As a side note, I am using deontology in a broader sense than Kant's ethics. Common sense ethics is often deontological.

I don't see how using future people's lives who will suffer is justified for the reason that they will contribute to something that helps already existing humans as a general concept via "civilization". It's also somewhat circular. People need to be born so others don't suffer, but that causes more suffering, but let's solve it with more birth, which caused suffering in the first place. If my claim is that suffering is structural and is there from the beginning of existence for an individual, you can see how this indeed is circular reasoning. — schopenhauer1

No, I don't. You seem stuck in the land of the hypothetical. "People don't need to be born, so it's possible that humans will refrain from procreating." Yes, except the possibility of that ever happening is infinitesimally small; so small, in fact, that it has no relevance to the problem of human suffering in terms of its present, not to mention its past and future, character and arrangement. My argument seeks to address human suffering on the terms that it presents itself to us. Ingredient to those terms is the fact that humans will continue to procreate until they are no longer able to do so. We both know this. Repeating the statement that "we don't have to" is like yelling at a brick wall and expecting it to fall over. In the end, it's a waste of breathe, time, and energy, and will fail in its intended goal, an apt definition of anti-natalism.

In the meantime, humans continue to suffer. How might their suffering be alleviated, if its alleviation is a moral and noble enterprise? Again, not by writing books no one will read about how we ought not to have children. It will have to be done by other means. I have suggested one of those means, its generalness notwithstanding. Preserving civilization is no small task but easier than convincing the planet not to procreate. @darthbarracuda has his own ideas about how best to alleviate suffering, most notably what he and others call "effective altruism." That smacks of consequentialism to me, and so rubs me the wrong way, but we are both agreed that there are better ways to confront suffering than anti-natalism (I think; I don't want to put words in his mouth). Thus, the change in my views is not an evolution out of anti-natalism and into some kind of Panglossian casuistry, but out of the former and into what I take to be a morally serious position.

1. It would be wrong to treat humans as a means and not as an ends in themselves, if it brings about all structural and contingent suffering for another person's life. — schopenhauer1

Wouldn't "structural" and "contingent" be opposites?

Thus bringing a person into the world for some cause (for civilization, other people, etc.) but creates the situation of structural and contingent suffering for the individual being born has occurred. — schopenhauer1

Ah, but if the prevention of suffering is what matters, then I have an easy reply. I could grant for the sake of argument that, on consequentialist grounds, humans ceasing to procreate prevents more suffering than preserving civilization, but once we factor in the given likelihood of these options occurring, then the first option is clearly the more likely and so the one that will prevent more suffering. In other words, my argument can be construed as beating the anti-natalist at his own consequentialist game.

As an aside here, I want to remind you that I gave you two hypothetical scenarios in which ceasing to procreate might not have the effect that you and the anti-natalist desire and expect. See here:

I don't think you can say in an absolute sense that there is no issue with not being born. How could you possibly know that, unless, again, you had prior acquaintance with nonexistence so as to make the comparison? It could turn out that God exists, in which case, nonexistence is known to be worse than existence from his larger perspective. It could turn out that rebirth and/or reincarnation is true, in which case, even if all human beings ceased procreating, they would still be reborn as other creatures and so continue the cycle of birth and death, or else be reborn as human beings in a future kalpa.

The only way to dispute these possibilities is, once again, to argue that naturalism/materialism is true.

Cowardice in the face of mortal death and pain is reasonable for the reasons I listed. That doesn't bother me. As far as hypocricy, it is not hypocritical to feel life as suffering but then not kill yourself. Suicide and the projection of an unknown non-existing self is scary for most. Rather, I think giving a new person the option of continuing to exist or make a most painful decision of suicide as well is rather an inescapable choice. There is no third alternative, though people like Schop's ascetics and the religious and the utopian theorists they may have found them. — schopenhauer1

I was speaking of suicide under the assumption that naturalism/materialism is true. If it's true, then there is no "unknown" of which you speak. Death is simply the dissolution of a material body, nothing more. So my charge of hypocrisy stands.

Ha, I knew you were going to say that :P — schopenhauer1

;)

Yet, based on my quote, have I said this? This seems to be a red herring aimed at antinatalists writ large but somehow is supposed to allude to my arguments though I keep on reiterating that I am not trying to be self-righteous or condemning, just explanatory of the situation. What you explain is the "bad" antinatalist/Christian's reaction to someone who "rejects" their worldview.. something I have not done. At the end of the day, you can only explain your point and if someone sees it, then they see it and will possibly change something as a result. — schopenhauer1

Well, with respect, I still think you're trying to have it both ways. You seem to be in favor of anti-natalism in one comment (and in general), but are then seemingly opposed to it in others. I haven't been convinced that you're not an anti-natalist, in the strict (read: moral) sense of that term.

Some Pessimists might be at odds with especially utilitarian consequentialism altogether because utilitarian consequentialism assumes that improvements can take place when in actuality we are never really improving. The human condition is such that it does not happen. It is veiled utopianism, the most optimistic of optimistic ideas. It is to buy into the carrot and stick.. if we just work harder to live together better now, we can make it work for a future, more ideal state. That is just something you will rarely see a Pessimist say. So no, they are probably not breaking their own ideals- they probably never had them. If you want to REFUTE their ideals, that is one thing, but I do not think they are being hypocritical to their own ideals. So again, to entail utilitarianism with Pessimism is to unfairly tie two concepts together that are not necessarily entailed. Pessimism actually has very little in the way of ethics- it is mostly an aesthetic comprehension of the world. What one does about it is more open for interpretation. What it does have (i.e. Schopenhauer's compassionate ideal), is not necessarily utilitarian anyways. — schopenhauer1

Well said. I would add, though, that I don't think pessimism is absolutely committed to there having been no progress or to the impossibility of progress in the future. Ending slavery in the US was a form of moral progress, for example. An objectively better state of affairs for human beings living in this corner of the globe occurred. The pessimist is not pessimistic about such developments, seeing as they plainly exist, but about the ability to ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts. Or at least, this would be my brand of pessimism. An even more radical form of pessimism might say that no one can ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts or by any other means. I don't think Schopenhauer goes this far, though, for example, for he is adamant that the complete abolition of the will (his stand-in for perfection) is possible but not by mere human effort alone. I could go on at length about this aspect of Schopenhauer's thought, but I shall simply say that, for him, something akin to grace is necessary to achieve salvation.

I do have a question now: how might anti-natalism be asserted on non-consequentialist grounds? And I mean principled, ethical grounds, not contingent reasons like "overpopulation" (which is a myth) that some people like to give for not having children. Some kind of misanthropic nihilism and/or moral relativism come to mind, but that's about it.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, the birth of a person is harmful to this person. — darthbarracuda

This contains the same logical contradiction found in most other arguments for anti-natalism. The fact is that birth harms no one. To say that it does requires that people exist before they are born, which is to say that people can exist before they exist, an absurdity. There's no getting around this.

No, I don't. You seem stuck in the land of the hypothetical. "People don't need to be born, so it's possible that humans will refrain from procreating." Yes, except the possibility of that ever happening is infinitesimally small; so small, in fact, that it has no relevance to the problem of human suffering in terms of its present, not to mention its past and future, character and arrangement. My argument seeks to address human suffering on the terms that it presents itself to us. Ingredient to those terms is the fact that humans will continue to procreate until they are no longer able to do so. We both know this. Repeating the statement that "we don't have to" is like yelling at a brick wall and expecting it to fall over. In the end, it's a waste of breathe, time, and energy, and will fail in its intended goal, an apt definition of anti-natalism.

In the meantime, humans continue to suffer. How might their suffering be alleviated, if its alleviation is a moral and noble enterprise? Again, not by writing books no one will read about how we ought not to have children. It will have to be done by other means. I have suggested one of those means, its generalness notwithstanding. Preserving civilization is no small task but easier than convincing the planet not to procreate. darthbarracuda has his own ideas about how best to alleviate suffering, most notably what he and others call "effective altruism." That smacks of consequentialism to me, and so rubs me the wrong way, but we are both agreed that there are better ways to confront suffering than anti-natalism (I think; I don't want to put words in his mouth). Thus, the change in my views is not an evolution out of anti-natalism and into some kind of Panglossian casuistry, but out of the former and into what I take to be a morally serious position. — Thorongil

See my answer in the next quote to some of what you raise here. I would like to note, that you mention "serious" question versus not going to happen. I have never been caught up with the end result. Perhaps it will never happen. Part of the point of aesthetic understanding of structural suffering like instrumentality is that there is no end goal.. We do to do to do.. A new person born, is ipso facto a new person that is born and must deal with life. Is it noble to try to alleviate contingent suffering for those already here? I think so, but not at the cost of starting a new life that will now have to deal with life and its own structural and contingent harms when this did not have to occur.

Wouldn't "structural" and "contingent" be opposites? — Thorongil

Yes, they are in a way opposites. Structural is suffering that never goes away, whatever circumstance someone experiences and contingent harms are based on time, place, upbringing, causal reasons, setting, culture, genetics,etc. etc.

Ah, but if the prevention of suffering is what matters, then I have an easy reply. I could grant for the sake of argument that, on consequentialist grounds, humans ceasing to procreate prevents more suffering than preserving civilization, but once we factor in the given likelihood of these options occurring, then the first option is clearly the more likely and so the one that will prevent more suffering. In other words, my argument can be construed as beating the anti-natalist at his own consequentialist game.

As an aside here, I want to remind you that I gave you two hypothetical scenarios in which ceasing to procreate might not have the effect that you and the anti-natalist desire and expect. See here:

I don't think you can say in an absolute sense that there is no issue with not being born. How could you possibly know that, unless, again, you had prior acquaintance with nonexistence so as to make the comparison? It could turn out that God exists, in which case, nonexistence is known to be worse than existence from his larger perspective. It could turn out that rebirth and/or reincarnation is true, in which case, even if all human beings ceased procreating, they would still be reborn as other creatures and so continue the cycle of birth and death, or else be reborn as human beings in a future kalpa.

The only way to dispute these possibilities is, once again, to argue that naturalism/materialism is true. — Thorongil

Nope, because it is not consequential. Rather, it is agent-centered- the individual's suffering is what matters, not this amorphous "suffering" as seen aggregated in some equation. The individual being born to lessen the suffering of others, is still creating a WHOLE new life that suffers and must be lessened by yet others. It's a treadmill of sorts. You have to draw the line in the sand. Preserving civilization to me, as explained earlier, is a tautology of sorts. I thought we agreed, most average folk do support this, just in their own self-interested, inadvertent way. It's already happening. Can there be a little more of this or that? Sure. "Civilization", despite the overblown rhetoric is still up and kicking, and defended and advanced by lawyers, judges, scientists, entrepreneurs, charities, universities, businesses, government entities, non-profits, and the like. This however, does not end the suffering en toto. Suffering will exist in a structural way. The aesthetic aspect is to see the structural suffering, which is subtle but all-pervasive. It is hard for some to see it as we are so used to seeing only contingent suffering as the form that "matters". The structural is existential and goes deeper than the foundations of material goods which your consequential formulation seems to indicate.

As far as nonexistence being worse, etc.. Non-existence has no worse.. you are actually doing what you are trying to accuse me of, reifying something that does not exist. It literally is nothing.. Since nonexistence can only be talked about in relation to the already-existing, we have no more to say about it, literally. As far as reincarnation, this again is the aesthetic aspect. It's not about the end goal, it's about understanding the situation and not wanting to put others in the situation.. It's not about a final consequence of complete nonbirth, it's about an understanding of the existential situation and doing something that comports with that. It is more than just stark naked antinatalism. It's about understanding our own existential condition.

Well, with respect, I still think you're trying to have it both ways. You seem to be in favor of anti-natalism in one comment (and in general), but are then seemingly opposed to it in others. I haven't been convinced that you're not an anti-natalist, in the strict (read: moral) sense of that term. — Thorongil

See above.

Well said. I would add, though, that I don't think pessimism is absolutely committed to there having been no progress or to the impossibility of progress in the future. Ending slavery in the US was a form of moral progress, for example. An objectively better state of affairs for human beings living in this corner of the globe occurred. The pessimist is not pessimistic about such developments, seeing as they plainly exist, but about the ability to ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts. Or at least, this would be my brand of pessimism. An even more radical form of pessimism might say that no one can ever reach a state of perfection by our own efforts or by any other means. I don't think Schopenhauer goes this far, though, for example, for he is adamant that the complete abolition of the will (his stand-in for perfection) is possible but not by mere human effort alone. I could go on at length about this aspect of Schopenhauer's thought, but I shall simply say that, for him, something akin to grace is necessary to achieve salvation.

I do have a question now: how might anti-natalism be asserted on non-consequentialist grounds? And I mean principled, ethical grounds, not contingent reasons like "overpopulation" (which is a myth) that some people like to give for not having children. Some kind of misanthropic nihilism and/or moral relativism come to mind, but that's about it. — Thorongil

Okay, the antinatalism comes from existential grounds.. Think of it as a first step in a questioning process that leads to greater understanding of the instrumental nature of things. So it's almost like existential therapy, if you will (with no connection to logotherapy, just in the fact that it has a self-questioning aspect). It also comes from deontological grounds- you don't treat people as a means to an end when it comes to starting a whole new life which will ipso facto have suffering by being in the first place. As far as the existential questioning, it is more fully stated in the OP:

The more fundamental question is why we continue bringing forth more people. What is it about having a next generation that needs to take place? The thoughtful answers would be something like: self-actualization, scientific discovery, art/music/humanities, creativity, flow experiences, physical pleasures, friends, relationships, achievement in some field or area of study, and aesthetic pleasures. However, the thoughtful person may also know that these experiences have some vague repetitiousness to it. It seems old hat that just repeats for each person in each generation. Why does it need to be carried out? Why go through it in the first place? In our linguistically-wired brains, we take the chaos of pure sensory information and through many cognitive mechanisms, create concepts and provide an impetus for our actions. In other words, we create goals. These goals, whether short-term, long-term, vague, or well-planned are executed as we have no choice. They well up from the unformed and provide some sort of ballast to the chaotic, undefined world. We must make one goal, then another, then another, even if just to get something to eat. What is really a value-less, goal-less world, is subjectivized into one where the individual human now has "priorities", "preferences", "tendencies", "hopes", "way of being in the world", and "personality". The structural needs of survival, the existential needs of entertainment, and the contingent setting of cultural surroundings that provide the content for surviving and entertaining, what is it that we want from this? Why do we need more people to exist who need goals to work towards, over and over, relentlessly until we die? — schopenhauer1

The fact is that birth harms no one. To say that it does requires that people exist before they are born, which is to say that people can exist before they exist, an absurdity. There's no getting around this. — Thorongil

Hardly, for we don't need someone to exist before they're born to be harmed. If something is bad to experience, then it is harmful for a person to experience it, even if they don't exist before. Especially if we define harm in the way I did in the first premise: something counts as a harm to a person if this person, if they were rational and well-informed, would prefer not to experience it.

Unless you honestly, truly believe it is not a harm to a baby to be tortured as soon as they're expelled from the womb. It's not a persuasive line of reasoning. If, for some crazy reason, people actually did exist in some pre-natal otherworld before they were born, would that suddenly make coming into biological existence a harm?

(I'm sure you'll agree that at least some people are better off dead, even if this means they don't exist to recognize that they're better off.)

I have never been caught up with the end result. — schopenhauer1

Yes you are! Read the following quote again:

it noble to try to alleviate contingent suffering for those already here? I think so, but not at the cost of starting a new life that will now have to deal with life and its own structural and contingent harms when this did not have to occur. — schopenhauer1

Here you make it crystal clear that your desired end result is the cessation of all procreation, owing to the "cost" of doing so. That word "cost" is also interesting, in light of your seeming disavowal of consequentialism.

This however, does not end the suffering en toto. — schopenhauer1

I never claimed it would, though.

As far as nonexistence being worse, etc.. Non-existence has no worse.. you are actually doing what you are trying to accuse me of, reifying something that does not exist. It literally is nothing.. — schopenhauer1

No I'm not. I was talking about the possibility of there being some greater perspective, such as God's or the Buddha's, that might entail that nonexistence is worse. I didn't assert that it was worse in and of itself, only from the standpoint of these perspectives. You, on the other hand, have consistently assumed materialism this whole time, and so that's why you face my objection about reifying nonexistence.

It also comes from deontological grounds- you don't treat people as a means to an end when it comes to starting a whole new life which will ipso facto have suffering by being in the first place. As far as the existential questioning — schopenhauer1

I've already addressed this. I think this will be my last post. We're just spinning our wheels and continuing any further would not be productive. I will just reiterate that 1) the arguments in favor of anti-natalism don't work, 2) because they don't work, procreation is admissible, and 3) I fail to understand how your position refutes either 1 or 2. And let me just say that I would love it if someone could refute 1 and 2, because I still possess the deep, stomach knotting intuition that procreation is wrong. But I simply fail to see how any argument can get to that conclusion.

Hardly, for we don't need someone to exist before they're born to be harmed. If something is bad to experience, then it is harmful for a person to experience it, even if they don't exist before. — darthbarracuda

No, this doesn't follow at all. If you don't need to exist in order to be harmed, then what is being harmed? Your position is utterly incoherent.

Unless you honestly, truly believe it is not a harm to a baby to be tortured as soon as they're expelled from the womb. — darthbarracuda

I was hoping you wouldn't equivocate on the word "birth," but it looks like you might be doing that here. I took "birth" to refer to "coming into existence," not "exiting a mother's birth canal." Let's get straight on what we're trying to say is bad here: the former or the latter. If the former, then you're arguing for anti-natalism. If the latter, then you're not arguing for anti-natalism, but for abortion, which is a separate topic.

If, for some crazy reason, people actually did exist in some pre-natal otherworld before they were born, would that suddenly make coming into biological existence a harm? — darthbarracuda

I think it would, yes. For then the logical contradiction goes away and the anti-natalist would have a very cogent point about consent, which he doesn't otherwise have.

(I'm sure you'll agree that at least some people are better off dead, even if this means they don't exist to recognize that they're better off.) — darthbarracuda

I don't know. I'd have to think about it.

Your position is utterly incoherent. — Thorongil

:-}

No, this doesn't follow at all. If you don't need to exist in order to be harmed, then what is being harmed? — Thorongil

No, obviously you need to exist to be harmed. You just don't need to exist before the harm occurs in order to be harmed. There's nothing incoherent here.

I took "birth" to refer to "coming into existence," not "exiting a mother's birth canal." — Thorongil

Right, I think you get what I meant though.

No, obviously you need to exist to be harmed. You just don't need to exist before the harm occurs in order to be harmed. — darthbarracuda

:-| Again, incoherence. These two statements are flatly contradictory of each other.

Right, I think you get what I meant though. — darthbarracuda

No. What was it?

No. What was it? — Thorongil

That coming into existence can be harmful.

Again, incoherence. These two statements are flatly contradictory of each other. — Thorongil

You're going to need to explain why.

I've already addressed this. I think this will be my last post. We're just spinning our wheels and continuing any further would not be productive. I will just reiterate that 1) the arguments in favor of anti-natalism don't work, 2) because they don't work, procreation is admissible, and 3) I fail to understand how your position refutes either 1 or 2. And let me just say that I would love it if someone could refute 1 and 2, because I still possess the deep, stomach knotting intuition that procreation is wrong. But I simply fail to see how any argument can get to that conclusion. — Thorongil

I feel that my arguments presented in this thread were strong enough to defend "antinatalism" in the form of aesthetic antinatalism mixed with basic (non-Kantian) deontological principles. Your "stomach knotting intuition" should be more at ease, but if it is not sufficient, I'd rather respond to a succinct itemized rebuttal to a summarized version of my responses. If you do this 1) I might find a flaw in your interpretation through your summarizing of my own arguments (and can thus fix any misguided notions that lead to the rebuttal) and 2) I can have chance to defend the rebuttal if the interpretation is indeed correct. However, if you feel that you no longer want to engage in the conversation, I understand. Just realize, just because Thorongil states that I have not defended (a certain form of) antinatalism, does not mean that I have in fact, not defended antinatalism.. That is of course, Thorongil's judgement of the matter, not necessarily the actual case.

That coming into existence can be harmful. — darthbarracuda

Okay. You had seemingly implied the opposite.

You're going to need to explain why. — darthbarracuda

I don't know what to say. One sentence says you can't be harmed before existing and the other says you can.

our "stomach knotting intuition" should be more at ease, but if it is not sufficient, I'd rather respond to a succinct itemized rebuttal to a summarized version of my responses. — schopenhauer1

With respect, I think I've already been doing this. I can only state what I have asserted again.

If you want a reboot, then perhaps you could you say whether you agree or disagree with the following definition: anti-natalism is the view that procreation is immoral.

I don't know what to say. One sentence says you can't be harmed before existing and the other says you can. — Thorongil

???

You can't be harmed if you do not exist.

Coming into existence implies you now exist. If this existence harms you, then you have been harmed by coming into existence.

Existence per se does not harm anyone; it merely provides the conditions, so to speak, for help or harm along with anything else to be.

Existence per se does not harm anyone; it merely provides the conditions, so to speak, for help or harm along with anything else to be. — Janus

(Y)

Existence per se does not harm anyone; it merely provides the conditions, so to speak, for help or harm along with anything else to be. — Janus

That's like saying you aren't harming a child by not making them wear a seatbelt, you're just providing the conditions that enable the child to be harmed. If a person's existence requires them to be harmed, then their existence is harmful to them. This should not be difficult to understand.

And, for some people, existence is equivalent to suffering, which is seen as harmful. There is no difference.

That's like saying you aren't harming a child by not making them wear a seatbelt, you're just providing the conditions that enable the child to be harmed. — darthbarracuda

It's not parallel, because the child exists in this scenario and in the case of birth, it doesn't. There is a being who might be harmed by not wearing a seatbelt. But there is no being who might be harmed by being born.

If a person's existence requires them to be harmed, then their existence is harmful to them. This should not be difficult to understand. — darthbarracuda

You're shifting the goalposts. We're talking about coming into existence, not existence itself.

Well, actually you are not necessarily harming a child by not making them wear a seat belt, so I can't see your point with that analogy.

Be that as it may, existence cannot be seen to be either a harm or a help, per se. Of course, if you don't exist then you cannot be harmed because you cannot be anything. It is meaningless to talk about someone never existing, and being better off never having existed, though, in the kind of way that we might talk about someone no longer existing, and being better off no longer existing. In any case we would only justifiably say that about someone whose sufferings had been truly intolerable.

If a persons' existence requires them to experience joy, then their existence is joyful, according to the logic of your formulation. It is not a matter of "difficulty of understanding", but interpretation according to disposition. That existence is "equivalent to suffering" for some people, says more about those people than it does about existence.

It's not parallel, because the child exists in this scenario and in the case of birth, it doesn't. There is a being who might be harmed by not wearing a seatbelt. But there is no being who might be harmed by being born. — Thorongil

Exactly!

There is a being who might be harmed by not wearing a seatbelt. But there is no being who might be harmed by being born. — Thorongil

But there is - the person who is being born. They are being born. Birth is happening - to them. If a person cannot be harmed by being born because they don't exist prior, can a person even be born at all, since they don't exist prior to being born?

Well, actually you are not necessarily harming a child by not making them wear a seat belt, so I can't see your point with that analogy — Janus

:-| Criminal negligence is a thing.

Be that as it may, existence cannot be seen to be either a harm or a help, per se. Of course, if you don't exist then you cannot be harmed because you cannot be anything. — Janus

This makes it seem like existence does, in fact, help or harm someone by enabling them to be harmed.

But there is - the person who is being born. — darthbarracuda

A most ambiguous reply. Do you remember what I said about equivocation? You've used the present progressive tense here, which can be used to describe either what is happening now or what will happen in the future. If you meant the former, then we must be talking about a being that already exists, in which case, we're not talking about coming into existence. If you meant the latter, then we're not talking about any person that exists, for there can be no person that exists before existing.

:-| Criminal negligence is a thing. — darthbarracuda

Yes, and I'm not recommending it; negligence, as worthy of condemnation as it indeed is, does not necessarily harm the child.

This makes it seem like existence does, in fact, help or harm someone by enabling them to be harmed. — darthbarracuda

Existence enables someone to be, period; but even this is a silly way of speaking because it makes it sound as though someone pre-existed existence. And it seems that you, apparently tendentiously, left off the 'or helped' that should have been included at the end of your sentence.

And it seems that you, apparently tendentiously, left off the 'or helped' that should have been included at the end of your sentence. — Janus

It wouldn't be "helped", it would have been "benefited". Helped implies there is something harmful that needs to be removed.

If you meant the latter, then we're not talking about any person that exists, for there can be no person that exists before existing. — Thorongil

I mean, no shit. But why should I believe someone needs to exist before in order to be harmed?

If I snapped my fingers and instantly fully-grown people appeared and were instantaneously tortured, would it be harmful to these people, since they previously did not exist? Would it only be a harm if, say, the came into existence, and then after one second began to be tortured? Why is prior existence so important?

But why should I believe someone needs to exist before in order to be harmed? — darthbarracuda

Because it's self-evident. You might as well ask why lemons need to exist before making lemonade.

If I snapped my fingers and instantly fully-grown people appeared and were instantaneously tortured, would it be harmful to these people — darthbarracuda

Yes, torture harms people, people who exist. :-}

Because it's self-evident. You might as well ask why lemons need to exist before making lemonade. — Thorongil

Lemons don't need to exist "before" making lemonade. They just need to exist at the time of making lemonade.

It wouldn't be "helped", it would have been "benefited". Helped implies there is something harmful that needs to be removed. — darthbarracuda

It was you said:

This makes it seem like existence does, in fact, help or harm someone by enabling them to be harmed. — darthbarracuda

It should have been:'This makes it seem like existence does, in fact, help or harm someone by enabling them to be harmed or helped.'

The words 'benefit' and 'benefited' could just as well be substituted for 'help' and 'helped'; it would make little difference to the substance of the sentence and no difference to its relevance for the point at issue.

Not that it is really relevant, but 'help' does not necessarily imply anything harmful that needs to be removed. Consider: "Increased practice helped his development as a musician".

Lemons don't need to exist "before" making lemonade. They just need to exist at the time of making lemonade. — darthbarracuda

It feels like you're pulling my leg now. If they exist at the time of making lemonade, then they existed before one made lemonade.

It feels like you're pulling my leg now. If they exist at the time of making lemonade, then they existed before one made lemonade. — Thorongil

If someone is born, that person is exposed to structural and contingent harms where there could have been no person born who would be exposed to structural and contingent harms. I am not sure why you would disagree with this. The cause of the person being born is the parents who have the kids.. Just as the cause of X event was the person who directly caused the event. Trying to put the starting point at a ridiculous causal chain that goes back infinitely makes no sense if you agree to how we attribute most events which is the direct cause of how something came about. The carpenter built the chair, but yes there were many circumstances that came about in order for the carpenter to build the chair.

Now perhaps the parents didn't realize this logic- I guarantee that this is indeed the case. This does not mean that the parents were not the cause of exposing the child to being harmed by causing it to be born. However, that is where antinatalism, and Pessimism more broadly would make its case, and thus see the logic of this.