Mac users - if you go to Control Panel>Keyboard>Text Replacements, you can enter Rödl with the umlaut to replace every instance of the name typed without it. — Wayfarer

Or just hold the "o" down and press 4. ö.

Mac users - if you go to Control Panel>Keyboard>Text Replacements, you can enter Rödl with the umlaut to replace every instance of the name typed without it. (And it will also work on your other iOS devices should you have any e.g. iPad, iPhone using same Apple ID.) — Wayfarer

Miraculous.

Mine's easier :joke:

Well, no. Rodl specifically says, "This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p." — J

Sure, but again, Rodl is asking us not to assume that being self-conscious means having two simultaneous thoughts, as above. — J

But I have nowhere said that there are two thoughts. That is not the issue. I wonder if you are conflating the issue of simultaneity from the other thread with the issue of self-conscious thinking of this thread? The proposition I have been attributing to Rodl comes from the OP.

We saw that for Kant the I think is not a thought, it is a kind of representation, it does not always accompany representations (or thoughts) and, when it does accompany them, it therefore represents a true form of self-consciousness.

I hate to say it, but a great deal of this comes down to how we want to use very ordinary words like "thought" and "accompany." — J

That's right, and I think it's just a matter of using words wrongly. When we are not conscious of thinking a thought, we are not self-conscious of our thinking of that thought. It doesn't make sense to say, "He is self-consciously thinking a thought without being conscious of his thinking the thought." If he is not conscious of thinking then he is not thinking the I think.

See my comment in the previous post about the possibly unfortunate choice of this term by phenomenologists. Most of our uses of "I think" are indeed conscious and intentional. (Not sure if they're also self-conscious, but often enough, I suppose.) But "the I think" is, or may be, different. — J

We could omit "intentional" if we like, but I don't see how we can omit "conscious." Once we say "I think" has nothing to do with consciousness of thinking we have departed much too far from the meaning of words.

PS -- As the writer of the OP, I officially declare that we no longer have to use the umlaut when referring to Rodl. What a pain in the ass :wink: . — J

:lol:
I was using copy-paste, but as others stopped using the umlaut it became harder to find.

At least for this thread,
Rödl = Rodl = Roooooooo4dl

I am a mobile phone user. I can just holds the o, and it gives me options.
ô ö ò ó œ ø ō õ

Honestly, I don't know what you folks are saying half the time. I've never read Frege, Rödl, or most others being mentioned. (I read most of Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. Absolutely loved what I could follow.) So I don't know how relevant these thoughts are.

I want to get away from the oak. Let's take baseball.
"Who is batting next for the Dodgers?" Some possible answers:
1) "I think Freddie Freeman."
2) "Freddie Freeman"
3) "I think Freddie Freeman is scheduled."
4) "Freddie Freeman is scheduled."

1) It's a fact that I think Freeman is batting next. Freeman may or may not bat next.

2) This is presented as a fact. It may or may not be. Difficult to see is the future. Always in motion it is. It may be that he's not even scheduled to bat next. Even if he is, any number of things might prevent his from batting next, right down to stepping in a hole and twisting his ankle one second from the plate. We'll have to wait and see.

3) It's a fact that I think Freeman is scheduled to bat next. It may or may not be a fact that Freeman is scheduled to bat next.

4) It's a fact that Freeman is scheduled to bat next. The lineup is written down, so you can read it. Doesn't mean he'll bat next, but he's scheduled.

Let say p stands for "I am", then I think p becomes "I think I am".
The familiar Cartesian statement is "I think therefore I am."

"I think I am" sounds like I am guessing I exist. "I think therefore I am." indicates "I think" is the precondition or necessary foundation for "I exist".

So how can the same "I think" imply guessing, and also the solid reasoned precondition for the existence? Or are they different "I think"?

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” — J

Tree has water and wood fibre in the content. Tree itself dies without water and the nutrients fed from the root. — Corvus

Photograph of a tree
I see a photograph. I see particular shapes and colours which I recognise as a tree. There is the form of a particular tree that exists in the photograph and there is the content of the form, which exists in my mind as the concept of a tree.

For Frege there is a separation between force and content, where the assertoric force is a propositional attitude towards a content. In this instance, that I judge that the particular shapes and colours represent a tree.

Rodl rejects Frege's separation between force and content. For Rodl the original form of judgment is the opposition of p and non-p, and it is not possible to make any judgment whether particular shapes and colours represent p or non-p in the absence of any content p. In other words, I cannot judge whether these particular shapes represent a tree or not without having prior knowledge of a tree.

Thinking of the tree
I see a photograph of an oak tree, which is a representation of an oak tree. When I think of an oak tree, I am not thinking about a representation of an oak tree, as this would lead into the infinite regress homunculus problem. It would mean that I was thinking of a representation of a representation.

As Kant wrote in CPR B132

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.

As Kant wrote, in order for me to think about an oak tree, accompanying my thought must be a representation of an oak tree, otherwise there would be nothing for me to think about. The "I think that there is an oak tree" cannot be external to the representation of an oak tree, otherwise the oak tree could not be thought about at all. The representation of the oak tree must be internal to the "I think that there is an oak tree".

Rodl, for a similar reason, in The Force and the content of judgement, rejected Frege's distinction between force and content. If content was external to force, any propositional attitude towards the content would be impossible, and there could be no judgement that the oak tree is shedding its leaves. Content must be internal to the force, where the judgement that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is no more than the articulation that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Knowing is not thinking
When I think of an oak tree, as a 1st person experience, I know that the thought is mine, rather than Pat's for example. I don't need to think about my thought in order to know that it is my thought. Therefore in every act of thinking there are two aspects, I think about the oak tree and I know that it is me who is thinking about the oak tree.

However, perhaps later, as a 3rd person experience, I may consciously think about my thought of an oak tree.

Knowing is not the same as thinking, in that I can know a pain in my hand without needing to think that I have a pain in my hand. For Frege a thought is either true or false. That I know a pain in my hand is not truth apt.

Rodl said "This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p."

Therefore, in every act of thinking there are two aspects, I think p and I know I think p.

These are excellent questions. I believe it was Keynes who, when asked whether he thought in words or images, replied, "I think in thoughts." Is there such a thing? And what accounts for the (apparently) self-validating quality of the experience -- this ties to your question "How do you know you are thinking these things?"

For myself, I can only say that my experience of thinking is an inchoate mish-mash of words, images, sounds, and "thoughts" (which seem to go much faster than any of the others but which I find almost impossible to describe, other than to say they have "content," which isn't much help). Probably there are other modalities in the mix too.

Not to harp on "scribbles," but I think you mean the equivalent of what a piece of written-down language would look like to someone who didn't know that language? Is that about right? — J

Partly. I'm saying that words are fundamentally scribbles and it is what we do with them that makes them into what we call words. Scribbles are "physical" things - ink on paper, the contrast of white and black light on your computer screen, etc. As such, they can cause things to happen, like changing someone's behavior, a computer perform certain functions, etc.

What I am trying to get you to explain is the fundamental parts of your thoughts. Scribbles appear as black scribbles on a white background, or as sounds that you hear. You can only ever know the world, including scribbles, as a visual or auditory experience. You can only think in visuals as well. Words are images, so you effectively think only in a mish-mash of images, sounds, feelings, tastes, and smells, of which scribbles are part of. So to say that your thoughts have content is to say that thoughts contain, colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings and our mind categorizes these things over time to produce meaningful behaviors.

For some reason, people seem to categorize words as having this special power or needing a special explanation that makes them separate from all the other visual experiences we have. I'm saying that is not the case. They are no different than any other visual experience you might have. The difference is what you do with them, no different than what you do with your car, or playing a computer game, or watching a movie. Words refer to other visuals, sounds, feelings, tastes and smells. The scribble, "sun" refers that bright, glowing disk you see in the sky during a clear day. The scribble, "sun" does not refer to more scribbles, unless you are looking in a dictionary, but even then all those scribbles must refer to other things that are not more scribbles for the scribbles to actually mean something.

If someone told me that they knew without doubt that something was true, I would be very doubtful about their opinion. — RussellA

Well, if it was their opinion, sure. There is some inherent uncertainty when it comes to expressing one's opinion, but not expressing observable facts. But then it would be odd for someone to express an opinion with the prefix, "I know without a doubt...", as that would mean they are not expressing an opinion, but a fact. We were not talking about opinions though. Is someone expressing an opinion or fact when stating, "The oak tree is shedding its leaves"?

I hear a sound and immediately think that the sound came from a motor car, but in fact it actually came from a motor bike.

I have the sense that my thought may be false, so am uncertain about it

Being a thought that was false, my thought was not about the world. It was not a part of the world. — RussellA

Just because it wasn't about the world doesn't mean it isn't part of the world. Does the Lord of the Rings book not exist in the world even though it isn't about the world? You misinterpreting a sound causes you to behave a certain way in the world. How can there be a causal relation between some thought you have and an action in the world if those thoughts are not in the world? If you are uncertain about the certainty of your thoughts, how can you ever say when some thought is part of the world or not? It would better to say that thoughts are part of the world like everything else is, as thoughts are information like everything else is. Even false thoughts and hallucinations have causal power and relations with everything else in the world.

As an Indirect Realist, I only have knowledge of what I perceive in my five senses. If I hear a sound, I have the knowledge that I have heard a sound. I may believe that the sound was caused by a motor bike, and I can find reasons to justify my belief that the sound was caused by a motor bike, but I can never know that the sound was not caused by a motor car. — RussellA

This seems contradictory. First you say you have knowledge of what you perceive in your five senses, but then conclude that you can never know what you perceive with one of your five senses (sound). What is the difference between a "belief", "think", and "knowledge" for you? What levels of uncertainty would you give each and why?

When I read the word "Gandalf", I picture in my mind "Gandalf" from the movie. — RussellA

Ok, would you say that the structure of your thoughts is more like watching the movie or reading the book? If scribbles in the book invoke the images from the movie, would you say that the scribbles in the book refer to the actions and things in the movie? Could it ever be the other way around? If so, provide an example.

But I have nowhere said that there are two thoughts — Leontiskos

Isn't that what you meant here (on Rodl's behalf, not your own)?:

So the claim of the OP by Rodl is <Every time p is thought, 'I think p' is thought> — Leontiskos

Sorry if I got you wrong. Maybe you thought I was attributing the thesis to you, rather than referring to your explication of Rodl.

Once we say "I think" has nothing to do with consciousness of thinking we have departed much too far from the meaning of words. — Leontiskos

I'm about to post something that may clarify this.

Isn't that what you meant here (on Rodl's behalf, not your own)?: — J

I meant to construe that not as a separate thought, but as a part of the thought p. But maybe that is not a very clear way of expressing Rodl's claim.

I've realized how much of the difficulties with the "I think" hinge on the two senses of “think” (and “thought”) I discussed above (and elaborated upon by @Patterner in interesting ways).

To recap: a thought may be a mental event, which occurs to a particular person at a particular time. “I had the thought that . . .” “Right now I’m thinking whether . . .” “Hold that thought!” But a thought can also be construed as the content of said mental event, what the thought is about – this is Frege’s use of “thought” as “proposition”.

It would be very useful to have two different words for each of these two senses of “think/thought” but I don’t think coining a new terminology is the best way to go. Instead, we could indicate them by their syntax. The “mental event” sense of “think” could be shown as “I think: ‛p’ ”. The propositional sense could be shown as “I think that p” or just “I think p”. Or we can just attach numbers to discriminate them: thought1 vs. thought2, think1 vs. think2.

The important insight is that, when someone argues that “the I think accompanies all our thoughts,” they are using both senses in the same sentence. We should translate this sentence as “When I think p (thought2), I must also think: ‛p’ (thought1).” Put this way, it shouldn’t even be controversial. You can’t propose or entertain or contemplate a proposition without also thinking1 it.

This makes sense of several things Rodl talks about, though of course he is hardly the first to argue for the “I think”. He expresses the wish that we had a more accurate notation "that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think."

In other words, p (thought2) can be pictorialized as being constituted or given expression by a thought1. You need the thought1 to even be able to form a thought2. Or . . . “the I think accompanies all our thoughts2.”

The also elucidates the Rodelian theme of p as seemingly mysterious or unexamined. He says:

If only we understood the letter p, the whole world would open up to us — Rodl, 55

.

He’s being a little sarcastic, in my reading, but his meaning is clear: If we continue to allow p to float somewhere in the World 3 of abstracta, without acknowledging its dependence on thought1, we are going to get a lot of things wrong.

One clarification: It’s tempting to say that thought2 must be equivalent to “I judge p” and indeed I believe Rodl jumps to this too often and too quickly. But if “I judge” means “I believe to be the case”, then this is a further move, one that is not necessitated by either think1 or think2 -- at least if the force/content distinction is kept in place. I can think the propositional content p without judging that it is the case.

Another clarification: This discrimination between the senses of “think/thought” is similar but not quite identical to what Popper would say about his World 2 and World 3, as I suggested above. Popper seems to me to be unclear about whether a World 2 thought can have a propositional content, or whether it must be regarded strictly as a brain event. Whereas I want to say that “thought1” is not only something that happens with neurons, but also with what I’m calling a “mental event”: it happens not just in the brain but also in the mind. My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when.

If “the I think accompanies all our thoughts” has been rendered uncontroversial, is it now also uninteresting, unimportant? This is a further question, which I’m continuing to reflect on. Another further question is, How to understand all this in terms of self-consciousness?

OK, I see that. I agree, it's iffy. I think Rodl is probably denying the "two thoughts" interpretation.

I'm saying that words are fundamentally scribbles and it is what we do with them that makes them into what we call words. — Harry Hindu

Ah, I think I'm understanding you better. So my question would be, Isn't language available to pre-literate people? Surely the words come first, and then, in most cases, a written language develops. Isn't your account reversing this to make the scribbles primary? We can't do anything with them unless they already represent words; it's not the doing that "makes them into what we call words."

Am I making too much of this? Maybe you just mean "sounds and/or scribbles".

To recap: a thought may be a mental event, which occurs to a particular person at a particular time. “I had the thought that . . .” “Right now I’m thinking whether . . .” “Hold that thought!” But a thought can also be construed as the content of said mental event, what the thought is about – this is Frege’s use of “thought” as “proposition”. — J

I don't follow the fundamental distinction here. It looks like when a thought occurs as a mental event it will always have a content, and that this content will be inseparable from the mental event. So what are the two different senses of "thought"?

The primary distinction that appears is thinking (as pointing to someone's opinion) vs. asserting (claiming that something is true). "The Earth is round {assertion} but he thinks it is flat {pointing to an opinion or judgment}."

Edit:

My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when. — J

Okay, but is this a real distinction or a mental distinction? Doesn't the event involve leveraging a proposition? We think thoughts and propose propositions, right? So the theory here is that there are timeless Platonic propositions that we can do stuff with in time, like doubt, entertain, assert, etc.

@J – Are these refinements to the use of "thought" and "think" discovered, or simply stipulated?

And again, not all thoughts have the form of a statement. One can think of a question. So what is the mental content of "What sort of tree is that?"

this content will be inseparable from the mental event — Leontiskos

There it is! -- "the I think accompanies all our thoughts2".

So what are the two different senses of "thought"? — Leontiskos

Fregean thought as "propositional content" versus thought as a current event, so to speak, something my mind thinks at time T1.

Giving examples still seems the best way for me to get it across:

Are you having a thought? Yes.
What is the thought of? p

Are you having a new thought (time has changed)? Yes.
What is the thought of? p

The content remains the same (the proposition, the Fregean thought) but these are clearly two distinct mental events. They could equally well happen to two separate people.

Are these refinements to the use of "thought" and "think" discovered, or simply stipulated? — Banno

I hope they're discovered! Do they fit your own experience? I only mean to stipulate the terminology, or rather bemoan that we haven't got a better one.

So what is the mental content of "What sort of tree is that?" — Banno

Good. I'll work on that. Makes me wonder if Rodl is also limiting "all our thoughts" to propositional thoughts.

Makes me wonder if Rodl is also limiting "all our thoughts" to propositional thoughts. — J

He seems to be. Considering too few alternatives is a common failing in such situations.

If you want to discover the use of "thinking", it pays to be wary that you are not stipulating it. So "A thought is a mental event"... is it? Are there other mental events that are not thoughts? If so, how do they differ? Are there mental phenomena that are not events? If not, what is the word "event" doing - would we be better off thinking of mental phenomena? Is a toothache a mental phenomenon, a mental event or a thought? All this by way of showing that the surrounds may not be the neat garden Rödl seems to be seeing. It may be a bit of a jungle.

the I think accompanies all our thoughts — J

Is that saying something profound, along the lines that any thought must include some notion of the self... or is it merely the grammatical observation that to think is to have a thought? Because the latter is pretty analytic, while the former is at best dubious.

Is Rödl just confusing these two reading, and thinking that he has made a discovery when all he has done is make a stipulation?

Fregean thought as "propositional content" versus thought as a current event, so to speak, something my mind thinks at time T1. — J

Okay, so here is an edit I added:

My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when. — J

Okay, but is this a real distinction or a mental distinction? Doesn't the event involve leveraging a proposition? We think thoughts and propose propositions, right? So the theory here is that there are timeless Platonic propositions that we can do stuff with in time, like doubt, entertain, assert, etc.

...Which I think tracks what you've said...?

The important insight is that, when someone argues that “the I think accompanies all our thoughts,” they are using both senses in the same sentence. We should translate this sentence as “When I think p (thought2), I must also think: ‛p’ (thought1).” Put this way, it shouldn’t even be controversial. You can’t propose or entertain or contemplate a proposition without also thinking1 it. — J

This seems to go back to <what I said to javra>. It looks like you are turning "I think p" into "p was thought."

There it is! -- "the I think accompanies all our thoughts2". — J

So the I think = thought1? Such that Rodl's claim is, "The temporal event of thinking accompanies all our [Fregian propositions]."

If the I think means only a temporal event of thinking, then what does it have to do with self-consciousness? What does it have to do with the self-reflective "I think"?

And it is also strange to try to make that term "thoughts" = [Fregian propositions]. Remember, this would mean that they are non-temporal, such that "thoughts" are not temporally distinct acts of thinking, but rather notionally distinct Fregian propositions. That is, the plural "thoughts" would capture two distinct Fregian propositions, but not the same Fregian proposition thought on two different days.

For clarity

• "The [ I think] accompanies all our [thoughts]"
• =
• "The [temporal event of thinking] accompanies all our [Fregian propositions]

So with I would say that this looks rather stipulative. But I agree that a temporal event of thinking accompanies every Fregian proposition. Like you say, that is uncontroversial (for non-Platonists).

Are there other mental events that are not thoughts? — Banno

The doings of the parasympathetic nervous system are regulated by the hypothalamus but are largely unconscious. Nevertheless they provide the foundation within which conscious thought gets its bearings.

So there are mental events that are not thoughts?

The parasympathetic nervous system controls salivation. Is salivation then to be thought of as a mental event?

Is salivation then to be thought of as a mental event? — Banno

Yeah, it's magic saliva. And maybe you have no brain, have you ever seen your own brain with your own two eyes? Nope, you can't, that's by definition, so maybe you don't have a brain, maybe there is a clockwork, Steampunk machine inside your skull that makes you imagine that you have an organic brain. Right?

(I'm being ironic).

The parasympathetic nervous system controls salivation. Is salivation then to be thought of as a mental event? — Banno

Of course. Often triggered by sensory stimuli.

Ah, I think I'm understanding you better. So my question would be, Isn't language available to pre-literate people? Surely the words come first, and then, in most cases, a written language develops. Isn't your account reversing this to make the scribbles primary? We can't do anything with them unless they already represent words; it's not the doing that "makes them into what we call words."

Am I making too much of this? Maybe you just mean "sounds and/or scribbles". — J

I would refine what I said and say that colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings are primary and all thoughts and perceptions are composed of these things, which would include scribbles/words.

To be able to conceive of language use one must first understand the concept of representation. This idea possibly developed in our ancestors as a by-product of the idea of other minds - understanding that there is a first-person experience in other's heads that can explain some of the behaviors observed, as if the behaviors represent one's mental states. Observing the behaviors of other species and how they communicate with each other (take for instance the display of a white-tailed dear's tail), one would develop a theory of other minds and representation. Scribbles on paper are essentially like the tail of the deer - a visual marker that represents something else. Human intelligence allowed us to develop a highly sophisticated system of representation and an educational system to instruct the people how to use it, as in what string of scribbles represents what.

Representation comes first from understanding natural symbols (white-tailed deer's tail), then arbitrary symbol use (agreed-upon scribbles and sounds and what they represent) follows.

Then your use of "mental event" is quite broad. I suppose that follows from your idealism.

What events are not mental events?

I've been going through Rödl's text and am making notes on it. This is a summary of some of the main points to date.

Rödl explicitly states that his book does not operate in the usual manner of advancing theses, defending positions, or engaging in debates with competing views. He says he seeks to articulate something already implicit in our everyday practice of judgment—a foundational understanding of judgment that is always already present in the capacity to judge. 'What is thought first-personally contains its being thought' - p2.

Judgment is a fundamental activity of thought—when we make a judgment, we assert something about the world, such as "the sky is blue." Rödl is interested in the self-consciousness inherent in judgment: the way in which, whenever we make a judgment, we implicitly understand what it means to judge. This self-consciousness isn't an explicit, theoretical knowledge but an implicit, practical understanding embedded in the act of judging itself. 'Thinking that something is so is being conscious of the validity of thinking this. We may put this by saying that a judgment is self-consciously valid, indicating that a judgment is a consciousness of itself as valid. The validity of judgment, then, not only is objective; it is also self-conscious' - p4

In this way, Rödl is not offering a new theory of judgment but rather bringing to explicit consciousness what we already know whenever we judge. His task is not to discover something new but to clarify and express the implicit understanding that makes judgment possible - P12-13

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sought to articulate the conditions that make experience and knowledge possible—not by adding new empirical knowledge, but by analyzing the structures of thought that underlie any experience. This is the basis of Kant's famous transcendental method. Rödl says 'As [the method] aims to express the comprehension of judgment that is contained in any judgment, the present essay can say only what anyone always already knows, knows in any judgment, knows insofar as she judges at all. It cannot say anything that is novel, it can make no discovery, it cannot advance our knowledge in the least. Echoing Kant, we can say that its work is not that universal knowledge, but a formula of it' in other words an enquiry into the terms and scope of judgement itself.

So Rödl’s project is not about increasing knowledge but clarifying its form. By "formula," he means a linguistic articulation that makes explicit what is always already known implicitly. This is a profound task because confusion about such fundamental structures—such as misunderstanding what it means to judge—can (and does, he claims) lead to widespread philosophical error.

The reason Frege is important, is because of his contention that the content of thought (<p>) can be entirely objective and independent of any particular subject. Frege’s emphasis is on the idea that thoughts exist as abstract, objective entities in a "third realm," independent of whether anyone thinks them. Fregean thoughts are, in principle, accessible to any rational being, and their validity does not depend on any individual subject's act of thinking. This is laid out in the famous article that has already been mentioned, The Thought: A Logical Enquiry, published in English in 1954.

Rödl's book is titled 'an introduction to absolute idealism', whilst Frege's essay is explicitly critical of idealism, in insisting on that true propositions are just so, independently of anyone thinking them. That seems oxymoronic to me, as I have argued at length in many debates on idealism.

Then your use of "mental event" is quite broad. — Banno

If one's hypothalamus stops controlling the parasympathetic nervous system for any length of time, you can be sure there will be no ensuing 'mental events' for that subject. Furthermore, the 'implicit' nature of judgement that Rödl refers to is, I'm sure, a consequence of the un- and sub-conscious bases of judgements. What we're consciously aware of thinking is only the tip of a proverbial iceberg. But then, much moden philosophy is (as Keating once famously said of a political opponent) 'all tip and no iceberg'.

What events are not mental events? — Banno