Was it our intellectually piercing dialectic, or were they just bored with what they were doing?

Our conversation became so spectacular, that they couldn’t help themselves but join in (;

the goodness or badness of the will is a direct reflection on the worthiness of being content with one’s subjective condition, which is commonly called being happy, which is itself the prime condition for moral integrity

I understand that you are claiming that being worthy of happiness is directly related to having a good will; but I am asking what makes a will good?

The one willing an act in defiance of his principles would post hoc evaluate his will as bad, earning himself the title of immoral.

But what, under your view, makes those principles right? Someone, surely, can will in accordance with their principles, thereby gaining at least a shallow sense of happiness, without willing in accordance with what is right.

No. I don't think you are following. I don't accept there are objective goods (your term). Society engages in an ongoing conversation about a 'code of conduct' and who counts as a citizen - this evolves and is subject to changes over time. Hence gay people are now citizens (in the West), whereas some years ago they were criminals.

1. Then, you are a moral anti-realist; and no one should take your view seriously; because all you are saying is that what is right or wrong is stance-dependent. So if, e.g., I want to do something you consider wrong, or others consider wrong, then there is absolutely no fact-of-the-matter that makes me wrong: I am just as right as you are (objectively speaking).

2. One can accept that there are objective goods AND that society is a power-related structure. The idea that some people are exhalted as heroes and those very same people criminals by others just highlights that humans are creating laws; and does not negate the fact that humans should be creating laws which abide by facticity. Under your view, those laws are non-factual; because there are no moral facts.

Our conversation became so spectacular, that they couldn’t help themselves — Bob Ross

Exactly the way I see it. Which makes….you know….two of us.

I am asking what makes a will good? — Bob Ross

I’m a fan of metaphysical reductionism, that is, reduce propositions to the lowest form of principles which suffice to ground the conceptions represented in the propositions, and, justify the relation of those conceptions to each other. Which is fine, but comes with the inherent danger of reducing beyond such justifications, often into relations irrational on the one hand and not even possible on the other, from the propositions themselves. The proverbial transcendental illusion, the only way out of which, is just don’t reduce further than needed.

And this is what happens when asking what makes a will good. If whatever makes the will good, can be represented as merely some necessary presupposition, it doesn’t matter what specifically is the case. It is enough to comprehend with apodeitic certainty that it is possible for there to be a root of what good is, hence it is non-contradictory, hence possibly true, the will just is the case. This is where it is proper for the common understanding to rest assured.

After having desolved the question of what makes a will good, it remains to be determined at least the conditions by which the possibility of its being good in itself, is given, which is the domain of the philosopher of metaphysics. These conditions are evidenced, and the case that there is such a thing as a will that is good in itself obtains, by the relevant activities of humanity in general, evil being the exception to the rule.

It is impossible to determine what it is exactly that makes the will good, for the simple reason it is impossible to determine exactly what the will is, which makes any scientific use of the principle of cause and effect in its empirical form useless. Best the metaphysician can do, is attribute certain rational constructs to the idea of a will, sufficient to explain man’s relevant activities, then speculate on the more parsimonious, the most logical, method by which those constructs originate, from which, as it so happens, arises Kantian transcendental logic.

That logic, then, while saying nothing about what makes a will good, is quite specific in a purely speculative fashion, with respect to the principles enabling the will to be that which is directly that faculty responsible for making the man a good man, by his proper use of it, and to whom is attributed moral agency.

The transcendental necessary presupposition: there is no good, in, of and for itself, other than the good will.
The form of transcendental principles: maxims, imperatives.
The transcendental logic’s original constructs: freedom, and autonomy.
————-

Right has nothing to do with good, but only with a good, or the good.

Anyway….food for thought. Or confusion. Take your pick.

Then, you are a moral anti-realist; and no one should take your view seriously; because all you are saying is that what is right or wrong is stance-dependent. So if, e.g., I want to do something you consider wrong, or others consider wrong, then there is absolutely no fact-of-the-matter that makes me wrong: I am just as right as you are (objectively speaking). — Bob Ross

That seems a rather limited way of interpreting my point. I did not say anything goes. I said humans come to agreements about what morality is and follow this right down to crafting legislation. For the most part, I am comfortable to live in a world with a code of conduct and one that provides consequences for those how step outside it.

Morality doesn't have to involve moral facts to provide social cohesion. predictability and harm minimisation. It's pragmatic and evolving.

Collectively we arrive at right and wrong through an intersubjective agreement. In other words cultures arrive at values, from a myriad sources. And we know there will always be outliers. We know that the idea for who counts is a full citizen has varied over time, as culture and values change. In the West, slavery is no longer acceptable, but it is acceptable to exploit and underpay workers to keep the rich person's housework and maintenance done. We no longer criminalise and imprison gay people or trans people. Although some elements of society seem to want to punish them again. Our agreements are not necessarily permanent.

For me this seems to be an ongoing conversation. There are no facts we can access about values, just agreements made about what we value together and what conduct we will accept. It's imperfect but I see nothing wrong with this. We don't need 'true' or objective morality to build a useful system.

One can accept that there are objective goods AND that society is a power-related structure. The idea that some people are exalted as heroes and those very same people criminals by others just highlights that humans are creating laws; and does not negate the fact that humans should be creating laws which abide by facticity. Under your view, those laws are non-factual; because there are no moral facts. — Bob Ross

Who mentioned power-related structures? Or heroes? I agree that the laws are non-factual. But I do not see this as a limitation, as you do. I don't go looking for absolute truth or foundational guarantees in the world because I am not convinced such things exist.

We don't need 'true' or objective morality to build a useful system.

To whom? To the slaves? To the masters?

According to you, it isn't actually wrong, e.g., to own slaves. All society is doing, is deciding that they don't like it anymore.

Who mentioned power-related structures?

That is what you are referring to without realizing it:

Collectively we arrive at right and wrong through an intersubjective agreement. In other words cultures arrive at values, from a myriad sources. And we know there will always be outliers. We know that the idea for who counts is a full citizen has varied over time, as culture and values change. In the West, slavery is no longer acceptable, but it is acceptable to exploit and underpay workers to keep the rich person's housework and maintenance done. We no longer criminalise and imprison gay people or trans people. Although some elements of society seem to want to punish them again. Our agreements are not necessarily permanent.

What you are noting is correct, insofar as it outlines how human social structures work, which are inherently power-structures, but the problem is that you gutted out the part where we are actually developing better social structures because they are ethically superior to previous ones. According to you, there is no true moral progress: apparently, abolishing slavery wasn't objectively better.

There are no facts we can access about values

We are talking about moral judgments, not value judgments.

I don't go looking for absolute truth or foundational guarantees in the world because I am not convinced such things exist.

I don't either.

Nothing about this explained why the will is good, am I missing something? You went from the will can be good to saying it cannot be determined what makes a will good. Again, I want to know why you believe that a will is good in any sense whatsoever. Why, e.g., can a habit not be good or bad?

E.g., I believe a will is good if it is virtuous; because objective goods are internal to the Teleological structure of the thing in question, morality pertains to the Teleological structure of agency, and so a good person will be any person which is fulfilling the Teleology of a person in a manner where they have excellences of habit which allow them to do so in the most ideal manner. A will, then, is good IFF it is comprised, habitually and deeply psychologically, of those excellences that allow them to realize and preserve those internal, objective goods. Viz., I can achieve the internal goods to being a human, which revolve around eudaimonia (as the chief good), IFF I have a will which habituates towards what allows me to do what a human was designed to do.

I would like some sort of elaboration, if possible, analogously, of what you saying makes the will good. If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good.

If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good. — Bob Ross

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good. I only said there is no scientific cause/effect evidence for the will itself, which is to say there is objective or empirical knowledge of it.

We don't need 'true' or objective morality to build a useful system.

To whom? To the slaves? To the masters? — Bob Ross

Depends on the society. Obviously in 1830's America, to the masters. But the conversation changed. There's a general thrust in the West for egalitarianism and greater solidarity. We all seem to agree with this except when we don't, when perhaps it involves people of colour, Muslims, or women or trans folk, we might not consider solidarity relevant and call any consideration of such people 'woke'.

We mostly all know how this works.

What you are noting is correct, insofar as it outlines how human social structures work, which are inherently power-structures, but the problem is that you gutted out the part where we are actually developing better social structures because they are ethically superior to previous ones. — Bob Ross

Only subject to certain purposes and values, right? I might share with you ideals of emancipatory humanism and by this frame we might both consider human rights imperative. Great.

But we all need to agree that this is the best way to achieve human flourishing or wellbeing or whatever you consider your foundational value to be. In choosing this, you are not being objective, nor is there agreement about what constitutes flourishing/wellbeing.

Now there might be some argument to suggest that if you decide that preventing suffering is your foundational goal then Marxism might be the best approach, or Islam. But of course we don't agree on this, hence the problem. Are there objective ways to reach a goal once you have arbitrarily chosen one? Perhaps. Is this what you are arguing for?

I obviously belong to a cultural tradition and have, like most humans, evolved as part of a social species - so for this reason nurturing, tribal identification, caring for others, collaboration, protecting the weak, is hard wired in me and most of us (unless, perhaps you grow up in a war zone). But even this is provisional and contingent.

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good.

I see. Let’s put it into a syllogism:

P1: What determines what is good grounds what is good.
P2: Agents determine what is good.
C: Agents are the grounds for what is good.

This is a equivocation between ontology and epistemology: that agents can come to know what is good, has no bearing in-itself on what actually is good.

Depends on the society. Obviously in 1830's America, to the masters. But the conversation changed. There's a general thrust in the West for egalitarianism and greater solidarity. We all seem to agree with this except when we don't

But according to you we don’t agree that it is actually better: we just subjectively like it more, whereas the masters subjectively liked their society more.

when perhaps it involves people of colour, Muslims, or women or trans folk, we might not consider solidarity relevant and call any consideration of such people 'woke'.

Here’s another gigantic issue with moral anti-realism: there’s no way to resolve these disagreements. The people, according to you, that are racist are no less right or wrong than those that want to eradicate it; so what exactly is one conveying to the racist when telling him he is wrong? Absolutely nothing but “Hey, I don’t like that you are doing that, and for some reason I think that you should abide by my feelings”.

But we all need to agree that this is the best way to achieve human flourishing or wellbeing or whatever you consider your foundational value to be

Which we can’t do in a rational way if there are no moral facts. That would explode into meaningless expressions of subjective dispositions.

Are there objective ways to reach a goal once you have arbitrarily chosen one? Perhaps. Is this what you are arguing for?

By “power-structure”, I was noting, and conceding, that you are absolutely right that human social structures are inherently hierarchical; and so those with the power dictate the rules (so to speak); and so there are human-interaction (social) dynamics to things that very well may not be orientated towards facticity; but I was also noting that there are moral facts, and these are the sort of facts which would dictate what a better world, a better social order, would look like. When people disagree ethically, they are either disagreeing about the truth of the matter or they are expressing meaningless non-objective dispositions they have. In the case of the latter, there may be legitimate disagreement if they subjectively agree on some maxim(s); but there’s not true disagreements because there are no facts. I say “I like vanilla ice cream”, you say “I don’t like vanilla ice cream”—who’s wrong? Neither.

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum! As of December 14, you have not posted for 6 days. My guess is that, after asking a very good question, you were perhaps overwhelmed by the many complicated good responses which maybe exceeded your expectations.

But take heart: you started a good thread (discussion). Good credit to you!

My advice is to aim for simple and down to earth, as you think about the topic "How to Define Good". As time goes on, you will see where you can be more nuanced.

This is a equivocation between ontology and epistemology…. — Bob Ross

I understand what you’re saying, but there’s a conceptual divide in place. Ontology as you intend the concept, has to do with things, what is and why, how, etc, of them. Epistemology, by the same token, has to do with the method, and the system using that method, belonging to a certain kind of intelligence, for knowing about those things subsumed under the conception of natural ontology.

Those don’t work for what’s going on here. Ontology, insofar as for that Nature is causality, and the human subject is the intelligence that knows only what Nature provides.

For what’s going on here, the subject himself is the causality, and of those of which he is the cause it isn’t that he knows of them, but rather that he reasons to them. It makes no sense to say he knows, of that which fully and immediately belongs to him alone.

This is where that thing I said about feelings not being cognitions, fits. And also, why everything we’re talking about here is of a far different systemic formalism. And while it is true we need that standard discursive epistemology to talk about this stuff, and we need the standard phenomenal ontology to properly deploy it for its intended purpose, there is no need of either in its development, in first-person internal immediacy.

What good is, is only determinable by moral philosophy, in which hypotheticals and mere examples have no say.

Thanks for this discussion, by the way. I've found it useful. These are my beliefs as they currently stand. I'm open to tweaking.

Here’s another gigantic issue with moral anti-realism: there’s no way to resolve these disagreements. — Bob Ross

There is no agreement on how morality works right now and yet we have morality and it mostly works. Cultures argue about morality all the time and have ongoing conversations about what they beleive and how to live better. So morality already functions the way I am suggesting. Western societies tend to balance pluralism. We do not have an agreed upon way to resolve disagreements, we just have a discourse.

Western societies usually seem to set wellbeing or flourishing as a goal. What is best for people and culture. But there will never be agreement on how to get there or indeed what precisely flourishing entails. But it's close enough.

But according to you we don’t agree that it is actually better: we just subjectively like it more, whereas the masters subjectively liked their society more. — Bob Ross

No, it's more than a mere like/dislike. Just because there are no moral truths, doesn't mean there's no reasoning involved.

My current belief is that there are no moral facts but I believe morality is useful pragmatically - people (mostly) feel empathy for others and they generally want a predictable, safe society. They want to be able to raise families, pursue interests, have relationships and achieve goals. They want codes of conduct that allow for this. That's what morality is. Like traffic lights. There's nothing inherently true about road rules but they provide us with systems of safety and allow for the possibility of effective road use. And we can still debate which rules work best for certain purposes.

Those don’t work for what’s going on here. Ontology, insofar as for that Nature is causality, and the human subject is the intelligence that knows only what Nature provides.

For what’s going on here, the subject himself is the causality, and of those of which he is the cause it isn’t that he knows of them, but rather that he reasons to them. It makes no sense to say he knows, of that which fully and immediately belongs to him alone.

I would say it is a conflation between ontology and epistemology but I realized this is just begging the question in our case; because you deny this distinction exactly due to the fact that you don’t think there is anything about how reality is that can dictate out it ought to be. Of course, the moral anti-realist has to note that the ontology of morality is really just grounded in the projections of subjects; and this is exactly what I understand you to be saying by noting that the wills of subjects are introduce new chains of causality into the world and are not themselves causal.

I don’t disagree that willing is inherently negativity (as hegel would put it) and, as such, does not itself originate out of causality; but this still doesn’t answer my question.

You have to provide some argument for why the will is good, and not merely the introducer of new chains of causality. So far, this is what I see you as arguing:

P1: A thing which produces new chains of causality and of which is not causal itself is good.
P2: Willing produces new chains of causality and is not causal itself.
C: Willing is good.

Again, in P1, why is it good? What grounds as good?

Thanks for this discussion, by the way. I've found it useful.

You too, my friend!

There is no agreement on how morality works right now and yet we have morality and it mostly works. Cultures argue about morality all the time and have ongoing conversations about what they beleive and how to live better. So morality already functions the way I am suggesting.

The key here is that you are not merely noting that there is moral disagreement: you are noting that there is no disagreement whatsoever about facts. This is not, by any moral realist’s lights, what is going on in society. The mere fact of moral disagreement doesn’t suggest itself that there are no moral facts; and, on the contrary, I would say that it suggests that people behave as if there are. Imagine you didn’t believe that it was actually wrong to, e.g., torture babies for fun—in all probability, you wouldn’t try to stop anyone who likes torturing babies for fun, nor would you try to codify its prohibition into law. In practice, what you are claiming would like more akin to two people arguing about their favorite flavor of ice cream: we may have an interesting discussion—we may even make progress towards bettering our own subjective tastes on it—but at the end of the day we wouldn’t say either or us are wrong nor that we should impose our tastes on each other. Most importantly: this is NOT how people behave about ethics.

Western societies usually seem to set wellbeing or flourishing as a goal. What is best for people and culture. But there will never be agreement on how to get there or indeed what precisely flourishing entails. But it's close enough.

According to you, again, well-being isn’t actually good: it’s just, at best, what everyone mostly wants to be the case. So, why should anyone who disagrees care? Is Hitler wrong, then? Under your view, he has no reason, other than his own subjective dispositions, to change his mind.

No, it's more than a mere like/dislike. Just because there are no moral truths, doesn't mean there's no reasoning involved.

Ultimately, it is; because it is not grounded in truth. E.g., I can refine my cooking to better accommodate my tastes, but there is absolutely nothing factual going on here at its core. There are facts about what I like, but what I like is dictating what I am doing—not some fact out there (ultimately).

My current belief is that there are no moral facts but I believe morality is useful pragmatically - people (mostly) feel empathy for others and they generally want a predictable, safe society. They want to be able to raise families, pursue interests, have relationships and achieve goals. They want codes of conduct that allow for this. That's what morality is

Yes, but, again, if a society were to emerge which didn’t care about those things—or even had anti-thetical values (like mass genocide, torturing, etc.)—then they wouldn’t be wrong according to you.

For me, people tend towards, assuming their environment isn’t heavily influencing them to the contrary, what is actually good because they tend to be healthy members of the human species; and healthy members of the human species have rational capacities that require of them to be impartial and just.

Like traffic lights. There's nothing inherently true about road rules but they provide us with systems of safety and allow for the possibility of effective road use

Well, there’s plenty of things that are factual about laws; but, to your point, they are grounded in something else—what is it, then? Morality as it relates to Justice: the polis. Having no vehicle laws, for me, is ultimately about allowing people to drive around safely because that is a part of a better society (objectively).

I think we may be going around in circles. I believe I have dealt with your objections sufficiently - as you no doubt feel you have with mine. :wink:

I'll conclude (for now) with a few points here.

So, why should anyone who disagrees care? Is Hitler wrong, then? Under your view, he has no reason, other than his own subjective dispositions, to change his mind. — Bob Ross

Hitler and many of his supporters probably thought they were doing good and were promoting flourishing as they saw it.

I have no problem stating that I am against Nazi values and their approach, but I don't believe there are objective moral facts about it. Nazi ideology contradicts most human conventions and behaviors, causes needless suffering, and is inherently unstable for society. What more justification do you need?

In the absence of moral facts morality shifts from being about discovering "truths" to constructing frameworks that work for individuals and communities. As I have already argued, humans mostly have concern for others and want predictability, safety, resources.

According to you, again, well-being isn’t actually good: it’s just, at best, what everyone mostly wants to be the case. So, why should anyone who disagrees care? — Bob Ross

Why should anyone care even if there are moral facts? Religious believers still commit crimes/sins even while they believe god is watching and will judge them. Makes no difference. Some people will do what they want regardless. What magic do you suppose a 'moral fact' has to compel anyone to do anything?

It sounds to me like you want to identify moral facts so you can dismiss any ethical positions you disagree with by appealing to 'truth' as the ultimate criterion. I'm curious - do you also wish to criminalize behaviors that don’t align with your truth criteria? What’s your end goal here?

In the case of the latter, there may be legitimate disagreement if they subjectively agree on some maxim(s); but there’s not true disagreements because there are no facts. I say “I like vanilla ice cream”, you say “I don’t like vanilla ice cream”—who’s wrong? Neither. — Bob Ross

This is a common rebuttal and I think this gets my position wrong. Rather more is at stake than flavor. We are not isolated nomads, indifferent to the fates of others. Just consider what it is to be a person. We are all invoked in webs of affinity and webs of sympathy and acquaintance. We are connected to others. We don’t (generally) want others to suffer. We are a social species. We support behaviors which support such human dispositions.

Why should anyone care even if there are moral facts?

Because it enables us to enact what is actually good; and anyone who doesn’t want to enact what is good must be either evil, ignorant, or a lunatic. Don’t you agree?

Religious believers still commit crimes/sins even while they believe god is watching and will judge them.

Moral realists can still do bad things, but this is either because they themselves choose to disobey what is wrong or the moral facts they believe are not entirely factual. My main point is that, in this case, at least I can admit that those kind of people are wrong (e.g., Hitler); whereas you can’t.

In the absence of moral facts morality shifts from being about discovering "truths" to constructing frameworks that work for individuals and communities

No it doesn’t. That is a moral judgment you are making here—viz., that society should construct itself to work for its communities—but there is absolutely no fact-of-the-matter that dictates that either. Morality, under your view, becomes people trying to impose their own subjective dispositions on those that are weaker than them—that’s it.

A person that comes around and says, e.g., that morality should be, under moral anti-realism, about allowing the ruling elite to do as they please (and for the servants and slave classes to obey) is equally as right as you are; and equally wrong.

What magic do you suppose a 'moral fact' has to compel anyone to do anything?

We shape society on rationality, which requires of itself factual interpretations of situations; and of which is relative to objective, impartial reasons for or against. Our entire legal system is predicated off of this….

What you are saying is that people should start being biased and subjective about their reasons for or against how society behaves….

It sounds to me like you want to identify moral facts so you can dismiss any ethical positions you disagree with by appealing to 'truth' as the ultimate criterion

Truth is the ultimate criterion. Let me ask you this: if I were forcing vanilla ice cream down a child’s throat screaming at them that “I don’t care what you say, you should like vanilla ice cream!!!”; wouldn't you stop me because it is true that I should not be forcing my own subjective dispositions on another person (let alone a child)?

I'm curious - do you also wish to criminalize behaviors that don’t align with your truth criteria? What’s your end goal here?

Now you’ve shifted the conversation from truth being the ultimate criterion to what criteria of truth one holds, which is different. I don’t expect everyone to have the exact same theory of truth as I have, but I do expect them to intuitionally have something similar. Most people agree and understand, e.g., that truth is objective and absolute—and even if they don’t they behave as if it is—and that we should not impose our own feelings on other people: that would be irrational.

We support behaviors which support such human dispositions.

So, then, if we by-at-large hate the jews; then we would be correct to extinguish them under your view. It’s the same glaring issue over and over again.

…..you don’t think there is anything about how reality is that can dictate out it ought to be. — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree with that. If I judge something perceived as offensive to my moral sensibilities, it is possible I may determine an act whereby that offense is rectified, which is the same as changing reality into what I feel it ought to be.

…..the moral anti-realist has to note that the ontology of morality is really just grounded in the projections of subjects….. — Bob Ross

Dunno about moral anti-realists, but as far as I’m concerned, morality doesn’t have an ontology, in the commons sense of the conception. On the other hand, I’m ok with the projection of subjects being the exemplification, or the objectification, of their respective moral determinations.

But this arena is anthropology, or clinical psychology, whereas I’m only interested in moral philosophy itself. Just like in cognitive systems: it’s not that we know, it’s how it is that we know; so too in moral systems, it’s not that we are moral, but how it is that are we moral.

…..and this is exactly what I understand you to be saying by noting that the wills of subjects are introduce new chains of causality into the world and are not themselves causal. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Backwards? The will of subjects is causal, insofar as it determines what a moral act shall be, in accordance with the those conditions intrinsic to individual moral constitution. But the will cannot itself project that act onto the world, insofar as any act requires physical motivations. The missing piece, or, the controlling factor let’s say, between the determination of a moral act and the projection of it, is aesthetic judgement, re:, does the feeling I get from the effect of this act reflect the feeling I get from the cause.

See the problem? The feeling of good in having willed a moral act does not necessarily match the feeling of good in having done it. And that is the mark of ideal moral agency: the only act willed is always good, the aesthetic judgement will always be positive, the act shall be done without regard to the consequential feeling of having done it.

Hence, the ideal of pure practical reason, and the ground of what makes a will good, doesn’t have an answer, the philosophy describing its function justifiably predicated on it being so.

Because it enables us to enact what is actually good; and anyone who doesn’t want to enact what is good must be either evil, ignorant, or a lunatic. Don’t you agree? — Bob Ross

No. I don't think things are as simple as this. But it tells me a lot about why this model appeals to you. You appear to be an absolutist.

So, then, if we by-at-large hate the jews; then we would be correct to extinguish them under your view. It’s the same glaring issue over and over again. — Bob Ross

Curious that you miss the point over and over again. It's this.

We are not isolated nomads, indifferent to the fates of others. Just consider what it is to be a person. We are all invoked in webs of affinity and webs of sympathy and acquaintance. We are connected to others. We don’t (generally) want others to suffer. We are a social species. We support behaviors which support such human dispositions. — Tom Storm

I have consistently argued that morality functions pragmatically and aims to provide a safe, predictable community that minimizes suffering. The fact that you keep arguing that I might just as well advocate anti-social or violent behaviour is absurd.

Your argument is similar to those religious apologists who maintain that if there wasn't a god there would be no morality and people would steal and lie and murder all over because only god can guarantee morality. Looks like you have just substituted god for the abstraction, truth.

Can we explore an example of a moral truth? What objective truth underpins the notion that stealing is wrong?

I am sorry Mww, I still have no clue why you believe that the will is good :sad:

It seems like you are taking the position that nothing is objectively good.

You appear to be an absolutist.

What do you think an ‘moral absolutist’ is?

I have consistently argued that morality functions pragmatically and aims to provide a safe, predictable community that minimizes suffering

It didn’t in Nazi Germany; and if it weren’t for the Allies winning, then most of the world would be just like it.

History doesn’t corroborate your position: rather, it tends to function as a tendency towards flourishing for an in-group. There have been tons of societies that do not generally care about the suffering of other people outside of their own group.

The fact that you keep arguing that I might just as well advocate anti-social or violent behaviour is absurd.

I am not saying that you like people being violent: I am saying that your view entails that people who are violent aren’t wrong for doing that; and that societies have not historically had a general disposition towards the well-being of humans...not even close. Heck, there was a huge span of history where entire classes of peoples were slaves…..

Your argument is similar to those religious apologists who maintain that if there wasn't a god there would be no morality and people would steal and lie and murder all over because only god can guarantee morality. Looks like you have just substituted god for the abstraction, truth.

What I am saying is that if there is no moral truth, then anything could be permissible relative to any given person’s subjective dispositions.

Now, with respect to this:

and people would steal and lie and murder all over because only god can guarantee morality [what is factually wrong is really wrong].

Not quite. I don’t think that people historically become immediately radically different if they disbelieve in moral realism; in fact, they tend to re-create basic moral realist intuitions into an attempted moral anti-realist substitute.

However, the reason these people don’t dramatically change, is because humans tend to be sheep. They are so influenced by their environment that their conscience ends up a reflection of their society’s conscience. That’s, IMHO, why they don’t start pillaging when they don’t believe, e.g., that it is actually wrong to pillage; because they don’t like the idea of pillaging (or what not) because they have the conscience of the historical context in which they are. Only few people in society think truly for themselves, to the point that they are willing to stand up straight—not straightened.

Can we explore an example of a moral truth?

We absolutely can. Let’s just take your example, since you mentioned it:

What objective truth underpins the notion that stealing is wrong?

For all intents and purposes hereon, I will refer to stealing as the purposeful and unlawful possession of another person’s (private) property. There are other definitions, and feel free to bring them up if you find them relevant, but I think this one will suffice.

Objective goods arise out of the teleological structures to which they refer; that is, they are goods which are objective because they are goods for and of the given teleological structure which are not good relative to anything stance-dependent.

The basic example I like to give is basketball. Is Lebron a good basketball player? Most people would say yes (and even if you don’t agree, just grant it for my point here). Here’s the interesting question though: is Lebron a good basketball player because one wants it to be the case that he is? No. Even if one yearns, desires, wishes, etc. for Lebron to be the worst basketball player in the world, that does not make it so; nor does it negate the fact that if he is placed on a court he will dominate. Is Lebron a good basketball player because one’s mere belief that he is makes it so? No. Even if one believes that Lebron is a terrible basketball player, that does not make it so; nor does it negate that he will dominate on the court. Is Lebron a good basketball player because we all agree he is? No. Everyone in the world could decide right now that Lebron sucks at basketball and it would still be true that he will dominate the court. The fact that Lebron is good at basketball is true stance-independently—thusly objectively. The goodness then, which Lebron exhibits, as it relates to basketball, is objective.

Now, someone might bring up the glaringly obvious fact that we invented basketball; but this doesn’t negate the above point. We could re-define basketball—viz., change all its rules—specifically so that it is true that Lebron sucks at basketball (now); but what the game—the teleological structure—which was historically called “basketball” is something Lebron is actually good at—viz., objectively good at.

What we can see here, is that we have a form of moral objectivism which is a form of moral relativism; whereof each objective good is relativistic to some teleological structure such that what is good is fundamentally about what best suits and sizes up to the teleology of it.

So, likewise, we could easily apply this to anything with a teleological structure. What’s a good clock? Presumably, among other things (perhaps), one that can tell the time appropriately. What’s a good chair? Presumably, among other things (perhaps), one that a person can rest on by sitting on it. What’s a good human? One that is properly behaving in accordance with what a human is designed to do. What is a human designed to do? Biology and philosophy (about our nature) tells us that.

We see here that this view inherently admits of evolutionary teleology, which is a hot take these days, so let me speak a few words on that real quick. The idea that biology supplies us with teleology has lost all credence nowadays, but it is easily recoverable by understanding that we behave as if it does provide a telos. For example, when one goes into the doctor’s office and says “my hand is acting poorly: it won’t move properly”; this analogous to the “good basketball player” example. One is not conveying, in normal speech, that their hand is behaving poorly only because they wish it worked differently. They are not expressing that it is behaving poorly—that it is being a bad hand—merely because their own belief that it is makes it so. No, no, no. They are saying that (1) there is a way that a human hand is supposed to work (viz., there is a teleology of a human hand) and (2) their hand is not sizing up properly to it. This becomes a much bigger problem for moral anti-realists that is often admitted (in my experience); because they have to claim, in order to be consistent, that when we go to the doctor complaining about our bodies not working properly (viz., not working in a healthy manner) that we are speaking purely about non-normative facts; which entails that, e.g., “my hand isn’t working properly like a hand should” is truly incorrect, colloquial shorthand for ~”my hand isn’t working like I would like it to [or like we all agree it should] [or like I believe it should][or <insert-non-objective-disposition-here>]”.

Back to the good human. In order to understand what a good human is, we must understand (1) the nature, teleologically, of a human and (2) how a human can behave so as to align themselves with it. There is a ton I could say here but to be brief, human’s have rational capacities with a sufficiently free will (that can will in strict accordance to reason—to cognition—over conative dispositions); and this marks them out, traditionally, as persons. A person—viz., a being which has a rational nature—must size up properly to what a rational nature is designed to do. Some of which are the intellectual virtues like the pursuit of truth, pursuit of knowledge, being open-minded, being intellectual curious, being impartial, being objective, etc. The one important right now, for your question about stealing, is Justice.

A good man is, ceteris paribus, a just man. Why? Because a good man properly utilizes his natural, rational faculties; and those rational faculties are designed to be impartial and objective; and, as such, are designed to bestow demerit and merit where it is deserved (objectively)—not where it is wanted. This is the essence of fairness.

As a just man, one cannot disprespect the proper merit that is innate to other persons; for they are just like him: they have a proper will which is rational. Therefore, in order to properly and impartially respect a person, he must respect—all else being equal—their will just as much as his own; and he cannot validly place his own will, all else being equal, above theirs without it being a matter of bias.

Now we can answer your question: why is stealing wrong (objectively)? Because stealing is effectively the act of cheating a person out of what they deserve in order to acquire someone one doesn’t deserve because they want it. This is to totally and utterly disrespect the other person qua person and to place one’s desires above the impartial facts.

In this view, it is worth noticing that stealing is not wrong because of some Divine Law or Platonic Form but, rather, because a person is a person and as such has a rational nature which they must adhere to in order to be a good person; given that the objective goods to persons are relative to the teleology of being a person. This is why nosce te ipsum is so important: one cannot escape what they are. If they want to be good, then they have to be a good at what they are—not what they want to be.

History doesn’t corroborate your position: rather, it tends to function as a tendency towards flourishing for an in-group. There have been tons of societies that do not generally care about the suffering of other people outside of their own group. — Bob Ross

I think history may have demonstrated that moral facts don't exist and societies can turn to killing people indiscriminately fairly quickly. Particularity those cultures run by those who think they own the truth.

Anyway - let's move on to the next part since we aren't going to agree on truth and facts.

And thanks again for engaging with such thorough responses.

In relation to your example about stealing

What we can see here, is that we have a form of moral objectivism which is a form of moral relativism; whereof each objective good is relativistic to some teleological structure such that what is good is fundamentally about what best suits and sizes up to the teleology of it. — Bob Ross

Agree. And I have already alluded to this approach myself that we can set a goal and reach this objectively, but the goal itself is subjective. This is how Sam Harris seems to arrive at wellbeing as a moral foundation.

We see here that this view inherently admits of evolutionary teleology, which is a hot take these days, so let me speak a few words on that real quick. The idea that biology supplies us with teleology has lost all credence nowadays, but it is easily recoverable by understanding that we behave as if it does provide a telos. — Bob Ross

As you suggest this is a contested idea and I have no way of determining whether you are correct about this.

Back to the good human. In order to understand what a good human is, we must understand (1) the nature, teleologically, of a human and (2) how a human can behave so as to align themselves with it. There is a ton I could say here but to be brief, human’s have rational capacities with a sufficiently free will (that can will in strict accordance to reason—to cognition—over conative dispositions); and this marks them out, traditionally, as persons. A person—viz., a being which has a rational nature—must size up properly to what a rational nature is designed to do. Some of which are the intellectual virtues like the pursuit of truth, pursuit of knowledge, being open-minded, being intellectual curious, being impartial, being objective, etc. The one important right now, for your question about stealing, is Justice. — Bob Ross

I find this paragraph riddled with assumptions I am either skeptical about or cannot accept as true. I see no good reasons to endorse essentialist accounts of human behavior, so the notion of a teleological human nature is contentious and unsubstantiated.

I believe our use of reason is directed and shaped by affective responses, with reason often serving as a post hoc justification for emotional responses. I tend to hold that reason follows emotion, so what is often described as a 'rational nature' is better understood as rationalization rather than an innate rationality. I don't accept that the qualities you have listed here (pursuit of truth or knowledge or impartiality) are anything more than contingent factors shaped by culture and language, and I don't think we are likely to arrive at an agreement about what such values would look like in practice. I also think several levels of expertise would be needed to assess the contents of this paragraph in full.

I do thank you for clarifying where you are coming from and I respect the amount of thought and effort you have put into this. You seem to really crave certainty. I tend to be more appreciative of uncertainty. I suspect our dispositions are responsible for where we land.

I don't think it is worth us taking any more time on this (for now) since we do not share enough presuppositions to continue and we are bound to stick to our guns no matter what the other person says.

Ok.

I think history may have demonstrated that moral facts don't exist and societies can turn to killing people indiscriminately fairly quickly.

Let’s parse this argument. You are saying:

P1: If moral facts exist then societies could not turn to killing people indiscriminately.
P2: Societies have turned to killing people indiscriminately.
C: Therefore, moral facts do not exist.

This is obviously a non-sequiture. This is like saying:

P1: If mathematical facts exist then societies could not turn to killing people indiscriminately.
P2: Societies have turned to killing people indiscriminately.
C: Therefore, mathematical facts do not exist.

The issue is the same for both: there mere existence of a fact does not entail that humans will immediately believe it is true. In fact, this would be odd to say; e.g., like a mathematical fact wasn’t a fact all along because we just demonstrated the proper proof for it (after lots of disputes), or like a mathematical fact should be believed to be true even though one doesn’t have good reasons to believe it (given they are not given the hindsight, like we are, that it is a fact).

This is how Sam Harris seems to arrive at wellbeing as a moral foundation.

:yikes: . Sam Harris just blanketly asserts that wellbeing is objectively good: his approach to metaethics is to avoid it…..

What we can see here, is that we have a form of moral objectivism which is a form of moral relativism; whereof each objective good is relativistic to some teleological structure such that what is good is fundamentally about what best suits and sizes up to the teleology of it. — Bob Ross

Agree. And I have already alluded to this approach myself that we can set a goal and reach this objectively, but the goal itself is subjective.

What you are describing here and with Harris’ “approach”, which is really a form of moral anti-realism, is that subject’s set out for themselves, cognitively or conatively, ends for themselves which are subjective (or non-objective to be exact); and somehow because of this there are no objective goods—just hypothetical goods. Viz., a hypothetical good for basketball would be, under this view, something like “if you want to be good at basketball, then you need to practice it” or “if we want to have fun, then let’s invent a game called basketball”; but, importantly, the examples I gave are NOT convertible to hypotheticals. “Lebron is a good basketball player” is not convertible to a hypothetical: it is a categorical statement which is normative, because it speaks of goodness which is about what ought to be. E.g., the good farmer is not hypothetically good at farming.

As you suggest this is a contested idea and I have no way of determining whether you are correct about this.

One must determine its truth based off of the reasons for accepting it. My argument was based off of the colloquial way we talk and behave about biology: we behave as if it is teleological. Are you suggesting, e.g., that when someone says “My eye is malfunctioning” that they are really saying something like “My eye is not working like I wish it would”?

I see no good reasons to endorse essentialist accounts of human behavior,

What do you mean by “essentialism”?

I believe our use of reason is directed and shaped by affective responses, with reason often serving as a post hoc justification for emotional responses. I tend to hold that reason follows emotion, so what is often described as a 'rational nature' is better understood as rationalization rather than an innate rationality.

Many times that is the case, but don’t you agree that it is possible for a human to completely go against their nature qua animal in accordance with only reasons they have for it? This would negate your point, because it admits of human’s having a nature such that they have rational capacities irregardless if they use them properly.

I don't think it is worth us taking any more time on this (for now) since we do not share enough presuppositions to continue and we are bound to stick to our guns no matter what the other person says.

Whether or not to conclude our discussion, I will leave up to you my friend. However, neither of us are bound to “stick to our guns no matter what the other person says”. I am more than willing to change my mind if someone gives me good reasons to.

[

I am more than willing to change my mind if someone gives me good reasons to. — Bob Ross

That's what people say, of course. But somehow no one ever provides good reasons, right? :razz:

Let’s parse this argument. You are saying:

P1: If moral facts exist then societies could not turn to killing people indiscriminately.
P2: Societies have turned to killing people indiscriminately.
C: Therefore, moral facts do not exist. — Bob Ross

That would be a bad argument and I apologize for lazy wording. I was aiming for a quip. I guess my point was an observation not an argument. Why is it that no matter what the moral system or moral facts people are convinced of at any given time, the killing continues. Could it be that morality is chimerical?

Sam Harris just blanketly asserts that wellbeing is objectively good: his approach to metaethics is to avoid it….. — Bob Ross

Well yes, as I say he has decided, not without precedent, that wellbeing should be the foundation of morality because harm to wellbeing appears to be a good indicator of what is bad.

Many times that is the case, but don’t you agree that it is possible for a human to completely go against their nature qua animal in accordance with only reasons they have for it? — Bob Ross

Not sure. How would we demonstrate when this happens?

What do you mean by “essentialism”? — Bob Ross

I take this to mean that there are essential characteristics of what it is to be human. For instance, that gender is unchanging that humans can be defined by traits like the ones you noted.

What you are describing here and with Harris’ “approach”, which is really a form of moral anti-realism, is that subject’s set out for themselves, cognitively or conatively, ends for themselves which are subjective (or non-objective to be exact); and somehow because of this there are no objective goods—just hypothetical goods. Viz., a hypothetical good for basketball would be, under this view, something like “if you want to be good at basketball, then you need to practice it” or “if we want to have fun, then let’s invent a game called basketball”; but, importantly, the examples I gave are NOT convertible to hypotheticals. “Lebron is a good basketball player” is not convertible to a hypothetical: it is a categorical statement which is normative, because it speaks of goodness which is about what ought to be. E.g., the good farmer is not hypothetically good at farming. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure I understand this argument very well. Might be me or the wording used. If you can keep it simpler and briefer it might assist.

I forget, are you borrowing from Aristotle's notion of teleology here? The purpose/functioning of a thing?

If basketball is about skill and winning, then Lebron is a good basketball player (I don't know who this is but I can make inferences)? You believe human life can be assessed similarly and has a telos? We can agree as to what constitutes good - based on teleological grounds, which you believe are objective?

That's what people say, of course. But somehow no one ever provides good reasons, right? :razz:

That’s not true: there are many people on this forum that have changed my mind about things. In fact, I used to advocate for moral anti-realism on here: just look at my past discussion boards I created.

Why is it that no matter what the moral system or moral facts people are convinced of at any given time, the killing continues. Could it be that morality is chimerical?

That’s a very complex, socio-pyschological question. I am not sure how deep we want to get into it. The first problem is that there are wildly different understandings of the moral facts out there; the second is that people tend to behave like a herd—they are not governed properly by reason. Most people just end up being regurgitations of their societies values unless they are the ones being persecuted.

Well yes, as I say he has decided, not without precedent, that wellbeing should be the foundation of morality because harm to wellbeing appears to be a good indicator of what is bad.

Just as a side note, the problem with Harris—and why he is a laughing stock in the philosophy community—is not that he thinks well-being is the chief good: it’s that he doesn’t give any actual arguments for why that is the case in the Moral Landscape. The parts where there is a semblance of an argument, are so poorly written. He gives no metaethical account of why goodness is objective, nor how well-being is objectively good. He just pulls it out of his butt.

The other problem is that he thinks ethics can be done purely through science; which makes as much sense as doing epistemology purely through science…

How would we demonstrate when this happens?

We do it all the time; some people more than others. Heck, just do it yourself real quick: decide to do exactly the opposite of what you want to do. Viola!

The most extreme example I can think of is David Goggins, if you’ve ever heard of him.

I take this to mean that there are essential characteristics of what it is to be human.

Ok, sure. There’s an essence to being a human; but it can evolve over time. I don’t think my view requires humans to be ever-unchanging to work.

I forget, are you borrowing from Aristotle's notion of teleology here? The purpose/functioning of a thing?

Yes.

I'm not sure I understand this argument very well. Might be me or the wording used. If you can keep it simpler and briefer it might assist.

Viz., under a view that says the only goods are hypothetical to one’s goals (e.g., if one wants to be healthy, then they shouldn’t smoke) there are no expressions of good which are non-hypothetical (e.g., “one shouldn’t smoke”); but the problem is that “Lebron is a good basketball player”, “Bob is a good farmer”, etc. are non-hypothetical expressions of goodness. It is on the person that takes this kind of view to explain how those kinds of expressions are reducible to hypotheticals.

If basketball is about skill and winning, then Lebron is a good basketball player (I don't know who this is but I can make inferences)?

Basketball is about winning in accordance with the rules of basketball: saying “if” here would just be an expression of one’s uncertainty about it. For example, imagine I told you “if math is about doing operations on numbers in such and such ways, then 2 + 2 = 4”: does that make all mathematical propositions hypothetical? I don’t think so. “2 + 2 = 4” is a valid, categorical statement; and me saying “if math <…>” is just an expression of my uncertainty about what math is; and even if it weren’t, “2 + 2 = 4” is a valid categorical statement.

You believe human life can be assessed similarly and has a telos? We can agree as to what constitutes good - based on teleological grounds, which you believe are objective?

Essentially, yes. I outlined it before in a previous post. Teleology provides objective, internal goods (to itself).

Cool. I may make some more useful comments under that pervious explanation later.