I disagree, we always want doctors to be aware of possible negative effects of any drugs they prescribe. Telling doctors this drug usually saves lives when a person has such and such symptoms, therefore always prescribe it when a person has those symptoms, is wrong, and not he way doctors are actually trained. They are trained to be aware of, and look for possible complications — Metaphysician Undercover

That also isn't what is happening in my hypothetical. The situation I presented was that of a patient in a time-sensitive situation where spending time investigating rare conditions may result in their death, drug X is the most effective drug for the condition and has the least general risk associated with it, and the patients does not present any signs in either their behaviour, symptoms, or available medical history that would suggest they have the rare condition that would make the proscribing of drug X the wrong choice.

Right, that's what I am talking about. Training is not simply about teaching general rules (prescribe X drug when a patient has such and such symptoms), it's also about culturing good intuition, which is reading the peculiarities of the unique circumstances. Doctors need this just as much as firefighters do.

You are wrong to say no such sign is present in this case. If I remember the example correctly, the sign is explicit, and tattooed right on the foot of the patient. The doctor might be aware of a trend to make such a tattoo, or some other factor learned might subconsciously incline the doctor to check the foot. And in real life cases there are often indications that a doctor might look for, just like a firefighter. Intuition is a factor which gives the expert an edge over others. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they might be aware of that if such a trend existed, but it doesn't. It's just this fellow doing it in this case. There are not indications that the doctor can see or notice without checking the patient's foot.

You might presume this, but if it were true, it would deny the possibility of free will. As I explained if it was an objective truth that a person desires X, then the person would have to seek X and would not be free to do otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't what it means for something to be objectively true at all. It is presumably objectively true that I want some ice cream. That doesn't mean I have to seek ice cream. I might change my mind and stop desiring it, or indeed act contrary to that desire (perhaps in pursuit of some other desire, or perhaps for some other reason). Just because I want something doesn't mean I have to keep wanting it or indeed have to pursue it. The reason I suggest that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter is that presumably we can be wrong about what we desire. We can think we desire one thing, but in fact we don't (this is different from desiring something and then, once we get it, we decide we don't really like it after all).

This is nonsense. No moral philosophy claims to state objective facts about the way people ought to act. We might make a general statement like "a person ought to do what is good", but since "good" is such a general term, this sort of statement says noting about any specific "way" that a person ought to be. Even Kant's presumed categorical imperative doesn't state a way that people should live. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are badly mistaken. Kant's categorical imperative absolutely does say how people should act. Specifically, that they must always act according to maxims that they can at the same time will to be universal law, that they must always treat humanity whether they find it in themselves or in others as an end unto itself and never as a mere means only, etc.

Not all adherents to normative theories have the same metaethical commitments, which is what will determine whether they think that their theory is aiming at objective moral truths or something else, but normative theories very much are aiming at figuring out how persons ought to be or act. Kant is one example, but certainly not the only one. For another, the classical utilitarian would say the way you should act is in the way that maximizes utility (usually understood as happiness - unhappiness).

You are wrong. As I demonstrated already, "the sort" you are interested in, is not a sort of morality at all. You pretty much accepted this already when you told me that you didn't agree with any traditional moral principles. So it's just like my example. If a person came up with a bunch of axioms which are completely inconsistent with traditional mathematics, and said "this is the sort of mathematics I'm interested in", we'd have to say that is not mathematic at all. And to take the analogy further, if someone proposed "a sort" of logic which was completely inconsistent with traditional logic, we'd designate it as illogical. Likewise, your "sort" is immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't demonstrated anything but a complete lack of understanding of the subject of moral philosophy. I recommend reading any introductory ethics textbook. The elements of moral philosophy by Rachels and Rachels might be a good place to start.

I'm starting to see that your form of "objectivism" is actually inconsistent with free will. This makes it inconsistent with moral theory, therefore immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't inconsistent with free will in the least. That being said, many moral philosophers seem to think free will is not necessary for moral theory (especially not of the strong, incompatibilist sort). I disagree with them on this point, but again, you appear to be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the landscape of moral philosophy.

You are demonstrating a very low level degree of education in moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not. You are making massive claims about the discipline that are just incorrect. What you percieve as a lack of education is actually just you being wrong about the thing we are discussing.

Different "formulations" is the key thing here. The problem for Kant is that there are two distinct universals to deal with, every situation, and every human being. Due to the incompatibility between these two universals, there cannot be one law for both, every human being in every situation. Kant thought there ought to be one overarching categorical imperative so he tried to determine it.

However, his attempt breaks down, such that we can either have distinct laws for each situation, which apply to all people, or we can have distinct laws for each person which apply in all situations. Either way ends up with a multitude of categorical imperatives, either a distinct imperative for each situation, or a distinct imperative for each person, and there cannot be one categorical imperative which determines them all because there are two distinct types. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't really know what this means. I don't know what it means that "every person" and "every situation" is a "universal". I don't really know what your criticism of Kant is here. And I don't know if you are claiming that Kant thinking there are multiple formulations of the categorical imperative is something to do with this point you are making and, if so, what you are saying the one has to do with the other.

Take Kant's for example. He starts from the personal believe, a subjective opinion, that there ought to be one categorical imperative. That is a subjective opinion. No matter how you look at it, you cannot get away from the subjectivity of moral philosophy.

You like to think that moral philosophy can start in objectivity, but that's your subjective opinion, and as Kant's effort demonstrates the quest for objectivity is doomed to failure. Therefore every successful (i.e. influential) moral philosophy in the past, begins with the subject. You can show me as many proposals for moral philosophy, as you like, which begin in objectivity, and I will show you how each fails. And, since they are all inconsistent with true, accepted, conventional, and influential moral philosophy, it's best to describe them as immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't start with a subjective opinion, but a believe about the objective. Also, whether or not Kant succeeds does not demonstrate that the goal he is aiming at is doomed to failure. Also, if you are calling a moral philosophy successful based on how influential is has been, then objectivity is very much the name of the game. Kant is one of the most influential moral philosophers of all times. Jeremy Bentham also begins with objective assumptions, such as it being irrational and impermissible to make an exception of oneself, such that if one values one's own happines, one ought to value others'. I mean, arguably the most influential moral tradition in the western world is the Christian tradition. It's vague, awful, and badly wrong, but it's certainly influential, and I think you'll find that the Christians are definitely aiming at objectivity.

On a different note, being accepted and convential is not the same as being true.

Unless you can provide the reasons, there is no abductive reasoning here at all, and your claim of what provides the best candidate for moral value is arbitrary.

I've provided good reason why "desire" grounds "value" in what is desirable. This is because desire is what shapes and guides our decisions. We choose things which we desire, and that is a natural fact. So we ground "value" in how it is naturally grounded. Notice, this is not proposed as "objective fact", it is a natural inclination. Since free will allows us to create structures of value not grounded in natural inclinations, such as what you propose, we cannot say that it is an objective fact that value must be grounded this way. It is a choice to be made, ground value in the natural way or not, just like the choice to be moral or immoral. We cannot say that it is an objective fact that we must behave morally, because that would be denying our freedom of choice to act immorally.. Such proposals, being inconsistent with what is natural, ought to be rejected as immoral, but I cannot say it's an objective fact that they must be rejected.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't say must I would say should. I think you'll find I did provide the reasons why this was the best candidate for moral value, I'm fairly certain I did so both in the initial primer and then again in response to your posts. Also, why should we assume that what we value and what is morally valuable are the same? Also, you appear to be committing a naturalistic fallacy towards the end there, suggesting that what is natural is moral etc.

I explained to you how this idea is very faulty. So it's definitely not an assumption I am making. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by this. It doesn't appear to relate to what I said though.

I don't see the contradiction. You simply demonstrate your lack of understanding of predication.
P1 predicates of the subject MU, the belief that truth is subjective.
P2 predicates of the subject Dan, the belief that truth is objective.
There is nothing more than this, and no incompatibility nor contradiction, different beliefs are predicated of different subjects.

It is only if you add a further premise, P3 "truth is subjective", that the appearance of contradiction arises. However, the appearance of contradiction is due to the way "truth is subjective" is interpreted by you. You interpret "truth is subjective" as an objective truth. And of course, if you interpret the proposition "truth is subjective": as an objective truth, contradiction is implicit within your interpretation, and so absurdity appears.

The issue therefore, is that since you believe truth is objective (P2), then if you judge P3 "truth is subjective" as true you create a contradiction. Therefore to judge P3 as true you need to be a different person than the Dan mentioned. Then you will not judge P3 "truth is subjective" through an interpretation of this as an objective truth, you will judge it as true in the only way that it could truly be judged as true, a subjective truth (you simply believe it), and then there is no contradiction and no absurdities. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say something is true, do you just mean that you believe it? There is nothing more to it than that? I want to be clear on what untennable position it is that you hold here.

No, I didn't imply any objective truth. I said that if two premises contradict each other, and we accept one as correct, then we must reject the other as wrong. There is no implied "objective truth" just adherence to the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but why do we need to abide by the law of noncontradiction if it is not true? What if you don't believe in the law of noncontradiction?

That also isn't what is happening in my hypothetical. The situation I presented was that of a patient in a time-sensitive situation where spending time investigating rare conditions may result in their death, drug X is the most effective drug for the condition and has the least general risk associated with it, and the patients does not present any signs in either their behaviour, symptoms, or available medical history that would suggest they have the rare condition that would make the proscribing of drug X the wrong choice. — Dan

There is nothing in this example to indicate that the wrong choice was made. There is only indication that the right choice was made. Therefore we ought to conclude that the right choice was made. Furthermore, if a patient does dies from that "rare condition", it is the rare condition which causes the patient's death, not the doctor's actions, and we still cannot conclude that the doctor's actions were wrong.

It is presumably objectively true that I want some ice cream. That doesn't mean I have to seek ice cream. — Dan

You are speaking nonsense again. If it is objectively true that you desire ice cream then it is objectively true that your are seeking it. How could it possibly be an objective truth that you desire ice cream unless you were seeking it? What produces the objective conclusion is the fact that you are seeking it. If you say "I feel like I want ice cream, but I am not seeking it", then you refer to subjective feelings, and it's not an objective truth, it's subjective. You, the subject are interpreting your own feelings as a desire for ice cream, and this means it's a subjective conclusion.

The reason I suggest that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter is that presumably we can be wrong about what we desire. We can think we desire one thing, but in fact we don't (this is different from desiring something and then, once we get it, we decide we don't really like it after all). — Dan

Right, and that's one example of why there is no such thing as objective truth about such feelings. They are what defines "subjective", feelings of the subject. You propose "that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", but as I've explained to you, this would exclude the possibility of free will. If there was objective truth in the matter, desires, and the actions which we say are caused by desires, would be one and the same. That is what is required to make the desire objectifiable. Conventionally we hold the desire as separate as separate from the action, because the causal connection is not necessary (free choice being intermediary), and the desire is of the subject, not observed, therefore subjective.

What I've been telling you, your presumption, "presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", is nothing but a fiction, a fantasy of your imagination, which is demonstrably incoherent. You presume this because it provides some support to your consequentialist morals. In reality though, if what you presume was true, it would deny the possibility of free will, and all types of moral philosophy. Therefore if you keep supporting your so-called moral philosophy on such presumptions, you render what you propose as something other than moral philosophy. I've been calling it "immoral", but I now see it's better called "amoral", because your principles put what you propose right outside the field of moral philosophy, so that it cannot be judged by the principles of moral philosophy to be immoral. What you propose is simply not relevant to moral philosophy, therefore amoral.

You are badly mistaken. Kant's categorical imperative absolutely does say how people should act. Specifically, that they must always act according to maxims... — Dan

You don't seem to understand the meaning of what you are saying here. If the imperative states "act according to maxims", that imperative is not telling anyone "how to act". It is telling them that there is a maxim which will tell them how to act. Then there needs to be a different maxim for every different situation to tell a person how to act in that situation. This proposed categorical imperative tells everyone that they must act according to a maxim which is applicable to each particular situation one finds oneself in, but that says nothing about how one should act in any situation.

Therefore it truly says nothing about how one should act. It just states a general principle of what one should consider before acting. And if we say that deciding how to act is itself an action, and this is the action which that categorical imperative refers to, then the imperative becomes incoherent. The imperative "how to act" must be understood before it can be followed in an act. If, "act" also refers to understanding it is impossible that one could apply the imperative to the act of understanding the imperative.

Your claim demonstrates the same type of category mistake you make when you say that "the world is changing" makes a statement about the way that the world is. "Changing" signifies something mutually exclusive from what "what is" signifies. The two were demonstrated by Aristotle to be incompatible. So when you predicate "is changing" of "the world" you create the illusion that "changing" is compatible with "what is". That is a sophistic trick exposed by Socrates and Plato thousands of years ago. You employ another version of the same type of sophistic trick when you claim that "one imperative which states that you must act according to many imperatives", means that there is one imperative which tells you how to act. Really, what this means is that there is one imperative which tells you that there are many imperatives which tell you how to act.

For another, the classical utilitarian would say the way you should act is in the way that maximizes utility (usually understood as happiness - unhappiness). — Dan

Again, all this says is that there is a different way to act for every different situation, which is the best way according to the situation. It is not one rule which tells you how to act in all situations.

It isn't inconsistent with free will in the least. That being said, many moral philosophers seem to think free will is not necessary for moral theory (especially not of the strong, incompatibilist sort). I disagree with them on this point, but again, you appear to be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the landscape of moral philosophy. — Dan

Yes, this is really the issue we have now. Since it is very clear that moral theory is inherently subjective, moral philosophers can produce all sorts of different moral theories. That is evident from the abundance and variety of moral theories which avail us. Some are quite absurd. However, some, like Platonic moral theory for example, get accepted, conventionalized, and become quite influential, through a sort of intersubjectivity.

On the other hand, there are some people who do not like the idea that moral theory is inherently subjective. They believe that the reality of a multitude of moral theories which is enabled by free will, freedom of choice in thinking, and the inherent subjectivity of moral theory, is for some reason a defect to moral theory, which ought to be corrected. So these people, like Kant, like yourself, and many others, ignore the lessons of history which teach us the reality about moral theories, and they produce further subjective theories, which propose objective principles as the foundation for their subjective theories.

Of course we can reject these as being inherently self-defeating, untrue in the sense of dishonesty, subjective theories which claim to be objective. Further, since their basic principles miss the true essence of a moral theory, a subjective theory which is agreeable, and likely to be accepted, and conventionalized in an intersubjective way, we can dismiss these proposals as outside the category of what constitutes a "moral theory".

He doesn't start with a subjective opinion, but a believe about the objective. — Dan

Any "belief about the objective" very clearly is a subjective opinion. If you understood metaphysics and ontology, you'd see this very clearly. Our beliefs about "the objective" are all subjective opinions.

Also, whether or not Kant succeeds does not demonstrate that the goal he is aiming at is doomed to failure. — Dan

The problems which he encounters which I explained, but you didn't understand demonstrates that his goal is doomed to failure. Maybe you'll understand better from what I said in this post, concerning the "one imperative", which dictates that a vast multitude of imperatives tells us what to do. Making an imperative which dictates that many imperatives are required, does not constitute demonstrating that one imperative will suffice. It actually demonstrates that the opposite is probable.

Kant is one of the most influential moral philosophers of all times. — Dan

I don't think so. Christianity is based in Platonist moral theory. It held sway in the western world for many hundreds of years. Kant pales in comparison. In fact Kant as a moralist, is more often than not, criticized and rejected, as insufficient. Where is the supposed "influence"?

I think you'll find that the Christians are definitely aiming at objectivity. — Dan

This demonstrates the same misunderstanding of the Platonic/Christian tradition you showed earlier. If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that each individual person has one's own place within the state, with ones own desires and goals. "The good" refers to what is desired by the individual, as the motivation for activity, and this is not one common, objective goal which we all seek. The idea of one common goal, validated by the divinity, is the idea which is shown to be incoherent in The Euthyphro.

On a different note, being accepted and convential is not the same as being true. — Dan

The goal of moral philosophy is not to be "true" in the "objective" way that you understand this word. That shows your attempt to conflate is and ought. The goal is to be "true to oneself", honest. And when an individual moral philosopher is honest in this way, the principles will be espoused by others. "Truth" in the way you use that word is irrelevant and outside of moral philosophy.

Also, why should we assume that what we value and what is morally valuable are the same? — Dan

How would you get anyone to accept your moral philosophy if you put forth a system where what is proposed as "valuable" is not actually valued by anyone? How is that coherent?

Also, you appear to be committing a naturalistic fallacy towards the end there, suggesting that what is natural is moral etc. — Dan

No, I'm not suggesting any such equivalence. I am suggesting that moral philosophy must be based in something real, and what we have as "real" in relation to the acts of beings, is what is natural. That doesn't say that what is natural and what is moral are equivalent. Basing moral philosophy in some fictional fantasy of what is "objectively" true or right, provides no traction.

When you say something is true, do you just mean that you believe it? — Dan

Yes, when I say "X is true", it means that I honestly believe X. You know, like when someone says "tell the truth", and in court when they say "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", it means what you honestly believe. How could there be anything more to "is true" than this?

Okay, but why do we need to abide by the law of noncontradiction if it is not true? What if you don't believe in the law of noncontradiction? — Dan

The law of noncontradiction is a rule I believe in because of its usefulness. Depending on one's attitude toward the law of identity, the applicability of the law of noncontradiction may be accepted or rejected. Hegel rejected the law of identity as a useless tautology. But then some who follow him, like dialetheists and dialectical materialists, also reject the law of noncontradiction, as inapplicable in cases where identity is inapplicable. They do not believe in the law of noncontradiction.

There is nothing in this example to indicate that the wrong choice was made. There is only indication that the right choice was made. Therefore we ought to conclude that the right choice was made. Furthermore, if a patient does dies from that "rare condition", it is the rare condition which causes the patient's death, not the doctor's actions, and we still cannot conclude that the doctor's actions were wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

The rare condition in this case causes drug X to be lethal, so the doctor's actions did kill them, which from an actual-value consequentialism perspective, does make them wrong inasmuch as the doctor could have acted differently and their action caused worse consequences than had they done so.

You are speaking nonsense again. If it is objectively true that you desire ice cream then it is objectively true that your are seeking it. How could it possibly be an objective truth that you desire ice cream unless you were seeking it? What produces the objective conclusion is the fact that you are seeking it. If you say "I feel like I want ice cream, but I am not seeking it", then you refer to subjective feelings, and it's not an objective truth, it's subjective. You, the subject are interpreting your own feelings as a desire for ice cream, and this means it's a subjective conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The rest of what I said here I think explains what I mean.

Right, and that's one example of why there is no such thing as objective truth about such feelings. They are what defines "subjective", feelings of the subject. You propose "that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", but as I've explained to you, this would exclude the possibility of free will. If there was objective truth in the matter, desires, and the actions which we say are caused by desires, would be one and the same. That is what is required to make the desire objectifiable. Conventionally we hold the desire as separate as separate from the action, because the causal connection is not necessary (free choice being intermediary), and the desire is of the subject, not observed, therefore subjective.

What I've been telling you, your presumption, "presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", is nothing but a fiction, a fantasy of your imagination, which is demonstrably incoherent. You presume this because it provides some support to your consequentialist morals. In reality though, if what you presume was true, it would deny the possibility of free will, and all types of moral philosophy. Therefore if you keep supporting your so-called moral philosophy on such presumptions, you render what you propose as something other than moral philosophy. I've been calling it "immoral", but I now see it's better called "amoral", because your principles put what you propose right outside the field of moral philosophy, so that it cannot be judged by the principles of moral philosophy to be immoral. What you propose is simply not relevant to moral philosophy, therefore amoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have just asserted that if there was an objective truth about the matter, this would make free will impossible, but there is no reason to think this. You are asserting that it can't be the case that it is objectively true that I desire ice cream but I am not seeking it, but there is no reason to think this is the case. Desires are indeed different from the actions one takes in pursuit of them.

The reason I think that truth is objective has nothing to do with consequentialism. The truth is objective, believing so is really the only viable option, as I've explained before. It is a necessary assumption to have any discussion of anything worth discussing.

You don't seem to understand the meaning of what you are saying here. If the imperative states "act according to maxims", that imperative is not telling anyone "how to act". It is telling them that there is a maxim which will tell them how to act. Then there needs to be a different maxim for every different situation to tell a person how to act in that situation. This proposed categorical imperative tells everyone that they must act according to a maxim which is applicable to each particular situation one finds oneself in, but that says nothing about how one should act in any situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, it says rather a lot more than "act according to maxims". It specifically says what kind of maxims it is rational (according to Kant) and therefor moral (according to Kant) to act in accordance with. It is very much telling you how to act.

And if we say that deciding how to act is itself an action, and this is the action which that categorical imperative refers to, then the imperative becomes incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's also not true, as presumably Kant would presumably say that the categorical imperative is consistent with itself so considering how one should act is an action that is in accordance with the formualtion of universalizability.

You employ another version of the same type of sophistic trick when you claim that "one imperative which states that you must act according to many imperatives", means that there is one imperative which tells you how to act. Really, what this means is that there is one imperative which tells you that there are many imperatives which tell you how to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I would say Kant does propose multiple rules for action, rather than just one, though he would surely disagree. Either way, they definitely are rules for acting. They don't spawn many imperatives, but rather limit the maxims we can justifably (according to Kant) act in accordance with, the actions we can justifiably take.

Again, all this says is that there is a different way to act for every different situation, which is the best way according to the situation. It is not one rule which tells you how to act in all situations. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is one rule which tells you how to act in all situations. Specifically, in the way that produces the most utility. Yes, that will certainly be different based on the situation, but it is clearly action-guiding.

Yes, this is really the issue we have now. Since it is very clear that moral theory is inherently subjective, moral philosophers can produce all sorts of different moral theories. That is evident from the abundance and variety of moral theories which avail us. Some are quite absurd. However, some, like Platonic moral theory for example, get accepted, conventionalized, and become quite influential, through a sort of intersubjectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't inherently subjective. But people are wrong a lot, and not clarifying their starting assumptions is a big part of this.

On the other hand, there are some people who do not like the idea that moral theory is inherently subjective. They believe that the reality of a multitude of moral theories which is enabled by free will, freedom of choice in thinking, and the inherent subjectivity of moral theory, is for some reason a defect to moral theory, which ought to be corrected. So these people, like Kant, like yourself, and many others, ignore the lessons of history which teach us the reality about moral theories, and they produce further subjective theories, which propose objective principles as the foundation for their subjective theories. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't what Kant or I do. Morality isn't subjective. People all believing different things about morality is a result of some (or all) of them being wrong.

Of course we can reject these as being inherently self-defeating, untrue in the sense of dishonesty, subjective theories which claim to be objective. Further, since their basic principles miss the true essence of a moral theory, a subjective theory which is agreeable, and likely to be accepted, and conventionalized in an intersubjective way, we can dismiss these proposals as outside the category of what constitutes a "moral theory". — Metaphysician Undercover

No idea who "we" is in this context as I'm fairly sure that moral objectivism is the majority view, but even if it weren't, we have good reason to think it is the correct view. Although, if I am right that objectivism is the majority view, this also means that objective theories are more likely to be accepted.

Any "belief about the objective" very clearly is a subjective opinion. If you understood metaphysics and ontology, you'd see this very clearly. Our beliefs about "the objective" are all subjective opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. When we hold beliefs about objective reality, those are not the same as subjective opinions about, for example, matters of taste. One set can be correct or incorrect, the other set, not so much.

The problems which he encounters which I explained, but you didn't understand demonstrates that his goal is doomed to failure. Maybe you'll understand better from what I said in this post, concerning the "one imperative", which dictates that a vast multitude of imperatives tells us what to do. Making an imperative which dictates that many imperatives are required, does not constitute demonstrating that one imperative will suffice. It actually demonstrates that the opposite is probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I didn't understand it because it didn't make sense. What you said in this post showed wrongheaded thinking about what constitutes action-guidingness in moral theories.

I don't think so. Christianity is based in Platonist moral theory. It held sway in the western world for many hundreds of years. Kant pales in comparison. In fact Kant as a moralist, is more often than not, criticized and rejected, as insufficient. Where is the supposed "influence"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, why do you think that Christianity is based on Plato?

This demonstrates the same misunderstanding of the Platonic/Christian tradition you showed earlier. If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that each individual person has one's own place within the state, with ones own desires and goals. "The good" refers to what is desired by the individual, as the motivation for activity, and this is not one common, objective goal which we all seek. The idea of one common goal, validated by the divinity, is the idea which is shown to be incoherent in The Euthyphro. — Metaphysician Undercover

Euthyphro shows nothing of the sort. Also, Plato and Christianity aren't the same thing. Also, Plato at least seemed to think there was a form of the good which all good things participated in. Given that this form is supposed to exist in the same realm of the forms as things like mathematical objects, presumably he thinks that this is an objective property things can have.

The goal of moral philosophy is not to be "true" in the "objective" way that you understand this word. That shows your attempt to conflate is and ought. The goal is to be "true to oneself", honest. And when an individual moral philosopher is honest in this way, the principles will be espoused by others. "Truth" in the way you use that word is irrelevant and outside of moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Truth is very much the goal of moral philosophy, certainly any moral philosophy worthy of discussion.

How would you get anyone to accept your moral philosophy if you put forth a system where what is proposed as "valuable" is not actually valued by anyone? How is that coherent? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because it is morally valuable. It is coherent because moral value and being valued by someone aren't the same thing. Further, how to make a theory persuasive is a different question to whether it is correct. As to why anyone might care, I think that a reasonable number of people do want to do the right thing, which is a good piece of luck for persauding them to do so.

No, I'm not suggesting any such equivalence. I am suggesting that moral philosophy must be based in something real, and what we have as "real" in relation to the acts of beings, is what is natural. That doesn't say that what is natural and what is moral are equivalent. Basing moral philosophy in some fictional fantasy of what is "objectively" true or right, provides no traction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective truth is not a fiction or a fantasy. It is in fact quite the opposite.

Yes, when I say "X is true", it means that I honestly believe X. You know, like when someone says "tell the truth", and in court when they say "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", it means what you honestly believe. How could there be anything more to "is true" than this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because people can be wrong.

The law of noncontradiction is a rule I believe in because of its usefulness. Depending on one's attitude toward the law of identity, the applicability of the law of noncontradiction may be accepted or rejected. Hegel rejected the law of identity as a useless tautology. But then some who follow him, like dialetheists and dialectical materialists, also reject the law of noncontradiction, as inapplicable in cases where identity is inapplicable. They do not believe in the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Usefulness in what sense? I don't know how any laws of logic or rules of theory selection in, for example, science can be useful if you think that whatever you believe is true. There's no fail-state, so there's no need for any of these rules. You can just believe any old nonsense and hold that it's true, no need to evaluate your beliefs for consistency or consider whether they match reality at all.

The rare condition in this case causes drug X to be lethal, so the doctor's actions did kill them, which from an actual-value consequentialism perspective, does make them wrong inasmuch as the doctor could have acted differently and their action caused worse consequences than had they done so. — Dan

I don't think so. As you state, the rare condition "causes drug X to be lethal". The act of administering the drug is not a lethal act, as indicated by all the other instances. Therefore the rare condition is the cause of death, not the doctor's action, which you mistakenly judge as wrong.

You have just asserted that if there was an objective truth about the matter, this would make free will impossible, but there is no reason to think this. You are asserting that it can't be the case that it is objectively true that I desire ice cream but I am not seeking it, but there is no reason to think this is the case. — Dan

I explained the reasons. It seems you didn't pay attention, maybe you didn't understand, or just ignored.

.

Desires are indeed different from the actions one takes in pursuit of them. — Dan

Sure they are different, when the desire is understood as subjective, and the action is understood as objective. But the issue is how could both the action and the desire be objective without them being one and the same. "Objective" implies observable by someone other than the subject. No part of the desire is observable except the actions associated with it. Therefore the proposed "objective desire" and the action which demonstrates it, would be one and

And the reason why objectivity of desire is incompatible with free will is that if there was objective fact about what I desired, then I, the subject could not use my will power to overcome that desire. In other words, I could not choose to desire something contrary to what I objectively desired, because a person could not deliberate, i.e. having incompatible desires. Take your shirt buying example as proof that desires cannot be objective. The stated desire is to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, yet somehow an incompatible desire caused the act. How could two incompatible desires both be objectively true at the same time? Yet two incompatible desires coexist when we deliberate.

I mean, it says rather a lot more than "act according to maxims". It specifically says what kind of maxims it is rational (according to Kant) and therefor moral (according to Kant) to act in accordance with. It is very much telling you how to act. — Dan

The categorical imperative says what kind of maxims tell one how to act. It does not "tell you how to act". It tells you what kind of maxims tell you how to act. This is another good example of the same type of category mistake you make when you say "the world is changing" says something about the way that the world is. In this case, since there is one maxim which says that there are many maxims required to tell you how to act, you conclude that there is one maxim which tells you how to act. In the other case, "the world is changing" tells you that there are many ways which "the world is" and you conclude that it states that there is one way that the world is.

I mean, I would say Kant does propose multiple rules for action, rather than just one, though he would surely disagree. — Dan

This is the problem. What Kant did, is not the same as what he said he did. What he said he was doing (his goal or intention) doesn't pan out in what he did. This is because what he was trying to do, base moral philosophy in one objective principle was impossible, so his endeavour was doomed to failure. So when we state what he did, he would disagree and say that's not what I was doing.

This is what happens when you seek to base moral philosophy in some fictional, fantasy "objective truth". You produce an unobtainable goal for your moral philosophy, an ideal (sort of perfection) which is unrealistic, such that the philosophy itself, which is intended to support that goal cannot do what you need it to do.

That isn't what Kant or I do. Morality isn't subjective. People all believing different things about morality is a result of some (or all) of them being wrong. — Dan

OK, and what do you base your claim that they are wrong on, other than insisting that your morality is right? These statements of yours are useless.

No idea who "we" is in this context as I'm fairly sure that moral objectivism is the majority view, but even if it weren't, we have good reason to think it is the correct view. Although, if I am right that objectivism is the majority view, this also means that objective theories are more likely to be accepted. — Dan

Ha ha, that's funny. You have good reason to think that objectivism is the correct view, because objectivism states its position to be objective, therefore impossible to be wrong. Oh, that's actually begging the question, and truly a very bad reason. "I hold the correct view, because I assert that it is impossible for me to be wrong."

And then you make a meaningless, unsupported assertion about objectivism being the majority view, when such a thing would be completely irrelevant to objectivism.

No it isn't. When we hold beliefs about objective reality, those are not the same as subjective opinions about, for example, matters of taste. — Dan

Beliefs about "objective reality" are metaphysical speculations which are subjective opinions, "matters of taste". This is one's attitude toward reality, what you prefer to believe, just like your attitude toward ice cream flavours.

Sorry, why do you think that Christianity is based on Plato? — Dan

To start with, I've read Plato, and I've also read St Augustine, a Church Father. Augustine claimed to base many of his ideas in Plato, and I've corroborated that claim through my own comparison. I've also read other Christian theologians, and have seen how they were influenced by reading Plato. We could discuss this, but you already demonstrated a strong aversion to theology.

Euthyphro shows nothing of the sort. — Dan

With the dilemma illustrated in Euthyphro, it is shown that it is neither the case that the pious is called "pious" because it refers to what is loved by the gods or God, nor is it the case that the gods, or God loving the pious is what causes it to be called "pious". And in the context of the discussion, court trials about impiety, it is demonstrate that in our world of existence, "pious" is what human beings determine it to be. So the idea of one common, independent "good", validated by divinity, is demonstrated as false, and "good" is what human beings determine.

Because it is morally valuable. It is coherent because moral value and being valued by someone aren't the same thing. — Dan

You have not demonstrated how something which is not valued by anyone could be valuable. If you are the one assigning "value" to it, then it is valuable to you. But that is clearly subjective.

Objective truth is not a fiction or a fantasy. It is in fact quite the opposite. — Dan

Thanks for letting me in on your subjective opinion. Not that it does you any good.

Because people can be wrong. — Dan

Right, now you're catching on. When someone says "tell the truth", and you tell the truth, you do actually tell the truth, even if you are wrong. That is the nature of human fallibility. Even when we tell the truth there is a possibility that "the truth" which is told, might still be wrong. That is what constitutes "an honest mistake".

If you insist that "the truth" must exclude the possibility of being wrong, you place 'truth" right outside the world of human existence, and human activity. This is the interaction problem of Platonic realism. Your proposed "objective truth" is a fantasy, a product of your imagination which has no bearing on the existence, and actions of human beings, unless these human beings are willing to accept this ideal (imaginary perfection), and allow it into their lives. Then it becomes a divinity, like God, something we accept, believe in, and have faith in.

Usefulness in what sense? I don't know how any laws of logic or rules of theory selection in, for example, science can be useful if you think that whatever you believe is true. There's no fail-state, so there's no need for any of these rules. You can just believe any old nonsense and hold that it's true, no need to evaluate your beliefs for consistency or consider whether they match reality at all. — Dan

Believing and doing are distinct things. If a person could sit in meditation, without doing anything, they could believe "any old nonsense, and believe it's true" as you say. However, life requires action or we die. When we move to act, our beliefs are tested for usefulness. Ones which do not produce success are forgotten, and no longer is it possible that a person believes any old nonsense. Beliefs of "any old nonsense" die with those who hold them. And "rules" which prove to be useful prevail over our activities.

I don't think so. As you state, the rare condition "causes drug X to be lethal". The act of administering the drug is not a lethal act, as indicated by all the other instances. Therefore the rare condition is the cause of death, not the doctor's action, which you mistakenly judge as wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider the implications of what you are saying here. Do you meant to imply that a doctor is not responsible for the death of a patient when proscribing a medicine that is lethal to a patient who has a specific condition. It seems like you are implying that doctors need not check for potential risk factors at all. I imagine you don't mean to imply this.

I explained the reasons. It seems you didn't pay attention, maybe you didn't understand, or just ignored. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your reasons seem to be based on a poor understanding of free will and objective truth.

Sure they are different, when the desire is understood as subjective, and the action is understood as objective. But the issue is how could both the action and the desire be objective without them being one and the same — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, are you suggesting something is objective?

As for how they can be the same thing, that's easy, not things that are objective are the same thing.

And the reason why objectivity of desire is incompatible with free will is that if there was objective fact about what I desired, then I, the subject could not use my will power to overcome that desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

That just isn't so. Even if we take objective to imply that it is observable to someone other than the subject, which I don't agree with, something being observable doesn't make it immutable. We might imagine a mind reader who can tell what you desire, but you might nevertheless be able to overcome that desire or not act in accordance with it.

The categorical imperative says what kind of maxims tell one how to act. It does not "tell you how to act". It tells you what kind of maxims tell you how to act. This is another good example of the same type of category mistake you make when you say "the world is changing" says something about the way that the world is. In this case, since there is one maxim which says that there are many maxims required to tell you how to act, you conclude that there is one maxim which tells you how to act. In the other case, "the world is changing" tells you that there are many ways which "the world is" and you conclude that it states that there is one way that the world is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does tell you how to act. It tells you what you should and shouldn't do, specifically, tells you which maxims you should and shouldn't act in accordance with.

This is the problem. What Kant did, is not the same as what he said he did. What he said he was doing (his goal or intention) doesn't pan out in what he did. This is because what he was trying to do, base moral philosophy in one objective principle was impossible, so his endeavour was doomed to failure. So when we state what he did, he would disagree and say that's not what I was doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are asserting it is impossible. You have given no reason to suggest that it is that doesn't require one to misunderstand essentially every element of the discussion in order to accept.

OK, and what do you base your claim that they are wrong on, other than insisting that your morality is right? These statements of yours are useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Among other things I base it on rational analysis of principles as well as the underlying assumptions that support those principles and the logic connecting the two.

Ha ha, that's funny. You have good reason to think that objectivism is the correct view, because objectivism states its position to be objective, therefore impossible to be wrong. Oh, that's actually begging the question, and truly a very bad reason. "I hold the correct view, because I assert that it is impossible for me to be wrong." — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely what I said. I don't know where you got this from, but it certainly isn't a claim I made.

Also, it is your position that claims one cannot be wrong. My position is there is a right answer, and I am attempting to find it. Yours appears to be that whatever one thinks, they're right.

Beliefs about "objective reality" are metaphysical speculations which are subjective opinions, "matters of taste". This is one's attitude toward reality, what you prefer to believe, just like your attitude toward ice cream flavours. — Metaphysician Undercover

They really aren't. One of them can be incorrect. If I like chocolate ice cream and you prefer strawberry, one of us isn't wrong. If you think the world is flat and I think it's round(ish) one of us is wrong.

To start with, I've read Plato, and I've also read St Augustine, a Church Father. Augustine claimed to base many of his ideas in Plato, and I've corroborated that claim through my own comparison. I've also read other Christian theologians, and have seen how they were influenced by reading Plato. We could discuss this, but you already demonstrated a strong aversion to theology. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not suggesting that no Christian thinkers were influenced by Plato, but you seem to be suggesting that their entire school of thought is based on his work, or that the two are in some way interchangable. That is rather a larger claim.

With the dilemma illustrated in Euthyphro, it is shown that it is neither the case that the pious is called "pious" because it refers to what is loved by the gods or God, nor is it the case that the gods, or God loving the pious is what causes it to be called "pious". And in the context of the discussion, court trials about impiety, it is demonstrate that in our world of existence, "pious" is what human beings determine it to be. So the idea of one common, independent "good", validated by divinity, is demonstrated as false, and "good" is what human beings determine. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Euthyphro dilemma shows that suggesting that the good/pious is determined by god/the gods leads one to either the good/pious being arbitrary or nor actually being determined by god/the gods after all. But this does not mean that there is no objective good/right. Good/right in the moral sense need not be 'determined' by anyone.

You have not demonstrated how something which is not valued by anyone could be valuable. If you are the one assigning "value" to it, then it is valuable to you. But that is clearly subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not 'assigning' value to it, I am suggesting that it might be morally valuable. Valuable as such. Valuable whether or not anyone values it. What one should do (or how one should be, or what one should pursue etc) regardless of what one wants. A categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one.

Thanks for letting me in on your subjective opinion. Not that it does you any good. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not my subjective opinion. It is my belief on an objective matter.

Right, now you're catching on. When someone says "tell the truth", and you tell the truth, you do actually tell the truth, even if you are wrong. That is the nature of human fallibility. Even when we tell the truth there is a possibility that "the truth" which is told, might still be wrong. That is what constitutes "an honest mistake".

If you insist that "the truth" must exclude the possibility of being wrong, you place 'truth" right outside the world of human existence, and human activity. This is the interaction problem of Platonic realism. Your proposed "objective truth" is a fantasy, a product of your imagination which has no bearing on the existence, and actions of human beings, unless these human beings are willing to accept this ideal (imaginary perfection), and allow it into their lives. Then it becomes a divinity, like God, something we accept, believe in, and have faith in. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, when someone says 'tell the truth' and you tell what you believe to be the truth but you are wrong, you have made an honest mistake but you have not 'told the truth'. You have been honest, but not truthful. And no, that doesn't imply any of what you said in the second paragraph here.

I don't know how you can consistently say that someone can say what they believe and be wrong. I don't know how your beliefs allow for honest mistakes.

Believing and doing are distinct things. If a person could sit in meditation, without doing anything, they could believe "any old nonsense, and believe it's true" as you say. However, life requires action or we die. When we move to act, our beliefs are tested for usefulness. Ones which do not produce success are forgotten, and no longer is it possible that a person believes any old nonsense. Beliefs of "any old nonsense" die with those who hold them. And "rules" which prove to be useful prevail over our activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think that life requires action or we die? Just believe something different and it won't anymore according to your position.

It is those of us who believe that there is a world beyond our beliefs that are entitled to suggest that one's beliefs can come into conflict with reality and prove to not be useful. If you think that anything you believe actually is true, then surely you can just stop believing that that lion is going to eat you, and it won't.

Consider the implications of what you are saying here. Do you meant to imply that a doctor is not responsible for the death of a patient when proscribing a medicine that is lethal to a patient who has a specific condition. It seems like you are implying that doctors need not check for potential risk factors at all. I imagine you don't mean to imply this. — Dan

You are not getting it Dan. The subject matter here, the issue which the example exposes, is the relevance of particular circumstances. The nature of particular circumstances is that they are features unique to the individual situation and therefore are outside the applicability of general, universal principles. In Aristotelian logic, these particular circumstances, which escape the formal rules, are known as accidents.

What you have done in reply here, is instead of respecting the reality of, and the nature of, particular circumstances, as features which fall outside the applicability of the universal rules, you have produced a universal rule to include that particular set of circumstances. This just indicates that you misunderstand the nature of particular circumstances. If it was feasible to produce a universal rule for every particular set of circumstances, then the applicability of universal rules would be negated, by the requirement of a different rule for every particular set of circumstances.

Sorry, are you suggesting something is objective? — Dan

That's right, I do not deny the relevance of "objectivity". What I am arguing is that "truth" and "right", as concepts produced by human subjects, are wrongly represented as "objective". To argue that "truth" and "right" are wrongly classed as "objective" does not imply that there is nothing which can be classed as "objective".

As for how they can be the same thing, that's easy, not things that are objective are the same thing. — Dan

Huh?

That just isn't so. Even if we take objective to imply that it is observable to someone other than the subject, which I don't agree with, something being observable doesn't make it immutable. We might imagine a mind reader who can tell what you desire, but you might nevertheless be able to overcome that desire or not act in accordance with it. — Dan

The point though, is that to consider opposing desires, as we do in deliberation, it is required that contrary desires are predicable of the same subject, at the same time, in violation of the law of noncontradiction. The three fundamental laws of logic dictate how we understand objects. Objects have identity as an object, and what we say about "the object" must obey the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

If we make the subject the object, as you propose in saying that the subject's desires are objective, there is an incompatibility with the law of noncontradiction when the object has contrary predicates (desires) at the same time, as is evident in deliberation.

I see a few possible solutions.

The first, most obvious possibility is to allow for a general violation of the law of noncontradiction. However, this has far reaching ramifications for our capacity to understand "the object", and further ramifications on the nature of "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects) in general.

The next possibility which I see, is to alter the law of identity, design a form of "identity", which allows that the identity of a subject, as an identifiable object, is a different kind of object (allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction) from other types of objects (not allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction). However, this is very confusing because now we have two distinct types of objects, those which obey the law of noncontradiction, and those which do not. Further, this would produce a bifurcation in "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects), according to that same division. Since the same words are used, "object", "objective", etc., equivocation and very significant, and important, misunderstanding, is inevitable.

What I propose therefore, is to maintain the separation between subject and object. This allows distinct words, "subject" and "object", so that we do not confuse things which are "subjective" (of the subject) with things which are "objective" (of the object). In this way, we are not inclined to call things which are property of the subject, like desires, "objective", because we maintain a proper separation between the categories, subject and object. That this categorical separation is required is demonstrated by the fact that understanding of "the object" is facilitated by adhering to the three fundamental laws of logic. However, understanding of "the subject" is facilitated by allowing for violation of those laws. This is because the fundamental, or essential nature of the object (describable by determinist principles), is incompatible with the fundamental, or essential nature of the subject (describable by the principles of free will).

It does tell you how to act. It tells you what you should and shouldn't do, specifically, tells you which maxims you should and shouldn't act in accordance with. — Dan

No it really doesn't tell you this, because you still have to make the decision for yourself, rather than having the categorical imperative state it for you.

Also, it is your position that claims one cannot be wrong. My position is there is a right answer, and I am attempting to find it. Yours appears to be that whatever one thinks, they're right. — Dan

You seem to be forgetting what I am arguing. Being right is not simply a matter of truth, there is also the issue of justification.

This is exactly the problem with your approach, You state all these things about obective truth and objective right, which you seem to honestly believe, therefore they are true for you, but you haven't been able to justify any of it. Your attempts demonstrate incoherency in your beliefs.

They really aren't. One of them can be incorrect. If I like chocolate ice cream and you prefer strawberry, one of us isn't wrong. If you think the world is flat and I think it's round(ish) one of us is wrong. — Dan

This example is not applicable. Claims about the world being flat, or round, are not claims about objective reality, they are claims about the world. You continue to demonstrate that you just do not understand predication at all.

The Euthyphro dilemma shows that suggesting that the good/pious is determined by god/the gods leads one to either the good/pious being arbitrary or nor actually being determined by god/the gods after all. But this does not mean that there is no objective good/right. Good/right in the moral sense need not be 'determined' by anyone. — Dan

You're right that the arguments themselves do not produce that conclusion. However, as I said, we are meant to infer, from the context of the dialogue, in relation to the human court trials of impiety, that pious/impious is determined by human beings. That is the way that Platonic arguments work. Plato demonstrates the unsound deductive arguments of others, unsound due to faulty premises. Then he provides information which is evidence for the probable correct premise. So the conclusion (the correct premise) is more like an inductive conclusion, based in evidence and probability, rather than a deductive proof.

Look at the conclusions more critically. Pious/good is not determined by the gods or God. Pious/good might be arbitrary. But obviously it is not arbitrary, because there are human trials going on which determine pious/good. That's the evidence. The conclusion we ought to draw, is obvious, human beings determine pious/good, in a non-arbitrary way.

I am not 'assigning' value to it, I am suggesting that it might be morally valuable. Valuable as such. Valuable whether or not anyone values it. What one should do (or how one should be, or what one should pursue etc) regardless of what one wants. A categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one. — Dan

This makes no sense. If you say that it is morally valuable, then you are assigning value to it, moral value. What could "valuable, but not valued by anyone" possibly mean? What would justify the claim that it is valuable? And if you say "it's just a belief", then as I explained, a belief must be justifiable through application, or it's worthless. Therefore it's a belief with no value, and self-contradicting.

It is not my subjective opinion. It is my belief on an objective matter. — Dan

Unless it is justifiable, it is just a subjective opinion. I think I've adequately demonstrated that your supposed concept of "objective truth" is unjustifiable. Therefore it is a subjective opinion.

I don't know how you can consistently say that someone can say what they believe and be wrong. I don't know how your beliefs allow for honest mistakes. — Dan

I think you are continuing to judge "subjective truth" from your premise that truth must be objective. Of course this is the instance of' begging the question' which I explained earlier. It makes "subjective truth" appear self-contradictory to you. Therefore you make all sorts of absurd conclusions about subjective truth. The problem, obviously, is that you are not letting go of your premise that truth must be objective, before considering the concept of "subjective truth".

Why do you think that life requires action or we die? Just believe something different and it won't anymore according to your position. — Dan

I don't see your point. We must breathe, eat, etc.. If you believe that you can live without these go ahead and try. I will then judge whether you've justified those beliefs or not.

You haven't demonstrated anything but a complete lack of understanding of the subject of moral philosophy. I recommend reading any introductory ethics textbook. — Dan

:roll:

You are not getting it Dan. The subject matter here, the issue which the example exposes, is the relevance of particular circumstances. The nature of particular circumstances is that they are features unique to the individual situation and therefore are outside the applicability of general, universal principles. In Aristotelian logic, these particular circumstances, which escape the formal rules, are known as accidents.

What you have done in reply here, is instead of respecting the reality of, and the nature of, particular circumstances, as features which fall outside the applicability of the universal rules, you have produced a universal rule to include that particular set of circumstances. This just indicates that you misunderstand the nature of particular circumstances. If it was feasible to produce a universal rule for every particular set of circumstances, then the applicability of universal rules would be negated, by the requirement of a different rule for every particular set of circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

Universal rules do apply to every particular circumstance. That's what makes them universal.

That's right, I do not deny the relevance of "objectivity". What I am arguing is that "truth" and "right", as concepts produced by human subjects, are wrongly represented as "objective". To argue that "truth" and "right" are wrongly classed as "objective" does not imply that there is nothing which can be classed as "objective". — Metaphysician Undercover

If not the truth, what can be objective? Are you perhaps using "truth" in some non-standard way? Perhaps you agree that there is an objective world with facts about it, but don't want to refer to these facts as true?

Huh? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, typo. Not all things that are objective are the same thing.

The point though, is that to consider opposing desires, as we do in deliberation, it is required that contrary desires are predicable of the same subject, at the same time, in violation of the law of noncontradiction. The three fundamental laws of logic dictate how we understand objects. Objects have identity as an object, and what we say about "the object" must obey the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

If we make the subject the object, as you propose in saying that the subject's desires are objective, there is an incompatibility with the law of noncontradiction when the object has contrary predicates (desires) at the same time, as is evident in deliberation.

I see a few possible solutions.

The first, most obvious possibility is to allow for a general violation of the law of noncontradiction. However, this has far reaching ramifications for our capacity to understand "the object", and further ramifications on the nature of "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects) in general.

The next possibility which I see, is to alter the law of identity, design a form of "identity", which allows that the identity of a subject, as an identifiable object, is a different kind of object (allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction) from other types of objects (not allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction). However, this is very confusing because now we have two distinct types of objects, those which obey the law of noncontradiction, and those which do not. Further, this would produce a bifurcation in "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects), according to that same division. Since the same words are used, "object", "objective", etc., equivocation and very significant, and important, misunderstanding, is inevitable.

What I propose therefore, is to maintain the separation between subject and object. This allows distinct words, "subject" and "object", so that we do not confuse things which are "subjective" (of the subject) with things which are "objective" (of the object). In this way, we are not inclined to call things which are property of the subject, like desires, "objective", because we maintain a proper separation between the categories, subject and object. That this categorical separation is required is demonstrated by the fact that understanding of "the object" is facilitated by adhering to the three fundamental laws of logic. However, understanding of "the subject" is facilitated by allowing for violation of those laws. This is because the fundamental, or essential nature of the object (describable by determinist principles), is incompatible with the fundamental, or essential nature of the subject (describable by the principles of free will). — Metaphysician Undercover

A much easier way to go would be to recognize that having conflicting desires is not in violation of the law of noncontradiction since having the property of "wanting to eat cake" and the property of "wanting to be thin" or whatever conflicting desires you like, aren't mutually exclusive and one does not imply the lack of the other.

No it really doesn't tell you this, because you still have to make the decision for yourself, rather than having the categorical imperative state it for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not really sure what you mean by this. Morality tells us how we should act, but you still make the decision of whether to do so yourself. It doesn't make you act in some way. But perhaps you mean instead that there are multiple maxims one might act in accordance with that may all be acceptable according to the categorical imperative? That's also not problematic, as morality telling you what to do doesn't require it to tell you that only one thing is permissible. There may be multiple actions that are morally permissible. That doesn't make the moral theory in question not action-guiding.

You seem to be forgetting what I am arguing. Being right is not simply a matter of truth, there is also the issue of justification.

This is exactly the problem with your approach, You state all these things about obective truth and objective right, which you seem to honestly believe, therefore they are true for you, but you haven't been able to justify any of it. Your attempts demonstrate incoherency in your beliefs. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have given good reasons to believe in what I have presented. I have not demonstrated incoherence or inconsistency in my beliefs. These accusations have been based on either misunderstanding the core concepts under discussion or on simply claiming I am making claims that I am not.

This example is not applicable. Claims about the world being flat, or round, are not claims about objective reality, they are claims about the world. You continue to demonstrate that you just do not understand predication at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

The planet that we live on is very much a part of objective reality. Claims about what shape it is absolutely are claims about objective reality.

Look at the conclusions more critically. Pious/good is not determined by the gods or God. Pious/good might be arbitrary. But obviously it is not arbitrary, because there are human trials going on which determine pious/good. That's the evidence. The conclusion we ought to draw, is obvious, human beings determine pious/good, in a non-arbitrary way. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a poor conclusion to draw from that information. First, that people would have a trial for something does not mean it exists in the first place (plenty of witchcraft trials, but no witches). Second, these things need not be "determined" by anyone, but rather discovered. Certainly we might have a trial where we attempt to discover the truth.

This makes no sense. If you say that it is morally valuable, then you are assigning value to it, moral value. What could "valuable, but not valued by anyone" possibly mean? What would justify the claim that it is valuable? And if you say "it's just a belief", then as I explained, a belief must be justifiable through application, or it's worthless. Therefore it's a belief with no value, and self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't say "it's just a belief". I give reasons why this is an appropriate belief to hold. And no, I am not assigning moral value to it, rather I am suggesting that it already has moral value as an objective fact. What "value" could mean in this context is that its presence determines the morality of actions (that's not an entire or formal definition of moral value of course, but rather an example of what it can mean for something to have moral value).

Unless it is justifiable, it is just a subjective opinion. I think I've adequately demonstrated that your supposed concept of "objective truth" is unjustifiable. Therefore it is a subjective opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have demonstrated that it is the only justified option. There are potentially other reasons to think so, but the fact that it is the only option where we can consider whether beliefs are justified (since it is possible for them to be wrong) or have any kind of meaningful discussion about anything, provides good enough reason in this case.

I think you are continuing to judge "subjective truth" from your premise that truth must be objective. Of course this is the instance of' begging the question' which I explained earlier. It makes "subjective truth" appear self-contradictory to you. Therefore you make all sorts of absurd conclusions about subjective truth. The problem, obviously, is that you are not letting go of your premise that truth must be objective, before considering the concept of "subjective truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am just taking what you have said at face value and pointing out that it is inconsistent.

I don't see your point. We must breathe, eat, etc.. If you believe that you can live without these go ahead and try. I will then judge whether you've justified those beliefs or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

My point is that your view that anything you believe is true is nonsense. I agree that we must breathe, eat, etc, but that is because there is an objective fact of the matter. Your position seems to be that if you believed that you no longer needed to eat, or breathe, then you would no longer need to.

Perhaps not my most polite of comments. Perhaps while attempting to spit someone else's words out of my mouth, I accidentally spat out some venom.

Universal rules do apply to every particular circumstance. That's what makes them universal. — Dan

I believe you are conflating "descriptive rules" with "prescriptive rules". A universal, descriptive rule, such as "we ought to do what is good", does not apply as a prescriptive rule. It is categorically distinct, as stating what is the case (description) rather than stating something we ought to do (prescription). What causes the confusion, is that it is a descriptive statement about what is valued, or as I say, what is desired.

The descriptive rule does not tell us how to act, it tells us "what is the case". A prescriptive rule, such as "you ought to save an abandoned baby", tells a person how to act, by projecting what is valued or desired into the individual. Descriptive value-based rules, such as "abandoned babies should be saved", and even "people should save abandoned babies", do not tell anyone how to act. Notice, that once the universal "people" is used, the statement becomes a descriptive "is" statement, as compared to the prescriptive which is directed at the individual named as "you".

Kant's so-called categorical imperative is a descriptive value-based rule. It tells us what is the case, that there is a prescriptive rule for every situation. As a descriptive rule, it does not tell us how to act. Prescriptive rules tell us how to act.

Are you perhaps using "truth" in some non-standard way? — Dan

I am using "truth" in a different standard way. If you check a dictionary you will notice two basic ways to use that word.

A much easier way to go would be to recognize that having conflicting desires is not in violation of the law of noncontradiction since having the property of "wanting to eat cake" and the property of "wanting to be thin" or whatever conflicting desires you like, aren't mutually exclusive and one does not imply the lack of the other. — Dan

All you do here is use sophistry to hide what you truly understand as contradictory. The properties of "wanting to eat cake", and "wanting not to eat cake", which make it difficult to decide whether or not to eat cake, are truly contradictory.

This way that you have, of refusing to accept what you know to be true, because it is inconsistent with the principles you espouse, is a sort of dishonesty, self-deception which interferes with good philosophical discourse. That is what led to the impasse in our discussion of "understanding". When it comes down to looking at these conditions which are internal to us, subjective features, you make statements which are completely inconsistent with my personal experience. This is the case now with your attempt to make "desire" objective. I cannot agree with such statements, and you refuse to consider the possibility that your statements may be inconsistent with your own experience. The impasse is imposed.

I'm not really sure what you mean by this. Morality tells us how we should act, but you still make the decision of whether to do so yourself. It doesn't make you act in some way. But perhaps you mean instead that there are multiple maxims one might act in accordance with that may all be acceptable according to the categorical imperative? That's also not problematic, as morality telling you what to do doesn't require it to tell you that only one thing is permissible. There may be multiple actions that are morally permissible. That doesn't make the moral theory in question not action-guiding. — Dan

The point is that a universal descriptive statement, by the fact that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive,, does not tell a person how to act. That is the point of the is/ought divide. The universal, descriptive statement, is a statement of what is the case, which may or may not have been produced from good inductive reasoning. So, "one ought to do good" is a descriptive value-based statement of what "is" the case, which may or may not be a good inductive conclusion. It does not, in any way, tell a person how to act. Notice there is no actions described. This is the same category mistake you repeat over and over. Because it is a value-based descriptive statement it uses the word "ought". By using the word "ought" in the phrase, it appears like the phrase is a prescriptive statement, telling a person what act one ought to make, but it's clearly not. In a similar way, "the world is changing" doesn't tell us anything about the way that the world "is".

So the issue (problem) is the gap between the universal, descriptive statement, and how one should act in any particular situation, consequently what one "ought" to do. In any particular situation, an individual must decide, which universal statements are applicable, and how to apply them toward what is desired or valued personally, by the individual. This will include universal value-based statements, which influence what the person desires, or values. It is this act of choice, by the individual, in the particular situation, which determines which universal statements are relevant, in relation to the individual's personal desires and values, which "tells a person how to act". Notice, it is an act of choice which tells the person how to act, not any specific universal statement, or set of universal statements. It is clearly not the universal statements which tell the person how to act, because the person must establish a relation between these statements and what is personally desired.

I have given good reasons to believe in what I have presented. — Dan

Your so-called "good reasons" to believe in objective truth, is that it is the only thing which makes sense to you. That is nothing other than a subjective opinion. So a true, honest understanding of your "objective truth" reveals it to be subjective.

And when you apply your premise of objective truth toward trying to understand "subjective truth", you create a contradiction which makes subjective truth appear to be absurd. These absurdities created by your begging the question constitutes your "good reasons".

The planet that we live on is very much a part of objective reality. Claims about what shape it is absolutely are claims about objective reality. — Dan

That's a composition fallacy.

And no, I am not assigning moral value to it, rather I am suggesting that it already has moral value as an objective fact. What "value" could mean in this context is that its presence determines the morality of actions (that's not an entire or formal definition of moral value of course, but rather an example of what it can mean for something to have moral value). — Dan

This merely demonstrates the incoherency of "has moral value as an objective fact". You are proposing, as a personal (subjective) opinion, your choice of "value", as a principle which "determines the morality of actions". You support this principle with reasons, an attempt at justification. Your reasons are "it is an objective fact".

Obviously, it is not an objective fact. It is your subjective opinion, an idea which you are proposing. And if you are capable of supporting this principle, it is a justified idea. But no amount of justification can turn it into an "objective fact" as you desire this to mean, independent from human values. Therefore "it is an objective fact" is incapable of justifying your opinion.

I have demonstrated that it is the only justified option. — Dan

No, you really haven't. You begged the question, assuming objective truth as a primary premise, then from this premise you show how the secondary premise of "subjective truth" produces absurdities. Duh! Obviously when you assume contradictory premises, the result is absurd.

There are potentially other reasons to think so, but the fact that it is the only option where we can consider whether beliefs are justified (since it is possible for them to be wrong) or have any kind of meaningful discussion about anything, provides good enough reason in this case. — Dan

Why do you think that the premise of objective truth provides the only means for justification? I already explained to you how application of beliefs in actual pratise is what justifies them. Further, I explained how we employ principles such as the law of noncontradiction in our judgements of justification.

It is your assumption of "objective truth", which is absolutely useless for any form of justification. What are we supposed to do, compare a belief with "the objective truth" to judge that belief in justification? Where would we find that "objective truth" to make the comparison, when all that appears to us is beliefs?

My point is that your view that anything you believe is true is nonsense. — Dan

Actually, if you had taken just a tiny bit of your precious ten years, to think about this, you would easily have recognized that the idea of "being true" as independent from "being believed to be true", is what is nonsense. There is absolutely nothing to the judgement "X is true" other than a belief that X is true.

I agree that we must breathe, eat, etc, but that is because there is an objective fact of the matter. — Dan

You have clearly reversed the logical priority here. Because we observe the necessity in the following, "we must breathe, eat, etc,", then we infer the logical conclusion, "there is an objective fact of the matter". Do you understand the difference? Please take some time to consider this because it is very important.

We cannot proceed logically from the premise "there is an objective fact of the matter", to the conclusion "we must breathe, eat, etc.", as you do when you say "that is because there is an objective fact of the matter". This is because these things, the need to breathe, eat, etc.. do not necessarily follow from a supposed "objective world". The premise "objective world" does not necessitate logically the need to eat, breathe, etc., so we cannot say that the need for these things is because there is an objective fact of the matter. This is the issue with free will as well. Freely chosen acts are not necessitated by "objective fact", that is the gap between what is, and what we choose, (and what we ought to choose), which cannot be bridged with logic, due to that lack of necessity.

However. we can proceed in the other direction, the inverse way, logically. We can look at the evidence, "we must breathe", "we must eat", etc., and the necessity provided by "must", produces what is required to make a logical conclusion about the "objective world" within which the subject lives. Notice though, that "must" (the form of necessity specified here), is as means to the end, which is "to live". If we assign "value" to life, then we can say things like "we ought to breathe", "we ought to eat", and these "oughts" are supported by the value assigned to living, as the end.

Notice that "the obective world" is produced as a logical conclusion from our observations, induced by our observations of "necessity". The very same type of observations of what is natural to us, as living beings, produces inductive conclusions about what is valued. Then, we can make logical conclusions about what is "necessary" in this other sense, as required to achieve those ends. But starting with "there is an objective fact about the matter" gives us nothing to base any logic in, because the is/ought gap cannot be bridged in this direction.

I believe you are conflating "descriptive rules" with "prescriptive rules". A universal, descriptive rule, such as "we ought to do what is good", does not apply as a prescriptive rule. It is categorically distinct, as stating what is the case (description) rather than stating something we ought to do (prescription). What causes the confusion, is that it is a descriptive statement about what is valued, or as I say, what is desired.

The descriptive rule does not tell us how to act, it tells us "what is the case". A prescriptive rule, such as "you ought to save an abandoned baby", tells a person how to act, by projecting what is valued or desired into the individual. Descriptive value-based rules, such as "abandoned babies should be saved", and even "people should save abandoned babies", do not tell anyone how to act. Notice, that once the universal "people" is used, the statement becomes a descriptive "is" statement, as compared to the prescriptive which is directed at the individual named as "you".

Kant's so-called categorical imperative is a descriptive value-based rule. It tells us what is the case, that there is a prescriptive rule for every situation. As a descriptive rule, it does not tell us how to act. Prescriptive rules tell us how to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

"We ought to do good" is a normative statement, not a descriptive one. You can tell because it's about what one ought to do. Kant's categorical imperative also attempts to tell us what we ought to do (or in this what we ought not to do) so it is normative, rather than descriptive.

I am using "truth" in a different standard way. If you check a dictionary you will notice two basic ways to use that word. — Metaphysician Undercover

By all means explain what you mean.

All you do here is use sophistry to hide what you truly understand as contradictory. The properties of "wanting to eat cake", and "wanting not to eat cake", which make it difficult to decide whether or not to eat cake, are truly contradictory.

This way that you have, of refusing to accept what you know to be true, because it is inconsistent with the principles you espouse, is a sort of dishonesty, self-deception which interferes with good philosophical discourse. That is what led to the impasse in our discussion of "understanding". When it comes down to looking at these conditions which are internal to us, subjective features, you make statements which are completely inconsistent with my personal experience. This is the case now with your attempt to make "desire" objective. I cannot agree with such statements, and you refuse to consider the possibility that your statements may be inconsistent with your own experience. The impasse is imposed. — Metaphysician Undercover

They aren't contradictory properties. One doesn't imply the lack of the other. This seems very obvious to me, and I certainly don't know the opposite to be true. This isn't sophistry, nor is it inconsistent with my own experience. I have conflicting desires all the time. I don't lose one desire because I choose to act in accordance with a conflicting one. We are entirely capable of having conflicting desires, there's nothing about that which runs afoul of the lack of non-contradiction.

Further, I don't have any particular attachment to the idea that desires are objective, but it seems as though we can be wrong about what it is that we desire, which suggests that there is some objective truth to the matter.

The point is that a universal descriptive statement, by the fact that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive,, does not tell a person how to act. That is the point of the is/ought divide. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is true, but Kant's categorical imperative is very much a normative claim.

So, "one ought to do good" is a descriptive value-based statement of what "is" the case, which may or may not be a good inductive conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. The biggest clue that it is a claim about what one ought to do might be the word "ought".

Your so-called "good reasons" to believe in objective truth, is that it is the only thing which makes sense to you. That is nothing other than a subjective opinion. So a true, honest understanding of your "objective truth" reveals it to be subjective.

And when you apply your premise of objective truth toward trying to understand "subjective truth", you create a contradiction which makes subjective truth appear to be absurd. These absurdities created by your begging the question constitutes your "good reasons". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not a subjective opinion, but a belief regarding objective fact based on reason. And not because it is the only thing that "makes sense to me" but rather because it is the only viable option for any kind of investigation, discussion, discovery, and really anything worth doing. "Subjective truth" is absurd, it's not me making it appear that way.

That's a composition fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. It would be a composition fallacy if I were to suggest that anything true of the planet we live on would be true of the whole of objective reality. It is not a composition fallacy to point out that the planet we live on exists objectively and claims made about it are claims about (a part of) objective reality.

This merely demonstrates the incoherency of "has moral value as an objective fact". You are proposing, as a personal (subjective) opinion, your choice of "value", as a principle which "determines the morality of actions". You support this principle with reasons, an attempt at justification. Your reasons are "it is an objective fact".

Obviously, it is not an objective fact. It is your subjective opinion, an idea which you are proposing. And if you are capable of supporting this principle, it is a justified idea. But no amount of justification can turn it into an "objective fact" as you desire this to mean, independent from human values. Therefore "it is an objective fact" is incapable of justifying your opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not proposing anything as a personal subjective opinion. I propose a candidate for objective value which I support with reasons which I have mentioned both in this discussion and in the initial primer, my reasons are not "it is an objective fact".

No, you really haven't. You begged the question, assuming objective truth as a primary premise, then from this premise you show how the secondary premise of "subjective truth" produces absurdities. Duh! Obviously when you assume contradictory premises, the result is absurd. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I allowed for things to be true subjectively and showed that this leads to absurdity. Things being true "subjectively" is what allows for contradictory premises, although exactly what you mean by being true subjectively has been difficult to pin down as you seem to make claims that you seem to be making about objective facts.

Why do you think that the premise of objective truth provides the only means for justification? I already explained to you how application of beliefs in actual pratise is what justifies them. Further, I explained how we employ principles such as the law of noncontradiction in our judgements of justification.

It is your assumption of "objective truth", which is absolutely useless for any form of justification. What are we supposed to do, compare a belief with "the objective truth" to judge that belief in justification? Where would we find that "objective truth" to make the comparison, when all that appears to us is beliefs? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. It is only with this assumption, that we can be wrong, that we can determine what beliefs can or cannot be justified.

And no, I do not suggest we have access to the objective truth of all matters (perhaps we do for some things, like the cogito, but not much) but we do our best to figure out what the world is like by considering the evidence we have available to us. If we instead assume that whatever we believe is correct, then there is no need for any of this surely.

Actually, if you had taken just a tiny bit of your precious ten years, to think about this, you would easily have recognized that the idea of "being true" as independent from "being believed to be true", is what is nonsense. There is absolutely nothing to the judgement "X is true" other than a belief that X is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the truth isn't the judgement. The fact isn't the belief. Again, people can be wrong.

You have clearly reversed the logical priority here. Because we observe the necessity in the following, "we must breathe, eat, etc,", then we infer the logical conclusion, "there is an objective fact of the matter". Do you understand the difference? Please take some time to consider this because it is very important.

We cannot proceed logically from the premise "there is an objective fact of the matter", to the conclusion "we must breathe, eat, etc.", as you do when you say "that is because there is an objective fact of the matter". This is because these things, the need to breathe, eat, etc.. do not necessarily follow from a supposed "objective world". The premise "objective world" does not necessitate logically the need to eat, breathe, etc., so we cannot say that the need for these things is because there is an objective fact of the matter. This is the issue with free will as well. Freely chosen acts are not necessitated by "objective fact", that is the gap between what is, and what we choose, (and what we ought to choose), which cannot be bridged with logic, due to that lack of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I think you are assuming I'm doing something here that I'm just not. I'm not suggesting for a second that we can tell that we need to eat and breathe because the truth is objective. What I am suggesting is that if you don't think there is an objective fact about whether we need to eat and breathe (which requires there to be such a thing as objective facts/objective truth) then you must accept that if you believed otherwise, you wouldn't need to breathe or eat.

Notice that "the obective world" is produced as a logical conclusion from our observations, induced by our observations of "necessity". The very same type of observations of what is natural to us, as living beings, produces inductive conclusions about what is valued. Then, we can make logical conclusions about what is "necessary" in this other sense, as required to achieve those ends. But starting with "there is an objective fact about the matter" gives us nothing to base any logic in, because the is/ought gap cannot be bridged in this direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't produced by the logical conclusion. We must assume there is objective truth in order to come to any conclusions about what we must do in any sense.

And again, you are bringing in the is/ought gap where it doesn't belong. There isn't any attempts to jump from the descriptive to the normative without intervening normative premises here. It is you who are making the claim that we must eat and breathe if we want to live (which is debatably normative in a pretty limited sense). I completely agree with this claim, and am simply pointing out that unless we think that our beliefs about the world can be wrong, then presumably anyone who does not believe this would not need to eat or breathe.

"We ought to do good" is a normative statement, not a descriptive one. You can tell because it's about what one ought to do — Dan

This really depends on how one would interpret the statement. If you interpret it as a value judgement, then it is making a subjective normative statement, indicating that the author believes that the type of action which one ought to do, is the good type. Then it might be interpreted as a normative statement, telling you that there is a type of act, called a good act, which is what you ought. Of course you can see how useless such a statement, as a normative statement, would be, as it gives no indicatinon as to how to identify an act as a good one. That's why I say it really is not a normative statement, because it says nothing about what type of acts one should make, only naming them as good acts.

But if you interpret it as an objectively true proposition, then it is a descriptive statement indicating that acts which are referred to with "ought" are only those describable as "good". In this case, the statement is interpreted as intended to demonstration (through a sort of description), the meaning of "ought". This is analogous to "all bachelors are unmarried men". It can be interpreted as a normative (subjective value) statement, meaning you ought only use "bachelor" to refer to a married man, or you can interpret it as a demonstrative, descriptive (objectively true) proposition, meaning that if it is called "bachelor" it is an unmarried man.

As a demonstrative, descriptive statement, is a more meaningful interpretation of "we ought to do good". Then if we are told "you ought to do X", we know that X is good, or desirable, from this descriptive interpretation. "We ought to do good" demonstrates the meaning of "ought", through that description, just like "all bachelors are unmarried men" demonstrates the meaning of "bachelor" through that description.

Clearly, these two modes of interpretation are completely different from each other, and this constitutes a form of ambiguity. To mix them up, and conflate the two is a form of equivocation which was common to classical sophistry, as demonstrated by Plato.

This is the type of sophistry which you are currently engaged in Dan. You interpret the statement true by definition, and you assume that this provides "objective truth" to the normative interpretation. So, you also take the inverted, normative (subjective value) interpretation of that statement, and you conflate the two. The conflation of two distinct, and incompatible interpretations provides you with the fallacious conclusion of a normative statement with objective truth.

They aren't contradictory properties. One doesn't imply the lack of the other. — Dan

If you say the desire to eat cake, and the desire to not eat cake, are not contradictory properties, then this is simple denial. And to stretch for other words to describe the desire to not eat cake, (the desire to lose weight or something like that), just demonstrates your refusal to acknowledge what "deliberation" really consists of, weighing the reasons for and against accepting a proposal.

I have conflicting desires all the time. — Dan

OK, now please accept the implications of this admission. If you are the subject, and you have contrary desires, then this means that if we are to predicate desires of that subject, you, in the same way that we predicate properties concerning an object with an identity, we must allow for violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Will you accept that, or are you going to go back to describing the "conflicting desires" with words that create the appearance that such desires are not really contradictory, in the way of sophistry?

That is true, but Kant's categorical imperative is very much a normative claim. — Dan

As indicated above, it can be interpreted in two very distinct ways. If you interpret the categorical imperative as "normative", then it is a subjective value statement. If you interpret it as a proposition with "objective truth", then it is a descriptive principle.

The biggest clue that it is a claim about what one ought to do might be the word "ought". — Dan

As explained above, the word "ought" does not necessarily imply that the statement indicates what one ought to do. To make that assumption would cause equivocation, when the statement was demonstrative, demonstrating or describing the meaning of "ought".

Here, let me formulate the statement in a slightly different way to demonstrate. "The acts which a person ought to do, are acts which are good." See how the statement is descriptive, and demonstrating the meaning of "ought", by describing what we ought to do, as good acts. This makes the same descriptive statement as "we ought to do what is good".

No, not a subjective opinion, but a belief regarding objective fact based on reason. — Dan

How is "belief regarding objective fact based on reason" anything other than a subjective opinion to you?
I'll refer you back to your claims about understanding one's own choice, to show you that having reasons for what one believes, does not negate the subjectivity of the belief.

No it isn't. It would be a composition fallacy if I were to suggest that anything true of the planet we live on would be true of the whole of objective reality. — Dan

That's exactly what you did do. You said that a belief about the planet is a belief about objective reality.

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. It is only with this assumption, that we can be wrong, that we can determine what beliefs can or cannot be justified. — Dan

I do not deny reality beyond what we believe. I deny that there is truth beyond what we believe, unless one assumes God or some other divinity.

No, I allowed for things to be true subjectively and showed that this leads to absurdity. Things being true "subjectively" is what allows for contradictory premises, although exactly what you mean by being true subjectively has been difficult to pin down as you seem to make claims that you seem to be making about objective facts. — Dan

Contradictory premises are common, so we have to accept that as part of reality. And, as explained above, it is necessary to allow predications of contradictory desires of the same subject at the same time. Therefore it is necessary to understand the reality of contradiction as a very important, and significant aspect of the subjective reality. Denying subjectivity because it allows for the reality of contradiction, is the mistaken approach, because deliberation, where contrary premises coexist, is very real, and we need to account for it as a significant part of reality.

So when a person deliberates on contrary beliefs, e.g. "the world is flat", and "the world is round" then we allow for violation of the law of excluded middle, the person believes neither. Or, if we represent this deliberation in the form of desires "the person wants to believe that the world is flat", and "the person wants to believe that the world is round", both at the same time, then the desires violate the law of noncontradiction, as explained above.

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. — Dan

I've told you already there is clearly very much beyond what people believe. I've just argued that its incoherent to say there is truth there, beyond what people believe, unless we attribute that truth to God.

But the truth isn't the judgement. The fact isn't the belief. Again, people can be wrong. — Dan

This indicates the problem about your perspective which I pointed out already. If, as is indicated here, "truth", and "fact" signify an exclusion of the possibility of error, then it is irrelevant to this world of human beliefs which we are talking about. If this is what you want from "truth", that the possibility of error is completely excluded, then we cannot use the word at all in talking about human affairs, because human beings are fallible, and cannot exclude the possibility of error. If this is what you desire from "truth" then we can never truthfully call a human belief "true", and the word becomes useless to us.

Therefore we need to respect the reality that "truth" actually is a judgement. We judge propositions as true, we judge beliefs as true. And if we use "truth" in this other way, which you propose, as an independent, objective form of "truth", we need to respect the difference lest we equivocate. But this other sense of "truth" which you propose is completely irrelevant, so we do not need to use it at all. So we have to accept "truth" as a type of human judgement Of course the sophists will equivocate though, and say that some human judgements of "truth" are objective truths.

And no, I do not suggest we have access to the objective truth of all matters (perhaps we do for some things, like the cogito, but not much) but we do our best to figure out what the world is like by considering the evidence we have available to us. If we instead assume that whatever we believe is correct, then there is no need for any of this surely. — Dan

Human beings are fallible. No judgement of truth or fact, made by a human being can exclude the possibility of mistake. Therefore human beings cannot have "objective truth" in any matters.

Yeah, I think you are assuming I'm doing something here that I'm just not. I'm not suggesting for a second that we can tell that we need to eat and breathe because the truth is objective. What I am suggesting is that if you don't think there is an objective fact about whether we need to eat and breathe (which requires there to be such a thing as objective facts/objective truth) then you must accept that if you believed otherwise, you wouldn't need to breathe or eat. — Dan

We do not need to eat and breathe, as an "objective fact", that's the point. If we do not eat and breathe we simply die. So, we only need to eat and breathe if we want to stay alive. This makes "we need to eat and breathe" a subjective value statement. We only need to eat and breathe for the sake of that specific subjective end, to stay alive.

It isn't produced by the logical conclusion. We must assume there is objective truth in order to come to any conclusions about what we must do in any sense. — Dan

You are sorely mistaken. All we "need", to make conclusions about what we must do, is desires, goals or intentions, as well as some experience. The desires tell us what we want, and the experience tells us the successful method of getting it. From this we can make a conclusion about "what we must do". If a person is lacking in experience, then they proceed through trial and error, but this type of choice is not of what we "must" do, it's a choice with less imperative.

Your claim "We must assume there is objective truth" makes no sense at all. How does the assumption of "objective truth" even have any bearing on our conclusions about what we must do? We cannot assume to know the objective truth. So the idea of objective truth becomes completely irrelevant, and we make our conclusions about what we must do relative to what we desire, and our experience, as I explained.

This really depends on how one would interpret the statement. If you interpret it as a value judgement, then it is making a subjective normative statement, indicating that the author believes that the type of action which one ought to do, is the good type. Then it might be interpreted as a normative statement, telling you that there is a type of act, called a good act, which is what you ought. Of course you can see how useless such a statement, as a normative statement, would be, as it gives no indicatinon as to how to identify an act as a good one. That's why I say it really is not a normative statement, because it says nothing about what type of acts one should make, only naming them as good acts.

But if you interpret it as an objectively true proposition, then it is a descriptive statement indicating that acts which are referred to with "ought" are only those describable as "good". In this case, the statement is interpreted as intended to demonstration (through a sort of description), the meaning of "ought". This is analogous to "all bachelors are unmarried men". It can be interpreted as a normative (subjective value) statement, meaning you ought only use "bachelor" to refer to a married man, or you can interpret it as a demonstrative, descriptive (objectively true) proposition, meaning that if it is called "bachelor" it is an unmarried man.

As a demonstrative, descriptive statement, is a more meaningful interpretation of "we ought to do good". Then if we are told "you ought to do X", we know that X is good, or desirable, from this descriptive interpretation. "We ought to do good" demonstrates the meaning of "ought", through that description, just like "all bachelors are unmarried men" demonstrates the meaning of "bachelor" through that description.

Clearly, these two modes of interpretation are completely different from each other, and this constitutes a form of ambiguity. To mix them up, and conflate the two is a form of equivocation which was common to classical sophistry, as demonstrated by Plato.

This is the type of sophistry which you are currently engaged in Dan. You interpret the statement true by definition, and you assume that this provides "objective truth" to the normative interpretation. So, you also take the inverted, normative (subjective value) interpretation of that statement, and you conflate the two. The conflation of two distinct, and incompatible interpretations provides you with the fallacious conclusion of a normative statement with objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't do anything of the sort. I haven't been claiming that my position is correct because it is true by definition, nor have I been conflating different definitions in order to pull some dubious trick. The rest of this looks like highly dubious and you seem to be making a lot of assumptions you aren't entitled to and conflating terms and concepts inappropriately. What I will say is this:

"You ought to do good" is a normative claim. It appears to be making the claim that one (or you) ought to perform good actions or promote good, (as is distinct from simply refraining from committing bad actions). That seems the most obvious way to interpret it and what I would probably take someone to mean if they said it to me.

If you say the desire to eat cake, and the desire to not eat cake, are not contradictory properties, then this is simple denial. And to stretch for other words to describe the desire to not eat cake, (the desire to lose weight or something like that), just demonstrates your refusal to acknowledge what "deliberation" really consists of, weighing the reasons for and against accepting a proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are very often reasons for and against a proposal, but the desire to eat cake and the desire to lose weight are not contradictory in the sense of being contradictory properties. People can definitely have both of them. One might count against an action (such as eating a cake) and one might count for it. None of this is a problem.

OK, now please accept the implications of this admission. If you are the subject, and you have contrary desires, then this means that if we are to predicate desires of that subject, you, in the same way that we predicate properties concerning an object with an identity, we must allow for violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Will you accept that, or are you going to go back to describing the "conflicting desires" with words that create the appearance that such desires are not really contradictory, in the way of sophistry? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have consistently been using words to describe conflicting desires that do not create the appearance of them being contradictory, because they are in fact, not contradictory (in the sense of being contradictory properties in violation of the law of noncontradiction). This is not sophistry, this is talking about things sensibly as they are.

As indicated above, it can be interpreted in two very distinct ways. If you interpret the categorical imperative as "normative", then it is a subjective value statement. If you interpret it as a proposition with "objective truth", then it is a descriptive principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is incorrect. It is an objective normative principle. I don't think it's correct, but it appears to very much be aiming at objective truth.

As explained above, the word "ought" does not necessarily imply that the statement indicates what one ought to do. To make that assumption would cause equivocation, when the statement was demonstrative, demonstrating or describing the meaning of "ought".

Here, let me formulate the statement in a slightly different way to demonstrate. "The acts which a person ought to do, are acts which are good." See how the statement is descriptive, and demonstrating the meaning of "ought", by describing what we ought to do, as good acts. This makes the same descriptive statement as "we ought to do what is good". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, it is true that dictionaries aren't making normative claims when they talk about the meaning of the word "ought", but people are very rarely talking about the meaning of the word "ought" when they say "you ought to do good". This would be a very strange way to talk about the meaning of the word.

In this case, the first statement isn't totally clear about what it means, and the second statement appears not to mean what you are suggesting it does. It is possible to interpret it that way, but it would be odd to do so, and it would not be a very clear way of making that claim.

How is "belief regarding objective fact based on reason" anything other than a subjective opinion to you?
I'll refer you back to your claims about understanding one's own choice, to show you that having reasons for what one believes, does not negate the subjectivity of the belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, subjective opinions cannot be wrong, as there is no fact of the matter. Beliefs about objective matters of fact can be wrong.

That's exactly what you did do. You said that a belief about the planet is a belief about objective reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say that a belief about the planet was a belief about all of objective reality, rather that it is a belief about objective reality, in this case, a part of objective reality. The parts that are most accessible to us to know things about tend to be on our planet.

I do not deny reality beyond what we believe. I deny that there is truth beyond what we believe, unless one assumes God or some other divinity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what this means. Are you allowing for an objective reality that has features/properties that we can be right or wrong about? Because, if so, good news, you believe in objective truth.

This indicates the problem about your perspective which I pointed out already. If, as is indicated here, "truth", and "fact" signify an exclusion of the possibility of error, then it is irrelevant to this world of human beliefs which we are talking about. If this is what you want from "truth", that the possibility of error is completely excluded, then we cannot use the word at all in talking about human affairs, because human beings are fallible, and cannot exclude the possibility of error. If this is what you desire from "truth" then we can never truthfully call a human belief "true", and the word becomes useless to us.

Therefore we need to respect the reality that "truth" actually is a judgement. We judge propositions as true, we judge beliefs as true. And if we use "truth" in this other way, which you propose, as an independent, objective form of "truth", we need to respect the difference lest we equivocate. But this other sense of "truth" which you propose is completely irrelevant, so we do not need to use it at all. So we have to accept "truth" as a type of human judgement Of course the sophists will equivocate though, and say that some human judgements of "truth" are objective truths. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we can absolutely use the word "truth" because we can aim at truth even if we cannot know for sure we have got it. When we claim that something is true, we usually mean that we think it is true, since there are so few things we can be sure about. But the judgement that it is true is not itself the truth. The judgement can be wrong. What makes that judgement wrong is that it doesn't match up with the truth.

Human beings are fallible. No judgement of truth or fact, made by a human being can exclude the possibility of mistake. Therefore human beings cannot have "objective truth" in any matters. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting the cogito aside, you're rather missing the point here. Truth isn't the same as certainty. Just because something exists in the world doesn't mean we can know about it, and even if we do, we aren't likely to have complete certainty of it.

We do not need to eat and breathe, as an "objective fact", that's the point. If we do not eat and breathe we simply die. So, we only need to eat and breathe if we want to stay alive. This makes "we need to eat and breathe" a subjective value statement. We only need to eat and breathe for the sake of that specific subjective end, to stay alive. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very much nit-picking and avoiding the core point. If you don't think there is an objective fact to whether you not eating or breathing will lead to your death and that this is just subjective, then presumably you think that if you believe that failing to eat or breathe will not lead to your death, then it won't.

You are sorely mistaken. All we "need", to make conclusions about what we must do, is desires, goals or intentions, as well as some experience. The desires tell us what we want, and the experience tells us the successful method of getting it. From this we can make a conclusion about "what we must do". If a person is lacking in experience, then they proceed through trial and error, but this type of choice is not of what we "must" do, it's a choice with less imperative.

Your claim "We must assume there is objective truth" makes no sense at all. How does the assumption of "objective truth" even have any bearing on our conclusions about what we must do? We cannot assume to know the objective truth. So the idea of objective truth becomes completely irrelevant, and we make our conclusions about what we must do relative to what we desire, and our experience, as I explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we need a lot more. We need to assume that the future will resemble the past in order to draw from our experiences to make judgements about the future.

Again, you are confusing "there is objective truth" with "we know the objective truth". These are not the same, but the assumption that there is a reality beyond that which we believe is necessary to any investigation/discovery/analysis/etc. You can't improve your beliefs if they are all correct by definition.

here are very often reasons for and against a proposal, but the desire to eat cake and the desire to lose weight are not contradictory in the sense of being contradictory properties. People can definitely have both of them. One might count against an action (such as eating a cake) and one might count for it. None of this is a problem. — Dan

You are changing the description to suit your purpose. I am talking about deliberation, the desire to eat cake versus the desire to not eat cake. There may be numerous reasons to eat cake, and numerous reasons to not eat cake (of which the desire to lose weight may be one). I am not talking about any specific reasons, I am talking about deliberation, in general, which considers various reasons for and against a proposition, or idea. So your straw man is not relevant.

Now, once you get beyond the straw man, you will see that people "can definitely have both" of contradictory desires. If, a person is weighing factors against, and for, a specific action, and this is not a case of having contradictory desires, then we need to answer which is properly called "the desire", and which is called "reasons against the desire"? Since "desire" is commonly associated with base emotions, we would say that "to eat cake" is the desire, and the other is "against the desire". In this way we might avoid the contradiction. That, I tell you is the sophistry designed to make the problem appear like an illusion.

So let's replace "desire" with "goal", "intention", or "end", to see the situation more clearly, free from that deceptive sophistry . Suppose I have two distinct goals. Goal #1 requires that I perform action A, and goal #2 requires that I do not perform action A. For example, I want to complete my Christmas shopping today, and this requires that I take the afternoon off from work, but I also want a clean absentee record at work, and this requires that I do not take the afternoon off. The subject of deliberation here is "I take the afternoon off from work". It is apprehended as a necessary means to the end which is goal #1. The exact contrary of this is recognized as the means to the end which is goal #2. Since I hold both goals at the very same time, I have an inclination (I excluded the word "desire" above) toward choosing contradictory propositions. The "inclination" which I have, as a describable property of a subject, "my attitude", violates the law of noncontradiction. I have, as a property of myself, contradictory inclinations.

This is very relevant to what I said about "understanding one's choice" in the case of buying the shirt. In the example, there was contradictory inclinations, and the example did not provide a reasonable understanding of the contradictory inclinations, therefore I conclude that the choice was not understood.

The driving inclination, the primary goal as stated in the example, goal#1 was "only buy cotton", and this is produced from an inclination toward cotton as the only desirable material. The secondary goal, goal #2, "buy a shirt" is produced from a different inclination, I need a shirt, or something like that. At the store, the attitude, or inclination, toward the particular object in question, a particular shirt, is contradictory, due to the difference between the two goals. Goal#2 produces the attitude of "buy", and goal#1 produces the attitude of "do not buy". Since the example does not provide reasons why goal#2 was prioritized over goal#1, in the decision, I concluded that the decision was not understood. When two goals collide, we need to refer to a higher goal in order to reasonably choose one over the other.

I have consistently been using words to describe conflicting desires that do not create the appearance of them being contradictory, because they are in fact, not contradictory (in the sense of being contradictory properties in violation of the law of noncontradiction). This is not sophistry, this is talking about things sensibly as they are. — Dan

As explained above, conflicting goals, intentions, or ends, produce contradictory inclinations or attitudes. Describing the contradictory inclinations in different ways, to make them appear like they are not actually contradictory, does not resolve the issue. And yes, that is sophistry, as it does not provide adequate principles for moral philosophy. We need good principles which help us to understand the problem of contradictory inclinations, and methods for resolving them. If we simply create the illusion that they are not contradictory, and insist that they are not actually contradictory, then we will be inclined to allow them to continue to coexist, and we will always be debilitated by a condition of indecision, or else we will continually make decisions which we do not properly understand, like the shirt example.

Again, subjective opinions cannot be wrong, as there is no fact of the matter. — Dan

What kind of bull shit is this? "Wrong", and "right" are judgements. And, it is subjective opinions which we judge as wrong or right. Your assumed "fact of the matter" is completely irrelevant.

I don't know what this means. Are you allowing for an objective reality that has features/properties that we can be right or wrong about? — Dan

No, I've already explained why this is not what I am saying. The supposed independent "reality" which I assume, is continually changing. We make "objective" judgements (judgements concerning supposed independent objects), based on certain logical principles, which are inconsistent with the reality of continual change. Therefore "objective reality" is incoherent as self-contradictory.

No, we can absolutely use the word "truth" because we can aim at truth even if we cannot know for sure we have got it. — Dan

The problem I described though, is that we can know for sure that we will never have "truth" as you use the word, due to the fact that we know for sure that human beings are not perfect in their knowledge. This makes "truth" as a goal, out of reach to human beings, an impossible goal for human beings. Having an impossible goal is counterproductive because when we come to realize (through demonstrations like mine), that the goal is impossible, it becomes very discouraging, as there is then a hole, where there should be a realistic (potentially obtainable) goal.

But the judgement that it is true is not itself the truth. The judgement can be wrong. What makes that judgement wrong is that it doesn't match up with the truth. — Dan

This is the unnecessary, and completely useless assumption you make, that there is something beyond the judgement "it is true", which is "itself the truth". All we have, beyond an individual judgement, is further judgements, personal reflection, and judgements from others. What produces the further judgement, that the initial judgement of "true" was a "wrong" judgement, is a change of mind, generally created by a difference of information, applied in personal reflection. Also, one person can judge another's judgement of "true" as "wrong" based on a similar difference of information. This other assumed thing, which you say is "itself the truth", is completely irrelevant, having absolutely no bearing on any of these judgements.

Putting the cogito aside, you're rather missing the point here. Truth isn't the same as certainty. Just because something exists in the world doesn't mean we can know about it, and even if we do, we aren't likely to have complete certainty of it. — Dan

But "truth" as you represent it, is absolute certainty. It is "the way the world is" without any possibility of error. Notice "the way the world is", is something distinct from "the world itself", as that which corresponds with "the world itself", in "truth". And as you insist, this correspondence must be without error. Therefore "truth" as you represent it, is a correspondence of absolute certainty.

This is very much nit-picking and avoiding the core point. If you don't think there is an objective fact to whether you not eating or breathing will lead to your death and that this is just subjective, then presumably you think that if you believe that failing to eat or breathe will not lead to your death, then it won't. — Dan

What? This makes no sense. The need to eat and breathe is not an objective fact, because it is not a fact about objects, it is a fact about subjects. That makes it a subjective fact. And, as I've explained, facts about subjects are completely different from facts about objects. In the case of the former we must allow violation to the fundamental laws of logic, in the case of the latter, we do not (try Charles Peirce for information on this). We must allow violation to those laws of logic for the reasons I explained, the facts about subjects (subjective facts) exist in relation to value structures, which are often conflicting. The fact that a person needs to eat and breathe exists as a fact, in relation to life, as the valued goal. If a person is suicidal, and values death, the need to eat and breathe is no longer given priority, and is therefore no longer a fact. That is the nature of "subjective facts" (facts about subjects), they shift, and change, depending on what the subject values. And since a single subject often has conflicting values, subjective facts are often contradictory. That produces the need for deliberation, and principles to resolve the reality of contradictory facts.

You are changing the description to suit your purpose. I am talking about deliberation, the desire to eat cake versus the desire to not eat cake. There may be numerous reasons to eat cake, and numerous reasons to not eat cake (of which the desire to lose weight may be one). I am not talking about any specific reasons, I am talking about deliberation, in general, which considers various reasons for and against a proposition, or idea. So your straw man is not relevant.

Now, once you get beyond the straw man, you will see that people "can definitely have both" of contradictory desires. If, a person is weighing factors against, and for, a specific action, and this is not a case of having contradictory desires, then we need to answer which is properly called "the desire", and which is called "reasons against the desire"? Since "desire" is commonly associated with base emotions, we would say that "to eat cake" is the desire, and the other is "against the desire". In this way we might avoid the contradiction. That, I tell you is the sophistry designed to make the problem appear like an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

There isn't a problem. You are inventing a problem where none exists.

So let's replace "desire" with "goal", "intention", or "end", to see the situation more clearly, free from that deceptive sophistry . Suppose I have two distinct goals. Goal #1 requires that I perform action A, and goal #2 requires that I do not perform action A. For example, I want to complete my Christmas shopping today, and this requires that I take the afternoon off from work, but I also want a clean absentee record at work, and this requires that I do not take the afternoon off. The subject of deliberation here is "I take the afternoon off from work". It is apprehended as a necessary means to the end which is goal #1. The exact contrary of this is recognized as the means to the end which is goal #2. Since I hold both goals at the very same time, I have an inclination (I excluded the word "desire" above) toward choosing contradictory propositions. The "inclination" which I have, as a describable property of a subject, "my attitude", violates the law of noncontradiction. I have, as a property of myself, contradictory inclinations. — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction at all. This is exactly the kind of situation I am saying is fine and not in the least contradictory (in the sense of having mutually exclusive properties). It's not a matter of words. People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations, these aren't contradictory properties since one does not imply the lack of the other.

When two goals collide, we need to refer to a higher goal in order to reasonably choose one over the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems fairly clearly not to be true. We can want two things but want one more than the other.

As explained above, conflicting goals, intentions, or ends, produce contradictory inclinations or attitudes. Describing the contradictory inclinations in different ways, to make them appear like they are not actually contradictory, does not resolve the issue. And yes, that is sophistry, as it does not provide adequate principles for moral philosophy. We need good principles which help us to understand the problem of contradictory inclinations, and methods for resolving them. If we simply create the illusion that they are not contradictory, and insist that they are not actually contradictory, then we will be inclined to allow them to continue to coexist, and we will always be debilitated by a condition of indecision, or else we will continually make decisions which we do not properly understand, like the shirt example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, it's not a matter of using a different word. I'm not engaging in any sophistry here, I'm just pointing out that it isn't in violation of the law of noncontradiction to want two things which conflict with one another.

What kind of bull shit is this? "Wrong", and "right" are judgements. And, it is subjective opinions which we judge as wrong or right. Your assumed "fact of the matter" is completely irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are confusing the judgement with the thing the judgement is made about.

No, I've already explained why this is not what I am saying. The supposed independent "reality" which I assume, is continually changing. We make "objective" judgements (judgements concerning supposed independent objects), based on certain logical principles, which are inconsistent with the reality of continual change. Therefore "objective reality" is incoherent as self-contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, every part of that is nonsense. 1) whether something is changing or not doesn't make it not objective or not existent. 2) The feature of constant change would, as mentioned earlier, be an objective truth about the world. 3) Logical principles aren't inconsistent with continual change unless you are suggesting that the laws of logic are included in the things that are always changing, is that what you are suggesting? 4) None of that shows anything like objective reality being in any way contradictory.

The problem I described though, is that we can know for sure that we will never have "truth" as you use the word, due to the fact that we know for sure that human beings are not perfect in their knowledge. This makes "truth" as a goal, out of reach to human beings, an impossible goal for human beings. Having an impossible goal is counterproductive because when we come to realize (through demonstrations like mine), that the goal is impossible, it becomes very discouraging, as there is then a hole, where there should be a realistic (potentially obtainable) goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can't know all of the truth, so we can't know any of it? Because that is fairly obviously a fallacy.

This is the unnecessary, and completely useless assumption you make, that there is something beyond the judgement "it is true", which is "itself the truth". All we have, beyond an individual judgement, is further judgements, personal reflection, and judgements from others. What produces the further judgement, that the initial judgement of "true" was a "wrong" judgement, is a change of mind, generally created by a difference of information, applied in personal reflection. Also, one person can judge another's judgement of "true" as "wrong" based on a similar difference of information. This other assumed thing, which you say is "itself the truth", is completely irrelevant, having absolutely no bearing on any of these judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you judge that you are running along a safe path but the truth of the matter involves a pitfall trap and a hungry tiger, then the truth has pretty significant bearing.

But "truth" as you represent it, is absolute certainty. It is "the way the world is" without any possibility of error. Notice "the way the world is", is something distinct from "the world itself", as that which corresponds with "the world itself", in "truth". And as you insist, this correspondence must be without error. Therefore "truth" as you represent it, is a correspondence of absolute certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, truth is not certainty at all. Certainty relates to degrees of confidence for our beliefs. It relates to states of mind. It is epistemic. The truth of those beliefs is (or isn't) in the world itself. Just because something believes something that is true is not a reason to believe their belief is certain.

For example, if we were playing poker and I believed you had three nines in your hand, and you did, then my belief would be true. But this wouldn't make me any more certain of my belief. It would still be a guess based on the information I had, just one that happened to be true in this case.

What? This makes no sense. The need to eat and breathe is not an objective fact, because it is not a fact about objects, it is a fact about subjects. That makes it a subjective fact. And, as I've explained, facts about subjects are completely different from facts about objects. In the case of the former we must allow violation to the fundamental laws of logic, in the case of the latter, we do not (try Charles Peirce for information on this). We must allow violation to those laws of logic for the reasons I explained, the facts about subjects (subjective facts) exist in relation to value structures, which are often conflicting. The fact that a person needs to eat and breathe exists as a fact, in relation to life, as the valued goal. If a person is suicidal, and values death, the need to eat and breathe is no longer given priority, and is therefore no longer a fact. That is the nature of "subjective facts" (facts about subjects), they shift, and change, depending on what the subject values. And since a single subject often has conflicting values, subjective facts are often contradictory. That produces the need for deliberation, and principles to resolve the reality of contradictory facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't include any claim about need here to avoid you trying to weasel out of the core point in exactly the way you are doing here, but you seem to have ignored that and done it anyway.

Also, an objective fact isn't a fact "about objects" nor is a subjective fact a fact "about subjects". Neither in the grammatical sense nor in the everyday use of that sense. That is not an appropriate definition.

What has been revealed now, is why there is such a huge difference between you and I as to what it means to "understand" one's choice. I believe that making a decision often involves having contradictory inclinations, and decision making involves resolving those contradictions. You have asserted that there is an "objective truth" concerning what one desires. This makes the way that I understand decision making unintelligible to you. And, the way that you understand decision making is unintelligible to me.

This doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction at all. This is exactly the kind of situation I am saying is fine and not in the least contradictory (in the sense of having mutually exclusive properties). It's not a matter of words. People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations, these aren't contradictory properties since one does not imply the lack of the other. — Dan

The point is that if we treat "inclinations" as objective properties, like you proposed we do with "desires", then there is a violation of the law of noncontradiction. A person cannot have, as objective properties, both the inclination to eat cake, and the inclination to not eat cake, at the same time without violating the law of noncontradiction.

You can insist, as I do, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations... " but then you ought to recognize that people are not objects, they are subjects, and what we can validly say about subjects is different from what we can validly say about objects. Objects cannot have contrary properties at the same time. Subjects can have contradictory properties at the same time,, as you yourself say, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations". Therefore we must maintain the division between objective facts and subjective facts. So what we say about the inclinations of people cannot be said to be objective fact, because we do not allow contradiction within "objective facts".

This seems fairly clearly not to be true. We can want two things but want one more than the other. — Dan

Sure, and of course, there is a reason why one has a higher value than the other, that is what I referred to as the "higher goal". The higher goal gives the higher value. And this is why one thing is wanted more than another.

In the case of objects, it makes no sense to say that an object has a specific property more than the contradictory property. We don't say that an object has the property of being red more than the property of not being red, allowing some of each. This would just be seen as an instance of attempting violate the law of excluded middle, by saying that the object is "to some degree" both red and not red.

This is more evidence as to why we need to maintain a distinction between "subjective" (of the subject), and objective.

Again, it's not a matter of using a different word. I'm not engaging in any sophistry here, I'm just pointing out that it isn't in violation of the law of noncontradiction to want two things which conflict with one another. — Dan

When we treat a subject as something with properties to be judged according to the fundamental laws of logic, then "what a person wants", would clearly violate the law of noncontradiction. This indicates that we cannot treat "what a person wants" as an objective property, because it would be a property which violates the law of noncontradiction, and this would make the supposed "objective" independent world unintelligible, if we allow for such violations in the "objective" world. . This is why I keep telling you that there is no "objective truth" to what a person desires. "What a person desires" exists relative to subjective value structures, of which a person has more than one, and which are constantly changing.

Again, you are confusing the judgement with the thing the judgement is made about. — Dan

No, it's you who is conflating the judgement with the thing that the judgement is about. The judgement is "true" or "false", and the thing judged is a statement, proposition, idea, belief, or something like that. In the other case the judgement is "right" or "wrong", and the thing judged is a human action. Whether it's "true", "false", "right", or "wrong", this is the judgement, not the thing being judged.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can't know all of the truth, so we can't know any of it? Because that is fairly obviously a fallacy. — Dan

I don't understand why this is so difficult for you. What I say is that none of our knowledge is truth as you describe "truth". You describe "truth" such that "a truth: is something in which the possibility of a mistake is excluded. Human beings are fallible, imperfect in their knowledge, so there is always a possibility of mistake within any human knowledge. All of our knowledge is imperfect. There is always the possibility of mistake. Therefore none of our knowledge obtains to the level of "truth" as you describe it, as requiring that there is no possibility of mistake.

When you judge that you are running along a safe path but the truth of the matter involves a pitfall trap and a hungry tiger, then the truth has pretty significant bearing. — Dan

The only relevant "truth" to this matter is a subjective truth. "Safe path" is a subjective judgement, relative to the values of a subject. The subject may misjudge, and make a mistake. The assumption of an "objective truth" to this matter is completely, and absolutely irrelevant. So why make it.

The truth of those beliefs is (or isn't) in the world itself. — Dan

You said that truth is "the way that the world is". That is clearly not "in the world itself", but something which corresponds with the world.

To make this clear to yourself, consider where falsity is. Clearly falsity is not "in the world itself", but it must be somewhere mustn't it? But the difference between truth and falsity is that one is the way that the world is, and the other is the way that the world isn't. That does not put truth into the world itself, it just shows that the designated "way" of truth is different from the "way" of falsity. Where might these different "ways" of the world exist? I assume there must be an infinity of them, because of all the possible wrong ways. These "ways" are not in the world, where are they? And what separates the true way from the false ways?

I didn't include any claim about need here to avoid you trying to weasel out of the core point in exactly the way you are doing here, but you seem to have ignored that and done it anyway. — Dan

This doesn't help, what you wrote still makes no sense. A belief about myself dying if I don't eat, is a belief relating to a subject, therefore it is subjective. What definition of "subjective" allows this belief to be anything other than subjective?

Also, an objective fact isn't a fact "about objects" nor is a subjective fact a fact "about subjects". Neither in the grammatical sense nor in the everyday use of that sense. That is not an appropriate definition. — Dan

"Subjective" means "of the person", which we know as "the subject". "Objective" means not of the subject, what is other than the subject, which we know as the objects.

What has been revealed now, is why there is such a huge difference between you and I as to what it means to "understand" one's choice. I believe that making a decision often involves having contradictory inclinations, and decision making involves resolving those contradictions. You have asserted that there is an "objective truth" concerning what one desires. This makes the way that I understand decision making unintelligible to you. And, the way that you understand decision making is unintelligible to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. Also, since I haven't defined understanding a choice in relation to someone's desires for making that choice, it really isn't relevant.

The point is that if we treat "inclinations" as objective properties, like you proposed we do with "desires", then there is a violation of the law of noncontradiction. A person cannot have, as objective properties, both the inclination to eat cake, and the inclination to not eat cake, at the same time without violating the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just wrong. This is not a violation of the law of noncontradiction at all. Wanting something does not imply not wanting something else which conflicts with the ability to get the first thing. It would be true that it couldn't be true of someone that they both have a desire to eat cake and do not have a desire to eat cake, but they might well have a desire not to eat cake, as this is not mutually exclusive with having a desire to eat cake. Conflicting desires are not logically problematic in the least.

Sure, and of course, there is a reason why one has a higher value than the other, that is what I referred to as the "higher goal". The higher goal gives the higher value. And this is why one thing is wanted more than another.

In the case of objects, it makes no sense to say that an object has a specific property more than the contradictory property. We don't say that an object has the property of being red more than the property of not being red, allowing some of each. This would just be seen as an instance of attempting violate the law of excluded middle, by saying that the object is "to some degree" both red and not red.

This is more evidence as to why we need to maintain a distinction between "subjective" (of the subject), and objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, no need for another goal to get involved, we can simply want two things but want one more than another.

Again, conflicting desires are not contradictory in the sense of one implying the lack of another.

When we treat a subject as something with properties to be judged according to the fundamental laws of logic, then "what a person wants", would clearly violate the law of noncontradiction. This indicates that we cannot treat "what a person wants" as an objective property, because it would be a property which violates the law of noncontradiction, and this would make the supposed "objective" independent world unintelligible, if we allow for such violations in the "objective" world. . This is why I keep telling you that there is no "objective truth" to what a person desires. "What a person desires" exists relative to subjective value structures, of which a person has more than one, and which are constantly changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no. It doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction because wanting something does not imply wanting something else which conflicts with the first thing. There isn't a problem here.

No, it's you who is conflating the judgement with the thing that the judgement is about. The judgement is "true" or "false", and the thing judged is a statement, proposition, idea, belief, or something like that. In the other case the judgement is "right" or "wrong", and the thing judged is a human action. Whether it's "true", "false", "right", or "wrong", this is the judgement, not the thing being judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about.

I don't understand why this is so difficult for you. What I say is that none of our knowledge is truth as you describe "truth". You describe "truth" such that "a truth: is something in which the possibility of a mistake is excluded. Human beings are fallible, imperfect in their knowledge, so there is always a possibility of mistake within any human knowledge. All of our knowledge is imperfect. There is always the possibility of mistake. Therefore none of our knowledge obtains to the level of "truth" as you describe it, as requiring that there is no possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. Again, you are conflating what is the case with how certain we can be in our knowledge that it is the case.

The only relevant "truth" to this matter is a subjective truth. "Safe path" is a subjective judgement, relative to the values of a subject. The subject may misjudge, and make a mistake. The assumption of an "objective truth" to this matter is completely, and absolutely irrelevant. So why make it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch.

You said that truth is "the way that the world is". That is clearly not "in the world itself", but something which corresponds with the world.

To make this clear to yourself, consider where falsity is. Clearly falsity is not "in the world itself", but it must be somewhere mustn't it? But the difference between truth and falsity is that one is the way that the world is, and the other is the way that the world isn't. That does not put truth into the world itself, it just shows that the designated "way" of truth is different from the "way" of falsity. Where might these different "ways" of the world exist? I assume there must be an infinity of them, because of all the possible wrong ways. These "ways" are not in the world, where are they? And what separates the true way from the false ways? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yea, I think I'd say that the truth of a proposition is in its correspondence with reality, at least as a fairly basic good-enough-for-government-work definition. I'm not sure asking "where falsity is" is a sensible question.

"Subjective" means "of the person", which we know as "the subject". "Objective" means not of the subject, what is other than the subject, which we know as the objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not a good definition when it comes to subjective and objective claims. I suspect this is going to be one of those things that is hard to pin down with definition. For example, there are definitions of "subjective" I might consider reasonable in which we perhaps wouldn't say that there is an objective fact of the matter to one's desires. So, let me offer some general comments rather than defining these terms.

To say that something is "subjective" generally refers to things such as matters of taste, where there is no right answer beyond what the person in question thinks.

To say that something is "objective" generally refers to things in which the truth of the matter exists independently of what the person in question thinks.

We can absolutely make objective claims about ourselves. If I claim that I am the president of Morocco, or that I have six arms, or that I am a centaur, these are certainly claims about me (the subject) but they aren't subjective claims. The truth (or in these cases falsity) of these statements depends on the state of the world.

I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. — Dan

As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you?

It's becoming very clear why you and I have completely different ideas about what it means to "understand one's choice". For you, to "understand one's choice" simply requires a description, what you like to think of as an "objectively true" description. For me, to "understand one's choice" requires the choice be given a position within one's wants, needs, desires and goals, the person's subjective value structure. The former, your sense of "understanding" is a description of what the choice is. The latter, my sense of "understanding" is to know why the choice was made.

In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about. — Dan

That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged.

There is no "property of wrongness". How would we sense that property? And if we do not sense it, how would we decide whether or not a thing had that property, except by a judgement? And if the decision of "wrong" is made by judgement, without any wrongness being evident through sensation, wrongness only being present to the mind that judges, how could the wrongness be anything other than the judgement itself?

We can go further, however, and ask about the judgement. This would be to ask about the wrongness which was determined. This requires a definition of "wrong" and an explanation of how the act fulfills the criteria of that definition.

I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. — Dan

You have provided a conditional proposition. And, the "conditional proposition" provides a rule for logical procedure. In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true".

Your sophistry is to introduce another sense of "true" which is hidden within your usage as "something that is true". This would be a sense of "true" which is independent of the logical procedure, and judgement of the conditional. In other words, the conditional proposition lays rules for a judgement of "true", while you also speak of "something that is true", independent of that judgement. Your statement conflates the two distinct meanings of "true" in an invitation to equivocate.

The invitation to equivocate is the sophistry. The conditional should be properly stated as "if we know that something is true, then we are not mistaken". The way you state it " if we know something that is true", is incoherent if analyzed. This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true.

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability.


This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective?

Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch. — Dan

You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes.

Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference?

You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me.

Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple.

As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure you are referring to the same thing as a problem that I am. What I am saying is the fact that people have conflicting desires is not a problem that needs solving or explaining. It is not running afoul of the law of noncontradiction.

That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

If someone said "that judgement is wrong" I would absolutely take them to mean that they think the judgement in question has the property of wrongness (probably in the sense of incorrectness). It would be incredibly weird to say that the judgement is the same thing as wrong. I'm not even really sure what that means.

In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't follow. You have added in "being sure", which is exactly where the problem arises. If we judge something to be true, we judge that belief to not be mistaken, but that isn't the same thing as being sure it isn't mistaken.

Further, there is no sophistry in pointing out that the judgement we make about something is different to the thing we are judging.

This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by this. On it's face, it looks very obviously wrong. Perhaps it is just unclear though.

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, yes the judgement of a belief as true or false is very much a judgement that involves the description of some thing (the belief) as being a certain way or having a certain property (being true or false or, if you prefer, having the property of truth of falsity, I'm not really that worried about whether this is described in terms of properties or not). Second, you appear to be trying to smuggle certainty into the mix where it doesn't belong. It might be fair to say that if I know 2+2=4 to be true, then I know this not to be mistaken, but that isn't the same as me being certain that I know this or being justified in that certainty. If, from the information I have, I could be wrong, then the level of certainty I am justified in holding is presumably somewhat less than 100%. But what levels of certainty we are justified in our lack of mistakenness regarding some belief is not the same as whether we are in fact mistaken or not.

This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective? — Metaphysician Undercover

This states an empirical fact, rather than a deductive argument, so logical validity doesn't really come into it. However, I'm not really sure how I am presenting anything as 'independent of the logic which makes it valid', or what exactly you are accusing me of here.

You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective truth is very much relevant. It is what determines which judgement is correct and, as demonstrated in the tiger and the pitfall trap example, it can rudely disabuse us of our previous notions without the need for anyone to disagree with us.

Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you serious with this? Are you genuinely suggesting that hypotheticals shouldn't be used in discussions regarding the truth? Are you suggesting my point would be better if I actually dug a trap on a path you were walking and filled it with a tiger?

You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are doing that thing again where you assert things as objective truths but refuse to call them such. You claim you are "going to die anyway" but your position (that truth is subjective) makes this only true if you believe it.

Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've missed the point entirely. I don't tell you anything. You go down the path believing there is no pitfall trap filled with a hungry tiger. However, the world does not live up to your belief and, despite your belief that the path you are treading contains no pitfall traps, you subsequently fall into one and are eaten. My point, which I thought was fairly clear, is that just believing something doesn't make it so and the truth or falsity of those beliefs has very real, sometimes lethal, consequences.