Nope. These statements can only be false if their antecedent is true while their consequent is false. In this case, the antecedent in FTI1 is "God exists", and the antecedent in ATI1 is "God does not exist". By the principle of Non-Contradiction and the principle of Excluded Middle, they can't both be false. — Arcane Sandwich

Mkay, I agree. The conjunct of FTI1 and ATI1 yields a contradiction, but...

Perhaps. — Arcane Sandwich

If so then I'd have to find some way to deny both mostly because I don't think the implication itself holds. Since existence does not relate to identity, and implication is a relationship between propositions, I'm thinking that what's false is the implication itself.

At the very least I'm not tempted to say that Jesus is not God because God does not exist. I can set up the implicature, but it's not why I think these things -- and I don't believe either FTI1 or ATI1.

So how does one represent that? Is it impossible?

If so then I'd have to find some way to deny both mostly because I don't think the implication itself holds. Since existence does not relate to identity, and implication is a relationship between propositions, I'm thinking that what's false is the implication itsel — Moliere

For an implication to be false, the antecedent has to be true and the consequent has to be false. Take a look at the truth table for conditional statements:



A conditional statement of the form "if p, then q" is equivalent to a disjunctive statement of the form "not p, or q". Here's the proof. With that in mind, premise FTI1 is equivalent to the following:

(FTI1*) Either God does not exist, or God is identical to Jesus.

And premise ATI1 is equivalent to the following:

(ATI1*) Either God exists, or God is not identical to Jesus.

Conditional statements ("implications") are not causal statements. They do not state that there's a cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Perhaps that's the source of your perplexity here. It's a common mistake.

At the very least I'm not tempted to say that Jesus is not God because God does not exist. I can set up the implicature, but it's not why I think these things -- and I don't believe either FTI1 or ATI1.

So how does one represent that? Is it impossible? — Moliere

Maybe. Can you elaborate a bit more on that point? Doesn't matter if what you say isn't accurate. Just freestyle it and see what happens.

I do get the feeling that you want to treat this case in a similar way to how Russell treats the case of the current king of France. Is that so? Or am I way off here?

This process might involve persons receiving (accepting) the revelation of Jesus Christ as redeemer and sanctifier who calls persons to a radical life of loving compassion, even the loving of our enemies. By willfully subjecting oneself to the commanding love of God, a person in this filial relationship with God through Christ may experience a change of character (from self-centeredness to serving others) in which the person’s character (or very being) may come to serve as evidence of the truths of faith. — Charles Taliaferro

Each of these attributes has been subject to nuanced different analysis, as noted below. God has also been traditionally conceived to be incorporeal or immaterial, immutable, impassable, omnipresent. And unlike Judaism and Islam, Christian theists conceive of God as triune (the Godhead is not homogenous but consists of three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) and incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth (fully God and fully human). — Charles Taliaferro

The “truth” of the Incarnation has been interpreted in such terms as these: in Jesus Christ (or in the narratives about Christ) God is disclosed. Or: Jesus Christ was so united with God’s will that his actions were and are the functional display of God’s character. Perhaps as a result of Hick’s challenge, philosophical work on the incarnation and other beliefs and practice specific to religious traditions have received renewed attention (see, for example, Taliaferro and Meister 2009). Hick has been a leading, widely appreciated force in the expansion of philosophy of religion in the late twentieth century. — Charles Taliaferro

Etc.

Is Charles Taliaferro's entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also bigoted, in your view? Must he have a horse in the race to be able to philosophize about religion? Is it bad philosophy, in your view?

More or less the same questions. Is Charles Taliaffero's entry in the SEP an example of theology or philosophy of religion, in your view?

A conditional statement of the form "if p, then q" is equivalent to a disjunctive statement of the form "not p, or q". Here's the proof. With that in mind, premise FTI1 is equivalent to the following:

(FTI1*) Either God does not exist, or God is identical to Jesus.

And premise ATI1 is equivalent to the following:

(ATI1*) Either God exists, or God is not identical to Jesus.

Conditional statements ("implications") are not causal statements. They do not state that there's a cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Perhaps that's the source of your perplexity here. It's a common mistake. — Arcane Sandwich

O I flip around the values all the time because I don't usually bother to use the symbology unless I'm doing mathematics.

What I did before was represent it incorrectly in the checker. I checked "(P->Q) and (~P->~Q)", rather than "(~(P->Q) and (~(~P->~Q)) in my first reply so didn't see that it was a contradiction.

(EDIT: Funny to note, though -- you can believe both FTI1 and ATI1 at the same time, due to the funny thing that is the material conditional -- maybe an agnostic Christian?)

Maybe. Can you elaborate a bit more on that point? Doesn't matter if what you say isn't accurate. Just freestyle it and see what happens.

I do get the feeling that you want to treat this case in a similar way to how Russell treats the case of the current king of France. Is that so? Or am I way off here? — Arcane Sandwich

My thinking on existence is largely influenced by Kant. So sentences of the sort "God exists" do not have conditions of justification even if they have a truth-value, so I wouldn't bother believing "God exists", or its negation, on rational grounds. The old "existence is not a predicate" is something that rings basically true to me -- logic does not prove existence, existence exists regardless of a choice of logic -- and the thought experiment between the imagined unicorn and the imagined unicorn existing demonstrates to me that there's not really a property added to something I'm thinking about. I need some other kind of justification to infer that something exists.

My thinking on existence is largely influenced by Kant. So sentences of the sort "God exists" do not have conditions of justification even if they have a truth-value, so I wouldn't bother believing "God exists", or its negation, on rational grounds. The old "existence is not a predicate" is something that rings basically true to me -- logic does not prove existence, existence exists regardless of a choice of logic -- and the thought experiment between the imagined unicorn and the imagined unicorn existing demonstrates to me that there's not really a property added to something I'm thinking about. I need some other kind of justification to infer that something exists. — Moliere

Are you averse to a statement such as "John Doe exists"? Replace "John Doe" with any other individual if you prefer.

Not averse, but I wouldn't infer things between John Doe's existence and who John Doe is -- it's not something I'd infer because of some logical relationship between "John Doe exists" and "John Doe is James Calvin", as a statement of identity.

The hobbit talking to Gandalf is Bilbo Baggins. He does not exist, though.

I follow Bunge in conceptualizing existence as a real property. The table in my living room has the property of existence. When I say that it exists, what I mean is that it has that property. As such, it's not a predicate. We instead symbolize it as a predicate, in particular with the first-order predicate letter "E". If the context is second-order or higher-order logic, we still use the "E" symbol, but as a predicate constant. Others disagree. Quine, for example, believes that we should symbolize it with a quantifier instead, "∃". I take it that Quine is wrong and that Bunge is right about this. However, I also believe that Bunge is wrong to distinguish two kinds of existence: real and conceptual. In my view, there's only real existence. Should the words "God" and "Jesus" be treated like Russellian definite descriptions? Or Kripkean rigid designators? Those are open questions.

I follow Bunge in conceptualizing existence as a real property. The table in my living room has the property of existence. When I say that it exists, what I mean is that it has that property. As such, it's not a predicate. We instead symbolize it as a predicate, in particular with the first-order predicate letter "E". If the context is second-order or higher-order logic, we still use the "E" symbol, but as a predicate constant. Others disagree. Quine, for example, believes that we should symbolize it with a quantifier instead, "∃". I take it that Quine is wrong and that Bunge is right about this. However, I also believe that Bunge is wrong to distinguish two kinds of existence: real and conceptual. In my view, there's only real existence. Should the words "God" and "Jesus" be treated like Russellian definite descriptions? Or Kripkean rigid designators? Those are open questions. — Arcane Sandwich

I'd probably fall closest to Quine in that I can see a parallel between using the quantifier and treating existence like it's not some property added to a conceptual.

But in following Kant there's not an easy distinction between predicates and properties. So some of my influence influences me to be less precise just because it's what makes sense to me, but could definitely use work.

I'm wondering if a believer probably uses "God" and "Jesus" as Kripkean rigid designators, and a non-believer would use them as Russellian definite descriptions? It seems so, to me -- I see religious texts very much in the same vein as I see poetry. Their value isn't in their truth or falsity; they are likely all of them false, but in terms of religion that's not that significant -- people aren't persuaded into a religious position on the basis of its rational position. I think it's something that can be treated rationally, of course, but I don't think that the rational arguments are what are persuasive on the topic.

But in following Kant there's not an easy distinction between predicates and properties. — Moliere

I believe that predicates are linguistic, while properties are ontological. The latter exist out there, in the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings. Existence is one such property, in my view.

I believe that predicates are linguistic, while properties are ontological. The latter exist out there, in the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings. Existence is one such property, in my view. — Arcane Sandwich

I'm kind of uncertain about properties just as I'm uncertain about objects, but that'll take us pretty far astray :D -- a lot of my skepticism is based in wondering how we can reliably make inferences with respect to metaphysics, and generally wondering how it is we can really ascertain what metaphysics is preferable in the face of many smart and educated people asserting contradictory opinions on the subject.

We can set up an idiom such that "existence is a property of the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings", and I can follow along in this use of the word "existence" -- but that doesn't tell me how I go about ascertain what exists, and it seems to me that I could prove basically anything to exist if I accept something like an identity statement for inferring that such and such exists.

Such as your two arguments -- it's just kind of funny to make an inference between existence and identity. I'd be inclined to go the reverse -- if Jesus is God, then God exists. So God could exist without Jesus being God, rather than asserting existence in order to demonstrate identity. Imagine how the argument would go over with the Muslim, yeah? "If God exists, then Muhammed is the prophet, and Jesus is a prophet. God exists, therefore..."

Do you see how that's funny?

I'm kind of uncertain about properties just as I'm uncertain about objects, but that'll take us pretty far astray :D -- a lot of my skepticism is based in wondering how we can reliably make inferences with respect to metaphysics, and generally wondering how it is we can really ascertain what metaphysics is preferable in the face of many smart and educated people asserting contradictory opinions on the subject. — Moliere

I'll just quote someone who is better than me:

Ontology should precede epistemology. And yet modern philosophy started rejecting metaphysics. It did so just because the ruling metaphysics around 1600 was obsolete. The price paid for this antimetaphysical turn was subjectivism, outspoken as in Berkeley’s case, or shame-faced as in Kant’s. — Bunge (2010: 201)

Such as your two arguments -- it's just kind of funny to make an inference between existence and identity. I'd be inclined to go the reverse -- if Jesus is God, then God exists. — Moliere

You could, sure. The argument would look like this:

1) If Jesus is God, then God exists.
2) Jesus is God.
3) So, God exists.

As an atheist, I would deny the second premise: Jesus is not God.

So God could exist without Jesus being God — Moliere

Yes, he could. For example, according to Muslims, God exists, and God is not Jesus.

"If God exists, then Muhammed is the prophet, and Jesus is a prophet. God exists, therefore..."

Do you see how that's funny? — Moliere

I'm afraid not, you'd have to spell it out for me, if you fancy.

I'm afraid not, you'd have to spell it out for me, if you fancy. — Arcane Sandwich

I'm always willing to try.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus.
(ATI2) God does not exist.
(ATI3) So, God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, he could. For example, according to Muslims, God exists, and God is not Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

And Let's add in any third religion:

(FTButDifferent1) If God exists, then God is not identical to Jesus.
(FTBD2) God exists
(FTBD3) Therefore, God is not identical to Jesus.

It's a different argument from the atheist. Furthermore we can plug in any God here -- there's a lot to choose from in picking out God's identity. But God existing just says that without saying what God is.

Further, unlike saying something like "John Doe exists", there is no way to adjudicate between any of the above arguments. There is absolutely no difference in the external world whether God does or does not exist, which is normally how we'd go about making a decision as to which premise -- God exists or God does not exist -- to accept.

But we accept that up front while forming premise 1 such that premise 2 will lead us to believe that God is what we already believe him to be based upon whether or not we believe he exists or does not exist.

So, in isolation, sure -- but in terms of how people go about deciding these things I don't see a reason to accept that there is a relationship between God's -- or any objects -- existence and what they are identical to. The non-existence God is identical to the non-existent God, and the existent God is identical to the existent God, but the link between God and Jesus or any other name won't say much about its existence.

It's a different argument from the atheist. Furthermore we can plug in any God here -- there's a lot to choose from in picking out God's identity. But God existing just says that without saying what God is. — Moliere

Exactly. That's the "problem" (if it can be called a problem) with classic Christian arguments for the existence of God, such as the ones provided by Anselm and Aquinas. They never say that God is Jesus, they only say that God exists.

Further, unlike saying something like "John Doe exists", there is no way to adjudicate between any of the above arguments. There is absolutely no difference in the external world whether God does or does not exist, which is normally how we'd go about making a decision as to which premise -- God exists or God does not exist -- to accept. — Moliere

Well, a Christian philosopher such as Aquinas would argue that God is real. He exists independently of human beings.

So, in isolation, sure -- but in terms of how people go about deciding these things I don't see a reason to accept that there is a relationship between God's -- or any objects -- existence and what they are identical to. — Moliere

I believe that the concept of existence is important not only in the context of philosophy of religion, but also in the context of science. As Bunge says:

Let us now use the existential predicate introduced above to revisit the most famous of all the arguments for God’s existence. Anselm of Canterbury argued that God exists because He is perfect, and existence is a property of perfection. Some mathematical logicians have claimed that Anselm was wrong because existence is not a predicate but the ∃ quantifier. I suggest that this objection is sophistic because in all the fields of knowledge we tacitly use an existential predicate that has nothing to do with the “existential” quantifier, as when it is asserted or denied that there are living beings in Mars or perpetual motion machines. — Bunge (2012: 174-175)

Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____∀x(Px → E_Rx)
God exists in R.______________________ E_Rg

Both premises are controversial, particularly the first one since it presupposes the existence of God. Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. An alternative is to admit the existence of God for the sake of argument, and add the ontological postulate that everything real is imperfect: that if something is perfect then it is ideal, like Pythagoras’ theorem or a Beethoven sonata. But the conjunction of both postulates implies the unreality of God. In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it. — Bunge (2012: 175)

My understanding is that it was the Christian Church which decided that the person spoken of as Jesus was the living incarnation of 'God'. This was bound up with the idea of the Trinity, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

What is questionable is about the person or figure in the Bible's view. He definitely saw himself as having a mission but did not necessarily see himself as the incarnation of God. He spoke of himself as the Son and spoke of a Father in heaven. However, this does not mean that he saw himself as the only Son. In the Christian story everyone could be seen as sons and daughters of God. However, I am aware that my interpretation is different from mainstream and fundamentalist accounts as I see the Bible in a symbolic way.

He definitely saw himself as having a mission but did not necessarily see himself as the incarnation of God. — Jack Cummins

Yes, in the logic of the stories, it may be that JC saw himself as the Messiah, which is not the same as God. You are likely right to see it as symbolism. We do not have any eyewitness accounts of Jesus or the events and the gospels were written decades after the events by anonymous sources. So we can't really say what anyone at the time involved thought. Essentially we are left with a form of literary criticism regarding a series of legends attached to a person (or persons) who was the inspiration for some stories.

The quest for the historical Jesus is one which may get lost and buried in the history of Christianity. There were probably many Jesus's and many wandering Jews. We are left with the Gospels which were written many years after any specific person. Also, the accounts were dependent on what became part of the canon of texts accepted by the early Christian Church. This excluded texts, especially the ones which were recovered as Gnostic. The idea of Jesus as identical with God? rather than as having a Messianic role, is within this historical and literary context.

I believe that the concept of existence is important not only in the context of philosophy of religion, but also in the context of science. As Bunge says: — Arcane Sandwich

I agree! And with Bunge -- I prefer to go back to Kant for my real reasons because that's who persuaded me of the slogan, but it's also anachronistic and subject to open interpretation.

"Existence" is an old hard nutshell I've thought about a lot, and I think investigations into the arguments for/against God are great to study the predicate. And I think in the logic Anselm was using it's fair to say that his argument is valid.

Exactly. That's the "problem" (if it can be called a problem) with classic Christian arguments for the existence of God, such as the ones provided by Anselm and Aquinas. They never say that God is Jesus, they only say that God exists. — Arcane Sandwich

I think this is sort of what Kant has in mind, though he goes further and denies we can know such things. JTB wise I'd shorten to -- "God exists" may be T, and we may B, but there is no J for believing "God exists" with respect to theoretical (scientific) knowledge.

To respond to the argument here --

Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____∀x(Px → ERx)
God exists in R.______________________ ERg — Bunge (2012: 175)

I'd deny P2 on the basis of the problem of evil in countering it logically, but to be fair, I just didn't believe God existed and don't find the ontological argument persuasive. First time I came across the ontological argument that was pretty much my thought: "Well, I can see how the sentences follow, but I certainly don't believe in the conclusion."

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God.

Is the notion of Jesus inconsistent?

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God. — Banno

:lol: He's also not God.

, you two need to talk... :wink:

Three atheists walk into a bar.

I'm more tempted to say that God, as a concept, is empty than inconsistent -- it's like the empty set. There's just not much to talk about until we have some kind of religion to talk about with a history and all that. Else it's "The one property I know God has is perfection, so he exists" :D

Due to the rules that govern the truth table for conditional statements, it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa. Likewise, if ATI1 is true, then ATI2 must be necessarily false, and vice-versa. — Arcane Sandwich

I think was correct the first time (in challenging some of these claims). Let me just poke a few holes:

...it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa. — Arcane Sandwich

First, if it is not possible to deny both premises, then it would follow that if one is false, then the other must necessarily be true. Your opposite claim simply does not follow.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

To give a counterexample, consider a Muslim who became an atheist. They deny (1) and (2). So it is very clearly possible to deny both premises.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one — Arcane Sandwich

This too looks to be false. The conclusions are contradictories, but that does not entail that the arguments are "contradictories" (so to speak). The believing Muslim is someone who rejects both arguments.

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.)

I think ↪Moliere was correct the first time. — Leontiskos

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.) — Leontiskos

In terms of the formalization I can see what @Arcane Sandwich is saying. For any set of sentences P and Q --



So we cannot simultaneously believe that both of these are not the case due to contradiction upon formalization:

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

"Existence is not a predicate" is the slogan; it ought be qualified if being serious, though, else we can say things like "We use "...exists" in the predicate position all the time without error -- what do you mean?"

I don't believe either sentence, but that's different from taking the conjunct of two propositions in the formal sense.

So there's some confusion here between epistemology, logic, ontology, and all that philosophical stuff which is hard to ascertain ;)

- That gets into the questions similar to <this thread>. My point wasn't to claim that both first premises are false. That cannot be done if we are using material conditionals. Note, though, that if we are talking about material conditionals, then if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true.

Interesting comments, but I'm going to have to ask you both if you have a horse in this race, otherwise it seems (per some folks' deluded opinions) that you can't philosophize about religion. Source: The Boy Scouts. Secondary source: Trust Me Bro.

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God. — Banno

I'll just deny your first premise: The notion of god is not inconsistent.

So, no comments on Taliaferro's work? Is it theology or philosophy of religion, in your opinion?

I'm more tempted to say that God, as a concept, is empty than inconsistent -- it's like the empty set. — Moliere

Nah. I'll just deny that. God, as a concept, is not like the empty set.

First, if it is not possible to deny both premises, then it would follow that if one is false, then the other must necessarily be true. — Leontiskos

Indeed.

Your opposite claim simply does not follow. — Leontiskos

You lost me here. Can you please clarify what you mean by that?

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich


To give a counterexample, consider a Muslim who became an atheist. They deny (1) and (2). So it is very clearly possible to deny both premises. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I follow. The formal structure of that argument is the following one:

1) If p, then q.
2) p.
3) so, q.

If (1) is false, then (2) is true, and if (1) is true, then (2) is false.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one — Arcane Sandwich


This too looks to be false. The conclusions are contradictories, but that does not entail that the arguments are "contradictories" (so to speak). The believing Muslim is someone who rejects both arguments. — Leontiskos

Here you might be right, but only in the sense that both arguments might be valid and yet unsound. If so, then that's a powerful reason for rejecting both arguments. However, it's still the case that if one of the conclusions is true, then the other one is false, and vice-versa. It cannot be the case that God exists and that God does not exist, at the same time, and in the same sense.

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.) — Leontiskos

I find this last comment somewhat odd. Consider the following case:

1) p and q.
2) If q, then r.
3) So, r.

This is indeed an argument, and it's valid (here's the proof). Indeed, (1) and (2) are premises. What do they mean? They don't mean anything, they're just empty symbols. But they're still premises. As such, they don't need to be intuitive, nor do they need to be defended. The same goes for the premises of the two arguments in the OP. They don't need to be intuitive, and they don't need to be defended in order to be premises. They only need to be defended if someone denies them.

That gets into the questions similar to <this thread>. My point wasn't to claim that both first premises are false. That cannot be done if we are using material conditionals. Note, though, that if we are talking about material conditionals, then if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true. — Leontiskos

The concept of soundness (and unsoundness) applies only to arguments, not to propositions (premises and conclusions), just as the concept of validity (or lack of thereof) only applies to arguments, not to propositions. A proposition (being a premise or a conclusion) can only be true or false. That is at least the modern understanding of such notions. It's not the same as in Aristotelian logic.

Nah. I'll just deny that. God, as a concept, is not like the empty set. — Arcane Sandwich

Cool.

What about the claim that "the concept of God is empty"?

I don't see why I can't deny that as well.

Got it.

At least in terms of the ontological argument it seems to me that "God" says very, very little. God exists because God is perfect, and to exist is more perfect than to not exist.

Or any rendition. Godel, I'm given to understand, formulated a valid form of the argument so the logical side isn't the issue, in my opinion.

It feels to me that when someone says that they are saying an analytic truth, rather than a synthetic truth -- which gets at a way in which this is very different from Quine. I can understand the argument, but I don't have any reason to believe that "God" is a part of reality -- that God exists.

"Empty" goes too far because of, what I would call, the poetic dimensions of religion. The meaning that's there, though false, is more meaningful than many true propositions.

It's just not rational in terms of scientific justification -- there's not a science which can evaluate which religious concept of god is superior because, by the science, they're all false, and mostly useless. So the science doesn't have much to say on the issue. (which is what Kant's "theoretical knowledge" is based upon)

It's just not rational in terms of scientific justification -- there's not a science which can evaluate which religious concept of god is superior because, by the science, they're all
false, and mostly useless. So the science doesn't have much to say on the issue. (which is what Kant's "theoretical knowledge" is based upon) — Moliere

Well, not quite. The ancient Greek episteme, as well as the ancient Roman and Medieval scientia, weren't necessarily alien to ontology and theology. Aristotle didn't see it that way, for example. He was a scientist, as well as a metaphysician. And, given his notion of the Prime Mover, he was arguably also a theologist, if the nature of his Prime Mover is divine. Aquinas was certainly a theologian as well as a metaphysican, and he was also arguably a scientist, given that he sought to harmonize reason and faith. As Bunge himself says:

Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it [Anselm's argument] instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. (...) In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it. — Bunge (2012: 175)