It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it.

God is not his thoughts.

God doesn’t move his mind: that makes no sense — Bob Ross

These are contrary to each other. If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement. To be purely simple is impossible

... an infinite series of beings ... — Bob Ross

Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...

... lack the power to exist (i.e., are contingent)

"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet). Aristotle's notion of "contingency" (accident) fallaciously reifies predication, or conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.

By cause, I mean it in the standard Aristotelian sense of that which actualized the potentiality.

Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics – of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/

... spatiotemporality implies[affords] divisibility.

Again, conflating (a) map(making) with a terrain further confuses the issue. :roll:

Certainly, the Thomist "Five Proofs" are not sound.
— 180 Proof

Why not? What false premises do they contain, if they are not sound? — Arcane Sandwich

Principally because the Aristotlean
premises used by Aquinas (& other Scholastic apologists) are metaphysical generalizations abstracted from (his) pseudo-physics (e.g. universal telology, absolute non-vacuum, absolute non-motion, etc) which are not factually true of matters of fact (or nature). Consider the following further objections to "the soundness" of Aquinas' Quinque viæ (by clicking on my username below) ...

...from an old thread concerning Thomistic sophistry:

[ ... ]

And [another] excerpt from an old post objecting to the soundness, etc of "the cosmological argument": — 180 Proof

Principally because the Aristotlean
premises used by Aquinas (& other Scholastic apologists) are metaphysical generalizations abstracted from (his) pseudo-physics (e.g. universal telology, absolute non-vacuum, absolute non-motion, etc) which are not factually true of matters of fact (or nature). Consider the following further objections to "the soundness" of Aquinas' Quinque viæ (by clicking on my username below) ...
...from an old thread concerning Thomistic sophistry:

[ ... ]

And [another] excerpt from an old post objecting to the soundness, etc of "the cosmological argument":
— 180 Proof — 180 Proof

This went way over my head. Can you explain it to me in a simpler way?

. universal telology, absolute non-vacuum, absolute non-motion, — 180 Proof

Exactly

18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts.
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being. — Bob Ross

19. Physics Interpretation/analogy:

The forms of the elementary 'particles' are directly quanta rung 'lumps' in the continuous purely simple and actual quantum waves/fields, as stable arrangements that tend to persist, but are secondary and temporary, as they may annihilate back into the purely simple, all the while the purely simple remaining as itself. The elementaries are not new substance; the one and only substance is the purely simple (quantum field). Waves are purely simple and ubiquitous in everything.

Composed beings are made of the elementaries plus their further conglomeration, we calling them to have 'parts' since we can see them separately, but the forms of the composed beings, too, are directly the purely simple and actual being, although, in the linear time of presentism, they at not there all at once but only potentially so. In externalist time, as in a block-universe, they are there all at once.

So, strictly speaking, there are no parts as separate from the purely simple, but for our convenience of identifying them separately and without having to always follow their mention with 'lumps of the simple'.

So, we have 'TOOT', the 'Theory Of One Thing'. In religious terms, all is God or Brahman.

Maybe, next time, we can identify some rudimentary perception somewhere…

A part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole. I keep it purposefully that vague, because I don’t think a more robust definition is necessary for intents of the OP.
To answer your question directly: in principle, there could be a part which is composed or uncomposed—those are the two logical options; and there is nothing, thusly, about a part per se which entails one or the other. — Bob Ross

These seem to be solid definitions, nice.

No, that is a contradiction. Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an ‘aristotelian atom’); for everything in space and time is divisible. — Bob Ross

Agreed.

This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). — Bob Ross

So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument. But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?

If I understand your question correctly as asking why an infinite per se series of a composed being’s parts cannot just be explained as necessary — Bob Ross

I'm not saying that its necessary, I'm just noting that the same logic which concludes:

1. A has no prior cause. A somehow has all the energy to cause B, which causes C, etc.
vs
2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

I'm not really defending the infinite regress argument, I'm just noting that I'm not quite seeing how 1 is not absurd while 2 is absurd. If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything, why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?

Its good to chat with you again!

If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement.

Like I said in that quote, God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself; so nothing you said here has any bearing to my response that you, ironically, quoted.

Also, as a side note, to have thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental.

Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...

What is an unbound surface? Can you give a concrete example of that?

What is a fractal? Ditto.

Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.

"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet).

I don’t understand your point here: could you elaborate?

The compositional beings exist for sure, but they are contingent; and an infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.

conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.

I don’t know what this means.

Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics – of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...

How would you define change? How would you define causality?

I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here.

So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument

A god of the gaps argument is an argument for God’s existence by appeal to ignorance. Nothing about the OP’s argument does that; so it can’t be a god of the gaps argument.

But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?

This ‘energetic and powerful’ entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom.

In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (:

2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because “somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that”; but if you understand what a gear is, then you no that no member of this infinite series would be capable of initiating the change. Something outside of that infinite series would, at the least, have to initiate the movement.

Likewise, if you have an infinite regress of members which do not have the power to keep the next member existing and yet each depends on the other, then something outside of that series is powering it.

Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause.

An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series.

If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything,

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual.

why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?

Because what I think you are missing is that the gears don’t have the ability to move themselves; so this “infinite power” would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series. Right now, you are positing that an infinite series of powerless things have infinite power coming from nothing. Something does not come from nothing.

Its good to chat with you again!

You too!

A god of the gaps argument is an argument for God’s existence by appeal to ignorance. — Bob Ross

Its more than that. Its a reference to creating an argument of mysticism to fill in when there's a problem that's difficult to solve. I find the belief in the infinite mystical, and used to dodge the question of universal origin.

This ‘energetic and powerful’ entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom. — Bob Ross

If it were an absolutely simple being, no parts, then how does it power a thing that has parts? Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part? A gear has teeth for example, and they much touch teeth to push the other gear. Energy itself is a part, so it would have to impart some to another thing. The problem is a definition of a partless immutable entity powering everything else contradicts how causation and power work.

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual. — Bob Ross

That would be an infinite regress by time though. This is the same as an infinitely existing bar spinning itself. What powers this infinite existing being? It also can't be partless if it is to have agency, intelligence, and infinite existence.

In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (: — Bob Ross

No, absolutely simple and something like a God do not fit. God is complex and can be identified in parts by expression at the least. Something perfectly simple would have no parts, no expression, and agency, no will. What I'm positing is that if there is an origin, it is not caused by something else. If it is not caused by something else, then it has no rules or reason for its origination of existence. Such a thing is not bound by logic in its existence. But if this is the case, there is no logic preventing an infinite regress from existing either, as it too would have no rules or reason for its origination of existence.

The problem I'm trying to note is that you need to apply the same criticism against an infinite series of no outside origin to a finite series of no outside origin. I posted a rewrite of my "Probability of a God" example a few days back where I cover this concept. You don't have to post there, but a quick read may clarify what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961721

2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because “somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that”; — Bob Ross

How is it any less absurd then a perfectly simple entity that existed eternally without prior cause and somehow started a chain of causality without anything else involved? Since we've already injected an eternal energy force without prior explanation, its not any less absurd to note the gears run infinitely regressive and share the infinite energy source which makes them run without prior origin. If an energy source can always have existed, then it and the gears could always have existed. The same thinking which allows us the first case, also allows us the second case.

Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause.

An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series. — Bob Ross

My point is that if we're positing that one thing can exist that seems impossible can exist without prior cause, we draw the line at another thing that seems impossible but can exist without prior cause?

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual. — Bob Ross

This is no different then the gears besides the fact you've said it doesn't have parts. You're still in an infinite regress. Why has this God existed up until now? We can go infinitely backwards to show how it has existed, and demonstrate why it exists in this moment now. Did this God think? Did it plan? Then it changed in some way.

Lets think further. Why does it need to be immutable? Don't most thing lose energy in a transfer? If the initial push was strong enough, the pusher doesn't need to be there anymore. We also know it can't be simple if its going to push.

Because what I think you are missing is that the gears don’t have the ability to move themselves; so this “infinite power” would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series — Bob Ross

Does an infinite God which is entirely simple have the ability to move itself? How does that work without contradiction? How is that any different from me saying, "The gears have always existed and always moved?"

It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it. — Bob Ross

Right. But what exactly does it mean? Am I complex-composed, or simple-non-compositional? How exactly does it work in the proof, and what exactly does it prove? And lacking requisite clarity at even this first premise, there is no point in proceeding to the second or beyond.

- Something is composed if it has parts and simple if it has no parts. This is a foundational idea in philosophy. The second premise means that a composed being will stop existing if its parts undergo certain changes. For example, if I chop you in half you will stop existing.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts. — Bob Ross

It is not as if living beings are an assemblage of parts that exist prior to or independently of the organism. We might say that the parts of living beings are made by or caused by that being though a process of autopoiesis.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement. — Bob Ross

No, the parts are contingent upon the being of which they are parts.

Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. — Bob Ross

What is an uncomposed part? Where do we find them?

An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts. — Bob Ross

A simple being without parts is an imaginative fiction masquerading as an a priori ontological necessity. The existence of the fiction, a simple being, is made up of and contingent upon a poorly composed chain of arguments that begins with something known but misunderstood, a living being that has distinguishable but not independent parts, and then posits something unknown and inexplicable as if it is a causal explanation.

27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is. — Bob Ross

Our use of the term 'good' does not entail that what is called good is without privation. "what the thing is" is an ambiguous claim. We might say that a dog or a meal a song is good but in none of these cases do we mean that to be a dog or a meal or a song is to be good or without privation. There are bad dogs and meals and songs. The claim that to be God is to be good because what God is is good is circular and question begging.

God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself — Bob Ross

I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?

thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental — Bob Ross

Everything is physical. Thomism fails because it uses bad physics. Everything has dialectic and paradox. Is God alive?

Everything is denied God by Thomism such that nothing real is left. God is not even noumena

infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible — Bob Ross

Imagine the infinite water slide again

I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here. — Bob Ross

It confirms part of your OP. Quantum Field Theory (QFT) is the most successful theory in the history of science.

This is a foundational idea in philosophy. — Leontiskos

Ok, so perhaps philosophically you can prove the existence of God. But what sort of a proof is that, and what sort of existence? I do not think anyone doubts the existence of ideas of g/Gods - is that the substance of the proof? That an idea of God exists? This way unicorns and gryphons exist, and all manner of conceivable things, and by reference all inconceivable as well. Which would imply that it is not the "substance" of such a God that matters but his accidents.

Or if you mean corporeal existence, then philosophy is not the way to go - at all. The best proof of the existence of anything in this scientific sense is either to exhibit the thing itself or adduce incontrovertible evidence of its existence. Ought to be simple, but in reality impossible, at least in terms of the understandings of such a God that I have read....

Am I complex-composed, or simple-non-compositional? — tim wood

At heart, you are simple-non-compositional quantum field, since that is all there is, yet, the elementaries, atoms, molecules, and cells take on a life of their own at each of their levesl to act as parts that effectively make you complex-composed.

The simple-non-compositional is Permanent and the complex-composed is a temporary arrangement of the Permanent until such time when we can live forever.

But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world?

:roll:

I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?

It makes no sense under any theory to say that a being is identical to its thoughts. That’s like saying you are identical to your thoughts: no, you think.

Secondly, that God is perfectly simple is not to say that God is conceptually simple: it is that God has no parts. God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts; and God is not ‘simple’ in the sense that God is like one singular atom.

Leontiskos reply suffices to answer your question: please let me know if you need me to provide more clarification.

God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts — Bob Ross

Another undefended assertion.

But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world? — Bob Ross

The ‘Macro’ world becomes of the elementary quanta of the Simplest being drawn into stars to form the atoms up through iron, the rest of the the elements becoming from supernovae or neutron star collisions, the atoms then forming molecules that go on to form cells and life…

Physics confirmations continued:

Quantum: A field quantum is an excitation of the quantum field at a certain energy level modeled by the natural formula of the sums of harmonic oscillations via a Fourier transform to form Quantum Field theory.

An electron in an atom that receives energy can only jump to a multiple of its energy level. This is know as the ‘quantum jump’.

Non quanta level excitations do not persist; they come and go, known as ‘virtual particles’.

What’s continuous means a field that waves,
Naught else; ‘Stillness’ is impossible.
A field has a changing value everywhere,
Since the ‘vacuum’ e’er has to fluctuate.

The fields overlap and some interact;
So, there is one overall field as All,
As the basis of all that is possible—
Of energy’s base motion default.

From the field points ever fluctuating,
Quantum field waverings have to result
From points e’er dragging on one another.
Points are bits that may form letter strokes.

As sums of harmonic oscillators,
Fields can only form their elementaries
At stable quanta energy levels;
Other excitation levels are virtuals.

Two slits experiment: Why do elementaries shot at two slits go through both slits to form a wave interference pattern, even if they are sent one at a time? Because they are field quanta with a wave nature, a wave bring simple and continuous.

Motion: How do the elementaries as field quanta move? They roll along the field, like kinks in a rope, but the rope ever remains.

Since the quantum fields are everywhere,
The elementaries, like ‘kinks’, can move
To anyplace in the realms of the fields.
As in a rope, only the quanta move.


Parts:

At each level of organization
Of temporaries in the universe,
New capabilities become available,
And so they take on a life of their own.


Interchangeable parts:

The elementaries of a type are
The same, being woven by the same weave,
Only at the stable rungs of quanta;
They’re well anchored, but they’re secondary.


Physical Nature:

Are the fields spooky as non physical?
Since the elementaries are physical,
And because they are outright field quanta,
The quantum fields are purely physical.


Change:

The ‘vacuum’ has to e’er jitter and sing,
This Base Existent forced as something,
Due to the nonexistence of ‘Nothing’;
If it ‘tries’ to be zero, it cannot.

At the indefinite quantum level,
Zero must be fuzzy, not definite;
So it can’t be zero, but has to be
As that which is ever up to something.

Change, change, change… constant change, as fast as it
Can happen—the speed of light being foremost
The speed of causality—o’er 13 billion years now,
From the simple on up to the more complex.

Its more than that. Its a reference to creating an argument of mysticism to fill in when there's a problem that's difficult to solve. I find the belief in the infinite mystical, and used to dodge the question of universal origin.

But nothing about the OP is mystical nor does it cite anything mystical. I challenge you to show me which premise in the OP is making an argument from ignorance.

If it were an absolutely simple being, no parts, then how does it power a thing that has parts?

The OP is just establishing that an absolutely simple being must be the underpinning (ultimately) for the actualization (composition) of the composed being: how it scientifically works is separate question that digresses from the OP.

Is this what you are referring to by ‘mysticism’? The OP doesn’t need to demonstrate how it scientifically works for us to know that it must exist.

Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part?

No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does ‘interact’ with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.

Energy itself is a part, so it would have to impart some to another thing.

Energy is just the ability to do work; so I am not following what you mean here. Energy doesn’t have parts just as much as space itself has no parts; however, it is worth noting that they are not absolutely simple concrete beings.

The problem is a definition of a partless immutable entity powering everything else contradicts how causation and power work.

What do you mean by power? I was just using it loosely to refer to actualization.

How does it contradict how causation works? Causation is just the actualization of potentials.

That would be an infinite regress by time though. This is the same as an infinitely existing bar spinning itself. What powers this infinite existing being?

It is not in time.

It also can't be partless if it is to have agency, intelligence, and infinite existence.

I don’t see why it couldn’t in principle. By partless, we are talking about in concreto parts. My feeling of sadness and my thought about maybe eating ice cream later are not parts of my (in concreto) being.

No, absolutely simple and something like a God do not fit. God is complex and can be identified in parts by expression at the least. Something perfectly simple would have no parts, no expression, and agency, no will.

I demonstrated the exact opposite is true in the OP: please feel free to contend with any of the relevant premises.

Such a thing is not bound by logic in its existence.

That doesn’t follow from what you said so far. A necessary being could, in principle, be bound by logic such as the law of identity.

. But if this is the case, there is no logic preventing an infinite regress from existing either, as it too would have no rules or reason for its origination of existence.

That misses the point. Like I said before, the problem is that you are positing an infinite series which is contradicted by what we know exists; so it is impossible. The idea of such an infinite series ceteris paribus, to your point, is possible.

The problem I'm trying to note is that you need to apply the same criticism against an infinite series of no outside origin to a finite series of no outside origin. I posted a rewrite of my "Probability of a God" example a few days back where I cover this concept. You don't have to post there, but a quick read may clarify what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961721

I am more than happy to discuss that in this thread if you want or in that thread; but the same issues I have voiced before still seem to be there. E.g., the term ‘cause’ is being used entirely too loosely.

Since we've already injected an eternal energy force without prior explanation, its not any less absurd to note the gears run infinitely regressive and share the infinite energy source which makes them run without prior origin.

Here’s a simple way of demonstrating my point with the gears:

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

There is no analogous argument that an absolutely simple being cannot actualize things.

My point is that if we're positing that one thing can exist that seems impossible can exist without prior cause, we draw the line at another thing that seems impossible but can exist without prior cause?

As shown above, one is impossible; the other you are blanketly asserting is impossible, and of which I deny.

Why does it need to be immutable?

That’s in the OP:

15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.

If the initial push was strong enough, the pusher doesn't need to be there anymore.

This argument is not about temporal causation nor per accidens causation: it is about per se causation; which entails that this example you gave does not apply since it is an example of the former. If the atoms in the apple cease to exist, then so immediately does the apple itself: this is not like begetting children where the son can beget children even after his father dies (or a person pushed doesn’t cease to exist when the person who pushed them does).

Does an infinite God which is entirely simple have the ability to move itself?

No, and this does not make Him lesser than omnipotent (in my view).

Then I have not been clear. Maybe this way. The conclusion of the proof of the OP is, "Therefore, God exists." In what sense of "existence"? Like me? My table? Or a tree? A scientific sense? A philosophical sense - whatever that might be? A religio/theological sense?

Leontiskos's answer is in what he calls terms fundamental to philosophy. But the conclusions of so-called philosophical arguments are philosophical, not scientific. So. this God whose existence you suppose proved, in what sense is he proved to exist?

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation — Bob Ross

Maybe matter is not something a partless being can know. Aquinas's arguments are weak on that. Deism sounds possible if we take any probability count with regard to partless God. There can be pure potential with no actualization perhaps that can actualize because of how the physics works. The gears coukd have eternally moved by gravity if they are on a slant

I don't believe that existence has different types because I am a monist about it; so a thing either exists or it doesn't in the sense of generic existence.

God would exist supernaturally, because God would be the basis of nature but transcends it.

In terms of proof, it is always worth mentioning that no philosophical argument is a strict proof; but I would say the OP "proves" that God exists from composition, and it is an inherently philosophical (namely metaphysical) argument.