does that answer your question, or not? — Arcane Sandwich

It does, actually. And forgive any intemperance on my part, but it is a subject that pushes buttons (although to be fair, it works both ways.) But at any rate, it’s kind of re-assuring to read those remarks.

Do you think this attitude of Bunge’s could fairly by described as ‘scientism’?

I don't see how you've shown this at all. In your example, perspective absolutely is an attribute of the world. "How we say things" is a consequence of how we experience them, and how we experience them says something about how the world is (else we need to write off empiricism). "How we say things" isn't something that is arbitrarily related to how the world is, nor do our practices of speech just happen to be what they are. Terms for perspective are universal across all languages because perspective is universal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for replying to my old post.

Just briefly, here is the argument I presented. We start with the butterfly moving from left to right for @Wayfarer, but right to left for me. There's an apparent contradiction here, in that I describe the movement of the butterfly as being the opposite of the way Wayf sees it. We resolve this by understanding that although we are both seeing the same thing, we describe it differently; and we develop a way of achieving agreement, we agree that the butterfly is flying towards the mountain. What we have done here is agree that we see things differently, and then to find a way of setting out what is the case in such a way that we are in agreement. In effect we phrase what is going on so that the individual perspective does not imply a contradiction.

Later we find ourselves on the other side of the mountain, and see the butterfly moving in the same direction, but now away from the mountain. In order to capture this we can change the description again, to say that they are moving towards the East.

The direction in which the butterfly is moving, in each case, stays the same. But we have three different descriptions, left to right, towards the mountains, and towards the East. Now the butterfly was always heading East, even when heading towards the mountain or from left to right. What has changes is not the movement of the butterfly, but the description used. We developed a way of setting out that movement that did not depend on the position of the observer. True, the observer still has a perspective, but that perspective is removed from the utterance.

There are three aspects to this account that I think are salient.

First, it is an application of the Principle of Relativity, the general form of which is to present scientific principles in such a way that they apply equally to all observers. Saying that the butterfly is moving towards the East will be true in all three case, while saying that they are moving towards the mountain or from left to right will be false for some observes.

This leads to considering interpretations of each observation in such a way as to achieve agreement. The butterfly moves from left to right for Wayfarer ≡ The butterfly moves towards the mountain for someone on it's inland side ≡ the butterfly is moving towards the East. We can apply the Principle of Charity to reach agreement on all these observations.

And this speaks to the communality of language, that what we say about how things are is part and parcel of our role as members of a community. This in firm opposition to the view that some individuals observations are somehow paramount, or must form the foundation of knowledge. Knowledge is not built from solipsism.

This is in contrast to Wayfarer's thesis that science neglects lived experience. A better way to think of this is that science combines multiple lived experiences in order to achieve agreement and verity. So sure, "our entire perceptual and cognitive apparatus biases our understanding of the world", and yet we can work to minimise that bias by paying attention to contexts and wording our utterances with care, so that they work in the widest available context. Not the view form nowhere but the view from anywhere.

Do you think this attitude of Bunge’s could fairly by described as ‘scientism’? — Wayfarer

Yes. It's one of his flaws as a philosopher. He fails to understand that his scientistic Crusade should drop all of the classicist sentimentalism. Enough with that. I actually met Bunge in person. I shook his hand. I can't say that I understand the man, at least not in what matters, but he had his flaws. He had his flaws as a philosopher, as a scientist, and as a human being. And I'm sure that a genius of his caliber could only agree with me on that, after careful thinking. The man was not alien to Ethics. He wrote a book about it. It just strikes me as hypocritical of him to write a tome on Ethics and then to write such an incendiary, sentimentalist pamphlet like "In Praise of Intolerance in Academia". Like, Bunge, mate, what is the matter with you? Why are you like this, mate? What unfathomable, horrible thing happened to you for you to be such a God-damn Ogre?

It’s the zeitgeist, the spirit of the age. That’s how I see it. Many great thinkers expressed similar sentiments in the 20th Century. But the times, they are a’changin’.

There are three aspects to this account that I think are salient. — Banno

Actually I think you’ve conflated this thread with the other one, Mind Created World, although they’re obviously related. My point in that other thread is simply that it is meaningless to say that of anything that it exists outside of or independently of any perspective, which I don’t think your patiently-explained butterfly effect (forgive the conceit) actually addresses. Outside any perspective, there is….well, you can’t say. That’s the point, and it’s a simple one.

This is in contrast to Wayfarer's thesis that science neglects lived experience. A better way to think of this is that science combines multiple lived experiences in order to achieve agreement and verity. — Banno

Firstly, the ‘Blind Spot of Science’ was not written by me but by Adam Frank (cosmologist), Evan Thompson (philosopher) and Marcello Gleiser (physicist) on the basis of Whitehead’s process philosophy and Husserl and Merleau Ponty’s phenomenology. And they would have no problem agreeing with the principle of inter-subjective validation. What they’re objecting to is the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion of what is actual, the idea that science provides a transparent window on the world as it truly is.

It’s the zeitgeist, the spirit of the age. That’s how I see it. Many great thinkers expressed similar sentiments in the 20th Century. But the times, they are a’changin’. — Wayfarer

Yes, it's Hegel's Spirit of the Age. I find that concept tiresome, though. He had a more interesting concept, the Ortgeist, the "Spirit of the Locality", or "Spirit of the Place". There is a dialectic, a language, a dialect, between Zeitgeist and Ortgeist, a conversation between the Spirit of the Age and the Spirit of the Locality. It's fascinating stuff, if you read it like a work of literature. It's Tolkien-esque, I would say. Poetic.

There is a science of perception. — Janus

The science of perception, like every other science suffers the same problem. Why would you think that it would be exempt? Suggesting that it would be exempt only demonstrates a denial of the problem, which is a display of the attitudinal illness I referred to.

My question was as to how including considerations of the subject (however that might be conceived) would improve the methods and results in sciences such as chemistry, geology, ecology or biology. — Janus

Respecting the reality of the subjective input in science greatly improves one's understanding of the results, through an enhanced ability to recognize where deficiencies lie. This provides the scientist, philosopher, or anyone reviewing any scientific results, with an approach which is known as "critical thinking".

Accordingly, the scientist might also look for ways of minimizing the subjective input, or even devising ways of exposing it as much as possible, to be studied by philosophers. This is in stark contrast to the attempt to hide the subjective influence which results from the aforementioned attitudinal illness.

Sure. Beats scientism hands down.

Sure. Beats scientism hands down. — Wayfarer

Eh, I would go that far. It beats Bunge's "line" of scientism, or his "version" of scientism, if you will. It doesn't beat my version of scientism (I'm very immodest, mate. Delusional, even).

Sure. Whatever floats your (ideal) boat.

Actually I think you’ve conflated this thread with the other one, — Wayfarer

They are on much the same.

...it is meaningless to say that of anything that it exists outside of or independently of any perspective — Wayfarer

Yes, to say. And yet there is gold in those hills, even if no one says it.

So you say.

And yet there is gold in those hills, even if no one says it. — Banno

What a sound thing to say. Brilliant, even. I'm not trying to be funny, I agree with the realism here.

Better start digging, then!

The argument is about whether things exist without minds. I say not, Banno references a gold discovery at a particular place as an example of a putatively mind-independent fact. This argument is interminable.

I will clarify that while I acknowledge the reality of empirical and so mind independent facts, reality as a whole is not mind independent, even though we can putatively imagine it as if it were.

The argument is about whether things exist without minds. I say not, Banno references a gold discovery at a particular place as an example of a putatively mind-independent fact. This argument is interminable. — Wayfarer

I'd recommend Quentin Meillassoux's book, After Finitude. You might find his concept of "correlationism" interesting.

This argument is interminable. — Wayfarer

Only because you won't shut up... :wink:

See https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15574/is-the-distinction-between-metaphysical-realism-anti-realism-useless-andor-wrong/p1
There is an extended, somewhat absurd, argument about whether there is gold in those hills, form about page 10. I won't blame you for not reading it, but thought I'd at least let you know some of the back story.

There is an extended, somewhat absurd, argument about whether there is gold in those hills, form about page 10. I won't blame you for not reading it, but thought I'd at least let you know some of the back story. — Banno

Thanks for the reference. I'll take a look at it. I'm familiar with this topic of conversation, though not with that specific reference, so thanks for that.

I'm just a realist at the end of the day. There are things that exist outside of my brain. Those things are still there when I go to sleep, and they are the same things that I find in the morning when I wake up.

Why would you think that it would be exempt? — Metaphysician Undercover

Exempt from what?

This is in stark contrast to the attempt to hide the subjective influence which results from the aforementioned attitudinal illness. — Metaphysician Undercover

I doubt anyone with a sensible attitude wants to deny that science relies on the senses or that perception is conceptually mediated or that scientists, being human, may have their biases. What else do you think the "subjective influence" consists in?

I'd recommend Quentin Meillassoux's book — Arcane Sandwich

He’s been discussed here, I’ve taken a look. Mine is the kind of argument he has in his sights.

There are things that exist outside of my brain. — Arcane Sandwich

That statement is made from a point of view outside both, which takes the brain as one object among others.

Those things are still there when I go to sleep, and they are the same things that I find in the morning when I wake up. — Arcane Sandwich

Yet amazing as it may seem, that is not an argument against transcendental idealism. There’s an anecdote that Bryan Magee tells about Karl Popper on this point, I’ll find it later.

That statement is made from a point of view outside both, which takes the brain as one object among others. — Wayfarer

It's what Meillassoux calls "speculative materialism". Contingency is necessary, as absurd as that sounds. I think it's absurd, and false. Meillassoux's claim, that is. Which is why I prefer to say that contingency and necessity are different modalities, and that it its possible to be aware of both at the same time. And when you are aware of both of them at the same time, an unpleasant feeling ensues. That's what happens in my subjective case, at least. I don't expect others to have a similar experience, but I wouldn't be surprised if they did.

EDIT:

Yet amazing as it may seem, that is not an argument against transcendental idealism. There’s an anecdote that Bryan Magee tells about Karl Popper on this point, I’ll find it later. — Wayfarer

I believe you. I don't intend my version of materialism as an argument against transcendental idealism. I'm tolerant of other people's philosophical premises, as long as they don't lead to dehumanizing conclusions, to say nothing of the possibility of justifying ideas whose sole objective is to dehumanize humans.

Does that make sense to you? It sounded better in my head, before typing it.

My point in that other thread is simply that it is meaningless to say that of anything that it exists outside of or independently of any perspective, which I don’t think your patiently-explained butterfly effect (forgive the conceit) actually addresses. Outside any perspective, there is….well, you can’t say. That’s the point, and it’s a simple one. — Wayfarer

It's a simplistic point, not a simple one. We can perfectly coherently say that things existed before human beings existed and will exist after they are extinct. You can say that we can't know what that existence is, because all we know of things existing is via perception, but that would be to conflate our knowing something to exist with its actual existence.

You can stipulate something like 'to exist is to stand out for a percipient' and of course on that definition nothing can exist absent percipients, which is basically what you are doing insisting: on your stipulated definition being the only "true" one. But that is a trivial tautology, and it is also not in accordance with the common usage of 'exist'. So, in Wittgenstein's terms, you are taking language on holiday.

Allow me to quote Meillassoux at this point, @Wayfarer and @Janus. It might help, but I'm not so sure of it myself. I'll quote it nonetheless:

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. — Quentin Meillassoux

And immediately afterwards, he says:

How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. — Quentin Meillassoux

What do you make of that?

EDIT: Tagging @MrLiminal as well, as this has something to do with the concept of Liminality, I think.
Tagging also @Corvus and @Mapping the Medium, as this point may interest them.

We can apply the Principle of Charity to reach agreement on all these observations.

And this speaks to the communality of language, that what we say about how things are is part and parcel of our role as members of a community. This in firm opposition to the view that some individuals observations are somehow paramount, or must form the foundation of knowledge. Knowledge is not built from solipsism.

This is in contrast to Wayfarer's thesis that science neglects lived experience. A better way to think of this is that science combines multiple lived experiences in order to achieve agreement and verity. So sure, "our entire perceptual and cognitive apparatus biases our understanding of the world", and yet we can work to minimise that bias by paying attention to contexts and wording our utterances with care, so that they work in the widest available context. Not the view form nowhere but the view from anywhere — Banno

This is, up to a point, compatible with Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the construction of empirically objective facts via the coordination of subjective perspectives among an intersubjective community. But when Husserl points out that the intersubjectively produced empirical objects are entities that no one actually sees, he doesn’t find it necessary to anchor this objectivity in a principle of charity that assumes a transcendence of perceptual bias via a grip on ‘the way things really are’.

Allow me to quote Meillassoux at this point — Arcane Sandwich

I'm keeping away from him, and from 'speculative realism' generally. There's a considerable body of work there but still within the generally physicalist-naturalist ambit, and I'm defending an idealist philosophy. Bernardo Kastrup is more my cup of tea. And philosophical cognitive scientist John Vervaeke, who's not an idealist philosopher, but is doing fantastic work on history of ideas.

Those things are still there when I go to sleep, and they are the same things that I find in the morning when I wake up. — Arcane Sandwich

You are in good company.

in practice it is surprisingly difficult to get transcendental idealism taken seriously, even by many good philosophers. Once, in Karl Popper's living-room, I asked him why he rejected it, whereupon he banged his hand against the radiator by which we were standing and said: 'When I come downstairs in the morning I take it for granted that this radiator has been here all night'‚ a reaction not above the level of Dr Johnson's to Berkeleianism — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy

The reaction of Johnson to Berkeley is the (in)famous Argument from the Stone.

Magee goes on:

Some of the best of empiricist philosophers have regarded transcendental idealism as so feeble that they have spoken patronizingly of Kant for putting it forward‚ from James Mill's notorious remark about his seeing very well what 'the poor man would be at', to passages in P. F. Strawson's The Bounds of Sense in which the author calls transcendental idealism names without bothering to argue seriously against it, and toys playfully with the question whether Kant was perhaps having us all on in putting it forward. ...Strawson appears from the outset to take it as having been already agreed between himself and his readers that transcendental idealism is some sort of risible fantasy, and therefore that Kant's constructive metaphysics will merit our attention only on condition that it can be shown to be logically independent of [it].

That would describe the attitude of most of the contributors here, with some illustrious exceptions (including the one directly above this post).

But when Husserl points out that the intersubjectively produced empirical objects are entities that no one actually sees... — Joshs

Husserl can't see the butterflies?

@Wayfarer understood, thank you for the clarification. So how can I help? What do you need me here for, philosophically? There does not seem to be anything that I can contribute to make any sort of improvement here. Unless, of course, if you would like to state your argument as a list of premises from which a conclusion is deduced. I can then tell you what strategies someone might employ for denying the premises of your argument, and what counter-strategies you might employ yourself for defending your premises. Other than that, I fear that I cannot offer you much on the topic of the OP.

Do you agree with the argument that science has a blind spot? You gave the kind of objections that a Burge might give, but then you say you don’t agree with Burge on that score. So do I take it that you are in agreement with the authors?

Do you agree with the argument that science has a blind spot? — Wayfarer

Of course I do. I might articulate such a notion differently, but I agree with the substantial part of the claim, not necessarily with the details of the case.

You gave the kind of objections that a Burge might give, but then you say you don’t agree with Burge on that score. — Wayfarer

And I don't. Again, I can "play the harp", if you want, but I see no need for that.

So do I take it that you are in agreement with the authors? — Wayfarer

Maybe I am, maybe I am not. I don't think it's a substantial point of disagreement between the authors and myself. I would prefer to disagree with them on other intellectual fronts. I choose my battles, if I can. I have no quarrel with transcendental idealism as a philosophy. So I see no point in arguing with its core premises.

Does that make sense?

Completely!