Hey…people exploded on us. We got somebody’s attention, it seems. Was it our intellectually piercing dialectic, or were they just bored with what they were doing?
————-

…how does one evaluate what is a good or bad will? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: the goodness or badness of the will is a direct reflection on the worthiness of being content with one’s subjective condition, which is commonly called being happy, which is itself the prime condition for moral integrity. The one willing an act in defiance of his principles would post hoc evaluate his will as bad, earning himself the title of immoral.

It is only under the apodeictic presupposition of a good will, that immoral practices are possible. On the other hand, if the will is neutral or bad, it becomes nearly impossible to explain why the predisposition of humans in general, given from historical precedence, is to do good, to act virtuously.

Cool. Gotta love it when a plan comes together.

I thought it was an extremely barmy attempt trying to define the undefinable spewing out loads of meaningless gibberish. :)
Great to have an agreement here. Thanks.

I couldn't quite parse what you were trying to say. Is the contention that individuals always know what is best for them and what is true for them vis-á-vis ethics?

You mean like one of these “possible worlds” the postmodern analytical mindset deems so relevant? Dunno about all that pathological nonsense

No, I mean it just in the common sense that we have the potential to be/do things we currently aren't/can't. I can play the guitar and bass. At one point I couldn't, but I obviously had the potential to learn in some sense. I can't play the violin, but potentially I could learn to do so. Likewise, someone who regularly drives drunk could potentially stop doing this, etc.

True dat….but much more fun to figure out why, both that it is barmy, and in addition, the incessant supposition it’s necessary.

Gmak Isn't it the case that good cannot be defined in morality? Only the human actions are good, neutral or evil. But good itself is a word for property of the actions

Not for most ethics. It is things, not acts that are primarily good. One can have a "good car," a "good doctor," a "good government," or a "good person" living a "good life."

An ethics where "moral good" is some sort of distinct property unrelated to these other uses of good and which primarily applies only to human acts seems doomed to failure IMHO, because it cannot explain what this "good" has to do with anything else that is desirable and choice-worthy.

On the prevailing view that dominated in the West for over a millennia, all good things or things that appear good are good in virtue of their possession/participation of the goodness of God, who is goodness itself for example.


For example, St. Augustine' De Doctrina Christiana (Chapter 22):

Among all these things, then, those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The rest are for use, that we may be able to arrive at the full enjoyment of the former. We, however, who enjoy and use other things are things ourselves...

Neither ought any one to have joy in himself, if you look at the matter clearly, because no one ought to love even himself for his own sake, but for the sake of Him who is the true object of enjoyment. For a man is never in so good a state as when his whole life is a journey towards the unchangeable life, and his affections are entirely fixed upon that. If, however, he loves himself for his own sake, he does not look at himself in relation to God, but turns his mind in upon himself, and so is not occupied with anything that is unchangeable. And thus he does not enjoy himself at his best, because he is better when his mind is fully fixed upon, and his affections wrapped up in, the unchangeable good, than when he turns from that to enjoy even himself. Wherefore if you ought not to love even yourself for your own sake, but for His in whom your love finds its most worthy object, no other man has a right to be angry if you love him too for God's sake.

An ethics where "moral good" is some sort of distinct property unrelated to these other uses of good and which primarily applies only to human acts seems doomed to failure IMHO, because it cannot explain what this "good" has to do with anything else that is desirable and choice-worthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good point. This is where Kant's practical reason comes in. Kant says that you know by human nature what morally good acts are in your heart and mind. He said something like this in his writings,
"In the sky, you see the stars shinning. In your mind, you know what the moral good actions are."

You don't need a thick tome of ethic book with the abstract definitions of what moral Good is, or what things or who are morally good. You know what morally good actions are by reflecting the situations and actions you must take out of the moral duty, which you understand by the practical reason.

True enough. ↪Bob Ross and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other. — Mww

Or devolution? Either way, I think the distinction between pleasure and happiness is still alive in our contemporary lexicon, and it avoids these arguments about happiness vs. happiness.

Is the contention that individuals always know what is best for them and what is true for them vis-á-vis ethics? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not ethically, insofar as ethics carries the implication of external authority, re: jurisprudence, and my knowledge of what is best for me merely keeps me out of jail. If I do not accept the truth of external jurisprudence, I am entitled to simply remove myself from it, which makes that truth contingent on whether or not I am suited to it.

Knowing what’s best for me, on a much stricter sense, is an internal necessary truth, carries the implication of an internal authority alone, the escape from which is, of course, quite impossible. Being human, and given a specific theoretical exposition, yes, individuals always know what is best for himself, and he certainly knows what is true, because he alone is the cause of what he knows as best for him.
———-

I mean it just in the common sense that we have the potential to be/do things we currently aren't/can't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do in fact have the capacity to acquire skills. I admit we do have the capacity, the potential, to do things we currently wouldn’t consider possible. I won’t deny myself the capacity to cheat on speed limits which experience affirms and from which the potential stands, but experience proves I will deny myself the capacity for cutting off lil’ ol’ ladies in the checkout line, and from which the potential has always fallen but may not always. Doesn’t all that make common sense attributions rather lacking in explanatory power?

On the other hand, I do know I have the capacity to throw the trolley switch, I do know my moral constitution or agency proper, mandates that I will not, but I do not know, given the immediate occassion, whether or not that act manifests through my will. Which sorta IS the point, re: explanatory power for determining acts can never be found in capacity for acting, but only in that by which originates the determinations themselves.

Oooo…devolution. I like that better. Aristotle = eudaimonia with or without arete, and Kantian happiness writ large, re: “…contentment with one’s subjective condition…”.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at?

…..you know by human nature what morally good acts are…. — Corvus

Absolutely. And from which arises my primary contention herein, that knowing what good acts are makes explicit you know what good is. And comes the notion that asking what is good, was never the right question to ask.

And comes the notion that asking what is good, was never the right question to ask. — Mww

Fully agree with you. That was my whole point. Plus the sense of moral good changes from / to different cultures, and different historical times. The practical reason will always remind the above facts to the thinker in his / her moral reasoning.

Knowing what’s best for me, on a much stricter sense, is an internal necessary truth, carries the implication of an internal authority alone, the escape from which is, of course, quite impossible. Being human, and given a specific theoretical exposition, yes, individuals always know what is best for himself, and he certainly knows what is true, because he alone is the cause of what he knows as best for him.

So what do you think of Plato's response to Protagoras' similar position in the Theaetetus, that philosophers and teachers are worthless if we can never be mistaken about what is best for us?

And how might we explain the ubiquitous human experience of regret, where we think that what we thought was best for us, has turned out (by our own admission) not to be? Is it best for us to drink all those whiskeys when we think it's a great idea at night, and then the same act that was good for us transforms into being bad for us when we wake up with a hangover?

When we throw our life's savings into a crypto scheme and promptly lose it in a rug pull, was the person who told us not invest not more right about what was good for us than we were?

This is self-undermining: if we assume there are objective goods but that, according to you, we cannot parse them properly, then we would be incapable of having an ‘ongoing conversation’ where we ‘scrutinize our actions’ objectively or intersubjectively. All it would be then, is baseless inter-subjective agreement; which is nothing but a moral anti-realist theory which should be disregarded immediately. — Bob Ross

No. I don't think you are following. I don't accept there are objective goods (your term). Society engages in an ongoing conversation about a 'code of conduct' and who counts as a citizen - this evolves and is subject to changes over time. Hence gay people are now citizens (in the West), whereas some years ago they were criminals. And who knows where this conversation will go under Trump. In other countries, gay people may still be killed. Humans determine notions of right and wrong pragmatically, based on evolving values,

ideals and situations. And the journey isn't one way, ideas like justice or fairness are constantly in flux.

Eudaimonia is not identical to the english word ‘happiness’. In english, it can refer vaguely to both superficial, hedonic happiness and the deeper, eudaimonic happiness. Aristotle simply says that the best is eudaimonia, which is ‘soul-living-well’, and everyone wants this that are healthy and sane merely in virtue of being an living being. If you don’t want to live well, ceteris paribus, then something’s wrong with you. — Bob Ross

Happiness will do. Eudaemonia is just one construct and to me it seems tied to an ancient, culturally specific framework of virtues and reason, which may or may not be of use today. I personally don't find this helpful.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at? — Mww

No, I don't think happiness is one species of pleasure. Think of an exchange like this:

• Son: Having sex with prostitutes whenever I please gives me great pleasure.
• Father: But what about happiness? Will it make you happy?

That exchange is as meaningful now as it was 2500 years ago. This constant claim that our word "happiness" primarily means something superficial looks to be simply wrong.

….philosophers and teachers are worthless if we can never be mistaken about what is best for us? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can never be mistaken about what’s best for ourselves iff we alone are the causality for it. We can be, and often are, mistaken in choosing to act in opposition to what is best. Philosophers and teachers have nothing to do with all that, except perhaps in the formulation of a speculative theory that explains how it all happens.

And how might we explain the ubiquitous human experience of regret…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That’s just the feeling one gets from a post hoc judgement that he’s chosen an act in opposition to what he knows is best. The proverbial easy way out….

Son: Having sex with prostitutes whenever I please gives me great pleasure.
Father: But what about happiness? Will it make you happy? — Leontiskos

Son: I think so. Certainly happier than you in your passive-aggressive and destructive marriage. :wink:

- Do you really think cocaine should be legal and prostitution leads to happiness? Or are you just saying things you don't believe to be true?

Do you really think cocaine should be legal and prostitution leads to happiness? — Leontiskos

Curious, I never said either of those two things.

Why wouldn’t the son just say oh HELL yeah I’m happy!!! Being a kid, he doesn’t consider it as being given pleasure, but only being given that by which pleasure in him just happens to be a consequence.

I mean, even if happiness is merely a subjective condition represented by contentment, contentment itself is no less a feeling of pleasure.

Yes, I find this one interesting. I am curious that people talk about good pleasures versus bad pleasures. I don't think there really is a distinction between feelings of wellbeing and satisfaction, or however else one wants to describe flourishing.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction. My own view is that a career criminal may well have a more pleasurable and satisfying life than a 'saint'. Knowing this is probably why humans constructed notions of heaven and hell, since there are not always consequences for crimes on earth.

My joke above, following the quote about the use of bought sex, is simply an observation that there is no recipe for happiness and a rewarding life. Discrete use of sex workers for pleasure might lead to someone's overall flourishing, while a marriage (which some might like to present as a virtuous contrast to naughty prostitution) might be like dying inside. Life is not simple.

- So you're just saying things you don't believe to be true. That's called lying.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction — Tom Storm

Agreed. That you use satisfaction, or I use contentment, we are in principle saying the same thing. To be a perfectly moral agent is to act, regardless of circumstance, only in accordance with that which provides satisfaction for the agent. Humans rarely do that regardless of circumstance, being influenced by everything from peer pressure to superficial personal gratifications, mere desires.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality. That’s the easy part; it remains to be explained what reason uses to make these determinations. Hence….moral philosophy.

So you're just saying things you don't believe to be true. That's called lying. — Leontiskos

I wonder however you arrived at this? Name calling too. That's called strange. doesn't seem to be having any trouble following.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality — Mww

I'll mull this over. I am happy to be convinced to change my view. :up:

superficial personal gratifications, mere desires. — Mww

I'm somewhat skeptical of this idea, but I understand its attractions and history.

I wonder however you arrived at this? Name calling too. That's called strange. — Tom Storm

No, it's called true. Saying things you don't believe is lying, whether you like it or not.

You're engaged in a lot of sophistry in this thread. Here's the question:

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? — Leontiskos

Do you have an honest answer?

Son: I think so. Certainly happier than you in your passive-aggressive and destructive marriage. :wink: — Tom Storm

:wink:

Where did the cocaine come in to the conversation? I thought they were talking about prostitution...

But when a few drugs were decriminalised in Canberra a year ago, it was predicted to be the begining of the end.... It wasn't.

An prostitution has long been legal here.

We never know what personal challenges a member here might be facing, so I generally don't return aggressive responses. I find it curious that your inferences are taking you to such adverse conclusions. I apologize if my posts have been unclear.

- So you won't give an honest answer to the question. Noted.

Where did the cocaine come in to the conversation? I thought they were talking about prostitution...

But when a few drugs were decriminalised in Canberra a year ago, it was predicted to be the begining of the end.... It wasn't. — Banno

Indeed.

Cocaine was named as a base pleasure. I said this:

There’s nothing inherently wrong with the pleasure cocaine can provide. Many people I've known use it a few times a year with great satisfaction and wellbeing. Addiction to coke however is a problem. But so is an addiction to hard work. So is an addition to alcohol, which can also be used responsibly, with great happiness and pleasure. — Tom Storm

Apparently this means I want to legalize cocaine. :wink: I have made no comments about legalization.

I do have a problem with people talking about good pleasures versus base pleasures. My point is it's the act that has the moral dimension, not the pleasure. But really I'm just asking questions. I don't think using alcohol or drugs for fun is necessarily a moral question.

Above and beyond this, I also think that it is possible for an immoral person (however we understand this) to live a happy and rewarding life. I do not mean this as an endorsement (although surely this is an unnecessary qualifier).