the tremendous virtual shit that you just took on my Thread. — Arcane Sandwich

I keep trying to be respectful anyway. (Really a “virtual shit”?)

If God exists, God is….Y.
God exists.
So God is….Y.

As I am trying to say, how does this necessitate “Y” be anything in particular?

If God exists, God is a ham sandwich.
God exists.
So, God is a ham sandwich.

Same, perfect logic. But nothing about God or ham sandwiches or Jesus illuminated - only logic 101 is illuminated.

Guess you are done with me.

Guess you are done with me. — Fire Ologist

Yes, I am. I'm not in the habit of entertaining trolls.

I'm not in the habit of entertaining trolls. — Arcane Sandwich

Just berating them. Got it.

I'm not in the habit of entertaining trolls. — Arcane Sandwich


Just berating them. Got it. — Fire Ologist

Of course. Trolls deserve to be promptly berated. Civility is for non-trolls.

If it is not a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus is not God.

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument, and I feel like it mostly works, but it does leave room for a few weird objections to P1 on the grounds that "Christ is God" is true, but that this is not "revealed truth."

Would anyone genuinely argue such a thing? I sort of doubt it. There are some people who argued that Christ can be known through natural reason alone because the Gospels are "fitting," a sort of "rationalist theology" that crops up in the 19th century. However, I'm pretty sure these folks said it was both revealed truth and accessible/confirmable through reason, not that it wasn't a revealed truth.

And I suppose some people could argue that Christ is God but that there is no evidence for this, making it not "revealed truth." Rather, faith is essential precisely because there is no evidence and it cannot be inferred as true or even likely. This second view might be more common actually. However, it seems like a quibble since presumably they would still say that they believe Christ is God due to revelation, just that such a thing is not "proven true by evidence/reason," if that makes sense.

Thank you.

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument, and I feel like it mostly works, but it does leave room for a few weird objections to P1 on the grounds that "Christ is God" is true, but that this is not "revealed truth." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's how I think that ATI4 can be denied. Let's first recall it here, for the sake of convenience:

(ATI4) If it is not a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus is not God.

A Christian of a rationalist persuasion could argue that in his or her case, it's true that they have not had such a revelation, and that nevertheless Jesus is indeed God. Maybe they have arrived at this idea simply by reason alone. This is similar to Aquinas' intent behind his Five Proofs: some people simply lack faith. In those cases, reason does the work that faith was supposed to do, which is to show that God does indeed exist (and, I would add, that God is indeed Jesus).

It would be an uncommon way to understand the notion of a revealed truth, but it doesn't seem like an impossible to thing to argue for.

I do indeed agree that Christians might prefer to deny ATI5:

(ATI5) It is not a revealed truth that Jesus is God.

The idea would be that it is indeed a revealed truth that Jesus is God. But then I have to ask: must everyone have this revelation? If someone is simply incapable of appreciating this truth, or if someone has no faith whatsoever, what would be the best course of action for the Christian, then?

I find it odd that Christian philosophers only offer arguments for the conclusion that God exists, while not offering any arguments for the conclusion that Jesus is God. Why would you resort to logic in the former case but not the latter? Is there any reason that warrants this differential treatment? — Arcane Sandwich

In all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be a necessary being. Jesus' being God is not necessary, and it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.

In all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be a necessary being. — Janus

Are you sure about that? It sounds like it's true, but don't want to rush to any conclusions here.

Jesus' being God is not necessary — Janus

Are you sure about that?

it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God. — Janus

Again, are you sure about that?

@Count Timothy von Icarus Please help me out here, as an intellectual colleague. You're the Christian one, I'm the atheist one, just explain to me how makes any sense, please explain that to me, to the best of your ability.

Are you sure about that? It sounds like it's true, but don't want to rush to any conclusions here. — Arcane Sandwich

As far as I know in all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be an eternal, infinite being that depends on nothing else for its existence. I think that is what is meant by "necessary". The point is that if such a being exists then it would necessarily exist. Of course I'm open to counterexamples.

Jesus' being God is not necessary
— Janus

Are you sure about that? — Arcane Sandwich

Why would it be necessary that God, assuming that it necessarily exists, should incarnate as a man, let alone as one and one only man?

it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.
— Janus

Again, are you sure about that? — Arcane Sandwich

As far as I know it is only in Christianity that God is believed to have incarnated as one and one only individual, namely Jesus. I also know that some sects of Christianity do not accept Jesus as the unique human incarnation of Goid.

Again, I am open to refutation. If you can show evidence that other religions held that Jesus was God or that every Christian sect held that Jesus was God incarnate.

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument — Count Timothy von Icarus

As for me, I don't understand the emphasis on symmetry. ATI4 is the fallacy of denying the antecedent with respect to FTI4. Of course one could set out ATI4 and ATI5, argue for them independently, and achieve a reasonable argument, but I don't see any atheist who would want to make that argument. In fact ATI4 seems uncontroversially false, given that things can be true without being revealed.

I don't see why @Arcane Sandwich keeps giving two contrasting modus ponens arguments, each with a mirrored conditional premise. In a true modus ponens, to argue from a mirrored conditional is just to deny the antecedent. Arcane seems to have biconditionals in mind, given the way that he does not see the conditional premises as controversial. So his arguments all look like this:

1. p ↔ q
2. p (theist's premise)
3. ~p (atheist's premise)
4. ∴q (theist's conclusion)
5. ∴~q (atheist's conclusion)

Now if one likes symmetry then one will like this approach, but unfortunately real arguments are almost never symmetrical in this way. Thus my critique always holds of this sort of symmetry–chasing, namely the critique that, "No one believes that," i.e. no one believes the conditional which is artificially constructed to aid the denial of the antecedent.* Drawing out the biconditional like this helps show why the logic quickly becomes so goofy, for those giving a modus ponens will almost always deny that their conditional premise is biconditional.

In real life a modus ponens gets mirrored by the contrasting modus tollens, not by an artificial conditional which allows one to deny the antecedent. To then go a step further, the deeper mistake here is the idea that one can quickly set out two arguments which will provide equal representation for the theist and the atheist. Such inevitably produces a faux equal representation. In my opinion, if one wants to delve into questions of theism or atheism, then one needs to produce an argument for one position or the other. This then brings us to the deepest critique: one cannot give simplistic "arguments" without defending one's premises (i.e. We should not be forced to surmise what people might argue. Rather, posters should be giving real arguments.)

In any case, this sort of symmetry does not represent the way real arguments work. In the real world where counter arguments are produced by ricochet, this sort of symmetry only occurs when interlocutors are falling into fallacies, such as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Note well how there are no overlapping premises. The theist and the atheist are basically talking past each other.

* And if we ask the question, "Why did you write this proposition which no one believes?," I think the answer is simply, "Because it's the opposite." ATI4 is the opposite of FTI4 and FTI1 is the opposite of ATI1. ATI4 and FTI1 have no intrinsic plausibility; they are merely the mirror opposites of the conditional premise of two real arguments, and they are written because there is some desire to have symmetrical opposites.

---

To say a bit more, a proof for God's existence will tend to rely on a definition or a quasi definition of God, and this is amenable to a biconditional. But an argument for Jesus' divinity will tend to rely on the idea that Jesus fulfills some condition which is unique to a divine being, and this will be much less amenable to a biconditional given the fact that such an empirical condition will rarely constitute a sine qua non. This is all the more true when we are talking about a revelation, which involves a measure of contingency by its very nature (i.e. FTI4 is not biconditional, and therefore ATI4 does not obtain. If FTI4 were biconditional then it would constitute a necessary truth and not a revealed truth, or at the very least it would represent a theological claim that Arcane is certainly not intending to make.).

I am interested in what do we learn from this argument? What is now known or made clearer? — Fire Ologist

may be trying to convey the same idea, namely the difference between arguments and "arguments."

---

- :up:

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain. — Leontiskos

(Note that in the original argument it is FTI1 that denies the antecedent of ATI1, and is hence implausible.)

Thanks for that insightful critique. It seems like your main objection to the OP is of a methodological nature, i.e., how people should argue, what are the rules of a good conversation, why should anyone assume that argumentative symmetry is better than non-symmetry, etc. In that sense, I would like to bring the discussion of this Thread back to metaphysics, not methodology. What I mean by that, is that the question of whether or not God exists, is a metaphysical question, not a methodological one. I think that you agree with that. What the OP is claiming, in addition to that, is that the question of whether or not Jesus is identical to God, is also a metaphysical question. And I think that you agree with that as well. As for the argumentative symmetry that I'm championing here, perhaps the following quote from Quentin Meillassoux might help clarify my position:

We can make things clearer by considering the following example. Let us suppose that two dogmatists are arguing about the nature of our future post-mortem. The Christian dogmatist claims to know (because he has supposedly demonstrated it) that our existence continues after death, and that it consists in the eternal contemplation of a God whose nature is incomprehensible from within the confines of our present existence. Thus, the latter claims to have demonstrated that what is in-itself is a God who, like the Cartesian God, can be shown by our finite reason to be incomprehensible for our finite reason. But the atheist dogmatist claims to know that, on the contrary, our existence is completely abolished by death, which utterly annihilates us.

It is at this stage that the correlationist comes along to disqualify both of their positions by defending a strict theoretical agnosticism. All beliefs strike her as equally legitimate given that theory is incapable of privileging one eventuality over another. For just as I cannot know the in-itself without converting it into a for-me, I cannot know what will happen to me when I am no longer of this world, since knowledge presupposes that one is of the world. Consequently, the agnostic has little difficulty in refuting both of these positions - all she has to do is demonstrate that it is self-contradictory to claim to know what is when one is no longer alive, since knowledge presupposes that one is still of this world. Accordingly, the two dogmatists are proffering realist theses about the in-itself, both of which are vitiated by the inconsistency proper to all realism - that of claiming to think what there is when one is not.

But then another disputant intervenes: the subjective idealist. The latter declares that the position of the agnostic is every bit as inconsistent as those of the two realists. For all three believe that there could be an in-itself radically different from our present state, whether it is a God who is inaccessible to natural reason, or a sheer nothingness. But this is precisely what is unthinkable, for I am no more capable of thinking a transcendent God than the annihilation of everything - more particularly, I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now. Consequently, my mind, if not my body, is immortal. Death, like every other form of radical transcendence, is annulled by the idealist, in the same way as he annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from the correlational structure of the subject. Because an in-itself that differs from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist declares it to be impossible.

The question now is under what conditions the correlationist agnostic can refute not only the theses of the two realists, but also that of the idealist. In order to counter the latter, the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether dazzled by God, or annihilated) is just as thinkable as my persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason - of this facticity - which implies that the other three thesis -those of the two realists and the idealist - are all equally possible. For even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this eventuality. The possibility of my not being is thinkable as the counterpart of the absence of any reason for my being, even if I cannot think what it would be not to be. Although realists maintain the possibility of a post-mortem condition that is unthinkable as such (whether as vision of God or as sheer nothingness), the thesis they maintain is itself thinkable - for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real. Consequently, the agnostic can recuse all three positions as instances of absolutism - all three claim to have identified a necessary reason implying one of the three states described above, whereas no such reason is available.

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. In order to think myself as mortal, as the atheist does - and hence as capable of not being - I must think my capacity-not-to-be as an absolute possibility, for if I think this possibility as a correlate of my thinking, if I maintain that the possibility of my not-being only exists as a correlate of my act of thinking the possibility of my not-being, then I can no longer conceive the possibility of my not-being, which is precisely the thesis defended by the idealist. For I think myself as mortal only if I think that my death has no need of my thought of death in order to be actual. If my ceasing to be depended upon my continuing to be so that I could keep thinking myself as not being, then I would continue to agonize indefinitely, without ever actually passing away. In other words, in order to refute subjective idealism, I must grant that my possible annihilation is thinkable as something that is not just the correlate of my thought of this annihilation. Thus, the correlationist's refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an absolutization (which is to say, a de-correlation) of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of facticity - this latter is the absolute whose reality is thinkable as that of the in-itself as such in its indifference to thought; an indifference which confers upon it the power to destroy me. — Quentin Meillassoux

With this in mind, and considering the rest of the contents of After Finitude, Meillassoux would have no choice but to accept the following Christian argument:

(FTI7) If hyper-Chaos exists, then it's possible that Jesus is God.
(FTI8) Hyper-Chaos exists.
(FTI9) So, it's possible that Jesus is God.

The term "it's possible", in the preceding argument, should be read in a modal sense, because almost nothing is impossible for hyper-Chaos. Meillassoux has no choice but to claim that both FTI7 and FTI8 are true.

As for myself, I deny premise FTI8: hyper-Chaos does not exist. I've published an article about this, in case anyone is interested. Send me a PM and I'll share the article with you.

I'd also advance the following non-Christian argument:

(ATI7) If hyper-Chaos does not exist, then it's not possible that Jesus is God.
(ATI8) Hyper-Chaos does not exist.
(ATI9) So, it's not possible that Jesus is God.

Perhaps to @Leontiskos's surprise, I'm not sure if I should accept this non-Christian argument or not. Is it true that it's impossible that Jesus is god, as the conclusion ATI9 says? I'm not sure.

And here's my interpretation of Meillassoux's quote, part by part:

We can make things clearer by considering the following example. Let us suppose that two dogmatists are arguing about the nature of our future post-mortem. The Christian dogmatist claims to know (because he has supposedly demonstrated it) that our existence continues after death, and that it consists in the eternal contemplation of a God whose nature is incomprehensible from within the confines of our present existence. Thus, the latter claims to have demonstrated that what is in-itself is a God who, like the Cartesian God, can be shown by our finite reason to be incomprehensible for our finite reason. — Quentin Meillassoux

This is a general theist argument, it's not necessarily a specifically Christian argument. Someone like Anselm, for example could have made this argument. Aquinas and Descartes could make similar arguments as well.

But the atheist dogmatist claims to know that, on the contrary, our existence is completely abolished by death, which utterly annihilates us. — Quentin Meillassoux

This is a general atheist argument, it's not necessarily a specifically "scientistic" argument. For example, an atheist that believes in ghosts or other paranormal entities can make a similar argument.

It is at this stage that the correlationist comes along to disqualify both of their positions by defending a strict theoretical agnosticism. All beliefs strike her as equally legitimate given that theory is incapable of privileging one eventuality over another. For just as I cannot know the in-itself without converting it into a for-me, I cannot know what will happen to me when I am no longer of this world, since knowledge presupposes that one is of the world. Consequently, the agnostic has little difficulty in refuting both of these positions - all she has to do is demonstrate that it is self-contradictory to claim to know what is when one is no longer alive, since knowledge presupposes that one is still of this world. Accordingly, the two dogmatists are proffering realist theses about the in-itself, both of which are vitiated by the inconsistency proper to all realism - that of claiming to think what there is when one is not. — Quentin Meillassoux

This is a general weak correlationist argument, in the sense that Meillassoux defines "weak correlationism". For example, a Kantian might make a similar argument.

But then another disputant intervenes: the subjective idealist. The latter declares that the position of the agnostic is every bit as inconsistent as those of the two realists. For all three believe that there could be an in-itself radically different from our present state, whether it is a God who is inaccessible to natural reason, or a sheer nothingness. But this is precisely what is unthinkable, for I am no more capable of thinking a transcendent God than the annihilation of everything - more particularly, I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now. Consequently, my mind, if not my body, is immortal. Death, like every other form of radical transcendence, is annulled by the idealist, in the same way as he annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from the correlational structure of the subject. Because an in-itself that differs from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist declares it to be impossible. — Quentin Meillassoux

This argument is an instance of what Meillassoux calls "subjective metaphysics". A Hegelian, for example could make this argument.

The question now is under what conditions the correlationist agnostic can refute not only the theses of the two realists, but also that of the idealist. In order to counter the latter, the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether dazzled by God, or annihilated) is just as thinkable as my persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason - of this facticity - which implies that the other three thesis -those of the two realists and the idealist - are all equally possible. For even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this eventuality. The possibility of my not being is thinkable as the counterpart of the absence of any reason for my being, even if I cannot think what it would be not to be. Although realists maintain the possibility of a post-mortem condition that is unthinkable as such (whether as vision of God or as sheer nothingness), the thesis they maintain is itself thinkable - for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real. Consequently, the agnostic can recuse all three positions as instances of absolutism - all three claim to have identified a necessary reason implying one of the three states described above, whereas no such reason is available. — Quentin Meillassoux

This is what the strong correlationist says. As such, he or she can be Wittgensteinian, or Heideggerian, or of a postmodern persuasion (such as Laclau, for example). It's a far more radical form of correlationism than Kant's weak correlationism.

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. In order to think myself as mortal, as the atheist does - and hence as capable of not being - I must think my capacity-not-to-be as an absolute possibility, for if I think this possibility as a correlate of my thinking, if I maintain that the possibility of my not-being only exists as a correlate of my act of thinking the possibility of my not-being, then I can no longer conceive the possibility of my not-being, which is precisely the thesis defended by the idealist. For I think myself as mortal only if I think that my death has no need of my thought of death in order to be actual. If my ceasing to be depended upon my continuing to be so that I could keep thinking myself as not being, then I would continue to agonize indefinitely, without ever actually passing away. In other words, in order to refute subjective idealism, I must grant that my possible annihilation is thinkable as something that is not just the correlate of my thought of this annihilation. Thus, the correlationist's refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an absolutization (which is to say, a de-correlation) of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of facticity - this latter is the absolute whose reality is thinkable as that of the in-itself as such in its indifference to thought; an indifference which confers upon it the power to destroy me. — Quentin Meillassoux

This is Meillassoux's own position, and (he thinks) it's also the position championed by Epicurus. In other words, it's materialism (specifically, speculative materialism in Meillassoux's case). Why? Because matter is being conceptualized in an Aristotelian way here, as potency, distinct from actuality (i.e., "form" in motion). That's why he talks about the capacity (i.e., the potentiality, the "materiality") to-be-other, and that such a capacity (materiality) is absolute. Stated differently, Meillassoux's philosophy might be described as "Absolute Materialism", as distinct from Hegel's "Absolute Idealism".

It's well known that Aristotle coined the terms "matter" and "energy". The former, hyle, is potentiality, and this is what Meillassoux is referring to when he speaks of "the capacity-to-be-other". The latter, energeia, is what Aristotle called "actuality", which is form-in-motion. By the same token, potentiality would be matter-in-motion.

Bunge would disagree. He defines energy, not matter, as the capacity to change. Matter itself is that which has this capacity, instead of being that capacity. That's why it's false to say that matter is identical to energy. It isn't. Energy is a property of matter, in Bunge's view. And this doesn't contradict Einstein's famous formula, E = mc², because in that formula, "m" doesn't mean "matter", it means mass. Matter is not identical to mass. Matter has mass, because mass is a property.

And so, the point here, is that there are several kinds of atheists, just as there are several kinds of Christians. An atheist can be dogmatist (i.e., a pre-Kantian realist), but he can also be a speculative materialist (i.e., a post-Kantian realist, as in, a Speculative Realist). True, Meillassoux no longer identifies as a Speculative Realist (in fact, he doesn't even identify as realist anymore). But that doesn't matter to me, because an atheist can also be a scientific materialist (i.e., a post-Kantian realist, who is not a Speculative Realist), like Bunge.

The idea would be that it is indeed a revealed truth that Jesus is God. But then I have to ask: must everyone have this revelation? If someone is simply incapable of appreciating this truth, or if someone has no faith whatsoever, what would be the best course of action for the Christian, then?

Son of man, thou dwellest in the midst of a rebellious house, which have eyes to see, and see not; they have ears to hear, and hear not: for they are a rebellious house. (Ezekiel 12:2, see also: Matthew 13:15, Jeremiah 5:21, Isaiah 6:10)

Responses here vary. In some (modern) theologies there is a strong division between the "natural" and "supernatural." Man, owing to his entirely fallen nature, can only recognize God through supernatural intervention. Man can see the evidence for God, enough to be under condemnation, but never enough to repent (a reading of Romans 1:20 that tends to downplay natural theology).

This is a minority view though. The Church Fathers often frame sin in terms of disease, and ignorance of what is truly best, God, in terms of disordered and improper love. Everything in the cosmos is moved by love, and a sign of its First Principle, beginning and ending in the Good (viz. existus et reditus). And on this view, it is the pursuit of virtue and wisdom (through grace) that turns one from the desire for base and worldly things to the questioning pursuit of what is truly best and actually true.

Such a pursuit is always questioning because it always involves transcending what one already is, the given of existing belief and desire, and it is always ecstatic, going beyond oneself to something else. But this is precisely the sort of "transformative journey" (man as "pilgrim") where demonstration is unlikely to play a major role. And indeed in evangelism, demonstration normally does not play a major role, and if it does, it is a sort of intermediary demonstration aimed at either demonstrating the choiceworthyness of virtue (not always even the theological virtues), the shortcomings of all finite goods, or else pointing out error in ascribing to God the features of a finite idol.

Hence, in terms of "argument," it is not "lack of signs" but "eyes to see" that tends to be the focus, just as one would not attempt to teach a blind man something using pictures until one has unclouded their sight.

12. The creatures of this sensible world signify the invisible things of God [Rom. 1:20], partly because God is of all creation the origin, exemplar, and end, and because every effect is the sign of its cause, the exemplification of the exemplar, and the way to the end to which it leads; partly from its proper representation; partly from prophetic prefiguration; partly from angelic operation; partly from further ordination. For every creature is by nature a sort of picture and likeness of that eternal wisdom, but especially that which in the book of Scripture is elevated by the spirit of prophecy to the prefiguration of spiritual things. But more does the eternal wisdom appear in those creatures in whose likeness God wished to appear in angelic ministry. And most specially does it appear in those which He wished to institute for the purpose of signifying which are not only signs according to their common name but also Sacraments.

13. From all this it follows that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made; so that those who are unwilling to give heed to them and to know God in them all, to bless Him and to love Him, are inexcusable [Rom. 1:20], while they are unwilling to be carried forth from the shadows into the wonderful light of God . But thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord, Who has transported us out of darkness into His wonderful light, when through these lights given from without we are disposed to re- enter into the mirror of our mind, in which the divine lights shine .

St. Bonaventure - Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. Chapter 2.12-13

(There is a tangentially related issue here of culpability, in that one is only culpable to the extent that one can know that one's actions are wrong, and this is why the sins of concupiscence, of wrong desire, have almost always been seen as much less severe than sins involving the conscious misuse of the intellect, e.g. fraud).

Here, it is sometimes taken that an appeal to the cardinal virtues (justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance) may be the first "medicine," just as Lady Philosophy gives Boethius the "numbing medicine" of Stoicism to quench his despair before bringing him on the philosophical/erotic ascent in the Consolation. Because if the issue is taken to be the corruption and degeneration of the nous, demonstration cannot be the first step.

So:

Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. (Matthew 7:7-8)

But in terms of revelation as solely "miraculous" empirical data, would it even work? The Hebrews wandered the desert with the pillar of fire and rebelled. The prophet Elijah fed the Widow of Zarephath and her son continually on their last small bit of flour and oil, yet only when he brought her son back to life, an even greater miracle, did she finally proclaim: " Now by this I know that thou art a man of God" (I Kings 17:24). Likewise, St. Thomas saw the risen Christ and would not believe until he had touched him:

"Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." (John 20:29)

Earlier in John we see:

Now when he was in Jerusalem at the passover, in the feast day, many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did. But Jesus did not commit himself unto them, because he knew all men, And needed not that any should testify of man: for he knew what was in man. (John 2:23-24)

And in Kings, shortly after Elijah asks God to kill him because he cannot bear the suffering of his prophetic mission (a common refrain among the prophets), sensible signs are given:

He said, “Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord, for the Lord is about to pass by.” Now there was a great wind, so strong that it was splitting mountains and breaking rocks in pieces before the Lord, but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the earthquake; 12 and after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a sound of sheer silence (I Kings 19:11-13, emphasis mine)

But God "is not in" any of the signs. As to God's presence in the "sheer silence," Scripture is silent. An intriguing message, since no ear hears silence, it is rather the absence of the sensible species.

As to God's presence in the "sheer silence," Scripture is silent. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is your interpretation of that, as a Christian? And are you Orthodox or Catholic?

(Thank you very much for such a high-quality response. It's the best comment I've seen so far in The Philosophy Forum)

- Thanks for that interesting quote.

It seems like your main objection to the OP is of a methodological nature — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, that's right, in particular the method necessary in order for a true dialogue to take place. Let me say a bit more regarding methodology, because I think it undergirds the metaphysics.

(FTI7) If hyper-Chaos exists, then it's possible that Jesus is God.
(FTI8) Hyper-Chaos exists.
(FTI9) So, it's possible that Jesus is God.

...

(ATI7) If hyper-Chaos does not exist, then it's not possible that Jesus is God.
(ATI8) Hyper-Chaos does not exist.
(ATI9) So, it's not possible that Jesus is God. — Arcane Sandwich

So this is another symmetrical pair of arguments. Note that when two or more people are considering a topic, they will first consider a thesis such as God's existence, and then they will consider an argument for or against that thesis. At that point the discussion must shift to be about the argument and its validity or soundness, not the thesis per se. If one person gives an argument for a conclusion and the second person gives a different argument for the contrary of that conclusion, then they end up talking past each other as I noted in my last post to you. What the second person must instead do is address the argument itself so that the two are talking about the same thing.

The only time I would want to present two diametrically opposed arguments is to say, "Here are two arguments, which do you find more persuasive?" But we should only do this with real, organic arguments; and arguments which are real and organic will hardly ever be mirror opposites. This sort of mirror opposition creates an a priori gulf between the interlocutors, where all common ground and agreement is denied. Without some common ground between interlocutors argument is not possible.

Perhaps to Leontiskos's surprise, I'm not sure if I should accept this non-Christian argument or not. Is it true that it's impossible that Jesus is god, as the conclusion ATI9 says? I'm not sure. — Arcane Sandwich

Relatedly, I don't think this is the right way to assess arguments. We shouldn't look at the conclusion in order to see whether to accept an argument, for such a thing constitutes post hoc rationalization. If we want to take an argument seriously then we must look at the premises, see if they are true, and then see if the inferences from the premises are valid. The conclusion is an after-thought to the analysis of an argument, in that it should not be assessed in isolation from the argument that supports it.

As for myself, I deny premise FTI8: hyper-Chaos does not exist. — Arcane Sandwich

The other difficulty I see is that "hyper-chaos" is more opaque to the average person than God is, and what this means is that your premises are more opaque than your conclusion (and therefore we are failing to move from what is better-known to what is lesser-known). Now perhaps you have an argument elsewhere where the premise(s) are defended, but as I said in my last, the defense of premises is central to an argument. The premises of a three-step argument will tend to be in need of ample support.

I don't have time to move beyond methodological considerations, but in general I think it is helpful when one gives arguments they really believe and that they are really willing to defend. This is related to my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

Thanks. Here's an argument that Georges Lemaître might advance.

(FTI10) If the Big Bang happened, then God caused it.
(FTI11) If so, then: if it is a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus caused the Big Bang.
(FTI12) It is a revealed truth that Jesus is God.
(FTI13) So, Jesus caused the Big Bang.
(FTI14) If so, then Jesus has a divine (i.e., super-natural, extra-ordinary) nature.
(FTI15) So, Jesus has a divine (i.e., super-natural, extra-ordinary) nature.

I don't have an atheist argument to mirror that Christian argument. Instead, as an atheist, I would deny premise FTI10: It's true that the Big Bang happened, but it's false that God caused it.

As a Christian, do you accept the argument from FTI10 to FTI15 yourself? If yes, why? If no, why not?

- This is a good post, but it strikes me as too strongly opposing rationality and signs. I think you are right that argument and rationality are overemphasized in our time, but as I see it the Bible and the tradition present faith and reason as an antinomy. Or in other words, I don't think there is a clear case to be made for the primacy of the will over the primacy of the intellect, as if the will must be regenerated before and independently of the intellect. Still, insofar as our age overemphasizes intellect, an emphasis on the will is meet.

To take but one example, "blindness" to signs is simultaneously an intellectual defect and a volitional defect. Additionally, that some abuse signs does not mean that others do not properly use them, and the Bible is filled with both types. There is even serpentine Ahaz who refuses to ask for a sign for all the wrong reasons, and this captures the way that intellect and will are all mixed together.

(Note though that a sign is altogether different from a demonstration in Aristotle's sense.)

Instead, as an atheist, I would deny premise FTI10: It's true that the Big Bang happened, but it's false that God caused it. — Arcane Sandwich

But there is no premise that the Big Bang happened, is there? And FTI11's "If so" is very strange, for it means, < If (If the Big Bang happened, then God caused it) then (if it is a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus caused the Big Bang) >. And this means that FTI12 is not sufficient for the modus ponens of FTI13.

But we could supply tacit premises that resolve some of this. My question is this: is FTI10 the weakest premise for the atheist? I think the weakest premise for the atheist is FTI12.

I see this argument as unpersuasive, but my difficulty with it is the same difficulty that appears elsewhere, namely the exclusion of the Trinity. That Jesus is divine does not bring with it the conclusion that whatever God does, Jesus does, for God (the Father) begat the Son and yet Jesus did not beget the Son. Further, Jesus was not remotely born when the Big Bang occurred, so how could he have caused it? We could argue that the Son is the Word through which all things were created, but I don't see why a Christian would want to pursue such arguments against an atheist who does not even believe in God at all.

You asked why Christians never argue for Jesus' divinity. I pointed out that they do. But it isn't a great surprise that you are not aware of those arguments. For why would a Christian try to convince someone that Jesus is divine if that person doesn't even believe that God exists? It would be putting the cart before the horse, especially in today's historically critical age.

(Note that the reason Lemaître thought the Big Bang had theological implications was because it so closely paralleled creatio ex nihilo, a revealed doctrine. And note that atheists and non-theists such as Einstein were highly prejudiced against Lemaître's findings because of this same theological reason. Given then that FTI10 was so widely accepted by Christians and non-Christians alike, it must have a fair amount of plausibility. Einstein's reaction was that FTI10 is plausible but the Big Bang could never have occurred, and that there must be something wrong with Lemaître's physics. Ergo: "God did not cause it, therefore it never happened.")

(Out for awhile.)

But there is no premise that the Big Bang happened, is there? — Leontiskos

Then let's add one. I'll have to change the numbers of the premises, accordingly:

(FTI10) The Big Bang happened.
(FTI11) If so, then God caused the Big Bang.
(FTI12) So, God caused the Big Bang.
(FTI13) If so, then: if it is a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus caused the Big Bang.
(FTI14) It is a revealed truth that Jesus is God.
(FTI15) So, Jesus caused the Big Bang.
(FTI16) If so, then Jesus has a divine (i.e., super-natural, extra-ordinary) nature.
(FTI17) So, Jesus has a divine (i.e., super-natural, extra-ordinary) nature.

And here's the structure, in propositional logic:

(FTI10) p
(FTI11) p → q
(FTI12) ∴ q
(FTI13) q → (r → s)
(FTI14) r
(FTI15) ∴ s
(FTI16) s → t
(FTI17) ∴ t

As a Christian, do you accept this new argument, yes or no?

As for myself, as an atheist, I deny premise FTI11: The Big Bang happened, but God didn't cause it.

I think the weakest premise for the atheist is FTI12. — Leontiskos

I don't see it that way. I'm not that "denomination" of atheist, just as a Protestant is not the same denomination as a Catholic.

Jesus was not remotely born when the Big Bang occurred, so how could he have caused it? We could argue that the Son is the Word through which all things were created — Leontiskos

Yes, that's correct. You just answered your own question. To my mind, at least.

I don't see why a Christian would want to pursue such arguments against an atheist who does not even believe in God at all. — Leontiskos

Well, there are many denominations of Christians, aren't there?

You asked why Christians never argue for Jesus' divinity. I pointed out that they do. But it isn't a great surprise that you are not aware of those arguments. — Leontiskos

Would you mind sharing them here?

why would a Christian try to convince someone that Jesus is divine if that person doesn't even believe that God exists? It would be putting the cart before the horse — Leontiskos

Don't worry about that, just share the arguments, please.

Note that the reason Lemaître thought the Big Bang had theological implications was because it so closely paralleled creatio ex nihilo, a revealed doctrine. — Leontiskos

Then perhaps you'll be surprised to know that Bunge suggests that the Big Bang didn't happen. In other words, Bunge himself denies premise FTI10: the Big Bang did not happen, precisely because (in Bunge's view), creatio ex nihilo is impossible. He says that as a physicist. He thinks that the Universe is somehow eternal in an Aristotelian sense. The series of efficient causes is truly infinite, and there is no problem in admitting (contra Aquinas) that an infinite regress of sufficient causes is not absurd. What's absurd for Aristotle is the lack of purpose in such a series. The Aristotelian Prime Mover is neither a material cause nor an efficient cause, it is only a formal cause and a final cause.

(slightly edited due to erratas)

Here is a new Christian argument, but of the Rastafari denomination (yes, I believe that Rastafari is a denomination of Christianity. Feel free to disagree).

(FTI18) There is no theologically significant difference between Haile Selassie (former Emperor of Ethiopia) and Jesus Christ.
(FTI19) If so, then: if it is a revealed truth that Haile Selassie (former Emperor of Ethiopia) is God incarnate, then it is a revealed truth that Jesus Christ is God incarnate.
(FTI20) It is a revealed truth that Haile Selassie (former Emperor of Ethiopia) is God incarnate.
(FTI21) So, it is a revealed truth that Jesus Christ is God incarnate.

There is no atheist mirror image of this argument. As an atheist, I'm not sure which premise I should deny here.

Here is the Wikipedia entry on Haile Selassie (former Emperor of Ethiopia).

I think that we (non-Rastas) can agree that Haile Selassie is, at the very least, the Rastafari messiah. That would be the correct technical term. But, of course, Rastas want to take this one step further: they claim that Haile Selassie is God incarnate. And I, as an atheist, don't think that's true. But here's my problem: I don't know if I would actually deny premise FTI20. So you see, I'm in quite the predicament here. Please help me.

But anyways, here's the audiovisual material in support of premise FTI20:



That video by itself is not evidence in favor of FTI20. But it's part of the evidence. The other part is this list of instructions:

Instruction 1) Smoke a very powerful joint of marijuana.
Instruction 2) Watch the official music video of Bob Marley and the Wailers' song "Iron, Lion, Zion".
Instruction 3) Wait for the image of Haile Selassie to appear.
Instruction 4) Focus your eyes on the image, and focus your ears on the song by Bob Marley and the Wailers.
Instruction 5) Wait for a divine revelation that premise FTI20 is true: It is a revealed truth that Haile Selassie (former Emperor of Ethiopia) is God incarnate.

That, to me, looks like a scientific experiment. I say that from an anthropological point of view (specifically, from the point of view of Bruno Latour's sociology of science).

The problem is, what happens if you don't get consistent results? What happens if people simply fail to achieve what Instruction 5 tells them to do?

EDIT: I am in no way mocking the Rastafari religion. As I said, I consider it to be a denomination of Christianity, on par with Protestantism, Catholicism, Mormonism, etc. In fact I find the official music video of "Iron, Lion, Zion" to be heart-wrenching, and I say that as an atheist. It is an incredibly sad song to listen to, despite the fact that it was intended as a happy song.

Or in other words, I don't think there is a clear case to be made for the primacy of the will over the primacy of the intellect, as if the will must be regenerated before and independently of the intellect. Still, insofar as our age overemphasizes intellect, an emphasis on the will is meet.

To take but one example, "blindness" to signs is simultaneously an intellectual defect and a volitional defect. Additionally, that some abuse signs does not mean that others do not properly use them, and the Bible is filled with both types. There is even serpentine Ahaz who refuses to ask for a sign for all the wrong reasons, and this captures the way that intellect and will are all mixed together.

:up: I wholeheartedly agree. And with the Patristics, it is often the nous in particular that has become subject to corruption and must be regenerated. Or, for another example, right at the center of the Commedia Dante has four cantos of discourses on love ("love" being the word at the exact middle of all the words written), and there it is "rational love" that allows "natural love" to go astray. Love, in responding to beauty, is equally divided between the will and the intellect.

For instance, how is one to recognize "true beauty" if the intellect has fallen into the Anglo-empiricist schema of viewing beauty as nothing but "the pleasure experienced associated with some sense datum?"

It certainly takes the wind out of Plato's sails: And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

It certainly takes the wind out of Plato's sails — Count Timothy von Icarus

Eh, I prefer Hegel's paragraph on the history of philosophy being like a plant:

The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve it or keep it free from its one-sidedness, and to recognise in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments. — Hegel

At some point we're going to need to talk about the Holy Spirit in this Thread.

I'm on a roll today. I hope that you Christians appreciate all of these good Christian arguments that I'm making on your behalf, and I say that irrespective of each one's specific Christian denomination.

(FTI22) If the spirit of Jesus was holy, then Jesus is God.
(FTI23) The spirit of Jesus was holy.
(FTI24) So, Jesus is God.
(FTI25) If so, then Jesus has an extra-ordinary nature: generically, a super-natural nature; specifically, an extra-ordinary nature. Uniquely, a divine nature.
(FTI26) So, Jesus has an extra-ordinary nature: generically, a super-natural nature; specifically, an extra-ordinary nature. Uniquely, a divine nature.

At some point we're going to need to talk about the Holy Spirit in this Thread. — Arcane Sandwich

“Bless your soul with tongues of fire; Holy Spirit burn;
Leave no trace of man’s desire; Holy Spirit turn.”

“Bless your soul with tongues of fire; Holy Spirit burn;
Leave no trace of man’s desire; Holy Spirit turn.” — PoeticUniverse

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