Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
— creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. The idea that he is doing it for fun is not impossible, but is a bit of a stretch. If females did it too, it would be plausible. But, as I understand it, they don't. Suppose that female behaviour indicates that they are attracted by what the male does. Perhaps that Is just an coincidence, but that's a bit of a stretch too. — Ludwig V

On reflection, I'm very unhappy with this comment. Setting it right, or at least righter, high-lights a complication in our question which has not gone unrecognized, but which, it seems to me, has not been fully recognized.

I don't think anyone seriously wants to reject the idea that the male bird of paradise builds his bower in order to attract a female. But @creativesoul is also right to observe that that purpose is not necessarily the bird's motivation. We ought to know this, since the same issue can be observed in human beings. Display behaviour can be observed in both males and female human beings, but it does not follow that they are motivated by the desire to make babies (though they may be, sometimes). Human beings can tell us what their motivation is, but the birds cannot. It seems to me, in fact, most likely that the birds just feel like building a bower, finding it a satisfactory and worth-while thing to do - just as so much display behaviour in human beings is done only because they feel that it is a worth-while thing to do.
But there is no doubt that such behaviour serves an evolutionary purpose. What's more, it explains the behaviour as rational; "feeling like it" doesn't explain anything.

Psychology seems to have more difficulty than any other science about escaping from its philosophical roots. — Ludwig V

But it relies more and more on neuroscience – understanding the structure and function of the brain – using techniques like brain imaging.

I'm not sure whether "by ascribing mental states to them" is a harmless paraphrase of "understanding other people" or something more substantial, philosophically speaking, and more controversial. — Ludwig V

Something more substantial. What controversy do you see?

I'm not sure that it is wise to treat these propositions more or less as axioms when they are the focus of much philosophical debate. — Ludwig V

Some psychologists criticize theory of mind because it can be wrong – that sometimes we make wrong conclusions - but I think that misses the point. That we can make inferences and interpretations of what is in another mind at all is the point. It says nothing about their accuracy.

I can play basketball and not sink the ball in the basket every time, but I’m still playing basketball.

Perhaps it doesn't make any difference whether philosophical dualism or one of its variants is true, but if that's so, it makes a big difference to philosophy. — Ludwig V

I understand philosophical dualism to mean that the physical body and the mental mind are different things, that the mind is not made of physical matter. This tends to agree with a scientific description. In biology, every part of an organism is described in terms of its structure and its correlating function (and structure complements function).

So, the physical brain is the structure and in undergoing its electro-chemical processes it produces its function - the mind. The mind can in this context be considered an emergent property of the brain – the intangible flow of information through the nervous system.

I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs. — Vera Mont

I'm sure that this can be part of the process, but it is not required.

Every person of faith has formed a theory of mind about what is in the mind of their God.

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
— creativesoul
Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce. — Ludwig V

Indeed, and this skirts around the very heart of the matter, but I'll nitpick first.

Autonomy is not an idea. Calling things "ideas" is quite unhelpful. Earlier you did the same with "the idea of metacognition".

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
— creativesoul
Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it. — Ludwig V

Talking about our own belief and others' is how we begin to think about them. Thinking about thought and belief is one thing that is required for knowing what others are thinking. Getting it right is another. Is talking about thought and belief required for thinking about it? I certainly think talking about it is required for getting it right. However, not all notions of "thought" and "belief" get it right.

The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?

We do so by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is how we do it. That's what talking about our own thought and belief involves. Thinking about one's own thoughts and beliefs requires isolating them as subject matters in their own right. We do that with naming and descriptive practices. We use "minds", "thought", "belief", "imagination", etc. Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts?

So, you've now invoked sentience which carries ethical considerations along with it. I'm not at all opposed to drawing and maintaining the distinction between sentient and non-sentient creatures; however, I do not see how we've established the basis to include such considerations in this discussion... yet. Sentient beings are capable of forming, having, and/r holding thought and belief about the world, but so too are all thinking/believing creatures. Do all creatures capable of thought count as sentient? That's yet another assessment that does not yet have a basis from which to draw a clear conclusion. The point was to show that simple differentiation between oneself and the rest of the world is something that is successfully done by creatures that are clearly incapable of knowing what your wants are. Hence, the fact that your dog distinguishes between herself and other dogs does not lend support that she knows what your wants are. <----that was the presupposition I was rejecting.

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive. — Ludwig V

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond?
— Ludwig V

I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything. — creativesoul

I'm not at all clear what you mean about comparing wants to things. It was usually pretty obvious when she wanted something and when she had got it. — Ludwig V

Your original claim above was not about you knowing her wants. It presupposed that she knew yours. How does she know which dog you want to respond without comparing your wants to your calling her name? I'm placing the presupposition/assumption that she knows which dog you want to respond when you call her name in question. That's precisely what needs argued for.

Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices. I would bet that your tone plays a role as well, in that certain tones do not mean the same things to her that others do, despite all of them being cases of calling her name. She can draw correlations between your tone. She cannot draw correlations between your wants. They are not the sorts of things that are directly perceptible. Nor is time. Nor are the rules governing here behaviour.




We began by discussing which sorts of thought and belief other species can and/or cannot have with one specific sort of thought/belief in mind at the start, rational thought/belief. The conversation seems to have been everywhere but has gotten little to nowhere. It is my considered opinion that the methodological approach being used by many if not most participants was/is not up to the task at hand. I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.

That endeavor(establishing a criterion/standard from which to judge/assess our own and others' thought and belief) involves doing quite a bit of philosophy.

We must begin by examining and/or assessing ourselves. It is imperative that we get some rather important things right(that we correctly identify what thought and belief is; what it consists of; and/or how it emerges onto the world stage; how it persists; etc). Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief. Those positions/linguistic frameworks work from inadequate conceptions/notions of "thought" and "belief" that are incapable of taking account of other creatures' thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. The results range from outright denial to anthropomorphism.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
— Ludwig V
Care to elaborate?
— creativesoul
I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals. — Ludwig V

I think the use of "concept" is problematic. What does it clarify? Nothing as best I can tell.

What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'. It seems to me that it unnecessarily adds complexity where none is needed, and hence only adds confusion.

The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
— creativesoul
I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.

Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again.
— creativesoul
I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear? — Ludwig V

Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).

Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'.

I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs. — Vera Mont
I'm sure that this can be part of the process, but it is not required. — Questioner

What, then, is the requirement?

Every person of faith has formed a theory of mind about what is in the mind of their God. — Questioner

No they have not. No person of faith living today has conceived of a god independently. They've been told by their priest, and read in the book thrust upon them by priests, and they accept that as gospel.... selectively.

What, then, is the requirement? — Vera Mont

The stimulation of and the processing by the following brain structures involved in theory of mind functioning:

Functional neuroimaging and structural connectivity studies have identified dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as the core regions of the neural substrate for ToM, extending to regions that include the precuneus (PCu), anterior temporal cortex, anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate (PostCing), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and amygdala, to constitute an extended ToM neural network

Also copied from the same webpage:

The theory of the mind (ToM), also known as mentalizing, is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 2006) and to obtain knowledge about others' perspectives at a given moment or in a particular situation, including intentions, hopes, expectations, fantasies, desires, or beliefs. This ability is essential for successful navigation in social life (Leslie, 2000; Krawczyk, 2018). These mental states can be divided into two components, an affective one, which involves the understanding of emotions, feelings or affective states and a cognitive component that implies beliefs, thoughts or intentions (Henry et al., 2015).

https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2021.618630/full

No they have not. No person of faith living today has conceived of a god independently. They've been told by their priest, and read in the book thrust upon them by priests, and they accept that as gospel.... selectively. — Vera Mont

A theory of mind does not “pop” into the head independently. We learn by what we see, hear, experience, do, and read, and then our brains, with its hypersocial focus and filters, ascribe mental states to that which is not us – and believe in them.

From the beginning, the Book of Genesis tells us God both deliberately and mindfully created all of Creation.

It is only a pastor’s highly evolved theory of mind that allows that pastor to preach about the contents of God’s mind (for example, what God expects from us), and our highly evolved theory of mind to believe that message. It is only a highly evolved theory of mind that allows the religious to believe they have a “personal relationship” with Jesus. When people pray, who are they praying to?

Consider -

In the movie Castaway, Tom Hanks' character befriends a volleyball that he calls “Wilson” – his only friend and companion during the years that he is on the island. The character ascribed mental states to the volleyball.

Or any fiction novel ever written with well-developed characters and we get right inside their heads. These characters are fictional, but they become real to us. We know what they are thinking and how they are feeling, and even anticipate their moves. This could not be possible without a well-developed theory of mind.

We learn by what we see, hear, experience, do, and read, and then our brains, with its hypersocial focus and filters, ascribe mental states to that which is not us – and believe in them. — Questioner

Which is exactly what I've been saying. You can stimulate a fetal brain anywhere you wants, and it still won't know what 'another' is, let alone guess what that other is thinking or imagine a great big Other in the sky.

The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief? — creativesoul

It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.)

(

Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices. — creativesoul

The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.)

I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another. — creativesoul

How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples).

Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief. — creativesoul

How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things? Many people accept the conclusion that they are not. So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.

What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'. — creativesoul

It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea.

Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).
Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'. — creativesoul

The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure. But neither of those is the correlation that he is supposed to make; he got it wrong. (That's why a causal account is unhelpful, because it cannot recognize that.) It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both.
You could correlate what Janus wants with Jimi's behaviour. But that's just another rule. (BTW That's not a causal correlation, because it is possible that Jimi might not comply.)

The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
— creativesoul
It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.) — Ludwig V

That's fair and certainly worthy of explanation.

While I agree that the cases are different, they differ in their respective targets. They differ regarding what the creatures focus upon. The target is different individuals' thought and belief. That's three different ways to say much the same thing. The similarity takes precedence here. They both are metacognitive endeavors. Thus, I do not see the relevance of that particular distinction when it comes to drawing and maintaining the distinction(s) between thought, belief, and experience that consists of correlations drawn between language use(and other things) and thought, belief, and experience that does not. Nor does it seem relevant to the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language use, and thought and belief that is not. <------that's the earlier peculiarity mentioned a few posts back. I could further set that out if need be. I've just recently come to acceptable terms with it myself.

Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices.
— creativesoul
The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.) — Ludwig V

Still seems too unsupported for my tastes.

It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives.

We learn our names by virtue of how many times it is being used during a short duration of time spent. Dogs do as well. Some dogs, if rewarded well, can learn to do all sort of things. I'm okay with saying she has learned to behave in some ways sometimes. She has learned how to behave/thrive/survive in many different situations. Name calling events being one of many.

I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
— creativesoul
How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples). — Ludwig V

Sure, but only after it's already in front of us.

When it comes to being capable of correctly attributing thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences to ourselves and other capable species, we must first have knowledge of the processes involved. It's not just a matter of what they believe, it's also a matter of how.

I've explained as best I can, and I'm fairly happy with my part. There's promise/potential. I'm content.

Methodological approach needs attention.

As early on as possible I suggest examining the justificatory ground(or lack thereof), the scope of rightful application, the explanatory power, the coherence and/or terminological consistency of the standard under scrutiny. There are some things that are perfectly clear. We're looking for knowledge of thought and belief that predated humans. Such thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge thereof. That is only to say that prior to knowledge that there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the earth prior to ourselves, there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the world. A correct standard/notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" will be amenable with/to those prehistoric facts.

We can prioritize working from the fewest possible dubious assumptions. We can demand that our position posit the fewest possible entities necessary. We can insist that spatiotemporal flexibility be shown/proven by virtue of being capable of spanning the evolutionary timeline. Our standards/notion of "thought and belief" must be amenable to evolutionary progression such that it is clear how creatures begin attributing meaning to sights, sounds, and such. That's what thinking about the world does.

This sets out some of the standards I'm working from. Methodological approach. I think I have a very strong methodological naturalist bent.

What do all thinking and believing creatures have in common such that it this set of common elemental constituents that makes them what they are? They are all capable of drawing correlations between different things. Biological machinery finds a timely home at this point in the discussion.

Thought and belief are always meaningful to the creature drawing the correlations(forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief). Some thinking creatures inhabited the earth long before we did. Any and all acceptable notions of "mind", "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must take proper account of this.

We find ourselves becoming strikingly aware that some meaning is prior to any and all notions of "meaning". The same is true of thought and "thought" as well as belief and "belief".

What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'.
— creativesoul
It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea. — Ludwig V

"Thought and belief" exhaust "concept", but not the other way around.

Concepts of concepts. Nah.

The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure. — Ludwig V

There is more than one correlation being drawn. Some are efficacious too. Some have been drawn and continue to influence subsequent behaviours afterwards.

That's not a problem.

Claims beginning with Jimi "might have" presuppose a world in which Jimi could have. It's that logically possible world that needs set out. What else must also be the case in order for it to be possible for Jimi to draw correlations between the dead chicken, Janus' presence, and Janus' displeasure?

How does the dog drive a wedge between Janus' displeasure and Janus' presence?

In order to connect three things, they must first be somehow disconnected.

How does Jimi disconnect Janus's presence from Janus' outward unhappy behaviour?

The chicken is in its own place. Jimi is as well. So too, is Janus. Janus' presence and Janus' displeasure do not share such clearly different spatiotemporal locations. Jimi does not think about Janus' displeasure in contrast/comparison or as a separate thing to/from Janus' presence. One must do so prior to connecting them(drawing a correlation between them).

It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both. — Ludwig V

I'm not sure what this is supposed to be aimed at. Looks to be made of straw.

Sure. Jimi's learned from his experience. Such experience was meaningful to Jimi by virtue of his having drawn correlations between his own behaviour and Janus's behaviour afterwards. Chickens became a bit more significant to Jimi as a result. Jimi learned that killing chickens has unwanted consequences. He can learn much the same lesson after touching fire.

Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality?

Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief.
— creativesoul
How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things? — Ludwig V

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.

Many people accept the conclusion that they are not.

Indeed they do. Some folk must if they are to remain free from self-contradiction.

So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.

I'm not even sure what you're claiming here. I'll add this...

If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking.

It is the case. Some positions cannot admit this. Thus, those positions must be rejected.

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken. — creativesoul

Some people might call that begging the question. One needs to explain the criteria for assertng it. But that's not a simple matter of evidence, because thinking of a dog as a sentient, rational creature is not a simple matter of fact but of thinking of a dog as, in many ways, (like) a person.

How does Jimi disconnect Janus's presence from Janus' outward unhappy behaviour? — creativesoul

Sometimes Janus is present and not outwardly unhappy, sometimes he is present and outwardly unhappy.

Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality? — creativesoul

That's very helpful. It clarifies what you meant when you said that all belief and thought consists of correlations. Thanks.

So Jimi's experience when he killed the first chicken might be expected to lead him to refrain from killing any more chickens on the principle that the burnt child fears the fire. But Jimi didn't fear the fire. He killed another chicken. (I'm not sure that dogs have a concept of causality as such. Simple correlations might be enough. But that's another issue.) What went wrong?
Maybe he forgot. But that suggests that he did not realize the significance (meaning) of his experience - i.e. he failed to generalize from it, in the way that the burnt child does. Then he was reminded of the first experience when he saw the chicken dead, or perhaps when Janus returned. That's the moment when he generalized from the first experience and realized that he was in trouble.
But it's not enough for him to generalize and understand that (1) whenever he kills a chicken, he will be in trouble. He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.

There's more to Jimi than just recognizing causal correlations.

Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts? — creativesoul

So when a creature recognizes that some belief it holds is false, it isn't thinking about its own thoughts? When a creature recognizes that some other creature is about to attack it, it isn't thinking about the other creature's thoughts?
I don't know what the question "how" means in this context. But one can think without language.

Herewith my last post on the opening question
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=are+crows+smarter+than+your+seven-year-old

I don't think anyone seriously wants to reject the idea that the male bird of paradise builds his bower in order to attract a female. But creativesoul is also right to observe that that purpose is not necessarily the bird's motivation. We ought to know this, since the same issue can be observed in human beings. Display behaviour can be observed in both males and female human beings, but it does not follow that they are motivated by the desire to make babies (though they may be, sometimes). Human beings can tell us what their motivation is, but the birds cannot. It seems to me, in fact, most likely that the birds just feel like building a bower, finding it a satisfactory and worth-while thing to do - just as so much display behaviour in human beings is done only because they feel that it is a worth-while thing to do.
But there is no doubt that such behaviour serves an evolutionary purpose. What's more, it explains the behaviour as rational; "feeling like it" doesn't explain anything. — Ludwig V

I love the work everyone has put into posting and this one is very interesting.
When nature changes the hormones the behavior will change.

I strongly think many female humans are unaware of wanting a baby when they start putting on lipstick, and possibly dressing and otherwise using body language, to attract the opposite sex. They might even be really against getting pregnant.

What they want is to be attractive and human females can be as competitive about this as different species of males strut their feathers, or another species will beat their chests. :grin:

Perhaps we have not stressed hormones enough?

The sexual response cycle refers to the sequence of physical and emotional changes that occur as a person becomes sexually aroused and participates in sexually stimulating activities, including intercourse and masturbation. Knowing how your body responds during each phase of the cycle can enhance your relationship and help you pinpoint the cause of any sexual problems.
https://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/sexual-health-your-guide-to-sexual-response-cycle

Sexual behaviors occur when the animal has enough of the hormone that causes the animal to be sexual. Bonobos and Humans are the most sexual and are not as controlled as most animals that have very short periods of being sexually receptive.

If you are a farmer wanting to breed your animals you need to know estrus.

[/quote]or “heat” is a period during the
reproductive cycle when female animals
become sexually receptive, signaling they
are ready for mating. In most cases, this
can also be referred to as “standing heat”
because the female will stand to be mated
by the male (Figure 1).
Estrus is caused by estrogen being
produced within developing follicles on
the ovary, and ovulation usually occurs
after the initial signs of estrus are detected. Duration of estrus and the time
of ovulation in relationship to the onset
of estrus vary with the species (Table 1).
If behavioral or physical signs are not
obvious, estrus may even pass unnoticed.
Successful recognition of the signs of
estrus for mating, just prior to the time of
ovulation, can result in increased conception rates for the herd or flock.
https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/as/as-559-w.pdf [/quote]

My point is we need to stop thinking animals decide to things for a reason and thinking about how unreasonable humans are. :lol:

What messes with our thinking is that social rules add another dimension to sexual behaviors. :chin: We can question what rules are playing, the social or hormonal ones? To what degree is the animal controlled the social rules or the hormonal ones what what part of this is thinking?

Herewith my last post on the opening question
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=are+crows+smarter+than+your+seven-year-old — Vera Mont

That was fascinating!

I want to refer back to a book about math that I am reading because it really made me think about thinking math. What is thinking math?

Thinking 1, 2, 3, and 35 is a language skill. Looking at a plate of cookies and determining which one has the most cookies is not a language skill. A person can count all the cookies on all the plates and use math to determine which plate has the most cookies, but we can also judge which plate has the most volume of cookies. Animals can do that without having the language for math.

Now when I multiply simple numbers like 2x2 or 7x8 I am thinking how I think. 2x2 is so easy but 7x8 is not. Why is it so much harder to figure 7x8? I am learning our ability to do math includes knowing the relationship of numbers. Animals don't have the language of math so they can not think through the relationships of numbers. Does anyone know what I am talking about or am I being too weird?

Please help. I am trying to understand animal thinking that is done without language, by being aware of my own thinking. besides thinking of math, I am also thinking I am depressed because the cold weather makes going outside so unpleasant and that can become isolating and how do I think through this problem instead of playing a computer game all-day to avoid life. :lol: I can think I really need to knock on a neighbor's door and be neighborly, but my body screams, no I don't want to go outside. Where is the rational thinking? My body does not want to go outside but my head knows better.

He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him. — Ludwig V

That is such a wonderful thought! A woman in Canada developed a method for teaching virtues that can be used in schools or by families. She is very clear that it is not enough to punish a child for doing wrong. The child must learn what is the right way to do things. I feel so much pain for all the children who are punished again and again and don't just magically realize how to avoid punishment. I have seen parents and schools fail to teach what is right.

That's very helpful. It clarifies what you meant when you said that all belief and thought consists of correlations. — Ludwig V

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken. — creativesoul

Those last two quotes go together but I am a bit overwhelmed by all the thinking that has gone on while I was gone. What are the correlations? Is the argument that animals without language are rational thinkers? Hum, :chin: I am thinking what would motivate me to go out in the old? I am thinking I would like myself a whole lot better if acted on the notion I should check on a neighbor and telling you about this increases my motivation to do the right thing. Are those thoughts the correlations?

I strongly think many female humans are unaware of wanting a baby when they start putting on lipstick, and possibly dressing and otherwise using body language, to attract the opposite sex. They might even be really against getting pregnant. — Athena

As I understand it, the paradise bird's behaviour is specific to mating and breeding. Human (and, presumably, bonobo) sexual behaviour is not strongly linked to fertility. I'm told that, at least in the case of bonobos, that sexual behaviour has additional functions in their social lives. That is certainly true in the case of humans.
Dressing up may be a sometimes a preliminary to actual courtship and mating, but it has other functions as well. It would be seriously reductionist not to recognize that. It claims membership of a social group and helps give one self-confidence. In relation to others it can deter aggression and form the basis of alliances. Other animals are not all the same in this respect. One needs to look at their lives holistically to understand what is going on.

My point is we need to stop thinking animals decide to things for a reason and thinking about how unreasonable humans are. :lol: — Athena

Yes, they are and we often equate irrationality with instinctive behaviour. But it's more complicated than that. Our instincts are mediated through the social and practical rules that we have learnt, so our actual behaviour is based on instincts, which are given. It doesn't follow that they are irrational, although they might be non-rational; I mean that they are best thought of a like axioms - starting-points for rationality, which adjusts instinctive impulses to the outside world. In addition, we can explain the instincts as rational, not from the point of view of the animal, but from the point of view of the evolutionary pressure to survive and reproduce.

I am thinking what would motivate me to go out in the old? — Athena

One of the functions of rationality, it seems to me, is to balance competing desires. But there are situations when it doesn't work very well, as in your case. I deeply sympathize with your desire not to hide from life whether in a machine or something else. It is not easy. The best I can offer is baby steps, building up slowly. If going outside to check on a neighbour is too much, try to think of a smaller steps that you can actually do. Going outside for one minute. (If you see her indoors wave at her throught the window.) Ringing your neighbour. (I suggest asking if you can borrow a cup of sugar, rather than just asking if they are OK.) That's how I try to handle those feelings. Mind you, I'm not very good at it.

I feel so much pain for all the children who are punished again and again and don't just magically realize how to avoid punishment. — Athena

No-one seems to recognize that punishment only works if the person being punished takes it the right way. But there's nothing to prevent people getting the wrong end of the stick. Like the fraudster who is caught and punished and responds by getting better at doing the fraud without getting caught.

There is a whole school of dog training which emphasizes reward-based training and frowns on the traditional punishments or even stick-and-carrot training.
It's important to emphasize that there is a form of punishment involved, but it is only withholding reward. In the context of no punishment, that works to deter unwanted behaviour. So if I were training Jimi, I would make a point of being around when Jimi is around chickens and keeping him distracted - ideally by playing his best game with him, or getting him to sit with me by offering intermittent treats. Once he's got that idea, you can gradually phase out the treats.

If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking. — creativesoul

Yes. That seems to be our starting-point. Out differences lie in what a proper account is.

It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives. — creativesoul

No, I don't suppose that a dog that knows its own name "in the exact same way" as we do. For example, it can't tell anyone what its name is. But it can do many of the things that we can do when we know our own name. In my opinion, the overlap is sufficient.
You are right, of course, that animals that don't undergo training in human ways, won't have to opportunity to learn their name. We probably ought to think of them as using pronouns only, though our reports might use names for people.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. — creativesoul

Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false.

Please help. I am trying to understand animal thinking that is done without language, by being aware of my own thinking. besides thinking of math, — Athena

That is probably the biggest difficulty. I have some ideas about how to respond to it, but will have to try to articulate them later.

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
— creativesoul
Some people might call that begging the question... — Ludwig V

That's their problem. I call it making sure a position is commensurate with the facts; what's happened or is happening; everyday events; etc. Many animals other than humans are clearly capable of problem solving. We can watch it happen. That's been proven over and over. So, either problem solving is something that can be done by a thoughtless creature(which amounts to saying that problem solving does not require thinking) or some non human creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought.

Since it is the case that some other animals problem solve, and problem solving is thinking, then it is not the case that only human are capable of thinking.

The conventional problems underwriting this matter stem from i) an abysmal failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and ii) parsing truth as nothing more than a property of true sentences.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use.
— creativesoul
Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false. — Ludwig V

I find it curious that you agree and then immediately misattribute meaning to the dog, based upon the dog's behaviour. Your dog's walking away from an empty food bowl may count as a recognition that it's
belief was false according to your criterion for what counts as such belief, but not mine.

The dog knows there's no food in bowl. The dog may have believed that there was prior to going to check. He checked. There was no food in the bowl. The bowl did not have food in it. That's what he believed. In order for him to recognize that his belief was false, he would have to first be capable of thinking about his own belief. As I've painstakingly set out heretofore many times over, thinking about one's own thought is a practice that is itself existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices replete with some proxy for the dog's own thought/belief. Dogs do not have what it takes.

Do you have any argument whatsoever for any of the claims you've been making? Do you have a valid objection to my own? Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought or belief such that all thought and belief satisfy it?

How does a dog(or any other animal without naming and descriptive practices) pick its own belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else in order to compare it to the world?