscribing drug X to patients who present with the same symptoms, have the same available medical history as it relates to this drug, and are of a similar age, weight, etc, most of those actions are good ones (and indeed right ones). We praise Doctor Bob for performing the wrong action because we want to encourage other doctors toward that set of actions, which contains many right actions, and away from the set of possible actions which includes all and only all the instances checking the patients' feet for clues, because most of those actions lead to the patient in question's death, and are bad (and indeed wrong).

This is a bit rough, but hopefully it is helpful to frame it not in terms of actions being good and bad, but actions that share similar qualities not having the same moral status because they occur in different circumstances, and aiming to produce the best outcome with our praising.

However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is faulty is that you are judging "types of act" as good or bad, and I'm judging specific acts as good or bad (or indeed right or wrong). There aren't two systems here at all. There's one, it's just that you seem to be under the misapprehension that it is aimed at "types of act" rather than specific acts.

I just think this whole exchange is a marvel of human endeavor, no matter who is "more correct" or I suppose "ultimately wrong". That aside, truth must remain truth. So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? Just so perhaps others who are a bit less entrenched in one or the other's particular "view" might have a crack at sharing their own perspective on the matter. — Outlander

I expect you'd have to ask MU. This discussion started because they (he?) claimed I was trying to marry two things that were supposedly inconsistent (freedom and consequentialism). It has since exploded into what feels at times like a game of philosophical whack-a-mole. Let me try to list some of the things we are disagreeing on, though you'll have to forgive me for missing some:

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear)

I don't know what MU considers the central disagreement here, and would happily address just that if it was clarified.

I expect you'd have to ask MU. This discussion started because they (he?) claimed I was trying to marry two things that were supposedly inconsistent (freedom and consequentialism). — Dan

They certainly have easily perceived inconsistencies. Freedom being a lack of constraint, consequentialism being an ultimate fate of such. A layman's perspective being such is what life and therefore intelligence is (Goldilocks anyone?). Which one can exist without the other? Only one. Though that doesn't necessarily defeat the ultimate truth and relevance of the other. The disagreement appears to be based, or at least of some notable relevance, to this dynamic.

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account) — Dan

"Wrong" has several definitions that can reasonably be sided with. "Incorrect" (per procedure), "immoral" (per subjective zeitgeist, perhaps based on objective damage or similar aspect), or "imperfect" (not quite hitting the bull's eye but with every reasonable attempt to have done so).

Actual-value is tricky. What seems to work immediately and perhaps for 1,000 years may actually be proven to have been a failure in 10,000 years. Surely you account for this.

These are all great and amazing points. Thank you for replying, *ahem*, finally. I will continue with the following bullet points shortly

They certainly have easily perceived inconsistencies. Freedom being a lack of constraint, consequentialism being an ultimate fate of such. A layman's perspective being such is what life and therefore intelligence is (Goldilocks anyone?). Which one can exist without the other? Only one. Though that doesn't necessarily defeat the ultimate truth and relevance of the other. The disagreement appears to be based, or at least of some notable relevance, to this dynamic. — Outlander

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you could try explaining it another way?

As to percieved inconsistencies, there really aren't any. Consequentialism is simply the view that the morality of actions is judged by reference to their consequences. This doesn't at all conflict with either the idea of freedom or the idea that freedom is valuable.

"Wrong" has several definitions that can reasonably be sided with. "Incorrect" (per procedure), "immoral" (per subjective zeitgeist, perhaps based on objective damage or similar aspect), or "imperfect" (not quite hitting the bull's eye but with every reasonable attempt to have done so).

Actual-value is tricky. What seems to work immediately and perhaps for 1,000 years may actually be proven to have been a failure in 10,000 years. Surely you account for this.

These are all great and amazing points. Thank you for replying, *ahem*, finally. I will continue with the following bullet points shortly — Outlander

I agree that actual-value is tricky. I think expected-value is also rather tricky and am not sure which is the better approach really. That's why I keep adding the qualifier, on an actual-value view, though to be fair, what I've said can also apply to expected-value consequentialism depending on how "expected" is fleshed out. All I was pointing out that on an actual-value approach, an action can be wrong, but still worth praising (since praising is a different action that can be evaluated by reference to it's likely consequences etc etc). This is a fairly obvious implication of the view of actual-value consequentialism, and I'm not really sure how it has gone on so long.

"Wrong" in this case meaning morally wrong (definitely not as per subjective zeitgeist, as I'm sure you've noticed I'm a moral objectivist).


When you say "finally," have you posted something here before and not recieved a reply? If so, I can only apologize, I almost certainly didn't see it.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you could try explaining it another way?

As to perceived inconsistencies, there really aren't any. Consequentialism is simply the view that the morality of actions is judged by reference to their consequences. This doesn't at all conflict with either the idea of freedom or the idea that freedom is valuable. — Dan

From an outside perspective. Freedom meaning "sans" restriction. This is not inherently "good." Humanity with "freedom" from an oxygen-rich environment results in a pile of bones. I mean, perhaps that's good for the planet in the long-term freeing it from pollution. But, as human persons, that would be, you know, kinda bad, wouldn't you say?

Allow me ample room to make mistakes as I attempt to become acquainted with this "Consequentialism". As I. and I would attest most if not many would understand, this, to put things in extremes for purpose of understanding, would mean, the person who dedicates their life to human welfare yet say, gets drunk, and accidentally burns down their dwelling in which they stored their life's work before they have yet to actualize such time, effort, and resources into such a goal, lived an "immoral" life. While, on the same hand, the person who spent a lifetime killing, robbing, and let's just say much worse, also got drunk and accidentally gave a slip of paper that contained the access code to his crypto-currency that contained the sum of his ill-gotten goods to one who immediately either gave it to the police or psychically accessed it themself, then donating it to charity, lived and died a "moral" person. Is that correct?

From an outside perspective. Freedom meaning "sans" restriction. This is not inherently "good." Humanity with "freedom" from an oxygen-rich environment results in a pile of bones. I mean, perhaps that's good for the planet in the long-term freeing it from pollution. But, as human persons, that would be, you know, kinda bad, wouldn't you say? — Outlander

I agree that "freedom" doesn't automatically mean good. But, to be fair, I never claimed that it did. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make choices (which I called "freedom" to save time), specifically, their own choices, is morally valuable, which I think you will agree is a much more specific claim.

Allow me ample room to make mistakes as I attempt to become acquainted with this "Consequentialism". As I. and I would attest most if not many would understand, this, to put things in extremes for purpose of understanding, would mean, the person who dedicates their life to human welfare yet say, gets drunk, and accidentally burns down their dwelling in which they stored their life's work before they have yet to actualize such time, effort, and resources into such a goal, lived an "immoral" life. While, on the same hand, the person who spent a lifetime killing, robbing, and let's just say much worse, also got drunk and accidentally gave a slip of paper that contained the access code to his crypto-currency that contained the sum of his ill-gotten goods to one who immediately either gave it to the police or psychically accessed it themself, then donating it to charity, lived and died a "moral" person. Is that correct? — Outlander

I mean, sort of. Consequentialism isn't really about determining whether people are moral so much as actions. Also it's not clear that the person who was trying to do good has actually done anything immoral, rather than failed to do something moral (and this is less clear in the case of the thief). But, broadly speaking, I think you've more-or-less got the right idea. Certainly this intuition pump is close enough to describing consequentialism in order to express a common criticism of consequentialism, which is that it doesn't care about intentions and this seems to run counter to commonly held moral intuitions.

As an aside, and as it relates to the point that I was trying to make to MU, we might still praise the person whose "life was immoral", since we want others to act in a similar way, and blame and even punish the one whose "life was moral" since we don't want others to act in a similar way.

Certainly this intuition pump is close enough to describing consequentialism in order to express a common criticism of consequentialism, which is that it doesn't care about intentions and this seems to run counter to commonly held moral intuitions. — Dan

Right, and that's likely what MU's resistance is fueled by. Understandably enough, yes?

As an aside, and as it relates to the point that I was trying to make to MU, we might still praise the person whose "life was immoral", since we want others to act in a similar way, and blame and even punish the one whose "life was moral" since we don't want others to act in a similar way. — Dan

See this is where things get, understandably, a bit "trippy". Your declaration of someone who hypothetically literally breathes morality and compassion being written off as "immoral" because something outside of his control happened in 2 seconds at the last minute. I mean. It just leaves a bad taste in one's mouth, philosophically speaking. Morally, at least. Surely you understand that. So, the difference or "point of contention" appears to be how you can simply look past that, in your view, likely as a service to a greater truth or logic, while others see such a hang-up as, well, to put it bluntly, a non-starter as far as any sort of validity as far as the subject at hand goes.

Does this make sense to you? If not, surely the otherwise common opposition does, how far off am I and for what reasons?

Right, and that's likely what MU's resistance is fueled by. Understandably enough, yes? — Outlander

I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter.

See this is where things get, understandably, a bit "trippy". Your declaration of someone who hypothetically literally breathes morality and compassion being written off as "immoral" because something outside of his control happened in 2 seconds at the last minute. I mean. It just leaves a bad taste in one's mouth, philosophically speaking. Morally, at least. Surely you understand that. So, the difference or "point of contention" appears to be how you can simply look past that, in your view, likely as a service to a greater truth or logic, while others see such a hang-up as, well, to put it bluntly, a non-starter as far as any sort of validity as far as the subject at hand goes. — Outlander

I wouldn't quite say that I am suggesting you write someone off as immoral, I did use quotation marks there as that was your phrasing. Also, the kind of consequentialism I outlined in the initial primer is a bit more sophisticated in terms of blaming people for things outside of their control. And validity is probably not the right word here as it isn't the reasoning between premises you're taking issue with.

All that being said, I get what you mean and I can certainly see how it runs counter to commonly held moral intuitions. Not considering intentions is, as I mentioned, one of the most common criticisms of consequentialists theories.

But all of that is surely beside the point as to whether consequentialism can consider something to be both wrong and praiseworthy (in the sense that we should praise it). That is fairly obviously the case as praising the thing is an action that can also evaluated by reference to its likely consequences to determine if we should do it.

* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits — Dan

A "habit" is by definition not ultimately restrictive. Now, an "addiction" or otherwise "mental complex" is in fact a debilitating factor. Perhaps I have a bad habit of ogling any attractive woman in the vicinity. That's independent from a ultimate deeply rooted lack of self-control. If one's freedom is "restricted" it is not by a mere "habit" but by a deeper rooted cause. Let's assume this to be true. There's, let's call them "inclinations", that can be realistically minimized to the point of non-existence by willpower (say in the mentioned example) and those that cannot (say a serial killer who hears voices or is impinged by some other truly dramatic action-controlling factor).

So we have to specifically determine if one has a "habit" or a "reasonable disablement" as far as what is expected from the average person.

Furthermore, what is a habit? In the animal kingdom, to be "afraid" or otherwise change one's behavior in the presence of a much larger animal is a natural inclination, present regardless if one is a genius or mentally disabled. Understandably, for biological reasons of survival. Now if we cast all habits or inclinations as "human nature" we inevitably reach a point of rightful discernment. Say you're looking for a place to sleep for the night and you have three options. One is brightly lit with lively and friendly human activity, the other not so much but well off the beaten path the natural seclusion seems to offer reasonable guarantee from anything one wishes to avoid, and the other a rundown hovel with shady characters coming and going. Naturally in the majority of cases one chooses the first or perhaps the second. Is this really a habit or an intrinsic reality of human existence? Sure, one might call the person who chooses the third option a "dullard" and "worthy of whatever he has coming to him". Is one's ultimate preference based on any number of things, perhaps things that would conscript us to at least consider such a way of thinking, a mere "habit" or something far greater?

* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom — Dan

A good metaphor is to imagine two kingdoms or lands or realms or what have you where said hypothetical is the ultimate law of the land or "reality", casting all current aspersions and understanding into oblivion. And from there, see what would happen and why if the two were to ever meet.

Even before that however, one must be reminded of the fact there is a litany of ways to interpret such terms from the get-go. Even before we get to the individual meaning of either.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. Say we take consequentialism as meaning human efforts ultimately matter in a world and reality that seems to place such far beneath any sort of functional status quo. This is indeed the sole monument of "freedom" for those who believe we are otherwise bound to randomness with any such attempt at definition or value literally as sound or constant as the predictability of the tides. You can even reverse the two and find relatable sentiment.

This is I think is the ultimate point of contention simply for the fact there are so many valid views or understandings that even from a passing glance come to mind.

I would, at last preliminarily, say, certain views of how reality ultimate is (consequentialism) remains a world of difference from how reality ultimately can, should be, and at times is as far as the limited time and ability of human observation goes (freedom).

* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means) — Dan

There's a lot to unpack here. Before even attempting to do so, I would have to assert, understanding of anything that intrinsically has to do with some sort of "ultimate reality" is critical by its own definition. I guess to put it low brow, if one doesn't understand or know what time is, one isn't really talking about ethics or anything coherent. It's so relevant it becomes comical or frivolous to point out, like reminding someone "to understand the relationship between circumstantial cause and effect one must know how to dress oneself in the morning." Yeah. No kidding.

* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise — Dan

Obviously this frame of putting the previous spat is without possibility for scrutiny. It resolves to effectiveness. Proficiency or "hitting the mark when asked to consistently" is the dynamic I feel is not being addressed here. There is expertise (perhaps wisdom) and cold, robotic calculation (perhaps knowledge). Perhaps you may find the two inseparable.

* The existence of objective truth — Dan

Well, if it exists. Prove it. 2+2 = 4. Unless I take 1 by violence. Now your 2+2 = 3. (I'm not trying to be funny or difficult, just, I mean, for all reasons of argument, is such a realization any less to the point?)

That's a bit of a poor example. There are natural laws, water has a boiling point of 100 degrees celcius and a freezing point of 0. So what? Sure, it tells me how long to wait before I can make a bowl of rice or what temperate I can expect to preserve future meals from, which are required for me or anyone to not starve. That's great. But what of it? How certain are we are of the things we declare as indisputable and what would it mean if such things were to change? Would we survive?

* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth — Dan

For most, absolutely. Why do anything unless I have to? Is the unfortunate mantra of man. One's "god" is either spiritual or scientific (see above laws that apparently 'govern' reality).

* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear) — Dan

People have ideas and inclinations that are better expressed to the point they find agreement toward. Not all are perfect, but they fit the bill at the time. Brevity means concision, I suppose.

I'm going to avoid quoting except where necessary to avoid excessive length.

Habits: Whatever we might say of people choosing to sleep in different circumstances, they are surely still free to do so. The dangerous option was an option, their inclination not to choose it wasn't a restriction on their freedom. This would be a very strange way to talk about this, right?

Also, as an aside, hearing voices probably isn't terribly restrictive either. The percentage of healthy people who will at some stage experience auditory hallucinations is surprisingly high. Delusions, rather than auditory hallucinations, are probably more of a concern (or at least, they could be, depending on the delusion), but that's really neither here nor there.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. Say we take consequentialism as meaning human efforts ultimately matter in a world and reality that seems to place such far beneath any sort of functional status quo. This is indeed the sole monument of "freedom" for those who believe we are otherwise bound to randomness with any such attempt at definition or value literally as sound or constant as the predictability of the tides. You can even reverse the two and find relatable sentiment.

This is I think is the ultimate point of contention simply for the fact there are so many valid views or understandings that even from a passing glance come to mind.

I would, at last preliminarily, say, certain views of how reality ultimate is (consequentialism) remains a world of difference from how reality ultimately can, should be, and at times is as far as the limited time and ability of human observation goes (freedom). — Outlander

I'm not totally sure I understand what you mean by this. Perhaps you could explain it in another way?

What I will say though is that consequentialism isn't a theory of what reality is. It's a type of normative theory (or perhaps a feature a normative theory can have depending on how you think about it), it is very much about how the world should be.

Time: Well, maybe. I'm not convinced we have a very good understanding of what time is or how it works, but yes I'd say that a basic understanding, like how the future follows the present etc, is certainly very useful.


Experts: No I think wisdom is very different from intelligence and both are different from knowledge. But I think we should all agree that just because someone has turned out to be wrong about something, it doesn't mean they weren't or aren't an expert in that field.

Objective truth: Well, there's a few options here. The first is to consider the alternative, that no truth is objective. What then? Subjective perhaps? If so, wouldn't "truth is subjective" be objectively true? And if not, then I can presumably get away with arguments such as this:

P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective

Actually, I can get away with rather a lot more than that. There's a thing called logical explosion or logical armageddon that occurs when you allow both classic logic and things to be both true and false at the same time where you can prove and disprove everything with logically sound arguments. It's bad, we don't want that. And the truth being intersubjective just shifts the problem to a bigger group but doesn't solve it. There are other reasons to think we should accept objective truth, but this seems the easiest to express in this context.

God: Science isn't a god, but more importantly, gods aren't necessary or even helpful for the existence of objective truth. If we suppose that a God were required to ground objective truth, then that God would need to exist objectively, surely, so we must first presuppose that things can exist, or not exist, objectively, before we can discuss whether such an entity does indeed exist.

Further, whether people care is not the same as whether something is true. The world is as it is, regardless of whether we pay attention.

Further further, I don't think people do only do things because they have to. I think most things people do because they want to (or because they get them something else they want).

Words: I think the point of words is to enable communication. While definitions are important, I think that if we all know what we're talking about, we are generally better off talking about it rather than spending all our time discussing whether we should use different words.

I think at this stage I would be entirely justified in saying "please, stop, for your own sake".
I literally said it is not Dan's problem. — AmadeusD

You stated, and I quote you: "That's not Dan's problem."
So I asked you, quote: "Well then what is Dan's problem?"
Do you have an answer for me?

If you could, perhaps, not entirely change the subject to attempt a further pointless and badly-worded impugning of Dan's work... That would be nice. But, it speaks to exactly what i"m saying - that's not his problem. It's yours. /quote]

It's you Amadeus, who's changing the subject. We were talking about, and this thread is about "Dan's problem". You are attempting to change the subject into "MU\s problem". I know it's The Lounge, and any sort of BS is permitted, but Dan and I are staying on topic, why do you want to butt in and change the subject. It makes no sense for you to act this way.
— AmadeusD

He's being a gentleman even giving you the time of day — AmadeusD

That is blatantly wrong. Dan is refusing to give me the time of day. As you did already, Dan refuses to consider the nature of time, thinking that this is irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Dan wants to make "freedom" a fundamental principle, then refuses to consider what makes freedom possible. If a person makes statements similar to "freedom is valuable" and "we ought to have freedom", then that person needs to be prepared to consider the means by which freedom is enabled. Otherwise it's a case of "talking through one's hat". If you, Dan, or anyone else, fails to see that human actions are a type of action, and all actions require "time", making "time" logically prior to human actions, this would seriously impair your moral philosophy.

That this has gone on months baffles me, as it probably does both of you - but for me, its his patience and your density that's baffling. — AmadeusD

Why should a few months of this baffle you? Dan claims to have already spent the better part of a decade pursuing this "problem". I'm working to demonstrate that the reason why his pursuit appears to go on endlessly is that he has a faulty approach. Let me tell you something AmadeusD. A man who's been on a specific quest for ten years, is not going to be convinced by a couple months of discussion, that his quest has been fruitless. The longer one remains on a mission the harder it is for that person to accept that it is impossible, because the amount of time wasted mounts. A few days wasted... "oops that was a mistake, glad I caught it". A few years wasted.. "after all this time I must be close to a solution by now".

So please, quit with your attempts to twist Dan's problem into being my problem. Clearly, after all these years, it's Dan's "density" which is the point of discussion, and I am the one showing patience in letting him persist with his zealous defense of his "impossible dream".

The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all. — Dan

Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement.

You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place.

The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely. — Dan

Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information.

Your ideas of "objective truth", and "objective right", are obviously misleading you now. You seem to think that since you can bring this into the example, "there is an objective truth as to whether the person is an expert or not", (your imaginary idea that there is such a thing as "being an expert", which is beyond simply being judged to be an expert), that it has some bearing in real life situations. It does not! We look at the information we have about the person and make the judgement. Whether or not the person is an expert is a matter of judgement alone. There is no "...being an expert", nor is there any "they are an expert until...", there is only "being judged to be an expert", and "they are judged as an expert until...".

How do you support your claim of "a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about"? All that the person making the judgement has to go on, is that the one in question acts like they know a lot. You assert "a big difference", because you assume some kind of "objective truth" to the matter, but this is all just imaginary. The "big difference" is in your imagination, because you are imagining an "objective truth" in the matter.

In reality, there is absolutely no difference to the people judging whether one is an expert or not, between "acting like you know a lot", and "actually knowing a lot". This is because the people making the judgment have nothing but the individual's actions to go on. So your claim of "a big difference", is only based in your imaginary "objective truth". Accordingly, you ought to conclude what this demonstration clearly reveals, your idea of "objective truth" is severely misleading you.

Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action. — Dan

Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged. You say "in most circumstances" it would not be wrong, but that's to remove the act from the circumstances and treat it as a type of act. You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action". Therefore, what you state here, that you would "not generalize this to the type of action", is inconsistent with what you actually do in the example which is to generalize.

You generalize to say that the type of action the doctor made (a similar action in different circumstances) is praiseworthy, even though the identified "individual action" is judged as wrong because of the circumstances. The one judgement judges the type of action, "right", while the other judgement judges the individual action, "wrong". The mistake you make, which I pointed out, is that the category of judgement, the principle of predication is "moral value". And, since the individual act is predicated as "wrong", it cannot be predicated as "right" in that same category of moral value, because that would be contradiction. This means that if you adhere to those principles which judge the individual action as "wrong", you must recognize the differences which make it wrong, and not predicable with that property "right". Therefore you need to recognize it as not only a distinct individual act, but also different with respect to that property, "moral value". Therefore the (individual) act which is judged as wrong is not the same as the (individual) act which is judged as praiseworthy. That I tell you is what reveals the problem with your enterprise.

I've seen MU be a bit less than becoming of his intellect in stating Dan has "Wasted 10 years". Perhaps he means such in the truest earnest form of communication. Perhaps he's just frustrated. Perhaps a bit of both? — Outlander

Look at the situation, Outlander. Dan asks in the op, if anyone can "solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on". I replied right after reading the op with "Therefore the 'freedom' perspective and the 'consequentialist' perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible.' So it was very clear to me, right away that Dan was tying to do something which is impossible, and I mean in the truest most earnest form of communication, that Dan has wasted that time.

We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'.

So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? — Outlander

If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear) — Dan

This I would say is quite a good summation. The issue is clearly not that you misunderstand me, it is simply that we have different beliefs. The question might be, why do you adhere so strongly to your beliefs, and I adhere so strongly to my beliefs, yet they are very different. On top of that, we might also add that these beliefs which are so different, concern a very important subject, moral philosophy.

Suppose you and I were both asked to judge a particular philosopher, to say whether that person was a good moral philosopher. I'm sure we would not agree. Since whether or not a person is an "expert" is a similar judgement, why do you think there is such a thing as "being an expert", rather than simply judgements made by people as to whether a person is an expert or not. If you think that there is such a thing as a good moral philosopher, independent of judgements made by people, how do you think we would ever know whether or not a person was this, so we could ensure that our judgements would correspond with this reality.

I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter. — Dan

This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject.

A "habit" is by definition not ultimately restrictive. — Outlander

For reference, the point I made is that a habit restricts one's freedom by inclining one to act without considering other available possibilities. Not looking at information limits the possibilities which are present to the person's mind, therefore restricting the person's freedom to choose (specifically the possibilities not present to the mind). There was some question about what constitutes "available" information. If the person has to seek the information does this qualify as "available"? And in the most simple case, if the person has to search through one's own memory, does this qualify as "available"?

When you consider this problem, of what qualifies as "available" information, the power of habit to restrict our freedom becomes even more evident. Since even searching one's own memory requires a directed "seeking" of information, the issue is not the availability of information, the issue is the inspiration or ambition to seek the information. Habit robs us of this inspiration, or ambition, by inclining us to act directly and immediately without seeking any further information to guide us, which might instill the desire to act in another way.

Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom — Dan

More precisely, the point I make is that valuing freedom is inconsistent with valuing consequentialist moral principles. This ought to be quite obvious, in principle, so I can't understand why it's so difficult for you. Freedom is the capacity to choose and make any action. Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. — Outlander

This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts.

P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective — Dan

All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict.

Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise.

You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made.

Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think I have implied some objective universal standard of expertise. I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented.

I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. No problem on that.

But heres the thing: Someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. In fact, I would go as far as to say that all experts do. These are exactly the people that we all refer to as experts and, I suspect, so do you, and we're not wrong to do so. They are experts, and they misunderstand a part of their field. These things are not mutually exclusive.

Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged — Metaphysician Undercover

I can say exactly that. I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times.

You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action" — Metaphysician Undercover

The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. That's it.

We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'. — Metaphysician Undercover

As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them.

If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions — Metaphysician Undercover

That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist.

This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is nonsense, and you seem to have your tongue on the keyboard again. I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". I have used the same definition of what it means to "understand one's choices" not only for the duration of this discussion, but for years before hand and you will also find it in the linked works mentioned in the initial primer.

Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions.

This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all.

This, I think, is the core of the problem. I make a claim, and you start arguing against some other claim which I've never made.

All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. My position is much simpler and doesn't turn to custard as soon as you think about it for five minutes. I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect.

No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. — Dan

As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.

Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement.

Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made. — Dan

If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it?

By actual-value consequentialist principles we cannot approve the act, because it is judged as wrong. What principles, what value system do you apply when you judge the act as praiseworthy? Whatever principles (value system) you apply, to judge the act as praiseworthy, clearly it is incompatible with actual-value consequentialism, which forced the judgement of wrong.

I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. — Dan

Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind.

I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented. — Dan

And here, by "intersubective" you mean agreement amongst a number of individuals don't you? So if there is such a "standard" which you refer to, it would be a rule of criteria by which we would judge whether a person is an expert. This way, if we all followed that specific rule, there would be significant agreement about whether a person is an expert or not. I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity".

Now, what do you think is the "standard" for expertise? Is it not, as I suggested earlier, the highest possible level of understanding? To me, this means that the person can carry out actions within one's field of expertise, for an extended period of time, without showing any mistakes. I still allow the possibility of mistake at some time, but such a mistake would not be conducive to the judgement of "expert", and it would carry with it the need to reevaluate an earlier judgement of "expert".

Of course, we really don't have any such "standard". We don't say that the person must be mistake free for a year, or six months or anything like that. This is because there is a whole lot of other factors which we take into account, the person's education, the type of mistake, degree of severity, and all of this even varies significantly from one area of expertise to another.

Therefore, it ought to be very clear to you, that there is no such thing as "objective expertise". Such objectivity requires "a standard" and clearly in the case of "expertise" we have no such standard. This is why you and I have no agreement about what constitutes an "expert". Just like you say, I want way too much from the word "understand", you also think that I want way too much from the word "expert". On the other hand, I accuse you of a "sloppy" use of words.

You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy.

I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times. — Dan

I know you can "say" this, you do a lot of that. You assert many things which I show to you to be incoherent, through logical demonstration. That is known as justification. I support my claim that you are incoherent with justification. You simply assert, 'you are wrong, and I am right', and when I ask you to justify, you either continue with your assertions or attempt to justify your position through a sloppy use of words which amounts to equivocation.

So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation.

The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. — Dan

You need to support this claim. The actual, individual act, was judged as "wrong" because it led to bad consequences. It is impossible that the very same act would "likely lead to good consequences" because by the law of identity, the same act is the act itself, and that act has those consequences which are judged as bad.

If the "actual-value consequentialist" removes "the act" from the circumstances, through abstraction, then that person is no longer talking about "the same act", one is making a generalization, and talking about a type of act. And if the person proceeds to argue that this "type of act" would likely have good consequences, that would produce the problems exposed by Hume, the problem of induction, and the is/ought gap.

As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them. — Dan

I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character.

That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist. — Dan

What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.

Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism.

The problem is that the means (method of evaluating) is not consistent with the end (the stated "measure" of value). In other words the means will not produce the end. Justification of this claim is as follows. The method of measurement evaluates (measures) according to the moral restrictions of the principles of consequentialism. "Freedom" as the measure of value is a lack of restriction. Therefore the stated "method" is not a means to the end at all, being inconsistent with the stated end. The proposed method measures value relative to specific restrictions, while the stated "measure", "freedom" is a lack of restrictions.

Therefore the proposed "method" must be apprehended as a distinct end, it is not conducive to the stated end, therefore it is distinct in its assignment of value. This means that you have two distinct ends, two measures of value, therefore two evaluation systems, one which has "freedom" as the measure of value, and the other has "consequentialism" as the measure of value.

I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". — Dan

No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean.

I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions. — Dan

Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice".

This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all. — Dan

Well then what is the "measure of value"? You state above, "freedom is the measure of value". This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices".

I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. — Dan

I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments.

I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect. — Dan

I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you?

As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.

Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise.

If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend.

If it helps you conceptualize this, it might be easier to imagine that the act consequentialist could just lie about the moral status of the action when they praise it (they don't need to actually lie, but they certainly could).

Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not sure the judgement of expertise is subjective, it might well be intersubjective or objective but invented etc, but sure, I think I am probably fine with accepting that way of talking about expertise.

I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter.

You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. I completely agree that rigorous definitions of key terms and concepts is very important for moral philosophy, or indeed any philosophy, since we only have words to communicate our ideas to others. However, I think you often want to pick over terms that have very little to do with the point I'm making and/or take issue because I'm not using words the way you want them used, despite me giving a clear and rigorous definition of how I am using them.

So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not saying similar actions would be praiseworthy, I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. You are, one again, attacking points I haven't made, rather than the one I have.

I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not logically impossible. These things are not inconsistent in any way. You are just wrong. I understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation.

What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.

Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have gotten a couple of things wrong here. First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. But, assuming that was just imprecise use of language, the other issue here is that you are treating consequentialism as a means to the end of freedom, and that's all wrong. Consequentialism is a way of evaluating the morality of actions, specifically by their consequences. The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. If my theory were not consequentialist but instead deontological, then it would presumably look a lot like a classic deontological theory of rights, where we must not violate someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them no matter what. Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake.

Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false.

No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean. — Metaphysician Undercover

I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. Likewise, I have tried to explain what I mean by "the action is wrong and also praiseworthy (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective)" many times, which should be very easy, because I mean exactly what I said. But you keep assuming I mean other, bizarre things, and then claim I'm flip-flopping when I say I don't mean them. But I never said or meant them in the first place. You grabbing the wrong end of the stick and then getting annoyed that the stick and then claiming that I am offering you lots of different sticks. In fact, it is the same stick every time, but you keep finding a way to grab a new and incorrect part of it (which is very strange as the stick I offered didn't have that many ends in the first place)

Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you want to use "freedom" in a very general sense. I have used the word "freedom" specifically to refer to the ability of persons to understand and make choices, and then further specified that it is only the ability of person to understand and make their own choices that we ought to use as a measure of moral value.

This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices". — Metaphysician Undercover

It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value".

Also, I don't exclude mental freedom at all. Many of the most important freedoms are ultimately mental ones. I'm not sure which stick you grabbed there, but I'm certain you got the wrong end of it.

I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here.

I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. Those judgements can be right or wrong in some way that I will happily agree is not objective in the sense we have been discussing. True or false are characteristics of propositions, theories, etc. We make judgements about them, which are either correct or not in a way which is, sometimes, objective. I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town.

Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise. — Dan

OK, you and I have different ideas about what constitutes "expertise". That's not surprising.

No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter. — Dan

So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert.

I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. — Dan

You give "several" definitions for the same word, or phrase. You gave at least two for "their own choice", a choice concerning one's own mind body and property, and, a choice which does not restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.

Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion.

I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. — Dan

Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation.

Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend. — Dan

I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. To me, doing this would only produce the conclusion that your judgement of "wrong" is faulty. Well, I might agree then, "the best consequences" are denial of "actual value" moral principles. Is that what "the best consequences" are in this case, recognition that the principles by which you judged the praiseworthy act as wrong, are faulty principles?

I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. — Dan

As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts.

This is like your judgement of "expertise", but inverted. We can praise a person as "an expert", and you say that even when the so-called expert makes mistakes, we continue to praise the person as "an expert". What we do, is remove the person from the context of those mistakes. We do not praise the person for the mistakes.

Now, in the inverted sense, we have the mistaken act itself, as wrong, incorrect. You want to praise the act itself, which has already been judged as mistaken. In your previous explanation, you removed the act from its context, to say that the act in "most circumstances" would not be wrong. This would put the blame on the circumstances, for the mistake, not on the person. But then it is not a case of saying "THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF" is praiseworthy, it is a case of saying that the circumstances were wrong, and the act itself was actually correct, therefore praiseworthy.

So, the "actual value" principle by which you judge the act as wrong is faulty because it puts the blame on the acter, saying that the act (as property of the acter) was "wrong", when in reality the mistake was caused by the circumstances, not the choices of the acter. It wrongfully blames the acter with a "wrong" act, and you recognize that this judgement of "wrong act" is wrong (you recognize the actual value judgement as faulty), therefore you proceed to praise the acter, knowing that the act was not really wrong, the mistake is properly attributable to the "accidents" of the circumstances, not the act itself.

Therefore, in the inverted context, the context of the judgement of "expertise", the person is judged as an expert, and praised as an expert. Yet, the person demonstrates "misunderstanding" by making a mistake. In order that we maintain the judgement of "expert" we attribute the mistakes to the circumstances, not to the field of expertise. The expert continues to display an impeccable understanding of one's area of expertise, yet fails in understanding specific circumstances, "accidentals", and this produces mistakes. The mistakes cannot be judged as "wrong acts" of the acter, because that would negate the praiseworthiness of the the person called an expert, so the mistakes are attributed to a misunderstanding of the circumstances, and "circumstances", or "accidentals" are something external to, not part of, the area of expertise.

It is not logically impossible. — Dan

OK, I grant to you, that by strict deductive logic, it is not "logically impossible". This is due to the is/ought gap. The is/ought separation makes it impossible to demonstrate logically that it is incoherent to say that we "ought to praise an act which is wrong". This is because judgements of "ought", and judgements of "is" are categorically distinct, and no logic can bridge that gap. Instead, we bridge the gap with rules of moral philosophy, ethics. These rules are definitional, like axioms of mathematics.

So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles.

What i say now, is that your system may not be "logically impossible", but since it negates and denies the conventions of moral philosophy, we cannot call what you are proposing "moral philosophy". What is "logically impossible" is for your proposed system to be called "moral philosophy". That what you propose is incompatible with conventional moral philosophy, and that you present it as "moral philosophy" is what produces incoherency, and this makes your enterprise "logically impossible". It is logically impossible that what you present is moral philosophy. It's like for example, if someone proposed new axioms which are completely inconsistent with accepted axioms of mathematics, and presented them as "mathematics". It would be logically impossible that what the person presented is mathematics. Therefore, to avoid the judgement of "logically impossible" you need to quit representing what you are doing as moral philosophy.

II understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation. — Dan

You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood.

First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. — Dan

You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy.

Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake. — Dan

This furthers the evidence that what you propose is not "moral philosophy". You have separated "value" from "what is desired", and assume some form of consequentialist valuation. However, consequentialist principles are still based in the determination of a "good" outcome. And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not?

You posit "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the ground. But this becomes circular when the definition becomes self-referential. When are the consequences judged as "good"? When that ability is enabled. But why is this principle the measurement of "good". I suggest to you, that it is because it is consistent with the "type of freedom" which you personally desire. Now your moral philosophy is grounded in desire, what you desire, and as a oral philosophy it becomes logically incoherent.

With this proposition, "the ability to make their own choices is the measure of 'good' which you desire", I bring your proposal into the system of conventional moral philosophy to judge your desire as incompatible with moral philosophy. You claim to overrule my subjective judgement with an appeal to "objectivity". You insist that your system is not grounded in what you personally desire, it is grounded in an objective understanding of "freedom". But that's false, you define "freedom" as you please.

Now you propose a so-called "moral philosophy" which does not ground "value" in something fundamentally subjective, what is desired, but you ground it in something you propose as objective, "freedom". And we're back to the start, this is not "moral philosophy" at all.

The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. — Dan

The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all.

Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan

Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them".

Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false. — Dan

That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good.

I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. — Dan

I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:

So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. — Dan

I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect.

This was the significant sticking point between us, which made agreement on what it means "to understand one's choice" impossible. I wanted this to mean applying one's rationality prior to making the choice, and put the possibilities to be selected from into the context of what is desired by the person, but you want simply "able to apply their rationality to the choice", which signifies the ability to rationalize the choice after the fact.

Actually, I don't think you even understand this difference, and the failure to agree, between us, because you deny that the nature of time is important.

It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value". — Dan

Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means.

I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here. — Dan

OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong.

No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. — Dan

This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate.

I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town. — Dan

As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good.

So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I didn't say that at all. For example, there is such a things as the rules of chess, though they were invented.

The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.

Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No I didn't. I used the same definition throughout, and you assumed extra definitions when they weren't given. When it comes to one's own choices, they are those regarding that is done with one's own mind, body, and property, but this is more of an outcome of the assumption that there are choices which belong to someone, rather than a definition. I'd suggest reading some of the initial material for further discussion of this. I also didn't define them as those that don't restrict other people's choices. That was you assuming, rather than me stating. I also gave a single definition of what it means to "understand" one's choice, these other definitions were not made by me, but incorrectly read into what I said by you.

Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

We haven't remotely stayed within the same subject here though. Since there are often five disagreements about different topics covering different fields, words need to be used in different ways.

I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already explained how it could lead to the best consequences: by promoting people acting in similar ways in situations that appear similar to them as the wrong action did to the actor in question but which are in fact different and will lead to good consequences rather than bad ones.

As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I think I see the assumption that is leading to confusion. You are assuming that moral principles must praise good, correct acts. That just isn't so. If praising a bad, incorrect act will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism recommends we do.

So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Praising a wrong act might well, such as in this case, be encouraging good acts. The world might be such that the best way to encourage good actions in future is to praise a bad action that has already occurred.

You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, that is fairly true of "freedom," as I am using it in a fairly revisionist way as a shorthand for "the ability of persons to understand and make choices", mostly because the latter is a mouthful. This is not the case for "system of evaluation."

You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it often assumed that what people value has moral value, certainly by the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists, but this is not a required assumption, and not one that I think we ought to make.

And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, it just isn't. It's often assumed that what we value is moral valuably, but I am not making that assumption as a) I don't think we do all necessarily want the same thing, b) even if we, as humans did, that is no reason to think that all persons do, and c) even if they do, as a matter of fact, that would merely be a contingent fact about them, rather than a necessary one. Instead, I would say that I begin with simpler assumptions, which I detailed in the initial primer, and then from there try to determine what is the best candidate for moral value.

The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, nope. Moral philosophy, as I understand it, is about how we ought to live our lives, where ought is understood in a universal, objective sense. To borrow a concept from Kant, think in terms of the categorical imperative, what we ought to do regardless of our desires (Kant is making some other assumptions I also don't make, such as morality being about rationality, but this concept is hopefully helpful in terms of expressing the general character of what I'm aiming at here).

Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them". — Metaphysician Undercover

First, you haven't demonstrated any such thing. Second, I am not presenting the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them as desired by people. I am presenting it as valuable whether or not it is desired.

That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, consequentialism isn't really a "means to an end". Also, I think you are taking consequentialism to include a lot more than it does. A consequentialist moral theory is one that evaluates the morality actions by reference to their consequences. That's it.

I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:
So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient.
— Dan
I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect. — Metaphysician Undercover

There aren't two definitions there. The second one is a clarification as you seem to have thought that to be able to apply one's rationality to it is to actually do so, and those are not the same thing. Also, being able to apply one's rationality to a choice is definitely not the same as giving reasons in retrospect, it is being able to recognize and respond to reasons for making that choice. And, in case it wasn't clear, the time you need to understand the choice such that you are able to apply your rationality to it is the time you are making it, not some time after the fact. This is a perfect example of me defining something consistently and you reading some bizarre new definition into what I have said.

Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't. Any percieved incoherence is likely the result of you reading additional claims I haven't made into what I have said, or else misunderstanding either what I'm saying or the fundamental concepts needed to discuss these points.

OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what I said. Since the view that truth is subjective allows for contradictory propostions to both (or all) be true, I demonstrated how this leads to problems using an argument that included contradictory premises to demonstrate why this position is not acceptable.

This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate. — Metaphysician Undercover

To judge someone as an expert indeed judges someone as having a quality, but "an expert" is a person who has that quality.

As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the only option for any sensible discussion of anything worthy of serious consideration.

I've already explained how it could lead to the best consequences: by promoting people acting in similar ways in situations that appear similar to them as the wrong action did to the actor in question but which are in fact different and will lead to good consequences rather than bad ones. — Dan

Obviously then, you are not praising the "same act" which was judged as wrong, you are praising, and promoting, what you clearly describe as "similar" acts.

That just isn't so. If praising a bad, incorrect act will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism recommends we do. — Dan

I'm still waiting for a logical explanation of how you believe that praising a bad, incorrect, act could lead to the best consequences. You've switched from your equivocation of "the same" to acknowledge that you are praising and promoting "similar acts". But now there is no principle whereby you would praise the bad act itself, you only praise and promote similar acts. The difference however, is that one is bad, and the others good. I suggest to you, that since bad and good are opposing predications, they aren't really "similar" at all, you just illogically claim this for argument sake.

Is it often assumed that what people value has moral value, certainly by the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists, but this is not a required assumption, and not one that I think we ought to make. — Dan

OK, I'll see if I can follow you with this assumption. I would say that moral value is based in "what people value". We proceed logically from determinations about what people value, to make conclusions about moral value.

You think that is not something we ought to do, you think it's a bad approach.. So now I want you to justify this claim that it is a bad approach.

Again, it just isn't. It's often assumed that what we value is moral valuably, but I am not making that assumption as a) I don't think we do all necessarily want the same thing, b) even if we, as humans did, that is no reason to think that all persons do, and c) even if they do, as a matter of fact, that would merely be a contingent fact about them, rather than a necessary one. Instead, I would say that I begin with simpler assumptions, which I detailed in the initial primer, and then from there try to determine what is the best candidate for moral value. — Dan

None of this justifies your claim.

a0 It is not necessary that we all want the same thing, to base moral value in what people value. In fact, it is in wanting different (though many are similar) things rather than the same thing which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If we all valued the same thing we would just fight over it, and we couldn't get anywhere with moral values. But since we may value different things, we can structure moral values in a way which allows us all to have what we need.

b) This is Irrelevant, because "moral value", as derived from what people value, does not assume that we all value the same thing. In fact, the opposite is the case.

c) The fact of the matter is as you say, when people value "the same thing", this is only contingently true, not a necessity. Because of this we can base moral principles in a system which allows people to value different things, and each have the different things that they value, without fighting over the same thing. So it actually is this "contingent fact" about "what people value", that they do not necessarily all value the same thing, which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If it was a necessary fact that we all valued the very same thing, we'd all fight over it and we could have no moral system based in what people value. Since what people value is contingent, we can all value different things and not fight over the same thing.

So your claim is not justified by your statements, it simply shows a lack of understanding of what it means to base moral value in what people value.

Again, nope. Moral philosophy, as I understand it, is about how we ought to live our lives, where ought is understood in a universal, objective sense. — Dan

Wow, you really do have a lack of understanding of moral philosophy. Do you really believe that moral philosophy dictates that we ought to all live our lives in the same way, according to some "universal, objective" sense of "ought". This is exactly the opposite of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is designed to allow us maximum freedom, for each person to seek after their own goals, in a way which doesn't interfere with others. We might employ universal principles, like love thy neighbour, but these are not employed in an objective sense, they are employed as a tool, the means toward allowing people to live their lives in the way they want, seeking the goals they want to seek, while allowing others the same capacity.

First, you haven't demonstrated any such thing. Second, I am not presenting the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them as desired by people. I am presenting it as valuable whether or not it is desired. — Dan

But you need to ground "value". By common definition "valuable" is defined as what is desirable, therefore value is grounded in what is desired. When you deny this relation, this grounding of "value" , you need to replace it with something else, otherwise you just make an arbitrary assertion, "X is valuable" without any reason as to why anyone might value it.

So, if "the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them" does not have value because it is desirable, then what makes it valuable. If you cannot say what makes it valuable then it's just an arbitrary random assertion. And, arbitrary random assertions do not produce moral philosophy.

Again, consequentialism isn't really a "means to an end". — Dan

You stated that consequentialism is the method. As method, it is the means.

That is not what I said. Since the view that truth is subjective allows for contradictory propostions to both (or all) be true, I demonstrated how this leads to problems using an argument that included contradictory premises to demonstrate why this position is not acceptable. — Dan

The view that truth is subjective does not allow that P1 and P2 are both true, as I explained. If you believe P1, therefore P1 is true by the subjective perspective, then P2 must be false. A person who thinks that truth is subjective cannot also think that truth is objective. And if you start with P2, "I think truth is objective", you cannot truthfully state P1, truth is subjective. No matter how you look at it, from the "truth is subjective" perspective you have sated two contradictory premises. It is only from the perspective of "truth is objective" that the two contradictory premises appear to be coherent, and that demonstrates the faultiness of that perspective. It makes two contradictory premises appear to make a coherent argument.

Obviously then, you are not praising the "same act" which was judged as wrong, you are praising, and promoting, what you clearly describe as "similar" acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the wrong action is being praised in order to promote the right ones.

I'm still waiting for a logical explanation of how you believe that praising a bad, incorrect, act could lead to the best consequences. You've switched from your equivocation of "the same" to acknowledge that you are praising and promoting "similar acts". But now there is no principle whereby you would praise the bad act itself, you only praise and promote similar acts. The difference however, is that one is bad, and the others good. I suggest to you, that since bad and good are opposing predications, they aren't really "similar" at all, you just illogically claim this for argument sake. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not equvocated so much as clarified since you seemed to be stuck on the term "same act". I have absolutely given you an example of this that used neither of these terms in the case of "proscribing drug X to a patient who has a specific medical history, set of symptoms, etc". In that case, praising the wrong action (from the perspective of actual-value consequentialism) of proscribing drug X to that patient is done because you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X.

None of this justifies your claim.

a0 It is not necessary that we all want the same thing, to base moral value in what people value. In fact, it is in wanting different (though many are similar) things rather than the same thing which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If we all valued the same thing we would just fight over it, and we couldn't get anywhere with moral values. But since we may value different things, we can structure moral values in a way which allows us all to have what we need.

b) This is Irrelevant, because "moral value", as derived from what people value, does not assume that we all value the same thing. In fact, the opposite is the case.

c) The fact of the matter is as you say, when people value "the same thing", this is only contingently true, not a necessity. Because of this we can base moral principles in a system which allows people to value different things, and each have the different things that they value, without fighting over the same thing. So it actually is this "contingent fact" about "what people value", that they do not necessarily all value the same thing, which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If it was a necessary fact that we all valued the very same thing, we'd all fight over it and we could have no moral system based in what people value. Since what people value is contingent, we can all value different things and not fight over the same thing.

So your claim is not justified by your statements, it simply shows a lack of understanding of what it means to base moral value in what people value. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there may be a clash of underlying assumptions here. I am assuming that things that any moral facts that exist are objectively true, in fact I would go as far as to say necessary truths. It seems as though you are treating moral values as something we invent? Is that fair to say? I think this might be the source of this disagreement.

Wow, you really do have a lack of understanding of moral philosophy. Do you really believe that moral philosophy dictates that we ought to all live our lives in the same way, according to some "universal, objective" sense of "ought". This is exactly the opposite of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is designed to allow us maximum freedom, for each person to seek after their own goals, in a way which doesn't interfere with others. We might employ universal principles, like love thy neighbour, but these are not employed in an objective sense, they are employed as a tool, the means toward allowing people to live their lives in the way they want, seeking the goals they want to seek, while allowing others the same capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm struggling with this one, because a lot of what you've said is dead wrong, down to the bones wrong. But, on the other hand, I would agree that moral philosophy should allow us maximum freedom (over our own choices) in a way which doesn't interfere with others' (possessive apostrophe added as I obviously mean others' freedom over their own choices). Let me say a few simple things then, rather than getting bogged down.

Having to live our lives "the same way" is not the same as all being subject to the same categorical imperative(s).

When I discuss "morality" I am referring to objective, universal, indeed necessary, morality. Those truths, if indeed they exist, are the ones I am after. I think that is what people say when they say "morality." If it isn't, then so much the worse for them, and I will accept the asterisk next to the word and continue on regardless, as those are the kind of moral truths that are worth pursuing.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that.

But you need to ground "value". By common definition "valuable" is defined as what is desirable, therefore value is grounded in what is desired. When you deny this relation, this grounding of "value" , you need to replace it with something else, otherwise you just make an arbitrary assertion, "X is valuable" without any reason as to why anyone might value it.

So, if "the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them" does not have value because it is desirable, then what makes it valuable. If you cannot say what makes it valuable then it's just an arbitrary random assertion. And, arbitrary random assertions do not produce moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say instead that the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them is the best candidate we have for moral value (for all the reasons mentioned in my primer and the referenced works). So, assuming anything has moral value, we should assume it is this. Abductive reasoning, not deductive.

You stated that consequentialism is the method. As method, it is the means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. It is a method of evalutating actions, but it is a feature a theory can have, it isn't a theory by itself.

The view that truth is subjective does not allow that P1 and P2 are both true, as I explained. If you believe P1, therefore P1 is true by the subjective perspective, then P2 must be false. A person who thinks that truth is subjective cannot also think that truth is objective. And if you start with P2, "I think truth is objective", you cannot truthfully state P1, truth is subjective. No matter how you look at it, from the "truth is subjective" perspective you have sated two contradictory premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that I don't think truth is subjective, but presumably you think I am wrong? Presumably you could state P1, and then state P2 (as Dan thinks etc etc), and thus end up with the conclusion that truth isn't subjective.

It is only from the perspective of "truth is objective" that the two contradictory premises appear to be coherent, and that demonstrates the faultiness of that perspective. It makes two contradictory premises appear to make a coherent argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know where you've gotten this from or why you think this, but it's not correct. It is very much your position which allows for contradictory premises since it allows the same proposition to be both true and untrue, especially when I start having beliefs about your beliefs etc.

No, the wrong action is being praised in order to promote the right ones. — Dan

To justify this would require demonstrating a causal relation between the proposed cause, praising the wrong, and the effect, future right ones.

I have not equvocated so much as clarified since you seemed to be stuck on the term "same act". I have absolutely given you an example of this that used neither of these terms in the case of "proscribing drug X to a patient who has a specific medical history, set of symptoms, etc". In that case, praising the wrong action (from the perspective of actual-value consequentialism) of proscribing drug X to that patient is done because you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X. — Dan

In the example, administering drug X caused the death of the patient, that's why it was judged as wrong. If you praise administering drugs which cause death to patients, how do you think that this promotes future right acts.

As I've been trying to tell you, without analyzing the act, and separating the right from the wrong, you cannot conclude that promoting the act will have the best consequences. This is because separating the actions of the acter, which you wish to praise, from the particular circumstances, which are responsible for the judgement of wrong, will have better consequences than simply praising the act which was wrong. The consequences will be better because analysis will enable the students to better "understand" the role of circumstances in relation to the consequences of their actions.

So, " you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X." But this is clearly not the best approach. We want doctors to do more than just consider "the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc,", we want doctors to also be aware of unique and peculiar circumstances. "Etc." here might indicate other situations in which the patient would die. This is a special sort of keenness which is sometimes associated with intuition, but it can be identified and cultivated by educators. It is a heightened sense of awareness of the risks and dangers in a given situation, and the capacity to rapidly assess and judge the potential impact of the circumstances.

This capacity separates someone with excellent capacities (expert), from someone who is merely good at what they do. If we want "the best consequences" we need to promote such excellence, rather than your average "goodness", and this means having the highest understanding of how the peculiarities and uniqueness of each particular situation may have an effect on the consequences. This is known as "good intuition", and excellence requires not only good education, but also good intuition. And that is why we do not judge "expertise" solely on a person's theoretical education, but also on one's practise, because how an individual applies one's theory to the vast variety of situations which a person finds oneself in, is what really determines how "good" the person is.

I think there may be a clash of underlying assumptions here. I am assuming that things that any moral facts that exist are objectively true, in fact I would go as far as to say necessary truths. It seems as though you are treating moral values as something we invent? Is that fair to say? I think this might be the source of this disagreement. — Dan

You are missing the point, let me try again.

If we name any specific thing, as that which a person desires, this would be as you say, a contingent truth, not a necessary truth. This is due to the nature of the human being, and free will. We have desires, and particular things are sometimes desired, but no particular thing desired, is necessarily desired, and this constitutes our freedom of choice. If certain things appeared to us as "necessary" in any absolute sense. we would have no freedom of choice, because of the necessity of those particular things.

Because of this, there is no "objective truth" to "what a person desires". If there was objective truth to "what a person desires", this would implicitly negate freedom of choice, by contradiction and incompatibility. So, moral philosophy takes this as a fundamental principle, not necessarily an "objective truth", though some may say that God supports this as an objective truth. I take it as an axiom, a self-evident principle, since it is evident that we have free will, it is a necessary conclusion that nothing desired is desired as necessary.

What I was telling you, is that this principle provides the basis for moral philosophy, because it allows for the reality of differences between us. So for example, we do not need to fight over the same thing. It is not necessary that we each have the very same thing, we can each have something similar. Furthermore, by cultivating the differences between us, we have different people suitable for different positions, different jobs, etc..

So, your idea " any moral facts that exist are objectively true" is actually counter productive to moral philosophy. "Moral facts" are statements about human subjectivity, what we value, and desire. And, it is essential to recognize and promote the "moral fact" that we may value and desire different things. This is necessary to avoid fighting over the same thing. Further, allowing for these differences allows us to cooperate toward common goals or ends, by each person playing a different role.

The difficult part to understand, and accept, is that "moral facts" themselves cannot be objectively true. This is what I've been trying to tell you concerning the nature of a predication, as a judgement. Judgements are made by subjects, and as such they are guided by one's desires and intentions, so they are inherently subjective. If we assume facts which are "objectively true" these fall outside the realm of human judgement, therefore outside the realm of "moral facts", which consists of human judgements. Then the only time they can become relevant is if we attempt to determine what these divine judgements might look like, but that is a completely different subject, not moral philosophy, but ontology or metaphysics. Plato outlined that separation in The Euthyphro.

I'm struggling with this one, because a lot of what you've said is dead wrong, down to the bones wrong. — Dan

That's consistent with your usual response. You insist that I am "dead wrong", but you offer nothing to back that up. You clearly have a misunderstanding of "moral philosophy", believing that it consists of some universal, objective statements about "the thing we all desire" when I've explained how this is dead wrong. Moral philosophy must be based in assumptions that we desire different things.

But, on the other hand, I would agree that moral philosophy should allow us maximum freedom (over our own choices) in a way which doesn't interfere with others' (possessive apostrophe added as I obviously mean others' freedom over their own choices). — Dan

So you really do share ideas with traditional moral philosophy. That is why I still think it is worthwhile discussing these things with you. We don't throw out the baby with the bath water. Your idea to maximize freedom is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. you just do not seem to have the same understanding of "freedom", and so you have a different approach.

Having to live our lives "the same way" is not the same as all being subject to the same categorical imperative(s).

When I discuss "morality" I am referring to objective, universal, indeed necessary, morality. Those truths, if indeed they exist, are the ones I am after. I think that is what people say when they say "morality." If it isn't, then so much the worse for them, and I will accept the asterisk next to the word and continue on regardless, as those are the kind of moral truths that are worth pursuing.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that. — Dan

I think you misunderstand Kant's concept of categorical imperative. Notice, there is not one universal "imperative", but a better interpretation would reveal a different imperative for each different situation. That renders Kant's idea as useless.

Moral philosophy is intended to help guide us through the difficulties of the uniqueness of situations, where universal objective principles do not well apply. So if you seek such universal, objective principles, as a basis for moral philosophy, you are proceeding in the wrong direction. What you ought to look at is how such universal principles fail us in the uniqueness of particular circumstances. That's what moral philosophy is all about, guiding us in dealing with the unique and peculiar circumstances which we find ourselves in every day. I think that is the lesson of the doctor example. The doctor follows "the universal rule" but still ends up making what could be judged as "the wrong choice". Moral philosophy guides us to hone our intuitions enabling us to rapidly assess the peculiarities of the circumstances, and how these peculiarities may effect any attempts to apply universal rules.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that. — Dan

That's right, there is absolutely no place for objectivism in moral philosophy, which deals with the decision making of subjects. The subject of moral philosophy is the decisions of the subject, so objectivity is irrelevant. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear on moral philosophy assume a compromised (false) sense of objectivity, often called intersubjectivity, which is nothing more than convention, agreement between subjects. Objectivism is relegated to a place outside moral philosophy, i.e. ontology or metaphysics. From there it can bear on epistemology, and even moral philosophy, but only in the way that it affects an individual subject's attitude toward these fields.

I would say instead that the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them is the best candidate we have for moral value (for all the reasons mentioned in my primer and the referenced works). So, assuming anything has moral value, we should assume it is this. Abductive reasoning, not deductive. — Dan

But you do not say why freedom of persons over their choices has "value". Because of this, it is just an arbitrary assertion. You assert something like "the ability to make one's own choice freely is the most valuable thing". But someone could say "the ability to eat is the most valuable thing", or "the ability to breathe", "the ability to move", or "the ability to see", or "hear", etc.. Unless you support your claim with reasons, it is just arbitrary like all these others, and many more.

To support or justify your position you need a definition of "value" which is consistent with your claim. The common definition associates "value" with what is desirable, but this does not work for you. And when we associate "value" with freedom in a more general sense, it is incompatible with general universal "objective" moral principles. So you need to give up one or the other. Either give up associating "value" with freedom. or give up associating "value" with objective moral principles, because the two produce incompatible definitions of "value". What I have proposed is to associate value with freedom, but then moral principles are taken as subjective.

I agree that I don't think truth is subjective, but presumably you think I am wrong? Presumably you could state P1, and then state P2 (as Dan thinks etc etc), and thus end up with the conclusion that truth isn't subjective. — Dan

No, it doesn't work that way. If I state P1 as "I think truth is subjective", and P2 as "Dan thinks truth is objective", then it is recognized as the beliefs of two different subjects. How do you get from this to "truth isn't subjective"? That would require the same sort of misunderstanding of predication which you demonstrated with "that expert is a person". See, "objective truth" is predicated to what "Dan thinks". It is not stated as "there is objective truth and Dan believes this", it is stated as Dan's belief, so it is only true if truth is subjective. Therefore we cannot conclude that truth is not subjective, because without the further premise "truth is subjective" none of the premises can be taken as truth. And with that premise, it just means that Dan's belief is inconsistent with that premise (i.e. wrong if we accept that premise).

To justify this would require demonstrating a causal relation between the proposed cause, praising the wrong, and the effect, future right ones. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I gave you an example of this in this hypothetical scenario. In real life, we would praise the wrong action when we had good reason to think this would lead to good consequences.

In the example, administering drug X caused the death of the patient, that's why it was judged as wrong. If you praise administering drugs which cause death to patients, how do you think that this promotes future right acts.

As I've been trying to tell you, without analyzing the act, and separating the right from the wrong, you cannot conclude that promoting the act will have the best consequences. This is because separating the actions of the acter, which you wish to praise, from the particular circumstances, which are responsible for the judgement of wrong, will have better consequences than simply praising the act which was wrong. The consequences will be better because analysis will enable the students to better "understand" the role of circumstances in relation to the consequences of their actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case, the drug caused the death of the patient due to unusual circumstances that would be irresponsible to check for in most cases where the patient is presenting with those symptoms/has that medical history/etc due to needing to act quickly or risk the patient's death. Assuming that this specific scenario has been analyzed and concluded that it is unlikely to come up again, or is likely to come up so rarely that checking for it will cost more lives than it saves, then we might well praise the wrong action in the hopes that doctors in the future will also proscribe drug X to patients presenting with the same symptoms/medical history/etc.

So, " you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X." But this is clearly not the best approach. We want doctors to do more than just consider "the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc,", we want doctors to also be aware of unique and peculiar circumstances. "Etc." here might indicate other situations in which the patient would die. This is a special sort of keenness which is sometimes associated with intuition, but it can be identified and cultivated by educators. It is a heightened sense of awareness of the risks and dangers in a given situation, and the capacity to rapidly assess and judge the potential impact of the circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, in this case we don't want doctors to be doing that because not proscribing drug X will kill more people than it saves.

Intuition, of the reliable kind that might present in this kind of context, is more about unconsciously noticing circumstances that your experience and training have prepared you to notice. Eg, a firefighter "just knowing" that a building is about to collapse, because they have unconsciously noticed signs that correspond to things they have seen in buildings on the verge of collapse in the past. In this case, no such signs are present in the patients who will die from drug X.

Because of this, there is no "objective truth" to "what a person desires". If there was objective truth to "what a person desires", this would implicitly negate freedom of choice, by contradiction and incompatibility. So, moral philosophy takes this as a fundamental principle, not necessarily an "objective truth", though some may say that God supports this as an objective truth. I take it as an axiom, a self-evident principle, since it is evident that we have free will, it is a necessary conclusion that nothing desired is desired as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, there presumably is an objective truth to what a person desires. I think you may be misusing "objective truth" there. Second, moral philosophy does not take this as a fundamental principle. It is an assumption presumed by some moral theories, but not all. Third, I'm not sure it is evident we have free will, though I think we do. Fourth, even if we did, that wouldn't mean that our desires wouldn't be hard-wired into us. Fifth, I am in no way claiming that our desires are necessary or all the same, and it wouldn't make any difference to me if they were, since I'm not making the assumption that what we desire is morally valuable.

So, your idea " any moral facts that exist are objectively true" is actually counter productive to moral philosophy. "Moral facts" are statements about human subjectivity, what we value, and desire. And, it is essential to recognize and promote the "moral fact" that we may value and desire different things. This is necessary to avoid fighting over the same thing. Further, allowing for these differences allows us to cooperate toward common goals or ends, by each person playing a different role. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, moral facts are facts about the way that persons ought to be or act. You are either assuming that what is desirable is valuable or indeed treating moral values as something we invent, like the rules of chess. I did ask about this, but I don't seem to have gotten an answer.

The difficult part to understand, and accept, is that "moral facts" themselves cannot be objectively true. This is what I've been trying to tell you concerning the nature of a predication, as a judgement. Judgements are made by subjects, and as such they are guided by one's desires and intentions, so they are inherently subjective. If we assume facts which are "objectively true" these fall outside the realm of human judgement, therefore outside the realm of "moral facts", which consists of human judgements. Then the only time they can become relevant is if we attempt to determine what these divine judgements might look like, but that is a completely different subject, not moral philosophy, but ontology or metaphysics. Plato outlined that separation in The Euthyphro. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no, morality (at least, of the sort I am interested in) is not about human judgements, but about the way all persons, actual and merely possible, ought to be or act. Of course, both are the subject of moral philosophy, as what morality is and what the goal of morality is is a question of metaethics.

That's consistent with your usual response. You insist that I am "dead wrong", but you offer nothing to back that up. You clearly have a misunderstanding of "moral philosophy", believing that it consists of some universal, objective statements about "the thing we all desire" when I've explained how this is dead wrong. Moral philosophy must be based in assumptions that we desire different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be fair, that wasn't the end of my response there. Also, moral philosophy is about a lot of things, such as whether morality is objective, or subjective, or relative, etc. I think that objectivism is the only viable metaethical option at this level, and that leaves us with either moral realism (paired with objectivism) or moral error theory as our potential plausible views of morality, of which I think moral realism is the better view to take. Also, quite a lot of normative theories in moral philosphy are very much based on the assumption that we all desire (or perhaps aim at) the same end. Utilitarianism very commonly relies on this assumption, and Aristotle seems to make it in the Nichomachean Ethics with regard to eudaimonia. That being said, I am not saying that morality is about what we all desire. I am saying it is not about what we desire at all.

So you really do share ideas with traditional moral philosophy. That is why I still think it is worthwhile discussing these things with you. We don't throw out the baby with the bath water. Your idea to maximize freedom is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. you just do not seem to have the same understanding of "freedom", and so you have a different approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very much not an idea that is common in moral philosophy.

I think you misunderstand Kant's concept of categorical imperative. Notice, there is not one universal "imperative", but a better interpretation would reveal a different imperative for each different situation. That renders Kant's idea as useless.

Moral philosophy is intended to help guide us through the difficulties of the uniqueness of situations, where universal objective principles do not well apply. So if you seek such universal, objective principles, as a basis for moral philosophy, you are proceeding in the wrong direction. What you ought to look at is how such universal principles fail us in the uniqueness of particular circumstances. That's what moral philosophy is all about, guiding us in dealing with the unique and peculiar circumstances which we find ourselves in every day. I think that is the lesson of the doctor example. The doctor follows "the universal rule" but still ends up making what could be judged as "the wrong choice". Moral philosophy guides us to hone our intuitions enabling us to rapidly assess the peculiarities of the circumstances, and how these peculiarities may effect any attempts to apply universal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, Kant aboslutely would say that there is one universal imperative, though he would claim there are different "formulations" of it.

Universal objective principles, assuming that any exist, do well apply to individual situations. That's rather what "universal" means. If the principle fails to provide appropriate guidance in some particular circumstance, then I suggest it wasn't the right principle in the first place.

The doctor case is a bit different, but I'd sooner not distract from my core point with that here.

That's right, there is absolutely no place for objectivism in moral philosophy, which deals with the decision making of subjects. The subject of moral philosophy is the decisions of the subject, so objectivity is irrelevant. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear on moral philosophy assume a compromised (false) sense of objectivity, often called intersubjectivity, which is nothing more than convention, agreement between subjects. Objectivism is relegated to a place outside moral philosophy, i.e. ontology or metaphysics. From there it can bear on epistemology, and even moral philosophy, but only in the way that it affects an individual subject's attitude toward these fields. — Metaphysician Undercover

So on one reading of this, you're very badly wrong. Moral philosophy as a discipline doesn't start with an assumption of subjectivity and then proceed from there. If you'd like, I can point you at some moral philosophy textbooks if you like so you can get a better grasp of this.

If however you are saying that moral philosophy should start with an assumption of subjectivism, then you're still wrong, but you at least have some company in your view. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear in morality (which I think is probably most of us, and is certainly me) are not using intersubjectivity and calling objectivity, we are talking about actual objectivity. I expect the reason you are having trouble with this is that you are making the assumption that morality is about what is desired, which isn't an assumption that everyone else is making, and that we all desire different things, which also isn't a desire that everyone else is making. It may be worth considering what assumptions you are making and ensure one of them is not that everyone else is making the same ones.

But you do not say why freedom of persons over their choices has "value". Because of this, it is just an arbitrary assertion. You assert something like "the ability to make one's own choice freely is the most valuable thing". But someone could say "the ability to eat is the most valuable thing", or "the ability to breathe", "the ability to move", or "the ability to see", or "hear", etc.. Unless you support your claim with reasons, it is just arbitrary like all these others, and many more.

To support or justify your position you need a definition of "value" which is consistent with your claim. The common definition associates "value" with what is desirable, but this does not work for you. And when we associate "value" with freedom in a more general sense, it is incompatible with general universal "objective" moral principles. So you need to give up one or the other. Either give up associating "value" with freedom. or give up associating "value" with objective moral principles, because the two produce incompatible definitions of "value". What I have proposed is to associate value with freedom, but then moral principles are taken as subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an arbitrary assertion, it is abductively reasoning towards the best candidate for moral value under the assumption that something has such value.

There is absolutely nothing incompatible between freedom and moral value being universal and objective.

No, it doesn't work that way. If I state P1 as "I think truth is subjective", and P2 as "Dan thinks truth is objective", then it is recognized as the beliefs of two different subjects. How do you get from this to "truth isn't subjective"? That would require the same sort of misunderstanding of predication which you demonstrated with "that expert is a person". See, "objective truth" is predicated to what "Dan thinks". It is not stated as "there is objective truth and Dan believes this", it is stated as Dan's belief, so it is only true if truth is subjective. Therefore we cannot conclude that truth is not subjective, because without the further premise "truth is subjective" none of the premises can be taken as truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I get from one to the other is that, presumably, if truth is subjective, then each of our beliefs are true "for us". I agree it is only true if truth is subjective, but if you think truth is subjective, then presumably you must accept that if I think truth is objective, I am also right, thus the contradiction.

And with that premise, it just means that Dan's belief is inconsistent with that premise (i.e. wrong if we accept that premise). — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that if we accept the premise "truth is subjective", then my beliefs about whether truth is subjective or not can be wrong? Which is to say, there is an objective truth to whether truth is subjective? I mentioned this earlier, but you tried to dodge it by allowing the subjectivity of truth to itself be subjective, which gives rise to exactly the problem I pointed out here.

No, in this case we don't want doctors to be doing that because not proscribing drug X will kill more people than it saves. — Dan

I disagree, we always want doctors to be aware of possible negative effects of any drugs they prescribe. Telling doctors this drug usually saves lives when a person has such and such symptoms, therefore always prescribe it when a person has those symptoms, is wrong, and not he way doctors are actually trained. They are trained to be aware of, and look for possible complications

Intuition, of the reliable kind that might present in this kind of context, is more about unconsciously noticing circumstances that your experience and training have prepared you to notice. Eg, a firefighter "just knowing" that a building is about to collapse, because they have unconsciously noticed signs that correspond to things they have seen in buildings on the verge of collapse in the past. In this case, no such signs are present in the patients who will die from drug X. — Dan

Right, that's what I am talking about. Training is not simply about teaching general rules (prescribe X drug when a patient has such and such symptoms), it's also about culturing good intuition, which is reading the peculiarities of the unique circumstances. Doctors need this just as much as firefighters do.

You are wrong to say no such sign is present in this case. If I remember the example correctly, the sign is explicit, and tattooed right on the foot of the patient. The doctor might be aware of a trend to make such a tattoo, or some other factor learned might subconsciously incline the doctor to check the foot. And in real life cases there are often indications that a doctor might look for, just like a firefighter. Intuition is a factor which gives the expert an edge over others.

First, there presumably is an objective truth to what a person desires. — Dan

You might presume this, but if it were true, it would deny the possibility of free will. As I explained if it was an objective truth that a person desires X, then the person would have to seek X and would not be free to do otherwise.

No, moral facts are facts about the way that persons ought to be or act. — Dan

This is nonsense. No moral philosophy claims to state objective facts about the way people ought to act. We might make a general statement like "a person ought to do what is good", but since "good" is such a general term, this sort of statement says noting about any specific "way" that a person ought to be. Even Kant's presumed categorical imperative doesn't state a way that people should live.

Again, no, morality (at least, of the sort I am interested in) is not about human judgements, but about the way all persons, actual and merely possible, ought to be or act. Of course, both are the subject of moral philosophy, as what morality is and what the goal of morality is is a question of metaethics. — Dan

You are wrong. As I demonstrated already, "the sort" you are interested in, is not a sort of morality at all. You pretty much accepted this already when you told me that you didn't agree with any traditional moral principles. So it's just like my example. If a person came up with a bunch of axioms which are completely inconsistent with traditional mathematics, and said "this is the sort of mathematics I'm interested in", we'd have to say that is not mathematic at all. And to take the analogy further, if someone proposed "a sort" of logic which was completely inconsistent with traditional logic, we'd designate it as illogical. Likewise, your "sort" is immoral.

I think that objectivism is the only viable metaethical option at this level, and that leaves us with either moral realism (paired with objectivism) or moral error theory as our potential plausible views of morality, of which I think moral realism is the better view to take. — Dan

I'm starting to see that your form of "objectivism" is actually inconsistent with free will. This makes it inconsistent with moral theory, therefore immoral.

This is very much not an idea that is common in moral philosophy. — Dan

You are demonstrating a very low level degree of education in moral philosophy.

I mean, Kant aboslutely would say that there is one universal imperative, though he would claim there are different "formulations" of it. — Dan

Different "formulations" is the key thing here. The problem for Kant is that there are two distinct universals to deal with, every situation, and every human being. Due to the incompatibility between these two universals, there cannot be one law for both, every human being in every situation. Kant thought there ought to be one overarching categorical imperative so he tried to determine it.

However, his attempt breaks down, such that we can either have distinct laws for each situation, which apply to all people, or we can have distinct laws for each person which apply in all situations. Either way ends up with a multitude of categorical imperatives, either a distinct imperative for each situation, or a distinct imperative for each person, and there cannot be one categorical imperative which determines them all because there are two distinct types.

So on one reading of this, you're very badly wrong. Moral philosophy as a discipline doesn't start with an assumption of subjectivity and then proceed from there. If you'd like, I can point you at some moral philosophy textbooks if you like so you can get a better grasp of this. — Dan

Take Kant's for example. He starts from the personal believe, a subjective opinion, that there ought to be one categorical imperative. That is a subjective opinion. No matter how you look at it, you cannot get away from the subjectivity of moral philosophy.

You like to think that moral philosophy can start in objectivity, but that's your subjective opinion, and as Kant's effort demonstrates the quest for objectivity is doomed to failure. Therefore every successful (i.e. influential) moral philosophy in the past, begins with the subject. You can show me as many proposals for moral philosophy, as you like, which begin in objectivity, and I will show you how each fails. And, since they are all inconsistent with true, accepted, conventional, and influential moral philosophy, it's best to describe them as immoral.

It is not an arbitrary assertion, it is abductively reasoning towards the best candidate for moral value under the assumption that something has such value. — Dan

Unless you can provide the reasons, there is no abductive reasoning here at all, and your claim of what provides the best candidate for moral value is arbitrary.

I've provided good reason why "desire" grounds "value" in what is desirable. This is because desire is what shapes and guides our decisions. We choose things which we desire, and that is a natural fact. So we ground "value" in how it is naturally grounded. Notice, this is not proposed as "objective fact", it is a natural inclination. Since free will allows us to create structures of value not grounded in natural inclinations, such as what you propose, we cannot say that it is an objective fact that value must be grounded this way. It is a choice to be made, ground value in the natural way or not, just like the choice to be moral or immoral. We cannot say that it is an objective fact that we must behave morally, because that would be denying our freedom of choice to act immorally.. Such proposals, being inconsistent with what is natural, ought to be rejected as immoral, but I cannot say it's an objective fact that they must be rejected..

It may be worth considering what assumptions you are making and ensure one of them is not that everyone else is making the same ones. — Dan

I explained to you how this idea is very faulty. So it's definitely not an assumption I am making.

How I get from one to the other is that, presumably, if truth is subjective, then each of our beliefs are true "for us". I agree it is only true if truth is subjective, but if you think truth is subjective, then presumably you must accept that if I think truth is objective, I am also right, thus the contradiction. — Dan

I don't see the contradiction. You simply demonstrate your lack of understanding of predication.
P1 predicates of the subject MU, the belief that truth is subjective.
P2 predicates of the subject Dan, the belief that truth is objective.
There is nothing more than this, and no incompatibility nor contradiction, different beliefs are predicated of different subjects.

It is only if you add a further premise, P3 "truth is subjective", that the appearance of contradiction arises. However, the appearance of contradiction is due to the way "truth is subjective" is interpreted by you. You interpret "truth is subjective" as an objective truth. And of course, if you interpret the proposition "truth is subjective": as an objective truth, contradiction is implicit within your interpretation, and so absurdity appears.

The issue therefore, is that since you believe truth is objective (P2), then if you judge P3 "truth is subjective" as true you create a contradiction. Therefore to judge P3 as true you need to be a different person than the Dan mentioned. Then you will not judge P3 "truth is subjective" through an interpretation of this as an objective truth, you will judge it as true in the only way that it could truly be judged as true, a subjective truth (you simply believe it), and then there is no contradiction and no absurdities.

So you're saying that if we accept the premise "truth is subjective", then my beliefs about whether truth is subjective or not can be wrong? Which is to say, there is an objective truth to whether truth is subjective? I mentioned this earlier, but you tried to dodge it by allowing the subjectivity of truth to itself be subjective, which gives rise to exactly the problem I pointed out here. — Dan

No, I didn't imply any objective truth. I said that if two premises contradict each other, and we accept one as correct, then we must reject the other as wrong. There is no implied "objective truth" just adherence to the law of noncontradiction.