The closest to it I found, and which inspired the argument from composition over motion, was Aquinas’ argument that if all essences do not in-themselves necessitate esse than none of them could exist; and so there must be an essence which is identical to its existence—God. It makes more sense to me to formulate it in terms of ‘composed being’ than forms and matter. — Bob Ross

Yes, and I thought you might be doing this. The difficulty is that essence/existence is a contentious form of composition, and a lot of people will fight you on this.

Sorry, I see how that might be confusing in the OP: I will rewrite that part. — Bob Ross

That's alright. I had figured it out by the time I wrote my next post, and I understand why you wrote it the way you did. You need "beings" to include parts, wholes, and simples. I had mistakenly assumed it excluded parts, which was a slip on my part.

The idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover). — Bob Ross

When I first read the argument I thought of what David Oderberg calls "Reverse mereological essentialism," and you've here confirmed that this is an issue. It's not quite right to say that substantial wholes depend on their parts, because in a more primary sense the parts depend on the whole. One might be able to get away with that language insofar as corruptible entities are contingent on account of their composite nature...

But the problem is that you are upbuilding existence, which amounts to a kind of reduction of wholes to parts (qua existence). You seem to be saying, "Why does a whole exist? Because its parts exist. Why do its parts exist? Because their parts exist. But since no part is self-existing..."

For Aquinas existence is granted to the parts and to the whole, but it is not granted to the whole mediately through the parts. This is actually a really key difference between Aristotelian substantial form and a mechanistic composite whole. Our modern age thinks of organisms as machines, with upbuilding parts. For Aristotle an organism is very different than a machine, having a substantial form.

For Aquinas’ essence version, it is the idea that the essence of a thing normally does not imply its existence, and so the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. If there were an infinite per se series of composition of things sorts of essences, then none of them could exist; for they are all contingent. There would have to be some essence—which he argues is only one of this kind—where it just is identical to its existence (i.e., is a necessary being). — Bob Ross

Yes, but very few people around here are going to grant you this without a lot of argument.

There are two Aristotelian rejoinders to your argument. The first is not exactly a rejoinder, but simply the fact that Aristotle did not posit created things as essence/existence composites (and in fact he never considered the matter). The second is more difficult, and it is Aristotle's belief that prime matter is uncreated and the universe is eternal. Aquinas is very conscientious of Aristotle's position on this.

Now perhaps you are not positing a finite universe, but I think a subtle difference on the nature of prime matter (between Aristotle and Aquinas) may come into your argument. This is because if prime matter is necessarily eternal, then in some sense it is not a composition of essence and existence.

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation. — Bob Ross

Okay. You seem to be saying that Atomism is false because divisibility never ceases with material objects. A lot of this draws back to the form of dependence that composition represents (and that is an interesting Thomistic query). But the heart of your argument seems to be the essence/existence distinction.

Why doesn't Aquinas appeal to the essence/existence distinction very often in his simpler works? I think it is because it is difficult to understand and know. Contrariwise, in his first argument for God's existence in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas begins with motion because, "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion." He begins with something that is very obvious and cannot be denied, and works from there. That's a key principle of all argument.

Our modern age thinks of organisms as machines, with upbuilding parts. For Aristotle an organism is very different than a machine, having a substantial form. — Leontiskos

But I get the impression the more holistic Aristotelian view is making something of a comeback, precisely because of his anticipation of self-organization.

Hello again Bob! My busy end of 2024 schedule has relented, so I have time again to properly engage with your posts. I'm always a fan of 'God' origin theories for philosophical exploration, so I'll point out a few issues I see.

What is a part? This seems a very important definition that must be clearly defined before the argument begins. Is there any part that is not also composed? For example, lets say I find an Aristotle atom, or a thing that is 'indivisible'. Could we not look at a part of that and say, "That's the front, back, and sides of the atom?'

In addition, can it be proven that we cannot have an infinite series of parts composing other parts?
Number 5 seems to assume this cannot the case. Can you give an example of a part that isn't composed by another part, or at least prove that its impossible for an infinite set of parts to exist?

You note that something which is not composed of parts must exist on its own. But if it exists on its own, then there is no reason for it to, or to not exist besides the fact that it does. If this is the case, can it not also logically be that there is an infinite regression of parts, and there is no reason for it to, or not to exist besides the fact that it does?

I think this is a good start to settle first before moving on.

- It does seem to be. :up:

Why not?

Because it would be an infinite series of beings which lack the power to exist (i.e., are contingent).

This statement does not follow (e.g. numbers are infinite and each is an infinite composite).

Numbers are not composed beings—at least not in the concrete sense I am discussing in the OP.

Besides, classical atomists argue otherwise.

Good point. Here’s my response:

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

"Cause" here is undefined

By cause, I mean it in the standard Aristotelian sense of that which actualized the potentiality.

but even so, this idea corresponds in conception to atoms in void.

What do you mean?

even if both "lack parts" they do not occupy the same positions simultaneously in space and time – necessarily "exist separately".

They cannot lack parts if they are in space and time: spatiotemporality implies divisibility.

This statement does not make sense since there are "two" which implies differentiation by more than just internal composition. "Parts" (i.e. internal compositions) are a necessary but not sufficient condition either for describing or of existing (see my reply to #9 above).

The point of #10 is exactly what you just noted (I believe); as two purely simple things could not exist since that implies differentiation.

On the other hand, if by this you mean to imply that two uncomposed beings could be differentiated by some sort of relation (which is non-spatiotemporal since the contrary would imply parts) then I would need more elaboration on that.

Arcane, with all due respect, everything you say is just superfluous and superficial. I am advancing this Thomistic style argument, as mentioned in the OP, because I think it is true.

No 'mind' or 'will', for that would be a composite system that has memory, foresees, plans, designs, implements forms, etc.

I don’t see why that is the case at all. The OP clearly demonstrates that an absolutely simple being—with no parts—has active potencies; and one of which is willing. One would have to reason from some other starting point than the OP to derive (perhaps) what you are saying. My question would be: from which are you starting your reasoning?

Rather, it is energetic, and so stillness is impossible, and higher and higher forms come forth from the elementary 'particles', unto our complex minds that have doing - this at the opposite end of the spectrum, but not as the simplest. Higher being lies in the future.

The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being.

I don’t know what this means; and I am not following how it relates to the OP.

Thomism doesn't establish a substance. — Gregory

What do you mean? Doesn't Thomism accept Aristotle's concept of substance?

:up:

I am not entirely following the argument that God is all-loving, so if anyone understands the Thomistic argument for that part I would much appreciate an explanation;

You might approach it through the convertibility of Goodness and Being. But the Doctrine of Transcendentals is a tricky subject.

A difficulty here is that people are going to read any appeal to that doctrine in more common sense terms and it seems plausible that a life full of suffering is worse than than no life at all, in which case there is a difference between willing existence and willing good.

I think Plato's argument in the Timaeus, that a being that is hostile or merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it is less than fully transcendent in terms of identity, is easier to grasp.

But a difficulty here that has cropped up already is that much modern thought is very comfortable with "it just is, no explanation is possible, and there need be no reasons." So it's very easy to find popular positions that undermine these premises. There is no "must," and no need to explain existence or essence for anything, they just are.

It even goes beyond this. "You want to talk about causes of the existence? Impossible and incoherent. If "cause" means anything at all it is already situated within the assumption of inscrutable brute fact existence and essence, initial conditions and laws. To question this is simply impossible." Not "brute fact explanations are acceptable" but "brute fact 'bo reason at all'" explanations are unquestionable.

What do you mean? Doesn't Thomism accept Aristotle's concept of substance — Arcane Sandwich

Not exactly because Aquinas has a Biblical idea of a pure *existence* which was uncreated because it was what was, was necessarily there. Aristotle had like sixty something prime movers according to Bertrand Russell, but don't quote me on that. Aristotle was more Greek culturally in his philosophy, while St. Thomas was more Latin and Jewish in his understanding. Aquinas is either too personalistic in his conception of God (they say he laid his head against the tabernacle and cried because he wanted to know more of God) or not enough (oddly). At the end it is believed he had a mystical experience

Not exactly because Aquinas has a Biblical idea of a pure *existence* which was uncreated because it was what was, was necessarily there. — Gregory

Interesting.

Aristotle had like sixty something prime movers according to Bertrand Russell, but don't quote me on that. — Gregory

Yes, I've read that somewhere. They are like celestial spheres, made of the fifth element, the Aether. Reality for Aristotle is like a Russian doll in that sense, or a series of Chinese boxes.

Aristotle was more Greek culturally in his philosophy, while St. Thomas was more Latin and Jewish in his understanding. — Gregory

That's a good point, I sometimes think about that, but I also tend to forget this point that you are referring to.

Aquinas is either too personalistic in his conception of God (they say he laid his head against the tabernacle and cried because he wanted to know more of God) or not enough (oddly) — Gregory

Well, Aquinas is the saint of Catholic studies, isn't he? So, I associate him more with the Catholic church than with medieval Latin culture.

At the end it is believed he had a mystical experience — Gregory

Yes, I can believe that. Mysticism is an important part of Christianity, I would say.

Well, Aquinas is the saint of Catholic studies, isn't he? So, I associate him more with the Catholic church than with medieval Latin culture — Arcane Sandwich

He seems like a very odd person to me. I would think Aristotle for example would consider him odd

I don’t see why that is the case at all. The OP clearly demonstrates that an absolutely simple being—with no parts—has active potencies; and one of which is willing — Bob Ross

Loosely related statements do not make an argument. Can something non-composed exist? It sounds like a contradiction in terms. It doesn't have clear meaning. It is so outside of noumena in that which it tries to describe that it becomes abstract instead of concrete. Better off reading Hegel

He seems like a very odd person to me. I would think Aristotle for example would consider him odd — Gregory

I agree. I've always had that same feeling about Aquinas myself, he seems like an odd person. But then again, what medieval thinker isn't odd? William of Ockham sounds like a person of common sense, until you begin to read him. Then he seem like an alien. I remember when I had to read his works, when I was a student at the Uni. We saw him in Medieval Philosophy. I remember that reading his words was like reading an alien language or something.

But he came up with Occam's razor, showing that common sense, scientific style that he wrote in. I question whether Aquinas wrote everything that is attributed to him. It just so processed and empty that to me it seems the Church has hidden the true story behind their creation. It has had a very damaging influence on the vitality of Western thought

I question whether Aquinas wrote everything that is attributed to him. It just so processed and empty that to me it seems the Church has hidden the true story behind their creation. — Gregory

Yes, this is possible. I agree. It's also possible that there are manuscripts of Aquinas that were destroyed for being heretical, or that simply got lost for no reason. Perhaps some of his unknown manuscripts exist, but they are not accessible to the general public.

He seems like a very odd person to me. I would think Aristotle for example would consider him odd — Gregory

I question whether Aquinas wrote everything that is attributed to him. It just so processed and empty that to me it seems the Church has hidden the true story behind their creation. — Gregory

:lol: :lol:

TPF is turning into Reddit, conspiracy theories and all.

The original text probably would have had ‘created’ where this text has ‘composed’, would it not?

No, as far as I understand, Aquinas didn’t forward this exact argument; but his version is of essence vs. esse.

Using the word ‘created’ shifts the focus towards per accidens causal series; which Aquinas believes could—in principle—go on for infinity. Using this word would essential focus the argument into a kalam cosmological-style argument (like William Lain Craig’s).

1. Created beings are made up of parts.

The problem I have is that a created being does not entail that they are necessarily made up of parts; at least not when beginning the argument. Composed beings are made up of parts (obviously); but we only learn that there is an uncreated being from a deduction from the originally inferred absolutely simple being—not the other way around. Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress.

Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the ‘creator-created’ distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument.

I don’t remember Aristotle’s argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things…

As we see ;-)

That is true :smile:

It looks like you disagree with every premise; so I am going to ask you to pick one that you would like us to discuss, and I will respond to that. Responding immediately to every rejoinder to every premise at the same time is an unattainable and unproductive task (I would say). So, which one do you want me to address first?

If God is pure act he would be everything

Absolutely not. Pantheism would be false under this view, because the composed part is separate from the thing which ultimately provides the ability to actualize it; whereas if it were true, then the composed part just would be a part of God.

A thing being purely actual means that it lacks passive potency: it does not entail that everything actualized by a purely actual being is a part of that being. On the contrary, we can prove this is impossible; for a purely actual being cannot have parts and for everything to be a part of God entails that God has at least everything in the universe as His parts, therefore God must be separate from the universe.

I don’t remember Aristotle’s argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things… — Bob Ross

Perhaps not but it seems natural that Aquinas would see the ‘unmoved mover’ as at least an analogy for the Divine Intellect?

When I first read the argument I thought of what David Oderberg calls "Reverse mereological essentialism," and you've here confirmed that this is an issue

Interesting, I am not that familiar with that position. Is it essentially the idea that the esse (viz., the parts) depend also on the essence (viz., the whole)?

It's not quite right to say that substantial wholes depend on their parts, because in a more primary sense the parts depend on the whole

I agree with this insofar as living beings aren’t just composed like non-living beings: they have a form that has to do with a process of maintaining and developing as an organism. Is that what you are referring to by “substantial form”?

For Aquinas existence is granted to the parts and to the whole, but it is not granted to the whole mediately through the parts.

I guess I am not seeing the issue. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesn’t seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts.

The second is more difficult, and it is Aristotle's belief that prime matter is uncreated and the universe is eternal. Aquinas is very conscientious of Aristotle's position on this.

Now perhaps you are not positing a finite universe, but I think a subtle difference on the nature of prime matter (between Aristotle and Aquinas) may come into your argument. This is because if prime matter is necessarily eternal, then in some sense it is not a composition of essence and existence.

That’s fair, and I hadn’t thought of that. I think this OP, if true, would necessitate that the universe is finite and that matter is not eternal; or at least that matter is eternal only insofar as it subsists in being (from God).

We can also, I would say, object in a similar manner to time, space, and natural laws. None of these have parts themselves, and so they would be immune to the OP; but my point would be that the OP establishes the requirement for God, and establishes the nature of God sufficiently to know that these kinds of things which have no parts themselves must be only in existence through God as well. I would say this because nothing can affect a purely actual being (since it lacks passive potency), granted such a being exists, and given natural laws (or time or space itself—if you are a realist about those) would be a medium which does affect such a being’s ability to actualize, it follows that no such purely transcendent natural laws (or time or space) can exist; for God must be more fundamental than them, as their own actualization. They equally have a potential to exist or not, and God actualizes that potentiality.

Why doesn't Aquinas appeal to the essence/existence distinction very often in his simpler works? I think it is because it is difficult to understand and know

That is fair, but my thing would be that Aristotelian idea of ‘motion’ is misleading for modern people; and makes them be too dismissive of the argument.

So the argument I saw in the Summa Theologica is:

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist,
are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of all
things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only
inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence,
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God
loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to
anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of
God infuses and creates goodness

This is the same argument I put forward in the OP; but it weirds me out: is it really a demonstration of being all-loving to will the good of everything by merely keeping it in existence? Also, what about the clearly conflicting so-called love of each being (such as organisms tearing each other apart and eating each other alive)?

If I only desire to will that you stay alive, or that you should exist to begin with, than do I really love you?

Hello again Bob! My busy end of 2024 schedule has relented, so I have time again to properly engage with your posts

No worries and glad to have you back, my friend!

What is a part?

A part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole. I keep it purposefully that vague, because I don’t think a more robust definition is necessary for intents of the OP.

Is there any part that is not also composed?

That would NOT be a part of the definition; for a part is a word which refers to a thing’s relation to another thing and not what some other thing may be in relation to it. Viz., whether a part is composed is just to regress into whether or not a part has its own parts, and this certainly is (and should) not (be) included in the definition.

To answer your question directly: in principle, there could be a part which is composed or uncomposed—those are the two logical options; and there is nothing, thusly, about a part per se which entails one or the other.

For example, lets say I find an Aristotle atom, or a thing that is 'indivisible'. Could we not look at a part of that and say, "That's the front, back, and sides of the atom?'

No, that is a contradiction. Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an ‘aristotelian atom’); for everything in space and time is divisible.

In addition, can it be proven that we cannot have an infinite series of parts composing other parts?
Number 5 seems to assume this cannot the case

That’s fair and a good question. I would say that the idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

You note that something which is not composed of parts must exist on its own. But if it exists on its own, then there is no reason for it to, or to not exist besides the fact that it does. If this is the case, can it not also logically be that there is an infinite regression of parts, and there is no reason for it to, or not to exist besides the fact that it does?

If I understand your question correctly as asking why an infinite per se series of a composed being’s parts cannot just be explained as necessary, then I would say that that is because it is absurd (as noted above). To say there is an infinite regress of things which lack the power to exist but somehow do exist makes no sense. The infinite regress being necessary would not make any member in that series necessary, which is what needs to be the case for the whole series to exist in the first place; just as much as an infinite regress of moving gears, to take my previous example, needs some member which itself can actualize (innately) and such an infinite regress itself being changeless would not provide any of its members with this ability to purely actualize anything.

TPF is turning into Reddit, conspiracy theories and all — Leontiskos

The Catholic Church has many secrets

The Catholic Church has many secrets — Gregory

Right, like the Opus Dei, for example.

Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress — Bob Ross

In time it could be eternal. In space it is infinitely divisible. See Kant's antimonies

composed part is separate from the thing which ultimately provides the ability to actualize it — Bob Ross

This is Thomism and false. A part is not actualized by the whole. That would mean it actualized *itself* with the rest of the whole

thing being purely actual means that it lacks passive potency: it does not entail that everything actualized by a purely actual being is a part of that being — Bob Ross

Yes it does since you say God is existence itself and the world exists. Thomism is a tangle of falsehoods

a purely actual being cannot have parts and for everything to be a part of God entails that God has at least everything in the universe as His parts, therefore God must be separate from the universe. — Bob Ross

The premise here is a purely actual being cannot have parts. Why is the premise the conclusion? This is what Aquinas does. All the 5 ways have the conclusion in the premise

. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesn’t seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts — Bob Ross

So now the parts instantiate the whole. You can't keep your story straight

but it weirds me out: is it really a demonstration of being all-loving to will the good of everything by merely keeping it in existence? — Bob Ross

Good you're questioning

As for the accidental infinite series, physics demonstrates perfectly fine how there can be a universe that subsists in its laws on its own. There is no proof from Aquinas's meager physics that there is a power out there other than the natural order. Imagine a slide that flows water down infinitely from infinite height downwards. The gravity is the prine mover, not some person you invent who has no parts lol. If you don't prove a mind you don't prove a God

Finally, answer me: if God is his thoughts and he knows he moved his mind to create the world, this brings new knowledge to God and since he is his thoughts he has therefore changed. Therefore to create is to change for God. Simple

Why not just start with #1. What does this mean?

1. Composed beings are made up of parts. — Bob Ross

In time it could be eternal. In space it is infinitely divisible. See Kant's antimonies

Even if that were true, it doesn’t negate what I said:

Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress

I was noting that it would have parts; and this is true if you are thinking about ‘eternity’ in the improper sense of persistence through time. Temporality itself provides parts to something, as can be divvied from each temporal succession.

A part is not actualized by the whole. That would mean it actualized *itself* with the rest of the whole

Not at all. The parts which make up the whole actualize the potential for the whole to exist; and, yes, I understand that is a controversial take on change. Irregardless, when we think of it in terms of composition, the parts make up the whole; which must bottom out at an absolutely simple thing at its base.

Yes it does since you say God is existence itself and the world exists

You aren’t understanding Thomism properly. By God’s essence entailing esse, Aquinas is noting that nothing else is pure actuality; and this pure actuality is not the only thing that exists but, rather, the bases for why it exists. They are obviously separate and this is internally coherent within Thomism; although, of course, one can have cogent reasons for disagreeing with it.

The premise here is a purely actual being cannot have parts. Why is the premise the conclusion? This is what Aquinas does. All the 5 ways have the conclusion in the premise

Nothing about what I said was begging the question: you keep randomly misquoting me.

So now the parts instantiate the whole. You can't keep your story straight

:roll: :lol:

You need to take things slower and actually read what I am saying: nothing I have said is incoherent nor logically inconsistent even if you disagree with it.

. Imagine a slide that flows water down infinitely from infinite height downwards. The gravity is the prine mover, not some person you invent who has no parts lol. If you don't prove a mind you don't prove a God

First of all, gravity is the displacement of space-time fabric which is relative to a relationship between the two objects effected; so this example is nonsensical.

Second of all, to be charitable, let’s assume that there is some sort of natural law that causes the water to flow down infinitely. This wouldn’t negate this argument from composition, which would, unlike an argument from motion, dictate that the water and the slide cannot be composed of an infinite per se series of parts and, thusly, God must exist. Either way, you end up with God’s existence (:

Now, natural laws and other real substances (if you are a realist about them)(like space and time) are immanently immune to the argument of composition and motion because they aren’t proper objects; however, crucially, the proper objects are what those arguments begin with and from them it can be derived that there is a purely actual and simple being; and then one can deduce that those laws and real substances must also be dependent (for reasons I see you have already read from my comment to someone else, so I do not feel the need to reiterate).

if God is his thoughts and he knows he moved his mind to create the world, this brings new knowledge to God and since he is his thoughts he has therefore changed. Therefore to create is to change for God. Simple

God is not his thoughts.

God doesn’t move his mind: that makes no sense.

God acquiring knowledge from His own creation is an interesting thought; but even if it is true it would not negate that God is omniscient in the sense described in the OP nor would it entail that God has changed. Change is the actualization of passive potential, and God would still lack any ability to be changed in that manner.

Lastly, God doesn’t create things in the sense like we do in time; and so it doesn’t seem incoherent to posit that a God knows everything that is going to happen and has happened and what is and what will be all the while creating and keeping it going. I admit, this is a bit confusing though.