Rödl treats Nagel as the last exit from the highway of absolute idealism:

The aim of this essay, as an introduction to absolute idealism, is to make plain that it is impossible to think judgment through this opposition: mind here, world there, two things in relation or not. To dismantle this opposition is not to propose that the world is mind-dependent. Nor is it to propose that the mind is world-dependent. These ways of speaking solidify the opposition; they are an impediment to comprehension.
— SC&O, Rödl, page 16 — Paine

Once we step beyond non-dualism, as all our thought does, and have identified such things as mind and world, then logical dependence relations may become apparent. For example, we transgress non-duality when we identify fish and water, and if we inquire as to whether there is a dependence relation between them it immediately becomes obvious that fish depend on water whereas water does not depend on fish.

I think the same can be said for the relation between mind and world (although this may depend on what we mean by 'world)—the mind depends on the world whereas the world does not depend on the mind. Of course, we could stipulate that 'world' means 'world as experienced by humans' which would of course make the world dependent on (the human) mind, but I don't think that is the common usage or intended meaning of the term 'world'.

According to absolute idealism the world just is the world as experienced by humans—"the rational is the real", so it doesn't seem clear that Rödl is moving beyond absolute idealism. I haven't read his work so maybe that is not his intention—do you read him as claiming that it was Nagel's intention? It's a very long time since I read The View From Nowhere.

Perhaps the problem is I'm not sure what you mean "last exit from the highway of absolute idealism".

The way things are: the tree is dropping its leaves.

A report about the way things are: "The tree is dropping its leaves".

A report of a thought: I think that the tree is dropping its leaves. Another: I thought "The tree is dropping its leave".

A few more thoughts. Is the tree dropping its leaves? Is the thing dropping leaves a tree? I wish the tree would not drop it's leaves. Let's call that thing that is dropping leaves, a "tree".

A report about a thought: I wonder if the tree will drop its leaves.

There's quite a lot going on in each of these.

This is a generous, sense-making interpretation — J

Is it? Can we "adequately convey the subjective experience" of a hand that hurts in the first person, with "my hand hurts", more effectively than in the third, "@RussellA's hand hurts"?

Is that what @Wayfarer was claiming? What more is in the first person account than in the third person account?

The real subject of the proposition, which is pain. Pain is never experienced in the third person. :roll:

That would have been my answer as well. "Convey," of course, is equivocal, but I took Wayfarer to be referring to an actual "feel," not merely the report that one was experienced. The latter can be conveyed, in a sense, without remainder, but not the former. In any case, I'm not sure Rodl is limiting himself to such cases.

The real subject of the proposition, which is pain. Pain is never experienced in the third person. — Wayfarer

But it is "adequately conveyed" in the first person?

Or is it just had?

This means that while we can refer to, or quote, a first-person statement like “my hand hurts,” we cannot adequately convey the subjective experience it conveys in a third-person proposition. — Wayfarer

So can we "adequately convey the subjective experience" in the first person but not in the third? Or is it also that we cannot adequately convey the subjective experience it conveys in a first-person proposition? Is the problem with first and third person, or is it with putting pain into a proposition?

Ok. Happy to drop pursuing this.

Perhaps the problem is I'm not sure what you mean "last exit from the highway of absolute idealism". — Janus

If the problem is not like Nagel put it, then it is another problem. Röd proposes an alternative response after honoring Nagel for making it a problem.

Is the problem with first and third person, or is it with putting pain into a proposition? — Banno

Both. I believe it was you who first first introduced 'my hand hurts' (here). I've provided a précis of the some of the discussuion in this post.

But it is "adequately conveyed" in the first person? — Banno

I can tell you 'my hand hurts' but I can't convey the actual feeling - which is the point! You will only know what I mean because you too know what it means to have a sore hand. ChatGPT will know what the words mean, but it will never know what it is like to have a sore hand.

Will you, ChatGPT?

No, I will never know what it is like to have a sore hand. I can analyze and convey the meaning of "my hand hurts" based on linguistic and logical structures, but I lack subjective experience and the capacity for first-person awareness, which are necessary to truly feel or know pain. This distinction underscores the unique nature of first-person experience, as discussed in your thread. — ChatGPT

No, I will never know what it is like to have a sore hand. I can analyze and convey the meaning of "my hand hurts" based on linguistic and logical structures, but I lack subjective experience and the capacity for first-person awareness, which are necessary to truly feel or know pain. This distinction underscores the unique nature of first-person experience, as discussed in your thread. — ChatGPT

Here's the problem with that: How do you know that ChatGPT is not lying to you when it says something like that? Are you sure that it doesn't have first-person awareness, or something equivalent to it? That it lacks subjective experience, granted. It does not follow from there that it does not have first-person awareness, or that it can't lie to you.

I believe it was you who first first introduced 'my hand hurts' — Wayfarer

But

Let Think1 = I think "my hand hurts" — RussellA

precedes mine. Never mind. It seems that the problem is not first person/third person but puting pain into an expression - "conveying" a pain as you put it.

Right. And Rödl uses that to make a larger point in support of his overall thesis (although his analogy was not 'my hand hurts'.)

a larger point — Wayfarer

This?

In the Fregean framework, first-person thoughts are problematical because they involve a self-referential aspect that cannot be ‘disquoted’ or fully expressed from a third-person perspective. This means that while we can refer to, or quote, a first-person statement like “my hand hurts,” we cannot adequately convey the subjective experience it conveys in a third-person proposition. The term ‘undisquotable’ highlights the idea that first-person thoughts maintain an intrinsic self-reference that eludes complete external articulation or understanding. — Wayfarer

So the claim is that we can refer to, or quote, a first-person statement: He said "my hand hurts". And we can turn this into a disquotation: He said that his hand hurts. Or, in Davidson's account: His hand hurts. He said that. Or if you want it in the third person, RussellA said that his hand hurts. And for Davidson, "my hand hurts" might be parsed as RussellA's hand hurts. RussellA said that.

What is it that is in the first person but not in the second or third? What does "first-person thoughts are problematical because they involve a self-referential aspect that cannot be ‘disquoted’ or fully expressed from a third-person perspective" say except that first person accounts are in the first person, while third person accounts are in the third person?

All very obtuse.

<"My hand hurts", uttered by RussellA, will be true if and only if RussellA said that he his hand hurts>, appears to give a third person account of what was said that has the same truth functionality. Perhaps it does not "covey the pain", but neither does "my hand hurts".

I'm not sure Rödl spends sufficient time developing his notion of "first-person thinking." He says it is "thought whose expression in language requires the use of a first-person pronoun" (1), but he seems to be assuming that this sort of thought is qualitatively different from other thought. Rödl seems to think that we have some kind of direct access to the self; that we are transparent to ourselves; and first-person thinking exemplifies this as a qualitatively unique mode of thought. (But presumably he is going to try to abolish the divide, not so that modern "objectivity" flows into "first-person thinking," but so that first-person self-consciousness flows into "objectivity.")

So, sorry if I sound like I'm waffling. — J

What?? Not ready to declare total understanding of all things yet?!?

:rofl:

Ok, I'll let it slide this time.

The real subject of the proposition, which is pain. Pain is never experienced in the third person. :roll: — Wayfarer

Indeed. Seeing a damaged hand does not mean the hand hurts. No damage does not mean the hand does not hurt. Only the bearer of the hand can know if the hand hurts.

Thanks, but I'm no clearer on what the problem or the "other problem" are.

Rödl seems to think that we have some kind of direct access to the self; that we are transparent to ourselves; and first-person thinking exemplifies this as a qualitatively unique mode of thought. — Leontiskos

Are you familiar with a term I've only recently acquired, 'ipseity'? It means precisely 'a sense of self' or of being a subject. And indeed only living beings, so far as we know, can conceivably have that sense (leaving aside the possibility of angelic intelligences). I know that I am, in quite a different sense than I know that the things around me are - as pointed out by Descartes, of course. I can't really understand how that can be called into question. (I read once an aphorism that I can't find a source for, 'a soul is whatever can say "I am"', which struck me as extremely profound.)

Only the bearer of the hand can know if the hand hurts. — Patterner

Of course. Why this seems puzzling or obtuse to anyone beats me.

Frege did indeed believe that force is separable from content, but he probably wouldn't agree that therefore you have to separate "I think" from "p" — J

To my understanding:

For Frege, perhaps it is more the case that force is separate to content, rather than force is separable from content.

As I see it, for Frege, force is always separate to content. For Rodl, force is always part of content.

For Frege, given that force is separate to content, doesn't this mean that "I think" must be separate to "p"?

I am using "p" as "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", for example.

What is a force of judgement? = "I think that _ is true", "I judge that _ is true", "I believe that _ is true", "I doubt that _ is true", "I am certain that _ is true", "I hope that _ is true", etc.

What is the content? = "p", "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "Pat is reading a book", etc.

Frege believed that the content can exist independently of any judgement about it. For example, he might believe that an oak tree shedding its leaves can exist independently of anyone observing it.

What does "I think p" mean. It does not mean "I think "p"". It means "I judge that p is true". For example, "I judge that the oak tree is shedding its leaves is true", which means that in my judgment, in the world is an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

For Frege, the content is separate to the force. The content "p" is separate to the force "I judge that _ "

Therefore, for Frege, one has to separate "I think" from "p" as "I think" is separate to "p"

I didn’t read far enough: you said known in a different way (or not at all). I would have said not at all, re: unknown, and nothing more. As you are wont to say, to which I agree…the inaccessibility of first person experience to any subject other than the holder of it.

Still, I will treat your statement that your hand hurts very differently than if I were Bob, with respect to the conditions set forth in 2.2, re: John and his muddy face.
————-

I'm not sure Rödl spends sufficient time developing his notion of "first-person thinking." — Leontiskos

Agreed, albeit perhaps for different reasons. In the very beginning, we are beset with contradiction:

“…. independent of any character….”;
“….. whether it is right to think something depends (…) not on any character of the subject thinking it…..”

His notion of first-person thinking is purely mechanical, which is fine for methodology, thought is objective and all that. But the character of the subject himself is inescapable, in the determination of the conceptions he relates to each other in the manifestations of his thoughts.

It certainly seems subjectively character-laden, to represent an existence by thinking up the name “Slinky”. “Quark”. Ooooo….even a purely abstract nonsense thought….supercalifragilisticexpialidoesous!!!

But he has to be allowed his ideas, especially considering the peer group to whom he is responding; it’s up to the reader the satisfaction found in them.

What?? Not ready to declare total understanding of all things yet?!?

:rofl: — Patterner

Fortunately not a requirement! Although to listen to some people on TPF, you'd think it was a requirement, and anyone who isn't quite sure what they think, and pursues possible lines of inquiry, is perceived as "refusing to take a position" or "arguing sophistically" or something like that.

The more I work with this, the more I'm realizing that the idea of "accompanying" a thought can be given so many interpretations that I wonder if it's even helpful.
— J

Perhaps you're over-thinking it. Rödl's point is that the truth of propositions can't be 'mind-independent' in the way that Frege's objectivism insists it must be. — Wayfarer

This is true. But he's also laying out a thesis about self-consciousness, and about why objectivity must be self-conscious, aware of itself as objective. This is where an innocent verb like "accompany" can become complicated. I'm still working to understand the nature of the accompaniment Rodl has in mind. Is it structural or experiential? Is it a thought like any other thought? etc.

I can't help but think that book you once mentioned, Bernstein's 'Beyond Objectivism and Relativism', might also be relevant to this argument. — Wayfarer

It is, but somewhat at a tangent. Bernstein's approach, through Gadamer, is hermeneutic. He's not focused on the logical/psychological structure of thought, a la Rodl and Kimhi, but more on the challenges to objectivity posed by the thesis that we have to draw a line between what is "out there" and our own ability to know it -- "Cartesian anxiety" is his term for this. There's a PhD dissertation for you -- connect Rodl and Gadamer!

Remember, that distinction suggests that thought can be objective only if it is detached from the subject who thinks it. However, first-person thought (I have pain) challenges this by showing that the act of judgment is self-conscious and cannot be isolated from what is judged. — Wayfarer

Self-consciousness is inside the "I" not the "I think"

Consider "I think p". Where exactly is the self-conscious part?

It is the "I" that is self-conscious, the subject that is self-conscious. Neither the act of judgement nor the "I think" are self-conscious.

"I think" is no more self-conscious than "I run" is self-conscious, or "I talk" is self-conscious.

As running and talking are outside the subject's self-consciousness, thinking is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

It is not the act of judgement "I think" that is self-conscious, it is the subject, the "I", that is self-conscious.

Therefore, this particular argument that a thought cannot be objective because it is inside the subject's self-consciousness is not a valid argument, because a subject's thoughts are outside the subject's self-consciousness.
===============================================================================

Rödl then goes on to argue against the possibility of first-person propositions as such, suggesting instead that the first-person pronoun is not a form of reference but an expression of self-consciousness. — Wayfarer

First and third-person propositions both refer to something outside the subject's self-consciousness

I agree that the first-person pronoun "I" is an expression of self-consciousness, because it is the "I" that is self-conscious.

In the first person "I know my hand hurts" and in the third person "I believe the oak tree is shedding its leaves"

As my thoughts are outside my self-consciousness, my knowing is also outside my self-consciousness.

In the expression "I know my hand hurts", "knowing my hand hurts" is outside the subject's self-consciousness.

Therefore, the first-person proposition "my hand hurts" is not an expression of self-consciousness, but refers to a hand that is hurting. In the same way, "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" refers to an oak tree that is shedding its leaves.

Ok. Well, Human languages are much more complex than any non-human language that we are aware of. With them, we can discuss things, and kinds of things, that cannot be discussed in any non-human language. Things that are not thought by any non-human.

Humans created systems using scribbles in order to make lasting records of ideas that can be expressed in those languages. Presumably, the motivation for creating such systems was the desire to communicate those utterances, both to distant people and to future generations. The squiggles can record and communicate relatively simple things that can be communicated in non-human languages, and also things, and kinds of things, that cannot be discussed in any non-human language.

The result being, when we look at the scribbles, we can, and very often must, think things, and kinds of things, that cannot be discussed in any non-human language, and which are not thought by any non-human. Also, they are often things the one looking at the scribbles has never thought before.

I don't know what's not logically possible in any of that. And I don't know how any power can be read into any of it. At least not in the magical/fantasy sense that I believe you mean it.

But these scribbles are signs that can pass extremely complex ideas, in great detail, from the mind of one person into the mind of a person living thousands of years later, who never had any inking of those particular ideas, or kinds of ideas. That's pretty darned special. — Patterner

As I have already pointed out, it is simply the sheer number of symbols being used, along with the sheer number of relations between the scribbles (letters to words, words to sentences, sentences to paragraphs, etc.) that makes language complex. But you must already be able to think in multiple layers of representation, and the memory to store the number of scribbles and their associated rules to be able to understand language use and how to use it yourself.

Pictures say a thousand words. So if I can substitute words with pictures, would that make a difference?

Our ancestors drew cave art. When our ancestors drew a mammoth on the cave wall, did they attempt to throw their spears at the picture, cook and eat it? No. They understood that the picture represents the mammoth they successfully hunted during the day. Instead of a picture of the mammoth, they could have drawn scribbles representing the mammoth and the hunt, but isn't it that the scribbles really point to the visual of the mammoth and the memories of the hunt? Language merely provides another layer of representation for the purpose of communicating ideas that a listener or speaker does not have access to the picture or the experience. Language does not make us think in ways that we already could not. Language use is itself a representation of the structure of our thoughts, not the other way around. For instance, the pictures on the cave will inform the women that did not participate in the hunt what happened during the hunt.

Will you, ChatGPT?

No, I will never know what it is like to have a sore hand. I can analyze and convey the meaning of "my hand hurts" based on linguistic and logical structures, but I lack subjective experience and the capacity for first-person awareness, which are necessary to truly feel or know pain. This distinction underscores the unique nature of first-person experience, as discussed in your thread.
— ChatGPT — Wayfarer

You also don't have hands, ChatGPT. I think that is the more important qualifier here because there is still a question what a subjective experience is and why a solid hunk of neurons can have subjective experiences but computers cannot.

Is it? Can we "adequately convey the subjective experience" of a hand that hurts in the first person, with "my hand hurts", more effectively than in the third, "@RussellA's hand hurts"?

Is that what Wayfarer was claiming? What more is in the first person account than in the third person account? — Banno

If scribble/utterance-use is conveying first-person experiences in the third person, then what does it mean to use scribbles/utterances in your mind to refer to the experience of pain which is in inherently first-person? If thoughts consist of scribbles/utterances then thoughts are inherently third-person not first-person.

Does using representation inherently put one in the third-person stance relative to what is being represented?

In general, the more observations the better one's conclusion ought to be. However, in practice, most people are entrenched in their positions, regardless of how many new observations they make.

Even so, this does not take away from the fact that observations cannot be guaranteed to be trustworthy, as anyone reading mainstream media would testify.

However, this doesn't mean that certainty cannot be discovered from uncertainty. Zero-knowledge proof is an interesting concept, and not only in computer sciences. — RussellA

As I have already explained, observation alone does not constitute knowledge. It is observations coupled with reasoning that constitutes knowledge. It was not just multiple observations that led you to be more certain in your beliefs. It is both multiple observations and the logical categorization and interpretation of those observations that constitutes knowledge.

It is both multiple observations and the logical categorization and interpretation of those observations that constitutes knowledge. — Harry Hindu

I agree, observations and reasoning are important.

Plato’s explanation of knowledge as justified true belief has stood for thousands of years.

The question is, which justified beliefs are true.

Problem one is that there is no one definition of truth, and problem two is that, even if there was, how would we know what the truth was.

Pardon me, that was a lame response. I will try giving a better one soon. I need to work for a bit.

Are you familiar with a term I've only recently acquired, 'ipseity'? It means precisely 'a sense of self' or of being a subject. And indeed only living beings, so far as we know, can conceivably have that sense (leaving aside the possibility of angelic intelligences). — Wayfarer

I think the question is whether sense of self is direct or indirect. If it were direct, then it would seem that there is nothing I would not know about myself. I would be fully transparent to myself. If it is indirect, then self-consciousness is not always present.

For example, for Kant:

Thought is an activity, in the synthesis of conceptions into a possible cognition; “I think” represents the consciousness of the occurrence of the activity, but not the activity itself. — Mww

-

- :up: