I have maintained from the beginning of this discussion thread that I think Moore was right that good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept. E.g., (although this wasn't addressed to you) this post. I am not saying you need to be aware of all my posts to other people in the thread, but I never suggested to the contrary in my discussion with you. My point was:

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

Begin at looking what brings happiness.


Why would they do that? They need to first understanding what it means for something to be good, then explore what is good. You are having them skip vital steps here.

(PS: the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics are good reads indeed: no disagreement there).

Where the conversation turned into a quest into Moorean ethics, was:

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross


Where did Moore say that?

I never suggested that the concept of good was definable in the sense that can be adequately defined.

So, going back to the actual point I was making, do you think the OP should start analyzing what is good by looking at what makes them happy (like you originally suggested) or what they think goodness even is in the first place? Do you still want them to put the cart before the horse?

EDIT:

I think what happened is you took my (consistent) approval of Moorean thought on the concept of 'good' as an admission that one shouldn't start out by analyzing what they think goodness is. I don't think that the person in the OP should start out with my idea of goodness, which is very Moorean, but, instead, should begin with their own understanding of it. A person just getting into ethics shouldn't start with other peoples' ethical theories: they should start by building their way up. What you, and most people on this thread did, is nudge the OP in the direction of your own ethical theory; instead of nudging in the direction of how to think about ethics for themselves.

I reject that good has properties

I was referring to the property of goodness, and not properties of goodness. It is one property, just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’.

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’ or ‘bad’, then it is assigning things the property of goodness and badness. No?

that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

Am I understanding correctly, that you, then, view what is good as whatever makes one happy? Again, wouldn’t that entail that, contrary to your first point, happiness is good (which entails it has the property of goodness)?

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
…
Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori?

…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct?

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.

I reject this as a false dichotomy. How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me).

That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise

I would say biology.

It would be interesting to hear Harris respond to your concerns. I haven't followed his project closely enough to consider what his deficits might be. As a moral nihilist, I retain some interest in the subject, but only a mild one.

I'm actually writing a paper on this because, from my experience in government, it seems that something like Harris view is dominant amongst policymakers and economists (less the religious bigotry, which most don't share). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've worked with a lot with policy makers in this country. Pretty much no one believes in god and their atheism is so ubiquitous in this largely secular country, that most don't even know what religion or theism refers to, except as the colourful beliefs held by immigrants. :wink:

If you believe goodness is innate knowledge, then why did you campaign to have people explain what it is?

I wasn't: I was advocating that everyone is giving the OP an incorrect starting position, which was whatever the responder thought is chiefly good (or good). It is first vital to segregate what the property is from what can be assigned it, what can be said to be good from what goodness even is itself, and that this is the first proper step of getting into (meta)ethics.

This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness.

Likewise, just because one cannot define something, it does not follow that one cannot describe that something to the point of understanding it sufficiently. Just because the concept of good is purely intuition, it does not follow that everyone automatically has a good grasp of what it is.

I wasn't: I was advocating that everyone is giving the OP an incorrect starting position, which was whatever the responder thought is chiefly good (or good). — Bob Ross

I didn't do that.

CC: @Mww, @Corvus

I didn't do that.

Just picture who you want to be and what kind of environment you want to be in 5 years from now. You're like an arrow shooting through time. Good is whatever is conducive to the arrow's path toward your vision. Evil is whatever makes the arrow deviate down some other path. — frank

I don't have a problem with the fact that you have your own ethical theory (in fact, I would be interested to hear about it), but the problem is that you just nudged them immediately towards your own view instead of explaining to them how to build up their own like this.

That was my only original point with everyone.

To be fair, I sympathize with starting a novice with analyzing existing ethical theories to begin; but that is putting the cart before the horse. It is a real problem that many people have, as exemplified by the fact that everyone so far (that I have noticed) in this thread has immediately bypassed metaethics to suggest their own whole-sale theories. The order of analysis in ethics is metaethics, normative ethics, then applied ethics.

No one, as far as I noticed, stopped to question what goodness is, what it would mean for it to be objective, what it would mean for judgments about it to be cognitive, etc.; No one thought to nudge the OP in the direction of asking what the nature of moral properties are; No one thought to ask them whether or not goodness would be a natural property; etc.

How is it not putting the cart before the horse to talk about this being good, or thinking about if this would be good and how it would be, before the metaphysics of goodness?

How is it not putting the cart before the horse to talk about this being good, or thinking about if this would be good and how it would be, before the metaphysics of goodness? — Bob Ross

Because morality is a road you walk. You fall, you get up, you learn, you try again. You learn what it feels like to be forgiven, how it's like being 10 feet tall. You come to see how bitterness twists your soul, but you don't know how to stop. And so on, and on.

The metaphysics of morality doesn't enhance the journey too much, does it?

Where did Moore say that?

I found my old copy PE, and had a quick scan of the book. Moore says something like this,

"Who right minded folk would ask what Good is unless for lexicographical purpose? .... Good is good. It is undefinable." (PE, pp.6)

You seem to think Moore had started with a concept of Good in PE, which is a misunderstanding of the original text in PE.

I have maintained from the beginning of this discussion thread that I think Moore was right that good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept. — Bob Ross

Your writing above seems to suggest Good is definable from what Moore had said about Good. Good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept. When Moore said Good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept, he didn't mean that it is a definition of Good. He was just telling about the nature of Good.

How can you define good when it is not definable? It seems to suggest you don't understand what you have been maintaining, and are self negating yourself.

The metaphysics of morality doesn't enhance the journey too much, does it?

I think it does. Normative ethics without metaethics is blind.

You seem to think Moore had started with a concept of Good in PE, which is a misunderstanding of the original text in PE.

No. Moore starts with an analysis of the concept of good: that was my point. You started with an analysis of what can be predicated to be good. That happiness is good does not say anything about what goodness is. That is an issue that you have: saying that goodness is undefinable (because it is absolutely simple) does not exempt you from this problem—you have to still analyze the properties of goodness (which includes analyzing, first and foremost, what the concept of ‘good’ refers to).

Your writing above seems to suggest Good is definable from what Moore had said about Good
…
He was just telling about the nature of Good.

What Moore means by “undefinable” is not that we can’t analyze its properties; afterall, he was a non-naturalist. What he meant is that what exactly ‘good’ simpliciter means cannot be defined properly because it is an absolutely simple concept. We are not in disagreement here; and I am not sure what about what I am saying is leading you to believe that I think we can define the concept of good in this sense of ‘definability’. In a looser sense of ‘definability’, we can: we can analyze the property of goodness and other moral properties themselves, beyond trying to properly define the concept of ‘good’ simpliciter, such as moral realism vs. anti-realism, cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, naturalism vs. non-naturalism, etc.

How can you define good when it is not definable? It seems to suggest you don't understand what you have been maintaining, and are self negating yourself.

Show me where I ever said that we can “define” good in this sense. Never once. I even referred you to an earlier post I made where I explicitly stated that the concept of good is absolutely simple and cannot be properly defined.

I don't know, Huckleberry Finn never studied meta-ethics.

Show me where I ever said that we can “define” good in this sense. Never once. I even referred you to an earlier post I made where I explicitly stated that the concept of good is absolutely simple and cannot be properly defined. — Bob Ross

OK, it is not an important point anyway. Just was trying to clarify the murky points you raised in this thread. It is not the main focus of this OP either.

I feel that my explanation for Good as the actions which brings happiness to all involved parties meeting at the mid point was good enough definition, if you really insist that one must start from a concept of Good.

If you feel that is the way you want go, and wish to present your concept of Good, by all means, go ahead after consulting the OP on the matter. I will stand aside, and add my opinion, if any crops up.

just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’. — Bob Ross

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red. It may be that a thing has a certain redness, indicating some relative quality of a certain property. But this latter use requires an object to which the property belongs, whereas the concept, in and of itself, does not. We perceive that a thing is red; we appreciate how or what kind of red it is, its redness.
————-

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason
—Mww

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’….. — Bob Ross

Attribution requires a conscious subject, the conscious subject requires functional intelligence, functional intelligence requires reason. You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

Ideal of is not attribution to; your misunderstanding is not my contradiction. I may have, and you may show that, I’ve contradicted myself; just not with that.
—————-

…..all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.

Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.
—Mww

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori? — Bob Ross

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Moral philosophy, then, while it may contain transcendental ideas, re: freedom, the c.i., and so on, isn’t itself a transcendental doctrine, for its end just is experience, in the form of acts conforming to it.
————-

…..are given to Nature.
— Mww

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct? — Bob Ross

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?
————-

How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me). — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s the common position of the pure realist, insofar as he’s already determined reality without understanding it. And there’s your proverbial cart before the horse. In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself.

Common, in that the comfort of certain knowledge as an end diminishes the theoretical means by which it obtains.
————-

I would say biology. — Bob Ross

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What an odd lot we are: we know how biology gives us brains but we don’t know how brains give us reason; we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains.

I dare you to call THAT a false dichotomy!!!
—————-

This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness. — Bob Ross

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition. It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does. And even if that general gravitation isn’t happiness, it is something, otherwise there is no fundamental underlying condition which serves as a rule for describing humanity proper. Nothing is lost by initiating a rational moral philosophy, which may even attempt to define good as the OP inquires, with happiness as a fundamental condition.

I am assuming you mean Mark Twain didn't study metaethics, normative ethics, nor applied ethics: in fact, I don't believe they existed as defined areas of ethics back then (given that it came along with Analytic Philosophy). More importantly, I am noting what is necessary to provide a treaties, an analytic proper, in ethics and not what is best for works of (american) literature. What is most convincing to people (politically), is certainly not a robust and rigid analysis of ethics.

Just was trying to clarify the murky points you raised in this thread.

What murky points?

It is not the main focus of this OP either.

It is, because the OP is asking where to begin in understanding what is good. It is putting the cart before the horse to begin with what can be predicated to be good, when one hasn’t analyzed what goodness is itself. Do you disagree?

I feel that my explanation for Good as the actions which brings happiness to all involved parties meeting at the mid point was good enough definition, if you really insist that one must start from a concept of Good.

This was my main point that you keep dismissing without any response: happiness is good is not a description whatsoever of what goodness is. It is not an analysis of the metaphysics of goodness. When you say it “was [a] good enough definition”, that is patently false; because it was not a “definition” in any of the two senses of the term that I used before (or anyone uses).

This is analogous to if there was an OP asking where to begin studying what is red, and your response is to say “analyze red trucks”. One should not begin with an analysis of what can be predicated to be red (like a red truck)—viz., happiness—but rather what does it mean for something, in principle, to be red at all? That’s where begin.

am assuming you mean Mark Twain didn't study metaethics, normative ethics, nor applied ethics: in fact, I don't believe they existed as defined areas of ethics back then (given that it came along with Analytic Philosophy). More importantly, I am noting what is necessary to provide a treaties, an analytic proper, in ethics and not what is best for works of (american) literature. What is most convincing to people (politically), is certainly not a robust and rigid analysis of ethics. — Bob Ross

Thanks for taking care of that. You're doing a great job. :up:

This was my main point that you keep dismissing without any response: happiness is good is not a description whatsoever of what goodness is. It is not an analysis of the metaphysics of goodness. When you say it “was [a] good enough definition”, that is patently false; because it was not a “definition” in any of the two senses of the term that I used before (or anyone uses). — Bob Ross

You are still missing the point. I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good.

I thought my point in my previous posts were clear. Good is not an entity. It is property or quality. There is no such a thing called Good. So Moore was right, it is undefinable.

Only human actions are good or not good based on the fact that whether the actions brought happiness to the society, the parties involved and the agent.

Until actions are performed, and analysied based on the above criteria, there is no such thing as Good. Good is the quality of some human actions.

It is putting the cart before the horse to begin with what can be predicated to be good, when one hasn’t analyzed what goodness is itself. Do you disagree? — Bob Ross

Yes I disagree. The horse want to have a free run by himself in the field, but you keep insisting putting the cart onto him.

Good cannot be found until you have performed some actions first.

Not all actions are moral actions of course. If you went out for a walk or dropped off by the shop, that is not moral action category. But if you helped out an elderly crossing the busy road for her safety, then it is an action performed in moral category.

From the practical reasoning, you would have known the action was morally good. It brought happiness to all the parties involved in the action, and it would be judged as morally good when the action was performed out of pure duty to bring happiness to the society, the elderly and yourself. This is how moral good operates and means. There is no some matter called Good out there for you to define what it is.

How do you define good? — Matias Isoo

In contrast to 'instrumental good' or 'aesthetic good', I define ethical good as flourishing (eudaimonia) from the moral conduct (eusocial habits) of non-reciprocally reducing harms (re: suffering).

Read (e.g.) Epicurus & Philippa Foot ...

I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good

So, under your view, it is good to do things that make you happy; but not good to be happy?

I thought my point in my previous posts were clear. Good is not an entity. It is property or quality.

My critique did not presuppose that there is an abstract object of The Good. Predicating happiness as being good is analogous to predicating actions (that produce happiness) as being good. You can just swap the parts where I said “happiness is good” for “actions which bring about happiness are good” in my critique, and it all still stands.

Good is not an entity. It is property or quality. There is no such a thing called Good. So Moore was right, it is undefinable.

That is a non-sequiture. Moore is talking about the property of goodness, just like you. Moore is not saying that goodness is undefinable because there is no abstract object for it.

Only human actions are good or not good based on the fact that whether the actions brought happiness to the society

That implies happiness is a good thing; which you denied above.

Until actions are performed, and analysied based on the above criteria, there is no such thing as Good. Good is the quality of some human actions.

“Good” is the concept of, roughly speaking, what ought to be: what you just described is the concept of ‘moral good’.

If you went out for a walk or dropped off by the shop, that is not moral action category

You don’t think that it may be, under certain circumstances, immoral to go out for a walk?

So, under your view, it is good to do things that make you happy; but not good to be happy? — Bob Ross

If it is good to do things that make you happy, then you are good to be happy. There are many different ways good can be used.

My critique did not presuppose that there is an abstract object of The Good. Predicating happiness as being good is analogous to predicating actions (that produce happiness) as being good. You can just swap the parts where I said “happiness is good” for “actions which bring about happiness are good” in my critique, and it all still stands. — Bob Ross

You seem to be trying to make things more complicated than necessary here.

That is a non-sequiture. Moore is talking about the property of goodness, just like you. Moore is not saying that goodness is undefinable because there is no abstract object for it. — Bob Ross

I was pointing out what looks like the source of your misunderstanding.

That implies happiness is a good thing; which you denied above. — Bob Ross

Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good? Happiness is the purpose of life, according to Aristotle.

“Good” is the concept of, roughly speaking, what ought to be: what you just described is the concept of ‘moral good’. — Bob Ross

I was looking into various philosophers' concept of Good, but there weren't much in them. One thing noticeable was that the concept of Good was all different in the different philosophers. Beginning with the concept of Good seems to be a not good idea in studying Ethics. Maybe you could come up with establishing the concept in the middle or later stage of reading up Ethics, if it is your topic of interest.

You don’t think that it may be, under certain circumstances, immoral to go out for a walk? — Bob Ross

Depending on the situation, it could be. It was just a simple example to help you understand the principle.

If it is good to do things that make you happy, then you are good to be happy
…
Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good?

You did: are you trying to troll me? That’s literally what I responded to, when you said:

I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good

I am growing impatient with how lazy and ridiculous you are being. You say one thing, and then deny it in the very next post.

You seem to be trying to make things more complicated than necessary here.

This explains exactly why your position is so muddied and convoluted. Instead of providing a substantive response, you just noted that you have absolutely no clue what I am saying.

Beginning with the concept of Good seems to be a not good idea in studying Ethics.

This is just a blanket assertion: I already explained that this is exactly what one should do, because analyzing what can be said to be good cannot be done properly without knowing what one means by ‘good’ in the first place. That’s like determining what is red without knowing what ‘red’ is itself. To negate this, you would have to explain how one can, e.g., reliably know what objects are red without knowing what ‘being red’ refers to.

You did: are you trying to troll me? That’s literally what I responded to, when you said: — Bob Ross

I was explaining to your question. When you say good actions make you happy, then the good actions were the cause for your happiness. You can be happy without any cause at all from your emotional state of the day. Hence good can be many different things depending on how you use it in the different situation.

You seem to be too over sensitive on reading the philosophical explanations, which are meant to offer you the simple explanations to your questions. It could be the case that you might be injecting too much emotions into the interactions on what supposed to be objective and rational discussions.

This explains exactly why your position is so muddied and convoluted. Instead of providing a substantive response, you just noted that you have absolutely no clue what I am saying. — Bob Ross

You seem to have some fixed ideas of your own on all these questions. But you asked the questions just for the question begging purposes, it appears. It seems to be the case that your questions were not to clarify the points, but to negate the replies as soon as they were sent to you. They are the typical case of question begging.

I apologize Mww, I forgot to respond to this one.

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red.

But that’s what ‘redness’ means: it’s the property of being red. Sure, a property is attributed to things by subjects; and so it is an estimation, to your point, of the quality which the thing has (or has for us in the case of the phenomenal property of redness). However, what use is it to this conversation to note that? I am not following the relevance. When analyzing redness, we would analyze redness (:

You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

I would would say thinking attributes.

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Can you elaborate more on this part? I didn’t quite follow it. When would a judgment be a prior but not transcendental?

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?

No, because that which the subject bestows onto Nature is not from nature itself; and bestowing properties to things which are not estimations of whatever qualities those things have themselves is purely subjective. Hence why moral anti-realism is considered the doctrine of projection; and moral realism the doctrine of discovery.

In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself

The point, I think, a moral realist would be mentioning is that there are features or qualities of Nature herself, or perhaps reality itself (for non-naturalists), which are of moral relevance and are the truth-bearers for moral propositions. So far, it sounds like in your view reality has no moral properties or qualities itself: we are just projecting what we want or think to be the case, with no objective basis, onto it.

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What do you mean?

we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains

Well, I think science tends to engage, secretly but necessarily, in metaphysics. Biology includes some metaphysics, don’t you think? It is the study of the nature of the body afterall….

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition.

Fair enough; but that’s my point. Shouldn’t we be nudging the OP in the direction of how to build their own theory—to think for themselves ethically—instead of nudging them in the direction of our own positions when the question asked is “how do I determine what is good?”? I would rather see us giving them the tools to ‘ethicize’ then tell them our own ethical theories.

It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does

I don’t disagree that eudaimonic happiness is the chief good for any living being; and it is necessarily so because it is merely the biproduct of the being’s physical constitution working in harmony and unison to do what it was “designed” to. That’s what it means to live well.

It could be the case that you might be injecting too much emotions into the interactions on what supposed to be objective and rational discussions.

Your comments speak for themselves:

You are still missing the point. I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good. — Corvus

That implies happiness is a good thing; which you denied above. — Bob Ross

Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good? Happiness is the purpose of life, according to Aristotle. — Corvus

Your comments speak for themselves: — Bob Ross

It was a bit disappointing to see your reaction rejecting my replies outright without much substance on your counter argument, and your uncorroborated accusation on my posts as a troll.

You did: are you trying to troll me? That’s literally what I responded to, when you said: — Bob Ross

From my observations in the past,
1. The accuser of troll is the genuine troll.
2. The accuser has nothing substantial to contribute to the topic. (ran out of ideas or knowledge)
3. The accuser's main purpose for his postings were question begging, rather than genuine interest in the topic.
4. The accuser is in some deep misunderstanding on the world and others.

I am going to break it down explicitly clear for you, and if you cannot muster the strength to respond adequately then we are going to have to agree to disagree.

I gave an elaborate and painfully obvious critique of your position:

This was my main point that you keep dismissing without any response: happiness is good is not a description whatsoever of what goodness is. It is not an analysis of the metaphysics of goodness. When you say it “was [a] good enough definition”, that is patently false; because it was not a “definition” in any of the two senses of the term that I used before (or anyone uses).

This is analogous to if there was an OP asking where to begin studying what is red, and your response is to say “analyze red trucks”. One should not begin with an analysis of what can be predicated to be red (like a red truck)—viz., happiness—but rather what does it mean for something, in principle, to be red at all? That’s where begin. — Bob Ross

Your response was to say:

You are still missing the point. I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good. — Corvus

Thereby trying to evade my critique by providing the rejoinder that it was a mischaracterization of your view (because you do not believe happiness is good). I, then, responded with:

So, under your view, it is good to do things that make you happy; but not good to be happy? — Bob Ross

And:

My critique did not presuppose that there is an abstract object of The Good. Predicating happiness as being good is analogous to predicating actions (that produce happiness) as being good. You can just swap the parts where I said “happiness is good” for “actions which bring about happiness are good” in my critique, and it all still stands. — Bob Ross

You, then, responded with:

You seem to be trying to make things more complicated than necessary here. — Corvus

And:

Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good? Happiness is the purpose of life, according to Aristotle. — Corvus

You are impossible to converse with, because you concede nothing (but instead try to ad hoc refactor your position as if it was your original point) and act like the recipient is the one completely misunderstanding the conversation. You tried to circumvent my critique by first challenging the idea that happiness is good and then when that didn’t work completely contradicted yourself and acted like I just completely fabricated the idea that you thought happiness was not good; and your response became ~”your over complicating this”.

There’s no discussion to be had if you are going to continue to stand ten toes down in this kind of way. Either address the critique or don’t; and stop acting like you didn’t originally counter my critique with the denial that happiness is good. It’s on the tapes, as I showed above: anyone can see for themselves.

EDIT:

I don't care if you think happiness is good or not per se: I am just pointing out that you refuse to accept the obvious contradiction that you landing yourself in. It would be very easy for you to just concede this and reword or refactor what you were saying to make it coherent: I am guilty of it too, and many people on this forum know that I refactor my positions all the time. I am not interested in holding you to previous things you have said as if you must stand by them forever: I just can't stand it when people try to act like what obviously just happened didn't happen. E.g., "where did you get that idea?": I don't know, maybe when you literally said it?

E.g., "where did you get that idea?": I don't know, maybe when you literally said it? — Bob Ross

Happiness is a state of mind, which is the purpose of life. This idea is from Aristotle, which inspired me to follow.

My point is simple, and precise. There is not much complication there.
Morally good actions bring happiness to all parties involved.
Happiness is a state of mind, which is the purpose of life.

You could further analyse what happiness is. We could say happiness is a mental state of mind, which is good and satisfactory. Good here is different from moral good of course. A good mental state is the opposite of a bad or unpleasant mental state, which is totally different from moral good.

I couldn't believe when you asked, can happiness be not good. I don't think I have implied or suggested that happiness is not good. Happiness is always good.
Good here is the quality of the mental state, which is happiness.

Moral good is the quality or value of some human actions when performed out of the moral duties and practical reasoning.