I have often thought that one of the reasons people are attracted to superphysical ideas is their aesthetic appeal. It perhaps seems more harmonious to imagine that there is a transcendent realm, something grander and more meaningful beyond the physical world. I have noticed how often advocates of the transcendent describe the physicalist position as an ugly worldview - stunted, disenchanted, devoid of mystery, limiting. — Tom Storm

I think this is right. The aesthetic appeal is important. I'm reminded of the sublime aesthetics of the great cathedrals and Christian rituals.

I don't view the physical world as ugly, disenchanted or devoid of mystery, though. I think it is beautiful and enchanting in its diversity and complexity of form, and full of mystery. And when you think about it the beauty of the cathedrals and rituals are themselves physical beauty. It's a beauty that seems to point beyond itself. to be sure, but I think all beauty does that, insofar as we don't really know why or how it is that things can be beautiful. I wonder some animals experience beauty. The ritual nest-making and extraordinary plumage of some birds seems to suggest that they do.

Nice saying! I think we are all here on account of the magnitude (apart from the sciences, and even there) of human ignorance. Hopefully we are all here to learn and change our ideas when we encounter ideas that explore deeper and make more sense than what we might presently believe.

Idealism or Deism would make no material difference in your life. But it might make a philosophical difference. What difference does your participation in a philosophical forum make in how you live your life? Personally, I have no ambition to change the world, just myself . . . . to change my mind, and the meaning of my life. :smile: — Gnomon

To me the only different participating in a philosophical forum could make would be to sharpen and clarify my ideas and also lead me to be more open to alternatives to my own thinking. I have changed my mind on metaphysical matters several times since first participating on philosophy forums, when I have encountered ideas that seem to go deeper and be more plausible.

I think this is right. The aesthetic appeal is important. I'm reminded of the sublime aesthetics of the great cathedrals and Christian rituals. — Janus

Indeed, although I don’t much like cathedrals. They are striking rather than beautiful. I think ideas can also seem ugly or beautiful. For instance, the idea of a world where there is nothing after death, where limitations are imposed by natural laws, and where there is no transformative reconciliation with the ground of being, may feel ugly to some people - much the way a painting by Francis Bacon might unsettle or alarm some.


I'm just repeating myself...

I agree that consciousness is a natural process — Joshs

Whereas I think it is an open question, subject to constant revision as our conception of nature is constantly changing. There are strong lines of argument that rationality itself is not subject to naturalistic explanations.

As to the natural vs. the supernatural/transcendental:

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego.

As to the difference between physicalism and non-physicalism:

I so far find that far more important than any sense of the esthetic is materialism’s/physicalism’s seeming entailment of nihilism—in so far as this stance is that wherein no intrinsic meaning occurs in anything whatsoever.

While I don’t find non-physicalism to be univocal in what is upheld as an alternative to physicalism, physicalism does in all its variants entail nothingness in the sense of non-being upon mortal death, as well as before the commencement of life. Such that all life thereby culminates in this very nothingness. (Can there be any variant of physicalism that doesn’t directly necessitate this?)

How, then, can physicalism be understood to allow for the possibility of a meaningful cosmos, hence a meaningful existence, and, by extension, of a meaningful life (be it in general or in particular)?

And this for many is indeed a differentiation that makes for quite a substantial difference—one’s individual aesthetic appreciations aside.

While I don’t find non-physicalism to be univocal in what is upheld as an alternative to physicalism, physicalism does in all its variants entail nothingness in the sense of non-being upon mortal death, as well as before the commencement of life. — javra

Which is an idea I personally find quite lovely. To me this is meaningful. We have one life, make it work.

How, then, can physicalism be understood to allow for the possibility of a meaningful cosmos, hence a meaningful existence, and, by extension, of a meaningful life (be it in general or in particular)? — javra

Meaning is a human term which is the product any number of contexts and we area sense making creatures - we can't help ourselves.

Deleuze changes his strong emphasis on Eternal Return and the privilege of the virtual.
“Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return. This is much as to say that the fascicular system does not really break with dualism, with complementarity between subject and object…unity is thwarted in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject”. (‘A thousand plateaus’, pg.6)
To avoid a strong opposition between virtual and actual modes of difference, Deleuze moves toward the phenomena of consolidation. While focusing on describing singular assemblages, he offers a much more elaborated approach to a complex mode of interdependence between the actual and the virtual. Now, he designates the phenomena of becoming a line of flight. At the same time, the actualized individuation and the tendency to organization are expressed through the concepts of the molecular and molar lines. Together, they compose an ‘open whole,’ which is indeed a paradoxical concept. However, the emergence of something qualitatively new cannot be explained exclusively by the means of logical, dialectical or semiotic transition. This obstacle makes any totality simultaneously impossible and necessary, a place of an irretrievable fullness. Deleuze theorizes reality in terms of eventuality and discontinuity. He follows the principle that the nature of elements does not predetermine them to enter one type of arrangement rather than another. Therefore, totality, an open whole, should be conceptualized afresh, depending on a considered problematic field. There is not the same transcendental-empirical synthesis, that Deleuze applies again and again. This vision sets in motion the productivity of the creative construction of Deleuzian philosophy.

Which is an idea I personally find quite lovely. — Tom Storm

OK, sure. For what it’s worth, personally, I too for my own reasons find the notion of nothingness after this life more appealing than any other (nice and interesting to be here, but enough with the metaphorical headaches after one entire lifetime of them has gone by). All the same, whether there is or isn’t something for us after our death to this world is not something derivable from—or even necessarily in tune with—our affinities, or else that which we emotively find most comforting. Rather irrational to assume that it is.

The issue I here responded to was of a difference that makes a difference between physicalism and non-physicalism. Nothing of your statements dispels the apparent reality that physicalism entails nihilism whereas non-physicalism does not. And to most people out there, this logical difference between the two is both sharp and substantial ... as well as bearing some weight on the issue of how one ought to best live one's life.

For instance, the idea of a world where there is nothing after death, where limitations are imposed by natural laws, and where there is no transformative reconciliation with the ground of being, may feel ugly to some people - much the way a painting by Francis Bacon might unsettle or alarm some. — Tom Storm

I find some cathedrals (for example Chartres) beautiful and many others merely impressive. St Peters I found to be a mixture of beauty and impressiveness (due to the sheer scale) .Perhaps when it comes to the natural world it's the vision of dissolution and death that disturbs some people.

The issue I here responded to was of a difference that makes a difference between physicalism and non-physicalism. Nothing of your statements dispels the apparent reality that physicalism entails nihilism whereas non-physicalism does not. And to most people out there, this logical difference between the two is both sharp and substantial ... as well as bearing some weight on the issue of how one ought to best live one's life. — javra

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives.

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego. — javra

Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. If you accept the idea that consciousness is not anything over and above neural activity, then its effects are measurable. The transcendental ego is arguably merely an idea. Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell.

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning. — Janus

As with most versions of Buddhism for example, I strongly disagree.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives. — Janus

Playing footloose with what the term "nihilism" signifies. For my part, I've already specified what I intended it to mean in this context. Basically, that of existential nihilism: the interpretation of life being inherently pointless.

Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. — Janus

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be.

Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell. — Janus

We can have no way of discerning the difference between a) the self/ego which knows (aka the transcendental ego) and b) the self/ego which is known by (a) (aka the empirical ego)? And this even in principle?

In virtue of what logic do you affirm this truth? And this contra to what Kant, James, and Husserl affirmed as a known.

When people for example say "I am tall (at least relative to ants or some such)" we know ourselves to be tall but also know that we as the consciousness/awareness or else mind which so knows cannot of itself hold the property of tallness. Whereas "my body is tall (therefore I am tall)" can be cogent, "my awareness/mind is tall (therefore I am tall)" can't. Or is this something we could have no way to know about as well.

As with most versions of Buddhism for example, I strongly disagree. — javra

So you think Buddhism gives life meaning? In virtue of what? Rebirth? Karma? Even if those, what guarantors their universality? Merely learning to let go of attachments cannot be an overarching meaning to life itself, since there are very good personal reasons for attempting to do this.

Playing footloose with what the term "nihilism" signifies. For my part, I've already specified what I intended it to mean in this context. Basically, that of existential nihilism: the interpretation of life being inherently pointless. — javra

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? What about such things as enjoyment, interest, creativity and even survival? Is there no point to any of those just because life is thought to be a merely physical phenomenon? And even if life were basically mind (whatever that could mean) rather than basically matter or energy, how would that fact alone give it more point? These are the same questions I already asked that you did not even attempt to answer.

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra

Why? Because you cannot come up with a response?

We can have no way of discerning the difference between a) the self/ego which knows (aka the transcendental ego) and b) the self/ego which is known by (a) (aka the empirical ego)? And this even in principle? — javra

Of course we can and do make conceptual distinctions between empirical and transcendental notions of the self or ego. My question was as to how we could possibly know that the transcendental ego is anything more than an idea.

Whereas "my body is tall (therefore I am tall)" can be cogent, "my awareness/mind is tall (therefore I am tall)" can't. Or is this something we could have no way to know about as well. — javra

I don't see how that argument, which merely gives an example of a category error, show us anything. It would be a category error to say that my farts are tall, or my breath is tall, or my digestion is tall. I'm sure there are plenty of other examples.

To me the lack of explainability of experience in physical terms is not a central criterion in deciding whether experience and consciousness of that experience is just a manifestation of physical processes . — Janus

I don't think I understand you. It looks to me like this says the inability to explain it in physical terms is not important to the question of whether or not it can be explained in physical terms.

We can imagine the logical possibility that the mental is somehow completely independent, but that is just a logical possibility we seem to have no evidence to believe in. — Janus

I don't imagine the mental is completely independent of the physical. I don't think we can remove mass or charge from particles, and I don't think we can remove proto-consciousness from them, either.

Mind you, my thoughts on all this are just speculation. I don't think physical properties can account for consciousness, so there must be something else at work. I've tried to work out this idea. But it's not even a theory, since I can't imagine how it could be tested. And, no, it really doesn't matter. Again, if you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make. But the search for understanding is fascinating. At least imo.

As to the natural vs. the supernatural/transcendental:

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways — javra

Everything in the universe is natural. If there is anything in the universe that is non-physical, invisible, and unmeasurable in quantifiable ways, it is still natural.

I don't think I understand you. It looks to me like this says the inability to explain it in physical terms is not important to the question of whether or not it can be explained in physical terms. — Patterner

No, it says that the inability to explain something in terms of physics does not entail that the thing to be explained is non-physical.

I don't imagine the mental is completely independent of the physical. I don't think we can remove mass or charge from particles, and I don't think we can remove proto-consciousness from them, either. — Patterner

Mass and charge are detectable in particles. Proto-consciousness in particles is purely speculative ,and in fact we don't really have any idea what it could look like.

I don't think physical properties can account for consciousness, so there must be something else at work. — Patterner

You don't think consciousness could evolve in a merely physical world? You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? Have you considered the possibility that it is not mind and matter itself which are incompatible, but just our conceptions of mind and matter which seem incompatible,

As you acknowledge there is no way to test the idea that they are not compatible anyway. Even if you could somehow confirm that mind could not possibly have evolved from physical matter, what difference would that knowledge make to your life as lived?

So you think Buddhism gives life meaning? In virtue of what? — Janus

In virtue of Buddhism being a soteriological school of thought.

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? — Janus

If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ?

And even if life were basically mind (whatever that could mean) rather than basically matter or energy, how would that fact alone give it more point? These are the same questions I already asked that you did not even attempt to answer. — Janus

1) I stated that non-physicalism does not entail nihilism. Not that it necessarily results in purpose. and 2) Try not to bullshit so much, please. You asked me no such questions. As is blatantly evidenced here:

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives.

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego. — javra


Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. If you accept the idea that consciousness is not anything over and above neural activity, then its effects are measurable. The transcendental ego is arguably merely an idea. Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell. — Janus

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra


Why? Because you cannot come up with a response? — Janus

No. Because it is a can of worms. Why do you respond this way? Other than to insult.

The notion of energy stems from Aristotle. Energy/work without purpose/telos as concept is thoroughly modern, utterly physicalist/materialist, and it need not be. But then to you energy would then be one of those transcendental issues that wouldn't be natural. And so forth.

My question was as to how we could possibly know that the transcendental ego is anything more than an idea. — Janus

You never posed a friggin question. You affirmed a truth, and this as though it were incontrovertible. As per the quote above.

As to how do I know that I as a transcendental ego am more that a mere idea: I am a subject of awareness that can hold awareness of, for example, ideas - farts as another example - thereby making my being as subject of awareness more than an idea.

Everything in the universe is natural. If there is anything in the universe that is non-physical, invisible, and unmeasurable in quantifiable ways, it is still natural. — Patterner

Very much agree.

In virtue of Buddhism being a soteriological school of thought. — javra

So the meaning of life lies in an afterlife or in nirvana (is it eternal life or extinction?).

No. Because it is a can of worms. Why do you respond this way? Other than to insult. — javra

Why are you so ready to feel insulted. The aim is to question and challnege not to insult. Are you not comfortable with your ideas being questioned and challenged?

The notion of energy stems from Aristotle. Energy/work without purpose/telos as concept is thoroughly modern, utterly physicalist/materialist, and it need not be. But then to you energy would then be one of those transcendental issues that wouldn't be natural. And so forth. — javra

I'm not concerning myself with ancient conceptions of energy. Energy is what does work, work that might be either purposeful or purposeless. In science we have the four fundamental forces (energies). I see energy as entirely immanent; in fact, I can make no sense of the idea of transcendental energy.

You never posed a friggin question. You affirmed a truth, and this as though it were incontrovertible. As per the quote above.

As to how do I know that I as a transcendental ego am more that a mere idea: I am a subject of awareness that can hold awareness of, for example, ideas - farts as another example - thereby making my being as subject of awareness more than an idea. — javra

I did not affirm a truth, I posed the question as to how we could ever know that the transcendental ego is more than merely an idea. When I said that it merely an idea, I meant that it cannot be anything more than an idea for us because there is no imaginable way to test whether it is more than an idea. There is no need to get angry or offended. we are just here discussing ideas, so what's the problem?

I don't understand your answer above. It just sounds stipulative rather than being any kind of means to knowledge.

No, it says that the inability to explain something in terms of physics does not entail that the thing to be explained is non-physical. — Janus

Ah. Ok. Can you give me another example of something that can't be explained in terms of physics that is not non-physical?

You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? — Janus

You believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable?

Have you considered the possibility that it is not mind and matter itself which are incompatible, but just our conceptions of mind and matter which seem incompatible, — Janus

I have considered the possibility. Can you give me any specific thoughts along these lines?

You don't think consciousness could evolve in a merely physical world? — Janus

That is correct.

As you acknowledge there is no way to test the idea that they are not compatible anyway. — Janus

I was taking about proto-consciousness when I said it's not a theory because it's not testable.

Even if you could somehow confirm that mind could not possibly have evolved from physical matter, what difference would that knowledge make to your life as lived? — Janus

I just said:
"And, no, it really doesn't matter. Again, if you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make. But the search for understanding is fascinating. At least imo."

I think it's the most fascinating topic of all. As I recently said, I don't need a reason to delve into the subject any note than I need a reason to listen to Bach, read Dune, or look at the view from the top of a mountain.


But there's also this. Two quotes from Star Trek: The Next Generation. Hope you know who Data and Dr. Crusher are.

1) Data made a daughter, named Lal.

Lal: I watch them, and I can do the things they do. But I will never feel the emotions. I’ll never know love.

Data: It is a limitation we must learn to accept, Lal.

Lal: Then why do you still try to emulate humans. What purpose does it serve, except to remind you that you are incomplete?

Data: I have asked myself that, many times, as I have struggled to be more human. Until I realized it is the struggle itself that is most important. We must strive to be more than we are, Lal. It does not matter that we will never reach our ultimate goal. The effort yields its own rewards.

2) Data and Dr. Crusher:

Data: What is the definition of life?

Crusher: That is a BIG question. Why do you ask?

Data: I am searching for a definition that will allow me to test an hypotheses.

Crusher: Well, the broadest scientific definition might be that life is what enables plants and animals to consume food, derive energy from it, grow, adapt themselves to their surrounding, and reproduce.

Data: And you suggest that anything that exhibits these characteristics is considered alive.

Crusher: In general, yes.

Data: What about fire?

Crusher: Fire?

Data: Yes. It consumes fuel to produce energy. It grows. It creates offspring. By your definition, is it alive?

Crusher: Fire is a chemical reaction. You could use the same argument for growing crystals. But, obviously, we don't consider them alive.

Data: And what about me? I do not grow. I do not reprodue. Yet I am considered to be alive.

Crusher: That's true. But you are unique.

Data: Hm. I wonder if that is so.

Crusher: Data, if I may ask, what exactly are you getting at?

Data: I am curious as to what transpired between the moment when I was nothing more than an assemblage of parts in Dr. Sung's laboratory and the next moment, when I became alive. What is it that endowed me with life?

Crusher: I remember Wesley asking me a similar question when he was little. And I tried desperately to give him an answer. But everything I said sounded inadequate. Then I realized that scientists and philosophers have been grappling with that question for centuries without coming to any conclusion.

Data: Are you saying the question cannot be answered?

Crusher: No. I think I'm saying that we struggle all our lives to answer it. That it's the struggle that is important. That's what helps us to define our place in the universe.

Or, as Jung said:

The meaning and purpose of a problem seem to lie not in its solution but in our working at it incessantly. — Jung

Janus, before you reply with question after question, try addressing those I asked of you.

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? — Janus


If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ? — javra

And as to:

Why are you so ready to feel insulted. — Janus

Simply because your question directly insinuates that my reply was pompous charlatanry - thereby taking a serious jab at my character. And in this, I stand by my right to feel insulted. Only human, don't you know. There a difference between being thick-skinned and being thick.

If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ? — javra

I haven't claimed there is an overall point to life. In fact quite the opposite—it is up to each of us to decide what the point of our lives is. Or else simply live your life, enjoy it and follow your interests and passions; I suppose that would be a point in itself.

Simply because your question directly insinuates that my reply was pompous charlatanry - thereby taking a serious jab at my character. And in this, I stand by my right to feel insulted. Only human, don't you know. There a difference between being thick-skinned and being thick. — javra

You are projecting—my question insinuated nothing, I was simply trying to get a clear answer from you. Anyway, if you are going to take exchanges of ideas on a philosophy forum personally, then I think it's best to stop.

OK. I have no more questions for you.

You are projecting—my question insinuated nothing, I was simply trying to get a clear answer from you. — Janus

:rofl:

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra

Why? Because you cannot come up with a response? — Janus

And "I am projecting", this because you say so.

Gaslighters are as gaslighters do. (This statement doesn't insinuate anything. :chin: )

Yea, you gave me a good laugh.

I think it's best to stop. — Janus

If you say so.

And "I am projecting", this because you say so. — javra

No, you are projecting because you are imputing motivations to what I said which were not there. It seems obvious you cannot carry on challenging conversations without becoming offended. That's why I said it's best to stop. I have no desire to hurt your feelings.

It seems obvious you cannot carry on challenging conversations without becoming offended. — Janus

You have a way of psychoanalyzing - and it's often as erroneous as hell to boot. But that your are imputing motivations which are not there is, well, it can't be projecting.

I have no desire to hurt your feelings. — Janus

How nifty of you. Don't worry about my feelings though so much as about the substance of what is said. This without assuming such psycho-babbles as that I'm posturing in my answers because I'm unable to come up with a response. Or that my feelings have been hurt by you.

Just in case we run across each other again.

↪Patterner OK. I have no more questions for you. — Janus

How about answering a couple? :grin:

You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? — Janus

You believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? My point being, it supports my position more than yours. What supports your position?

Have you considered the possibility that it is not mind and matter itself which are incompatible, but just our conceptions of mind and matter which seem incompatible, — Janus

I have considered the possibility. Can you give me any specific thoughts along these lines?

You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable?
— Janus
You believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? My point being, it supports my position more than yours. What supports your position? — Patterner

My position is that, considering the current state of science, as far as I am familiar with it, it seems most plausible that mind evolved in a physical world. I don't imagine that mind came from anywhere else, and the panpsychist idea seems unintelligible.

Naively, we think about things in intuitive ways. Hence animism was common to early forager societies. Likewise it is natural for us to naively think that the mind and body are different. After all, one observes the other. And I don't deny they are different. I see mind as a function of the body. It is obviously not an object of the senses as the body is. As I said earlier energy is not an object of the senses either and nor is causation.

So I believe the mind is, despite how it might seem, a physical process or function, and I don't believe that because the way the mind seems to us intuitively is not explicable in terms of physics. On the contrary I think it is more likely that the way the mind seems to us is a kind of illusion.

I have said it doesn't matter anyway, but the reason I engage in this discussion is that I think the fact it doesn't matter does itself matter. If we are attached to the idea of the mind being this way or that it will cloud our judgement because confirmation bias will have taken hold.

I believe it only matters to those who think physicalism destroys any hope of there being more to our beings than just this life. I don't see anything wrong with believing that provided it is acknowledged to be an article of faith. When people start imagining that it is an objective truth, then fundamentalist thinking looms, and I think that is most dangerous to societal well-being.

I also object to the idea that physicalism is self-evidently false, because that conclusion is always based on a strawman model of physicalism. I don't say that idealism is self-evidently false just that it seems to me to be the more plausible of the options. I don't object to others thinking idealism is the more plausible, and I'm happy to leave it at that—agree to disagree, even though I think that conclusion is most likely wrong.

My position is that, considering the current state of science, as I am familiar with it, it seems most plausible that mind evolved in a physical world. — Janus

What do you mean by "considering the current state of science"? There are any number of examples throughout history of the most plausible explanation for something, according to that time's current state of science, being as wrong as can be. What is it about our current state that convinces you that, despite the fact that it doesn't seem to be a physical process or function, not even to you, it is?

On the contrary I think it is more likely that the way the mind seems to us is a kind of illusion. — Janus

I've always had trouble understanding this position. The way the mind seems to itself... The mind is an illusion being fooled by itself. Illusions fool the viewer. The audience. But, in this case, that upon which everything else is built, the viewer and the illusion are the same thing.


I agree about Idealism. I don't understand why minds wouldn't exist as their true selves in their true realm/setting, but concoct a setting nothing like it in which to exist, where they cannot act or interact according to their nature.

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. ¹

It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemistry, to electricity, to the vegetative and then to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility—that is, knowledge—which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.

Thus the tremendous petitio principii (= circular reasoning) reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, is empirically given—that is to say, is substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away. ²

Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But ...all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and active in time³. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained.

To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism. The recognition here of the obvious impossibility of such a system establishes another truth which will appear in the course of our exposition, the truth that all science properly so called, by which I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach its final goal, nor give a complete and adequate explanation: for it is not concerned with the inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea; indeed, it really teaches nothing more than the relation of one idea to another. — Arthur Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation

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1. This grounds the connection between physical causation and logical necessity.

2. "The very idea of science from the usual point of view is to take out everything to do with human subjectivity and see what remains. QBism says, if you take everything out of quantum theory to do with human subjectivity, then nothing remains" ~ Christian Fuchs

3. Hence, 'mind-created world'.

1. This grounds the connection between physical causation and logical necessity. . . . .
Hence, 'mind-created world'. — Wayfarer

Since I have no formal training in philosophical language and methods, some of Schopenhauer's argument against Materialism is lost on me. For example, the notion of "givenness", begs the question "by whom?". Are the ideas he calls "given" merely his personal preferences and assumptions, or Axioms generally accepted by experts in the field, or divine revelations?

Since unresolved debates between Materialism and Idealism are common on this forum, it might help to clarify our language, and the ideas that each side takes for granted. Will you take the time to summarize his argument in your own words? That might help me to resolve my own ambiguity about the obvious material/physical nature of nature, and the less obvious meta-physical essence of philosophical argumentation about Reality. Thanks. :smile:


Excerpts from the Schopenhauer quote :
# "Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly."
# "materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea"
# "To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea."

"Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly." — Gnomon

What he's saying, is that the 'idea' of the object, which is its appearance to us in consciousness, is 'immediately given'. That applies to every characteristic of the object - how it feels, how heavy it is, etc, all of which are ideas. The key phrase is 'it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and active in time'. He's *not* saying that we have the idea of the object on one hand, and the actual object on the other - everything that appears to us, appears as 'idea'. Whereas materialism attempts to explain this unitary experience with reference to something else altogether, namely, 'matter', as a theoretical construct existing apart from or outside the experience of the object, and which is somehow more fundamental than the experience itself.

I recall you've read Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order - the resonances with that book ought to be clear. For example:

In fact, what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter ('Mind, Life and Universe') that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

That 'nonmaterial component' is not, however, external to the mind itself, but the activity of consciousness which integrates sensory and intellectual data into a meaningful whole - Kant's 'transcendental unity of apperception'. (Ref. Pinter doesn't mention Schopenhauer but there are numerous references to Kant.)

He's *not* saying that we have the idea of the object on one hand, and the actual object on the other - everything that appears to us, appears as 'idea'. Whereas materialism attempts to explain this unitary experience with reference to something else altogether, namely, 'matter', as a theoretical construct existing apart from or outside the experience of the object, and which is somehow more fundamental than the experience itself. — Wayfarer

So, Schopenhauer is agreeing with Kant, that we can "not" know the true reality (ding an sich), and must make-do (improvise) with an imitation simulation : a virtual reality (immaterial experience)? But stubborn Materialists insist on getting true, authentic Reality, even if they have to take it on theory/faith? In that case, is natural Matter their substitute for belief in a super-natural Ideal realm?

I guess what Schopenhauer means by "given" is the knowledge (appearance) presented to us, effortlessly, by our understanding (interpreting) minds. Most of us take that mental experience for granted as real-enough (given), even though lacking in stuff with material properties. Yet some think it's the brain that does the "hard work" of bringing the exterior world inside the interior experience.

However, the "hard question" remains : by what physical process does a brain construct a worldview? What are the physical/material stages/steps between object and subject? I suppose the easy answer is to just take the experience as a "gift", given by the brain. But hard-to-please Materialists grudgingly accept the gift as an artificial substitute for the real object. Their policy is, "accept no substitutes" for the true ding. Hence, they rudely look a gift-horse in the mouth, to determine its true reality. :smile: :wink:


Note --- Quantum physicists constructed theoretical models of matter in empty space, that serve as place-holders for the ding an sich. Their theory of fields requires some "thing" to occupy each point in space, and to jump around (fluctuate) as they absorb virtual photons. Are such Fields real or ideal? Is that kind of matter True or Apparent?

A "virtual particle" is a temporary, theoretical particle that arises from the quantum field theory concept of "empty space" not being truly empty, . . . . ___ Google AI overview

Buddha's "Self"
His extraordinary insight was that appearances, properly understood as impermanent, interdependent, and unsatisfying, are also devoid of the ontological underpinnings we are used to ascribing to everything in our world. All of it, without exception, is utterly devoid of self.
https://tricycle.org/magazine/appearance-and-reality/
Note --- Is "self" the Buddhist version of matter or stuff or ding an sich?

However, the "hard question" remains : by what physical process does a brain construct a worldview? — Gnomon

Unknown

In that case, is natural Matter their substitute for belief in a super-natural Ideal realm? — Gnomon

As I've said earlier in the thread, the process was one of elimination: first posit 'the world' as comprising extended matter and non-extended mind; then show that there is no feasible way for the latter to affect the former; then declare that latter non-existent, leaving only the former. That's the predicament leftover from the 'Cartesian division'. It's still very much active in the grammar of the Western worldview.

However, the "hard question" remains : by what physical process does a brain construct a worldview? — Gnomon
Unknown — Wayfarer

Quote from the link to : The Neural Binding Problem :
" In Science, something is called “a problem” when there is no plausible model for its substrate. So we have the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996), but not the color problem, although there is a great deal of ongoing color research."
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3538094/#Sec3

how does the brain create consciousness
"The brain creates consciousness through a complex interplay of billions of neurons, and there are multiple theories about how this happens"
"The creation of consciousness is one of the greatest remaining mysteries in science and philosophy"
___Google AI overview
Note --- "Multiple Theories", but none with a step-by-step process from Sensation to Meaning.