I would say that cultures interact in much the same way individuals do. In both cases there are things like exchange, mutual cooperation, conflict, argument, persuasion, and coercion.

True. What I would be saying, analogously, is that we have taken the "you-do-you while I-do-me" principle too far: if your friend decides to go out and rape someone, then you have a duty to forceably impose your values on them insofar as they shouldn't be doing that. Similarly, a society has a duty to take over or at least subjugate another society to their values when the latter gets too immoral.

Anti-imperialism is a very limited justification in the first place. But the disorderedness of a society is not in itself a sufficient reason for intervention. Should we intervene in North Korea out of compassion? Perhaps, but perhaps not. Compassion can be a motive, but it is seldom a sufficient condition for action.

Even if the negative consequences were very low (or non-existent), are you saying that the West would not be justified in taking over North Korea by force?

I agree that coercion should be the last resort, but it seems to be a resort; and seems to be a valid resort to stop societal structures that are really immoral; and this entails some version of imperialism, even if it is a much weaker version than the standard ones historically.

What I would be saying, analogously, is that we have taken the "you-do-you while I-do-me" principle too far: if your friend decides to go out and rape someone, then you have a duty to forceably impose your values on them insofar as they shouldn't be doing that. Similarly, a society has a duty to take over or at least subjugate another society to their values when the latter gets too immoral.

...

and [coercion] seems to be a valid resort to stop societal structures that are really immoral; and this entails some version of imperialism — Bob Ross

Well, in virtue of what do we have a duty to prevent immorality? Do we have a duty to perpetrators? Do we have a duty to victims? Do we have a duty to "friends"? Do we have a duty to strangers? Do we have a duty to strangers on the other side of the world?

Even if the negative consequences were very low (or non-existent), are you saying that the West would not be justified in taking over North Korea by force? — Bob Ross

If there were no negative consequences then we would be justified. But even something as simple as resource allocation is a negative consequence, so there will always be negative consequences.

Even if the negative consequences were very low (or non-existent), are you saying that the West would not be justified in taking over North Korea by force?

I agree that coercion should be the last resort, but it seems to be a resort; and seems to be a valid resort to stop societal structures that are really immoral; and this entails some version of imperialism, even if it is a much weaker version than the standard ones historically. — Bob Ross

When both the US and North Korea have nuclear weapons, then the question would this:

How many Americans and what percentage of North Koreans population is a justifiable sacrifice to erase the North Korean dictatorship out of existence? And if with Americans the death toll less than have died of Covid (less than 1,2 million), let's say just Hawaii and the Bay area were destroyed, then how many North Koreans would it be enough to revenge the lost Americans?

Well, in virtue of what do we have a duty to prevent immorality?

Justice—no?

Do we have a duty to perpetrators?

What do you mean?

Do we have a duty to victims?

Yes. To punish the perpetrator and avenge the victim(s).

Do we have a duty to "friends"?

Yes.

Do we have a duty to strangers?

Yes. Do you not believe that you have any duty to be just to strangers?

Do we have a duty to strangers on the other side of the world?

Does being just ultimately depend on where the injustice is happening? Sure, circumstances matter, but, in principle, it doesn’t matter.

If there were no negative consequences then we would be justified. But even something as simple as resource allocation is a negative consequence, so there will always be negative consequences.

Agreed.

We are not justified in going to nuclear war with North Korea, assuming both sides have working nukes, to save the people there. The nation firstly has a duty to its own citizens, and not other citizens of other nations.

Justice—no?

...

Yes. To punish the perpetrator and avenge the victim(s). — Bob Ross

Generally we do not believe that everyone has legal standing (locus standi).

Similarly, it is the duty of the judge to punish the perpetrator and avenge the victim, not the common person.

Do we have a duty in justice to right wrongs happening on the other side of the world? I don't know. Maybe, but not really? Not everything is within our jurisdiction. Here is Aquinas:

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

Generally we do not believe that everyone has legal standing (locus standi).

I think moral and legal standing are different: the latter is a practical attempt at justice for the community, whereas the former can surpass that sphere of jurisdiction. To deny this, by my lights, is to accept that nothing immoral is happening, e.g., when a citizen of another country violently attacks a citizen of another (for there is no notion of justice qua morality in this sphere of discourse since it lands outside of the purview of both societies to a sufficient extent).

Perhaps the solution is to say that both authorities of each society would congregate to resolve the matter, as opposed to the lower institutions (e.g., police) imposing justice; but, then, what of the, e.g., indigenous member of the tribe, which does not have a sufficiently powerful community to advocate on their behalf, or the non-citizen? Are they chopped liver? If there is not such distinction, mentioned above, then I think so.

Similarly, it is the duty of the judge to punish the perpetrator and avenge the victim, not the common person.

This is true if we are careful to denote this duty as legal duty—not moral duty. E.g., I do not have a legal duty to save my daughter from a burning building but I certainly have a moral duty to do so.

Usually, when we note that a person doesn’t have “duty” to enact justice for another; we tend to be saying that as a pragmatic rule of thumb for two reasons: the first being that it tends to be handled more appropriately by those that are of an institution designed to handle it (e.g., police, first responders, etc.), and secondly because imposing that justice usually has sufficiently negative consequences to the avenger that we would not blame them for avoiding avenging or stopping the attack in the first place.

However, I do think it is commonly accepted that if the negative consequences are sufficiently trivial, that it is immoral to do nothing. For example, the man that watched this women get kidnapped while she screamed for help technically doesn’t have a legal duty to intervene; but we all think he should have (morally speaking, as that is a part of a man’s moral duty and role in society to be a protector).

Do we have a duty in justice to right wrongs happening on the other side of the world?

The problem I have with this line of thinking is that, in principle, we can wipe our hands clean when we avoid doing just things because they are outside of our jurisdiction—jurisdiction is just a pragmatic notion to enact justice.

Likewise, the issue with thinking solely in terms of jurisdiction, in the sense Aquinas noted in your quote, is demonstrated sufficiently in the quote itself:

And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction

People who think in terms of solely jurisdiction have the same susceptibility as denotoligists: avoiding the right thing to do because it doesn’t follow the strict rules laid out for people to follow by people.

Sorry, I forgot about this.

I think moral and legal standing are different: the latter is a practical attempt at justice for the community, whereas the former can surpass that sphere of jurisdiction. — Bob Ross

They are the same insofar as moral standing is not infinite. Not everything is our responsibility to rectify.

To deny this, by my lights, is to accept that nothing immoral is happening — Bob Ross

Why? If I don't have a claim to prevent something, then that something cannot be immoral? This is obviously not true in law.

Usually, when we note that a person doesn’t have “duty” to enact justice for another; we tend to be saying that as a pragmatic rule of thumb for two reasons: the first being that it tends to be handled more appropriately by those that are of an institution designed to handle it (e.g., police, first responders, etc.), and secondly because imposing that justice usually has sufficiently negative consequences to the avenger that we would not blame them for avoiding avenging or stopping the attack in the first place.

However, I do think it is commonly accepted that if the negative consequences are sufficiently trivial, that it is immoral to do nothing. — Bob Ross

But what about the first reason you gave? That there are those with a duty? If something is happening on the other side of the world, then the duty generally falls to those who live there.

The problem I have with this line of thinking is that, in principle, we can wipe our hands clean when we avoid doing just things because they are outside of our jurisdiction—jurisdiction is just a pragmatic notion to enact justice. — Bob Ross

I think we both know that the answer to my question is, "No." Or at least, "Generally not."

We are not responsible for everything. That's a fairly important moral and psychological principle, and one that we really struggle with in the West. Your slippery slope concern does not invalidate it.

Sorry, I forgot about this.

No worries at all: I did the same thing to @Mww haha.

Why? If I don't have a claim to prevent something, then that something cannot be immoral?

I was assuming that if something is immoral than, ceteris paribus, one would think it should not be done; which, to me, implies some degree of duty merely by acknowledging that. Of course, you are denying the binding of a moral agent to stopping immorality simpliciter; since one may not have a duty, under your view, to stop it even though it is immoral.

If something is happening on the other side of the world, then the duty generally falls to those who live there.
...
We are not responsible for everything. That's a fairly important moral and psychological principle, and one that we really struggle with in the West. Your slippery slope concern does not invalidate it.
...
Not everything is our responsibility to rectify.

Let me ask you this (to better understand your position): let's imagine you are the head of the police for the entire county (or region) that you live in; you find out that a woman is getting raped 2 inches past the county (or region) line (thusly making it in a different county [or region] than your own jurisdiction); and you find out that the authorities in that county will not do anything about it (perhaps they lack the resources, simply aren't doing their job, etc.). Are you saying that you wouldn't dispatch units to help that woman because, in principle, the raping is happening outside of your country (jurisdiction)?

If so, then please, if you don't mind, elaborate why or how one could justify doing nothing in this situation; and, more generally, how a moral agent is not bound, qua moral agency, to stop immoral acts all else being equal.

I understand that we do not have a duty to invest all our time and energy, even as moral agents, into saving people; but that's because we have a duty to ourselves and others (like family) that are prioritized higher.

I challenge you to try to justify, in your response to this OP, e.g., why Western, democratic values should not be forcibly imposed on obviously degenerate, inferior societies at least in principle—like Talibanian Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, China, India, etc. Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good, that it is virtually impossible to justify leaving them be in the name of anti-imperialism. E.g., if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

Installing democracy in a nation in which its people follow other moral rules for their politics is impossible. Even if you forcefully destroy what they have and force them to vote, they will never find a stable ground to operate on. You are effectively not trying to install democracy, you are trying to reshape their entire world view, their beliefs and sense of normalcy.

Yes, we can argue that cultures can be evaluated out of their humanistic qualities. We can oppose a culture for how it treats its people. But change can only come from the inside. We can try and expose these people to our values, show them another way and if they want to follow that they will eventually change.

But enforcing it by force will attach that brutality to the values that's supposed to be installed.

In essence, if I invade a nation, killing anything that comes in my way and then try to communicate my message of peace and understanding, of free will and love. My entire course of action to do so creates a cognitive dissonance in the people I try to "help". They might agree with the love, peace and understanding, but at the same time your actions speak of violence. Will that people not see view the whole package of what you brought them? That you did not only bring the message of love, but also the force and violence as well?

Because we can also look within the western democracies that we have. As a swede I could view US politics as barbaric. With its inability to help its own people, the racial violence, the risk of authoritarian power and the risk of its military capability to initiate a new world war when some delusional president takes power.

Should the more balanced democracies within western culture gather together and invade the US, kill its corrupt leaders and corporate "oligarks", rip their constitution to pieces and install the better constitutional laws that we have, the parliament politics that better function as a representative democratic system and stay there until the US population have learned the better way of how democracy should be handled?

Because democracy in itself and the western values in general are in some places wildly in conflict with itself. And many democracies are ill-built to govern against manipulation and corruption within their halls of power.

The bottom line is that change has to come from the inside. The only way to truly change a nation to the better is to inspire better ideals. It is painfully slow, but it is also rock solid in the long term. Most attempts at "installing democracy" have failed miserably, with even more dire consequences like terrorism growing not only to fight back within their own borders, but also against he power that came there to "help".

What you are talking about when mentioning North Korea is not about installing "better values" and changing their culture to a "better system". You look at their existence as a danger to the world, with their nuclear capabilities and their threats of war. Invading to defeat that is not about "installing democracy" any more than invading Nazi Germany to get rid of Hitler's regime. That's another action entirely that has to do with offensive defense, not "helping" people.

The bottom line is that change has to come from the inside. The only way to truly change a nation to the better is to inspire better ideals

That is a better way to do it, but an invasion can work too and sometimes is necessary. You are forgetting that every major Western country was built off the violence and subjugation of weaker societies. E.g, the US was originally native american territory. For some reason Westerns seem to forget this, like the West just emerged through peaceful “inspirations”……

My point is not that we need to incessantly impose our values on other societies; but, rather, that it is a necessary last resort sometimes. Likewise, we should be, always, trying to influence other nations to our better values (if we truly believe ours are better, that is).

I would love to see Iran fall, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, etc. Wouldn’t you? Yes, the West has tried before and failed—so what? Try again. Perhaps try your “inspiration” tactics.

It is painfully slow, but it is also rock solid in the long term.

Like what? Are you thinking of peaceful protests—Ghandi’esque style—change? That won’t due, excuse my french, twiddly d**k in Iran…

Most attempts at "installing democracy" have failed miserably

But, still, in principle, we should be trying to install it by whatever means are feasible and reasonable relative to the nation executing it.

What you are talking about when mentioning North Korea is not about installing "better values" and changing their culture to a "better system". You look at their existence as a danger to the world, with their nuclear capabilities and their threats of war.

No, I don’t. Let’s clear away the misconfusion here. Imagine North Korea was the exact as it is now except it had no ability nuke or bomb any other nations. According to your logic here, North Korea shouldn’t be invaded because….it is not about “changing their culture to a ‘better system’ even though they are mass genociding their people?!?

As a swede I could view US politics as barbaric. With its inability to help its own people, the racial violence, the risk of authoritarian power and the risk of its military capability to initiate a new world war when some delusional president takes power.

The US has its own problems for sure, but it isn’t nearly as bad as you make it seem. There’s very little racial violence, and most of it is from liberals on whites (or other perceived non-minorities); the US provides people with a good standard of living with a booming economy; and Trump is not going to do anything worse than Biden has already done.

Should the more balanced democracies

Lmao, is this Sweden you are referring to? Do you think Sweden is better than the US? I hope you aren’t referring to inferior societies like Great Britain.

Should the more balanced democracies within western culture gather together and invade the US

If you genuinely think that the US is that bad, then you should be advocating for those “balanced demoncracies” to influence the US into being better as much as feasibly possible. Is the US bad enough to invade it? That’s going to be relative to how bad you think it is.

For me, I think the US is much better than these “balanced democracies”; and I don’t all of them combined could put a dent in the US—at least not head-on warfare. Maybe they could get the people to revolt for the sake of socialism.

kill its corrupt leaders and corporate "oligarks"

There is definitely a lot of corruption, like any other of these “balanced countries”. I wouldn’t say we should kill them, but rather charge them with the crimes they have committed and actually hold them to the law.

, rip their constitution to pieces and install the better constitutional laws that we have,

Ok, name one constitution that is better than the american one; and elaborate on its main rights that it outlines.

Sweden has strict gun laws that prevent good people from defending themselves and the people from being capable of overthrowing a tyrannical government. Ironically, it has incredibly high gun violence too…..

I would never live in a country that doesn’t have a basic right to bear arms. Never.

In essence, if I invade a nation, killing anything that comes in my way and then try to communicate my message of peace and understanding, of free will and love.

An invasion doesn’t have to look like that; but, sure, there will be immanent resistance—that’s natural. Historically, it is a couple generations later when those sentiments die out. However, in my examples, the issues on those inferior societies are substantial and not trivial. I wouldn’t advocate to invade Sweden even though I don’t think it is a better place to live because it isn’t THAT BAD. Talibanian Afghanistan IS THAT BAD.

You are right that using full force to invade a country will have nasty side effects for a while and may end up biting the whole project in the butt (and, not to mention, may be immoral if the reasons are not solid for doing so); but my point is that invasion is a last resort sometimes just like killing someone to counter a violent offense that is occurring (e.g., an active shooter).

I was assuming that if something is immoral than, ceteris paribus, one would think it should not be done; which, to me, implies some degree of duty merely by acknowledging that. Of course, you are denying the binding of a moral agent to stopping immorality simpliciter; since one may not have a duty, under your view, to stop it even though it is immoral. — Bob Ross

That's right. I don't think that just because something is immoral I therefore have a duty to stop or prevent it. If that were true then I would have a duty to stop every immoral act I have knowledge of, which would be impossible.

If so, then please, if you don't mind, elaborate why or how one could justify doing nothing in this situation; and, more generally, how a moral agent is not bound, qua moral agency, to stop immoral acts all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Let's grant that one has a moral duty to help the woman being raped, even if they do not have a legal duty (and I have never said otherwise). How does your conclusion follow that we have a duty to prevent every immoral act we have knowledge of? I don't think it follows at all.

and, more generally, how a moral agent is not bound, qua moral agency, to stop immoral acts all else being equal. — Bob Ross

If I were bound to stop all immoral acts then I would be bound to do the impossible (by stopping every immoral act I have knowledge of); but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore I am not bound to stop all immoral acts.

I don't know that your idea of "being bound ceteris paribus" is ultimately coherent. Being "bound" implies necessity, whereas "ceteris paribus" implies non-necessity.

Put differently, if we want to say that we should oppose the immorality that is within our power and competence to oppose, then we have actually contradicted the thesis that we are bound to oppose all immorality we have knowledge of (at least on the presupposition that we have knowledge of immorality that is beyond our power or competence to oppose).

If I were bound to stop all immoral acts then I would be bound to do the impossible (by stopping every immoral act I have knowledge of); but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore I am not bound to stop all immoral acts.

One may be bound, e.g., to save every person from burning buildings per se—as is the case for firefighters—but yet be incapable of saving everyone in some particular, burning building. I think “duty” is much more complicated than just what one is bound to do in a particular situation pragamatically. The duty to save people from a burning building clearly extends to saving everyone if possible, but if NOT possible then save as many as possible; and even though it extends to everyone, we would not say that a firefighter did not uphold their duty, irregardless, by only saving as many as they could. It seems like you are missing the fact that duty refers to both: the ideal and pragmatic. All you are noting above, is essentially that we are incapable of fulfilling the ideal duty which we have, or however one should properly explain it (but you get the point), when there is a pragmatic aspect to it. The impossibility of upholding what is ideal, does not negate it as such.

In colloquial speech, we would say that I have a moral duty to my family but not to the homeless stranger; but all else being equal people would say I have a moral obligation to help the latter in ideal circumstances. E.g., a filthy rich man, who doesn’t help the homeless man but instead spends it on utterly superficial commodities (like Yachts, women, etc.), even though he could do it with no considerable consequences (to his own wealth), because it is not his duty to help them—that’s the duty of some homelessness governmental agency I suppose. This seems wrong—don’t you think?

I don't know that your idea of "being bound ceteris paribus" is ultimately coherent. Being "bound" implies necessity, whereas "ceteris paribus" implies non-necessity.

I partially agree: prima facie you are right to point out that if one is bound to X, then they must abide by X irregardless of the circumstances; but that’s not quite right. If one is bound to X, then they must abide by X irregardless of the irrelevant circumstances. Circumstances could be a factor in duty, but not all circumstances are. E.g., a firefighter must save all people from burning buildings irregardless of if they feel like it, but they are not violating that duty meaningfully by saving as many as they can if they cannot save everyone.

Put differently, if we want to say that we should oppose the immorality that is within our power and competence to oppose, then we have actually contradicted the thesis that we are bound to oppose all immorality we have knowledge of (at least on the presupposition that we have knowledge of immorality that is beyond our power or competence to oppose).

Yes, I am not arguing that we must oppose immorality that is out of our power to oppose: I am arguing that, all else being equal, a moral agent opposes all immorality that they can.

In western culture, it is exceedingly common to despise and oppose nationalism and imperialism; for it tends to be barbaric, supremacistic, unnecessary and exclusive. Instead, westerner’s are more and more apt to accepting a version of cultural relativism. Viz., why should I be proud of my country? Why should my country start wars in the name of its values? It is just a nation meant to facilitate the protections and needs of the people—after all! — Bob Ross

That isn't what cultural relativism is. You don't have to be a cultural (or moral) relativist to think those things, and being a relativist doesn't guarantee that you won't think all of those things.

Cultural relativism is the view that objective goods are relative to social norms and values; and this line of thinking does usually cause anti-nationalist ideologies. It is also worth mentioning, to your point, that one may be an anti-nationalist for other reasons.

E.g., a firefighter must save all people from burning buildings irregardless of if they feel like it, but they are not violating that duty meaningfully by saving as many as they can if they cannot save everyone. — Bob Ross

We could rephrase my argument for the firefighter:

If one were bound to save every person from fire then they would be bound to do the impossible; but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore no one is bound to save every person from fire.

You say that a firefighter is bound to save every person from burning buildings. I don't think that is right, and I don't think you will find that idea in a firefighting oath.

Yes, I am not arguing that we must oppose immorality that is out of our power to oppose: I am arguing that, all else being equal, a moral agent opposes all immorality that they can. — Bob Ross

Is a firefighter bound to save every person from fire that he can? No, and although this may sound pedantic, firefighters work on teams, and that means that they are supposed to share the load. This means that a firefighter might be rebuked by his captain for trying to save someone (because it is not always appropriate for him to try to save someone, even when he can).

With regard to common citizens, I don't think a moral agent should "oppose all the immorality that they can." I think they should oppose all the immorality that they should. "Can" is obviously a very loaded word. Let's return to Aquinas' quote:

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

And especially objection 3 and its response:

Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (II-II:32:2). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

The question here is whether there are reserved forms of correction. Aquinas thinks there are, and that "chastisement by blows" is one of them.

My claim is that the same distinction regarding jurisdiction applies to nations and cultures. "It is lawful for any nation to impart correction to a willing nation, but to impart it to an unwilling nation belongs to those only who have charge over it."

And then there is the deeper question of open coercion, which applies to things like war. Given the United States' military prowess, it can oppose a great deal of immorality. But I don't think it should, because I don't think it has a duty to do whatever it can.

Cultural relativism is the view that objective goods are relative to social norms and values; and this line of thinking does usually cause anti-nationalist ideologies. — Bob Ross

I'm not so sure about this, I think here @flannel jesus is correct. Being critical about your own nation, it's democratic system isn't cultural relativism. It doesn't lead to cultural relativism or that cultural relativism would lead to self criticism. Self criticism can lead to anti-nationalism, if the society has believed in itself and it's values. Self criticism can lead to improving yourself, which is good, but it also can lead to self hatred and apathy.

This is a very interesting take, that I would like to explore more.

If one were bound to save every person from fire then they would be bound to do the impossible; but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore no one is bound to save every person from fire.
…
Is a firefighter bound to save every person from fire that he can? No,

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone.

With regard to common citizens, I don't think a moral agent should "oppose all the immorality that they can."

So what about the man that watched that woman get kidnapped? It seems like your view leaves no room for moral obligation to help people outside of the strict, institutionalized sense of duty. In fact, wouldn’t it follow that—not only was the man permitted to just stand there and watch but—he was not permitted to stop it since, according to your Thomistic take, he has no jurisdiction to reprimand a fellow unwilling citizen?

To me, it seems like at least some citizens (like healthy males) have certain duties towards other citizens that are not institutionalized; no different than how if the government were to become too tyrannical, then the people would have the duty to revolt.

Like I said before, cultural relativism leads to anti-nationalism; but not all anti-nationalism is due to cultural relativism. I was noting cultural relativism specifically because it is prominent among the masses in the west.

Moral relativism and cultural relativism aren't synonyms.

I think you are talking more about moral relativism than cultural relativism.

No I am not. Cultural relativism is a (family of) moral realist theory(ies) that posits, fundamentally, that objective goods are internal (i.e., relative) to societies or cultures—in terms of norms, values, or/and laws—whereas moral relativism is any moral theory which posits that objective goods are internal (i.e., relative) to something. Cultural relativism is a form of moral relativism; not all moral relativist theories are a form of cultural relativism.

IMHO, although cultural relativism is allegedly a form of moral realism, it reduces to a form of inter-subjectivism or "inter-non-objectivism" and thusly is a form of moral anti-realism (in actuality). It naturally makes sense for a cultural relativist to opt for anti-nationalism, because imposing moral law (or objective goods) that is only valid for one society can't be validly applied to another.

In a vaguer sense, I think people are moving more and more towards cultural relativism and truth relativism; and that's why many people find it upsetting to impose values onto other nations.

This is a very interesting take, that I would like to explore more. — Bob Ross

:up:

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

Yes, and that seems in line with what I found when looking at firefighter's oaths, i.e. "Protecting people."

So what about the man that watched that woman get kidnapped? It seems like your view leaves no room for moral obligation to help people outside of the strict, institutionalized sense of duty. — Bob Ross

• We must oppose all the immorality that we can.
• We must oppose all the immorality that we should.

On your "can" formulation we must help the woman being raped. What about on my "should" formulation? Is there a reason why we should help her aside from the simple fact that we can? I think so.

Aquinas addresses some of this in the complicated Question 79 of the Secunda Secundae, particularly in Article 1 (on the quasi-integral parts of justice) and Article 3 (on omission).

First:

In fact, wouldn’t it follow that—not only was the man permitted to just stand there and watch but—he was not permitted to stop it since, according to your Thomistic take, he has no jurisdiction to reprimand a fellow unwilling citizen? — Bob Ross

See, in the same Question:

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.3.ad3

How does this pertain to justice, given that Aquinas is speaking in the context of a section of the Secunda Secundae devoted to justice?

I would point to this:

If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [Cf. II-II:58:5]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil. — Aquinas, ST II-II.79.1 - Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?

Given that an omission, strictly speaking, is a matter of justice and due (cf. ST II-II.79.3), and omitting aid to the rape victim is an omission of justice in this strict sense, then how is it that the victim is due aid? (If they are not due aid then helping them might be a nice thing to do, but it is not due to them as a kind of duty.)

For Aquinas there are two options. The aid could be due qua the specific virtue of justice, or it could be due according to justice taken in the general sense. If we want to go the route of the specific virtue of justice, then the good of aid must be due to them qua individual (e.g. commutatively). I wouldn't take that route. If we want to go the route of justice taken in a general sense, then the good of aid must be due to them in virtue of their relation to the community or God. I think we could go the route of the community and say that one is acting as a kind of unofficial police officer who has care of the common good. Similar to the way we might pick up litter for the sake of the community, we should also prevent overt injustices such as rape for the sake of the community. This is to assess the person's private good qua common good.

So the rape victim has a right which we must honor in view of their inclusion within our community. Is a person on the other side of the world a member of our community? Classically the answer is 'no', and to say 'yes' is to stretch the meaning of "community" unduly. But if one wants to say that they are a member of the human community and we have a duty to all members of the human community, then it could be said that a duty is owed to them, albeit the thinnest kind of duty.

And then there is the question of their relation to God, especially if we take a revealed aspect of God. This is where it gets tricky, because the Christian has a duty to the victim via God, and our society is by and large a Christian society (and therefore many of the cultural intuitions are Christian intuitions). Thus Aquinas speaks of mercy and beneficence in the context of supernatural charity (ST II-II.30 and II-II.31). For example:

Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Reply to Objection 1. Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful. — Aquinas ST II-II.31.2.ad1 - Whether we ought to do good to all?

(Note that for Aristotle this is more straightforward, as we should be beneficent but beneficence is not due in justice.)

And:

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need. — Aquinas II-II.31.3 - Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

And on this principle it should be seen that, in effect, we have no real duties to random strangers on the other side of the world.

One almost gets the impression that the Republican and Democratic parties are still unaware of the non-corporately-commissioned polls showing that a majority of Americans favor the governmental implementation of some public programs, especially universal health care.

One would think the Democrats would finally support thus implement the latter, so why is the DNC refusing to allow it — if only by disallowing the genuinely fiscally progressive Senator Bernie Sanders to run as its presidential nominee, however many Democrat-voters want him? I mean, other than the DNC being afraid of crossing the corporate lobbyists, especially those hired to represent the healthcare industry’s unlimited-profit interests, who make some of the largest donations to the party election coffers.

(Every county in West Virginia voted for Sanders in the 2016 primaries, yet the DNC declared them as wins for Hillary Clinton. The voters there wanted Sanders, but the DNC overruled them. That's not democratic; that’s complacency and arrogance. And the 'Democratic' party needs to change that, otherwise such great election defeats can/will reoccur.)

... As for their election loss, the DNC (via candidate Kamala) did rely too much on her promises to ‘protect democracy’ and constitutionally enshrine abortion rights nationwide motivating enough voters to her side. This, while there’s a very large and likely still growing electorate who, due to their formidable unaffordability difficulties, don’t have the luxury to make democracy and/or abortion their primary vote-determining concern(s). That many people are financially struggling that much. And, of course, the bad optics and damage resulting from the Biden/Harris administration's essentially-open-borders migration policy only exacerbated political matters.

Quite frankly, one could get the impression that the Democrats and Kamala, etcetera, felt entitled to win; thus, their immense election-loss shock.

Therefore, unless such unaffordability significantly improves, it may no longer be sufficient for a campaigning candidate to focus on non-fiscal social issues, which, besides abortion, mostly consist of race, sexuality and gender. ... Then again, according to ‘Calamity’ Jane Bodine in the film ‘Our Brand Is Crisis’: “If voting changed anything [in favor of the weak/poor/disenfranchised] they’d have made it illegal.”

According to your posts, Aquinas says:

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

And:

It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another.

I am doing some interpretation work here, but here’s the two key points:

1. One cannot reprimand a person which one has no jurisdiction over.
2. One can reprimand a person which is doing something unlawful.

These two principles, which emerged from the two quotes above, are not compatible with each other, at least prima facie, because there could be cases, for principle 2, where a person is doing something unlawful, one must reprimand them (either in the sense of stopping them or punishing them), and one has no legal jurisdiction to do so; which would contradict the first principle.

An easy example is that kidnapping case I gave, where the citizen clearly has no jurisdiction, in any meaningful sense of that word, to reprimand nor have any authority over the perpetrator and yet they clearly have a moral duty to help. This leads me to:

If we want to go the route of justice taken in a general sense, then the good of aid must be due to them in virtue of their relation to the community or God
...
I think we could go the route of the community and say that one is acting as a kind of unofficial police officer who has care of the common good

Then we are not restricting ‘duty’ to its strict meaning as it relates to law—unless we are stretching it to the idea of Divine Law—and thereby we must admit that some duties can be relative to other Teleological structures than legal structures. This was my original point, which was negated by Aquinas’ view that one only has duty when relative to strict, legal structures.

The question, then, becomes: “what kinds of teleological structures can support duties?”. Before I dive into that, I want to address a couple other things first:

So the rape victim has a right which we must honor in view of their inclusion within our community. Is a person on the other side of the world a member of our community? Classically the answer is 'no', and to say 'yes' is to stretch the meaning of "community" unduly.

If I were to grant that one such set of moral duties relates to the teleological structure of ‘community’, then it seems to plainly follow that the entire human species, as a whole, is the highest of this type of structure as it relates to humans (or, if we want to add in Divine structures, then it would be the highest relative to human, natural structures). I don’t see how it would be a stretch to do so because the more universal the structure, the less immediate the duties are; and all you seem to be noting is that the universal, human community is much more distant to the citizen than the most localized community of which they are a member. This is true of the entire hierarchy, however, as a separate district from a citizen’s most local community is also very mediate (e.g., a state across the country of the US from a citizen of another state is also proportionally mediate relative to their local county or city).

Perhaps the argument is not that because they are so distant to each other that they are not proper communities but, rather, that there is no legal structure which subsumes each (nation) to each other; and so they are not a proper community. The problem with this is twofold: (1) we already established, by your own point, that legal structures are not the only teleological structures which can support duties (although I haven’t elaborated yet on what other kinds may exist) and (2) (more importantly) there are such legal structures (e.g., NATO, the UN, etc.). With respect to #2, there is no completely universalized legal structure yet, but humanity is obviously working towards it (with universal rights, UN judges, etc.).

We must oppose all the immorality that we can.
We must oppose all the immorality that we should.

I wouldn’t say that one must oppose all the immorality that they can per se: one should oppose all immorality that they can as it relates to their duties. The difference between us, is that I think of duties as relating to many teleological structures, whereas yours seems to be limited to legal structures.

So, what teleological structures can support duties? I would argue: all of them! Just as all teleological structures can and do support objective, internal goods to and for the given structure; so, too, does it house duties which relate to the preservation and realization of the purposes in those structures. E.g., just as there is such a thing as a good lion, there is such a thing as a dutiful lion.

Duty and (objective) goods are inextricably linked and relativistic to the Telos of the given structure. Then, it must be asked, which of these are morally relevant? Surely, e.g., a dutiful lion is not morally relevant, for the lion cannot rationally deliberate (in any meaningful sense). I would say, in short, that the directly morally relevant goods are the goods of moral agency; that is, the objective (and internal) goods to (and for) minds which are capable of rational deliberation as it relates to the Teleological structure immanent to such a mind qua personhood. Indirectly, all other teleological structures are morally relevant only insofar as they relate to this chief structure for persons. E.g., the virtues of the body, such as eating healthy, are morally relevant only insofar as they relate to sustaining the goods that are relative to the nature of a mind qua personhood; and, as such, are virtues that are relevant because they are required for the latter (such as needing to be healthy because one’s body is their temple).

For you, I would ask: how are you distinguishing which teleological structures can support duties and which can’t? Doesn’t, e.g., a chess player have certain chess duties (such as not cheating to win) even though they are not directly morally relevant duties?

1. One cannot reprimand a person which one has no jurisdiction over.
2. One can reprimand a person which is doing something unlawful. — Bob Ross

The word "reprimand" does not appear at all in the passages you quote, which hinders your argument for equivocation.

Then we are not restricting ‘duty’ to its strict meaning as it relates to law — Bob Ross

What do you think it would mean to restrict duty to that which relates to law? Are you thinking of positive law or something?

The question, then, becomes: “what kinds of teleological structures can support duties?” — Bob Ross

How do you suppose a teleological structure would support a duty?

If I were to grant that one such set of moral duties relates to the teleological structure of ‘community’, then it seems to plainly follow that the entire human species, as a whole, is the highest of this type of structure as it relates to humans — Bob Ross

Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good. But the human race is not a community in any obvious sense. For the ancients the largest community would have been the polis, the city-state. Telling a human that they are responsible for every human would be like telling a bee that it is responsible for every bee, as opposed to the bees of its hive and especially its queen. The bee would have no reason to believe you.

Perhaps the argument is not that because they are so distant to each other that they are not proper communities but, rather,... — Bob Ross

What is a community? It is something like a group of mutually self-sufficient people. Communal obligations arise in virtue of that interdependence. The parties to a war would be an example of separate communities.

I wouldn’t say that one must oppose all the immorality that they can per se: one should oppose all immorality that they can as it relates to their duties. — Bob Ross

But that's circular, for you are appealing to your principle in order to establish duties.

The difference between us, is that I think of duties as relating to many teleological structures, whereas yours seems to be limited to legal structures. — Bob Ross

I don't know where you are getting these ideas, but I don't think you will find them in my posts.

So, what teleological structures can support duties? I would argue: all of them! Just as all teleological structures can and do support objective, internal goods to and for the given structure; so, too, does it house duties which relate to the preservation and realization of the purposes in those structures. E.g., just as there is such a thing as a good lion, there is such a thing as a dutiful lion. — Bob Ross

I was about to make a joke about the animal kingdom, and then you went on to talk about dutiful lions. So you think that teleology entails duties and lions have duties?

Surely, e.g., a dutiful lion is not morally relevant, for the lion cannot rationally deliberate (in any meaningful sense). — Bob Ross

If lions cannot deliberate then I'm not sure what a dutiful lion is.

Doesn’t, e.g., a chess player have certain chess duties (such as not cheating to win) even though they are not directly morally relevant duties? — Bob Ross

The chess player has a hypothetical imperative to follow the rules of chess, but unless he has a duty to play chess he has no duty to follow the rules of chess. Yet if he promises someone to play chess with them, then he has a duty to follow the rules in virtue of his promise. In any case, hypothetical imperatives are not duties.

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

If the firefighter can save everyone then s/he has a duty to do that. You cannot have a duty to do the impossible, so it follows that if it is impossible to save everyone, then the firefighter cannot have a duty to do that.

The word "reprimand" does not appear at all in the passages you quote, which hinders your argument for equivocation.

I see what you are saying, but if Aquinas is just noting that no man can punish another who is not in their jurisdiction (to do so) but that they can restrain or stop a person from doing wrong; then this does not, per se, negate my point since invading a nation like North Korea is done primarily for stopping them—not punishing them.

What do you think it would mean to restrict duty to that which relates to law?
…
For the ancients the largest community would have been the polis, the city-state

I thought you were saying, by way of Aquinas, that a nation cannot invade another nation to stop them from doing immoral things to their own people because that nation has no jurisdiction over the other one (and thusly no duty to do it). That’s inherently about the legal system: the jurisdiction that they don’t have is purely legal—no?

Likewise, the polis is about legal jurisdiction: it is the city-state.

Are you thinking of positive law or something?

I don’t know what positive law is.

How do you suppose a teleological structure would support a duty?

It arises out of the roles an agent has within that teleological structure—e.g., a good dad, a good son, a good mother, a good police officer, a good firefighter, a good judge, etc.

I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good

I agree, but in the eudaimonic sense of ‘my good’ and not a modern egoistic sense. My good includes my roles—some of which I did not choose myself—and some of my roles as a moral agent are such that—being just, impartial, and properly respectful of life—I should care about the cleanliness of the water on the whole planet for the sake of the entire moral project (which is to properly respect life in a nutshell).

I don’t just have a duty to clean the water for my own ‘community’ (as you mean it) but, rather, to preserve the human good and the good of all life—don’t you agree? If you see a polluted stream that you knew with 100% certainty wouldn’t pose any threat to your community but would to another, then you think you have no moral obligation, ceteris paribus, to do something about it? The human good (in terms of as a whole) doesn’t bind you at all—just the communal good?

Telling a human that they are responsible for every human would be like telling a bee that it is responsible for every bee, as opposed to the bees of its hive and especially its queen.

Not quite, this is, again, the straw man that I am arguing that every human is obligated to do the impossible; but I am saying that human’s have duties to the human race—not just their own nation.

What is a community? It is something like a group of mutually self-sufficient people

A nation wouldn’t be a community then: they aren’t self-sufficient. They have to trade with other nations.

Communal obligations arise in virtue of that interdependence

I don’t think so. For you, would you say that if you didn’t require the resources of anyone else in your nation (and thereby were living completely self-sufficiently), then you have no obligations to help other people? What if you are filthy rich and completely self-sufficient and there are people that are starving? It seems like under your view there would be no duty or obligation to help them because there is no interdependence.

But that's circular, for you are appealing to your principle in order to establish duties.

I don’t remember how I initially presented the principle, but it might have been. What I am saying is that there are duties which arise out of the roles one has in a teleological structure, some of which can be morally relevant, and that those duties do extend to the entirety of the moral project [of respecting life—Justice and Fairness].

I was about to make a joke about the animal kingdom, and then you went on to talk about dutiful lions. So you think that teleology entails duties and lions have duties?
…
If lions cannot deliberate then I'm not sure what a dutiful lion is.

I used that example of purpose in anticipation (;

If I am right that duties arise out of the roles derived from the teleological structure and duty is living in proper agreement with those roles and being dutiful is fulfilling one’s duties, then a lion is dutiful if the lion is fulfilling its roles within the teleological structure of being a lion—e.g., a good father lion, etc.

Voluntariness and choice are not the same thing—given that I take the Aristotelian approach here—and duty is just acting in alignment with one’s obligations; which can be done voluntarily without choice.

The chess player has a hypothetical imperative to follow the rules of chess, but unless he has a duty to play chess he has no duty to follow the rules of chess.

It is not a hypothetical imperative that the chess player is a good or bad chess player; nor that they are a dutiful or undutiful chess player. Just as much as a good human is not an expression of a hypothetical imperative.

If they are a chess player, then they are bound to follow the rules. Sure, they can decide to become a chess player or not, but that doesn’t make the goodness, badness, and dutifulness which is relative to that teleological structure a hypothetical imperative for a chess player.

If I take your argument seriously, then it sounds like all forms of moral relativism must express merely hypothetical imperatives.

I see what you are saying, but if Aquinas is just noting that no man can punish another who is not in their jurisdiction (to do so) but that they can restrain or stop a person from doing wrong; then this does not, per se, negate my point since invading a nation like North Korea is done primarily for stopping them—not punishing them. — Bob Ross

Well, to occupy a country militarily seems quite different from, "to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then." I think you're really talking about an act of war, and I don't think just war theory would permit initiating a war or a war-like act simply for the sake of preventing some country from engaging in immorality. Some immoralities may justify wars, but certainly not all.

I thought you were saying, by way of Aquinas, that a nation cannot invade another nation to stop them from doing immoral things to their own people because that nation has no jurisdiction over the other one (and thusly no duty to do it). That’s inherently about the legal system: the jurisdiction that they don’t have is purely legal—no?

Likewise, the polis is about legal jurisdiction: it is the city-state. — Bob Ross

My point is that, just as there is legal jurisdiction, so too is there moral jurisdiction. One is not morally justified in preventing every act of immorality, just as one is not legally justified in preventing every act of illegality. It is an analogy. I am not saying the moral and the legal are identical.

And no, the polis is not about legal jurisdiction. It is about mutual interdependence.

It arises out of the roles an agent has within that teleological structure—e.g., a good dad, a good son, a good mother, a good police officer, a good firefighter, a good judge, etc. — Bob Ross

Okay.

...I should care about the cleanliness of the water on the whole planet for the sake of the entire moral project (which is to properly respect life in a nutshell).

I don’t just have a duty to clean the water for my own ‘community’ (as you mean it) but, rather, to preserve the human good and the good of all life—don’t you agree? If you see a polluted stream that you knew with 100% certainty wouldn’t pose any threat to your community but would to another, then you think you have no moral obligation, ceteris paribus, to do something about it? The human good (in terms of as a whole) doesn’t bind you at all—just the communal good? — Bob Ross

I think we have a Christian duty to help humans qua human, but not a natural duty. Kant is attempting to rationalize Christian morality, and I don't think he succeeds. For example, what is your rationale? What does it mean that we have a duty "for the sake of the entire moral project?"

Presumably you would say we also have a duty to rational aliens on other planets, if they exist?

If I am traveling in China and I notice a source of water pollution, I do not think I am bound in natural justice to address it.

The reason the average Western citizen thinks he has duties to random strangers on the other side of the world is because he was reared in a Christian culture.

Not quite, this is, again, the straw man that I am arguing that every human is obligated to do the impossible; but I am saying that human’s have duties to the human race—not just their own nation. — Bob Ross

I know, and again, "The bee would have no reason to believe you." Do you offer any reason for why we are responsible to people on the other side of the world?

A nation wouldn’t be a community then: they aren’t self-sufficient. They have to trade with other nations. — Bob Ross

For wealth, but usually not for necessity. But a nation would generally be seen as a kind of para-community.

I don’t think so. For you, would you say that if you didn’t require the resources of anyone else in your nation (and thereby were living completely self-sufficiently), then you have no obligations to help other people? What if you are filthy rich and completely self-sufficient and there are people that are starving? It seems like under your view there would be no duty or obligation to help them because there is no interdependence. — Bob Ross

Humans are pretty much always dependent, but if there were a non-social species then yes, it would not have communal obligations. One does not have communal obligations if one does not belong to a community.

I don’t remember how I initially presented the principle, but it might have been. What I am saying is that there are duties which arise out of the roles one has in a teleological structure, some of which can be morally relevant, and that those duties do extend to the entirety of the moral project [of respecting life—Justice and Fairness]. — Bob Ross

Supposing I have duties to random strangers on the other side of the world, in virtue of what teleological reality do I have those duties?

I used that example of purpose in anticipation (;

If I am right that duties arise out of the roles derived from the teleological structure and duty is living in proper agreement with those roles and being dutiful is fulfilling one’s duties, then a lion is dutiful if the lion is fulfilling its roles within the teleological structure of being a lion—e.g., a good father lion, etc.

Voluntariness and choice are not the same thing—given that I take the Aristotelian approach here—and duty is just acting in alignment with one’s obligations; which can be done voluntarily without choice. — Bob Ross

A lion is bound by nature to care for its young, but not by reason. I don't see that Aristotle would attribute volition to lions. He says, "a voluntary act is one which is originated by the doer with knowledge of the particular circumstances of the act" (Nicomachean Ethics, III.i).

If they are a chess player, then they are bound to follow the rules. Sure, they can decide to become a chess player or not, but that doesn’t make the goodness, badness, and dutifulness which is relative to that teleological structure a hypothetical imperative for a chess player. — Bob Ross

Your point looks tautological, "If he wants to play the game of chess, then he must follow the rules of chess, because in order to play the game one must follow the rules." But you are trying to say that chess duties are not moral duties. I would say that if one breaks their promise to play chess then they are acting immorally, which can be done by cheating. I don't recognize non-moral duties.

If I take your argument seriously, then it sounds like all forms of moral relativism must express merely hypothetical imperatives. — Bob Ross

Sure, that sounds right to me.

@Bob Ross I am assuming you are not advocating for the idea of "might is right" but you can surely see that this is an issue.

In concise terms how would you address this criticism?

The nation is only justified relative to the moral facts: not their own inter-subjective dispositions.