So what?

Presumably a smear? :wink:

https://philosophynow.org/issues/103/WittgensteinTolstoy_and_the_Folly_of_Logical_Positivism

I know this. Still a smear, right?

What I meant was, the famous last statement in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is often used to smother discussions of certain topics. It certainly is on this forum often enough. I recognise that 'mystical' is often a pejorative term but it's not only that. Discussing the limits of language and logic is a legitimate subject in philosophy, and I don't agree at all that ' the transcendent can mean nothing to us', although it's not an argument I necessarily want to re-open.

The one passage in that entire work that speaks to me is this one:

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.

As for the rest, I can take it or leave it, but generally the latter.

Yes, ↪Wayfarer is not the type to make arrogant or aggressive attacks on debatable philosophical positions. He's usually more subtly nuanced. And his "humble" approach may seem less impressive than the more arrogant assertions of Scientism. — Gnomon

There is nothing arrogant about advancing clear arguments. And I ever said his approach was humble, I said his claim was humble. Meaning: trivial, uncontroversial.

It's less an attack on Physicalism/Realism than a presentation of alternative views of the Mind/Body relationship. — Gnomon

What a shame. I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety. Though I wouldn't expect much from an article that quotes Galen Strawson, the lamest critic I've ever read.

it's not an attack on 'realism' per se. It's a criticism of the idea that the criterion for what is real, is what exists independently of the mind, which is a specific (and fallacious) form of realism. — Wayfarer

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism.

Discussing the limits of language and logic is a legitimate subject in philosophy, and I don't agree at all that ' the transcendent can mean nothing to us'. — Wayfarer

Maybe, but it is far from demonstrable that you're correct on this. How would we know? (That's rhetorical, not needing a lengthy explanation of metaphysical answers.) view here seems entirely plausible and legitimate. What we simply have here is a disagreement about how the world may be. You both are aware of the same accounts, but your inferences take you to different conclusions. I tend to favour skepticism myself.

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism. — goremand

Sure. That’s a very broad category. I’m not nihilist.

I see him reacting in different ways to is consistent with the qualities I perceive in those different things. That's all I'm claiming. — Janus

Which is fine. But why would you expect otherwise? What epistemic access do you have to compare your view to something else's? So of course, you will interpret the world and other creatures' behavior, in a way that makes sense to you.

They wouldn't react that way if they were blind and felt no bodily sensations, though, would they? If not then we can conclude that they feel the heat and sense the height just as do. I don't know if this is universally true, but it is said that dogs already react instinctively to snakes when they are very young, but would you expect them to do that if they could not sense the presence of the snake? — Janus

Yeah, it would make sense for them to perceive threats for survival. Otherwise, we wouldn't have dogs, which would be bad.

we know they have sense organs and bodies not all that different to ours give us reason to believe that they at least see the things in the environment that we see, and that those things exist independently of us and the dogs, whatever the ultimate nature of those existences are. So, I don't see that I'm claiming anything which is not consistent with our experiences. That said of course we cannot be absolutely certain of anything. — Janus

Yeah, I am not denying that the use experimental medication on mice, then they move on to humans.

But we should be cautious in paying to much attention to outer features (eyes, organs), with inner experience.

There is nothing arrogant about advancing clear arguments. And I ever said his approach was humble, I said his claim was humble. Meaning: trivial, uncontroversial. — goremand

If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? Apparently, the relationship of material Reality to mental Mind touches a nerve for some posters on this forum.

The only thing unclear about the OP is that it is not a simplistic Either/Or argument, but as I see it, a sophisticated Both/And position of complementarity*1. Few philosophers would deny that the Real world includes both Matter and Mind. The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and another. What's yours? :smile:

*1. Complementarity is the realization that a single thing, when considered from different perspectives, can appear to have different, or even contradictory, properties. Complementarity alerts us that answering different kinds of questions can require radically different approaches.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-mind-expanding-power-of-complementarity/

What a shame. I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety. Though I wouldn't expect much from an article that quotes Galen Strawson, the lamest critic I've ever read. — goremand

Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? Ironically, he claims to be a proponent of Physicalism*2. But how, then, can he say that "physicalism entails panpsychism"? Maybe his position is complementary*2, which you interpret as "lame". :grin:

*2. Is Galen Strawson a physicalist?
As a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is 'really just neurons firing', at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves.
https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf
Note --- The subtitle of the linked article is : "Realistic Monism : Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism"

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism. — goremand

Yes. I think Wayfarer's notion of Mind/World is "compatible" with Realism, in the sense that Mind & Matter are complementary, not oppositions : not one to the exclusion of the other. But it's difficult to articulate that subtle inter-relationship in terms of our matter-oriented language. For example, to say that mind is immaterial, could be interpreted to mean that "mind doesn't matter" : i.e. trivial. :nerd:

DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate-idea consumer?

So of course, you will interpret the world and other creatures' behavior, in a way that makes sense to you. — Manuel

I can observe other creatures' behavior towards things in the environment. It's not a matter of interpretation. I can see that their different behaviors towards different things and I know those behaviors are in accordance with how I understand those things—trees, walls, doorways, balls, fire, high places, and cars and so on.

Anyway I've said all I have to say. Anything else will just be repetition.

Yeah, it would make sense for them to perceive threats for survival. Otherwise, we wouldn't have dogs, which would be bad. — Manuel

It seems you missed the point entirely. The point was that innate or not they would have to perceive those threats, which would mean they would have to have functioning sense organs—sense organs not so different from ours.

But we should be cautious in paying to much attention to outer features (eyes, organs), with inner experience. — Manuel

I don't even know what this means. If it means you think we should not make inferences from the similarities of other animals' sense organs and bodies to ours to similarities between the nature of other animals' experience and ours, I don't see why not. I think those structural similarities along with the intelligibility of other animals' behavior towards things in the environment give us very good reason to make such inferences. What else could we possibly have to go on?

If it means we should not feel absolutely certainty about the soundness of such inferences I agree, but I see little reason to doubt it. I don't think we should feel absolutely certain about almost anything in any "ultimate" sense. Science itself remains forever defeasible.

Anyway, I'll repeat that I have nothing more to say on this. If we still disagree then I'm fine with that, even if I can't understand why it should be so.

Presumably a smear? :wink: — Tom Storm

So it would seem.

What we simply have here is a disagreement about how the world may be. You both are aware of the same accounts, but your inferences take you to different conclusions. I tend to favour skepticism myself. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think this is exactly right. Some proponents of different views seem to think it is self-evident that their opponents are being inconsistent or incoherent and hence wrong by default. I don't think that and go only with what seems most plausible to me or else suspend judgment. If anything, I'd say my most basic position is skepticism—I just don't think we know or even can know all that much.

I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety — goremand

I have a long history of posting critical comments about Daniel Dennett, who is the main representative of eliminative materialism.

Bernardo Kastrup is strident in his criticism of materialism, with titles such as Materialism is Baloney. But he’s not well-regarded on this forum either, the consensus being in threads posted in years past that he’s dismissed as an eccentric or a crank. I don’t in the least agree with that description, but I also mention him only sparingly from time to time.

Yeah. Let's leave it there for the time being. It was still an interesting chat. :up:

If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? — Gnomon

I can't speak for other people but I found it quite provocative at first glance, and to his credit @Wayfarer still gives substantial responses to other posters which I'm sure helps keep the thread active.

The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and ↪Wayfarer another. What's yours? — Gnomon

I wouldn't call myself call myself an eliminativist, but substantively I'm close enough to resent Strawson calling it "absurd", "great silliness", "dumbest thing ever", etc.

Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. — Gnomon

Yes.

Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? — Gnomon

No, you tend to overinterpret what I write somewhat. I only know Strawson as a critic of eliminativism, and that's the role he plays in the article.

DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate-idea consumer? — Gnomon

In the game I think he ate souls or something. I was twelve when I came up with this handle.

I have a long history of posting critical comments about Daniel Dennett, who is the main representative of eliminative materialism. — Wayfarer

I agree that he essentially was, although he never admitted it himself. But do you believe I can find in your critical comments something more insightful than the willful non-engagement I've found in Strawson, Nagel, Searle, etc.?

Bernardo Kastrup is strident in his criticism of materialism, with titles such as Materialism is Baloney. But he’s not well-regarded on this forum — Wayfarer

I like him fine, but to my knowledge he never took eliminative materialism seriously either.

But do you believe I can find in your critical comments something more insightful than the willful non-engagement I've found in Strawson, Nagel, Searle, etc.? — goremand

They're all different. We've had debates here about Strawson's panpsychism, which I've never agreed with. I think he tries to rescue materialism by injecting matter with some kind of 'secret sauce'. The same goes for Philip Goff. (Actually, Goff once signed up for this forum, purely to respond to my criticism of one of his articles, which I was chuffed by.) Searle, I've only ever read the Chinese Room argument, but I think it stacks up. As for Thomas Nagel, he's been a pretty vociferous critic of Dennett. But the best overall take-down is The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart, in The New Atlantis, in which he says some of Dennett's arguments are 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' (although a close runner-up would be The God Genome by Leon Wieseltier, a review of one of his books).

the best overall take-down is The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart, in The New Atlantis, in which he says some of Dennett's arguments are 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' — Wayfarer

But this is exactly what I mean, harsh words to cover up the lack up substance in the reply. There is no need to argue anything if you can just insist that your thesis is "obvious" and the other is "absurd", "ridiculous" and "preposterous". Strawson is the master of this approach, utterly shameless in my opinion. At least Chalmers used polite words like "counterintuitive".

Dennett didn't do this situation any favors either by being so willing to play word-games with mental concepts, always saying "I don't doubt X, I just don't think X is what you think it is", as if that's not substantively the same thing.

This is to say every reply or critical review of Dennett's books have been a disappointment to me, and that includes the two you posted, which I read long ago.

No, you tend to overinterpret what I write somewhat. I only know Strawson as a critic of eliminativism, and that's the role he plays in the article. — goremand

I don't know anything about Eliminativism, beyond the Wikipedia article that discusses both sides of the argument. But my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another : tangible, physical stuff vs imaginary, metaphysical*1 concepts.

The Mental world has been interpreted in terms of Souls & Spirits and Ghosts & Goblins ; but also in terms of Intelligence & Information. On the other hand, the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. Hence, your preference for "clear" Black vs White dichotomies seems doomed to frustration. Unless of course, you simply believe one or the other based on Faith. Is that an "overinterpretation" of your Either/Or position? :smile:


*1. Metaphysical : relating to "the essentially metaphysical question of the nature of the mind"
___ Oxford dictionary
Note --- Is Mind something that can be dissected by scientists with scalpels, or a holistic function of a material brain, that must be inferred by reason?

my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another. — Gnomon

A preference that can't be justified has no place in a discussion. In this case the justification for eliminativism would be parsimony.

the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. — Gnomon

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution.

What you're describing (qualia "emerging" from matter) is called emergentism and is an altogether different view.

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution. — goremand

No experience at all?

At the very least, no qualitative experience. I think only the Churchlands would be brutal enough to propose we get rid of the concept of experience in all its forms.

A preference that can't be justified has no place in a discussion. In this case the justification for eliminativism would be parsimony. — goremand

How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to summarily eliminate the entities you don't like?

Qualitative Experience can't be dissected by scientists, so simply eliminate it as immaterial. But then, Metaphysics is all about immaterial ideas, so eliminate Philosophy : yes/no? :smile:

Because it can lack firmness and consistency when applied to complex ideas or phenomena, Occam's razor is more commonly seen as a guiding heuristic than as a principle of absolute truth. ___Wikipedia

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution. — goremand

Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide. :joke:

Insofar as it is mind-created it is delusory. Mysticism proper is seeing through what the mind creates. There’s a term for that in Buddhism, called ‘prapanca’, meaning ‘conceptual proliferation’, detailed in a text delightfully called the Honeyball Sutta. — Wayfarer

But unless one is enlightened, one cannot talk about these things with any kind of integrity, nor demand respect from others as if one in fact knew what one is talking about.

What so often happens in discussions of transcendental and mystical topics is that people admit to being unenlightened, but then they still tell others how to become enlightened, and then they take umbrage at other people not being impressed or convinced.

It's not that those others are too materialistic, or have too much of the proverbial dust in their eyes. Their negative reaction to unenlightened people teaching about enlightenment is perfectly normal and justified: it's only normal not to want to take lessons from someone who admits to not having realized them.


(Notice how it is a rule for Theravada monks not to teach people other than in a few specific situations.)

Constructivism applies to the ways in which we see things but not to what we see. — Janus

This is what a realist says, yes.

But unless one is enlightened, one cannot talk about these things with any kind of integrity — baker

My reference to Buddhism was in respect of a glossary term in Buddhist lexicon which was relevant to the question. I’m not ‘offering teachings’ or putting myself up as enlightened. This is a philosophy forum, and this thread a discussion of a philosophical topic, if it makes you uncomfortable then perhaps you shouldn’t involve yourself.

if it makes you uncomfortable then perhaps you shouldn’t involve yourself. — Wayfarer

Duh. Oh, please. I'm trying to explain to you why you often get the negative reactions you do and how come there is so much bad blood between you and some others.

Despite what some Westerners like to believe, Buddhism is not a philosophy and is not intended to be discussed at philosophy forums, in the manner of Western secular academia.

What you're experiencing is a case of grasping the snake of the Dhamma at the wrong end, at the tail, and thus getting bitten. But you don't seem to understand that, and instead blame your opponents.

At the very least, no qualitative experience. I think only the Churchlands would be brutal enough to propose we get rid of the concept of experience in all its forms. — goremand

Even positing no qualitative experience seems wrongheaded, let alone positing no experience at all. Don't some experiences feel good and others bad? It seems superfluous to say that we experience a quality of experiences over and above the experiences. I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too.

We don't perceive red quales we perceive red things. Just different ways of talking I guess, but one seems less parsimonious. Is there any fact of the matter I wonder? It seems redundant to say we experience the quality of beer, for example, rather than just saying we drink the beer. Sure, the beer has a taste, but that is not separate from its fizziness and its coldness, and they are all just a part of drinking it.

This is what a realist says, yes. — baker

Right, we all (hopefully) say what seems most reasonable to us personally. No one knows for sure so we are stuck with what seems most plausible. Of course that varies depending on one's starting presuppositions.

But unless one is enlightened, one cannot talk about these things with any kind of integrity, nor demand respect from others as if one in fact knew what one is talking about. — baker

I tend to agree with this, although I would say not only "unless" but "even if". I don't know what it means to be enlightened, or even if there really is such a state, but I'm quite sure it does not mean discursively knowing the answer to all kinds of philosophical questions.

If you believe being enlightened is a real thing, what leads you to believe it, presuming you are not yourself enlightened?

It seems redundant to say we experience the quality of beer, for example, rather than just saying we drink the beer. Sure, the beer has a taste, but that is not separate from its fizziness and its coldness, and they are all just a part of drinking it. — Janus

I haven't been reading nearly all of this thread, so I don't know if you're speaking from a stance other than what I get reading it in a vacuum. But if I'm understanding, them I disagree. We can pour beer into the gullet of a machine that can detect all of the properties that give it its taste, fizziness, and coldness, and give us a printout of those qualities that far exceeds our own ability to analyze it. But that machine will not experience the beer. You can drink it while engaged in an engrossing, or heated, discussion, and not experience it. I hate beer, and naked women all around me would not sufficiently distract me from the unpleasant experience of it.