If there is anything in the universe that everything else is composed by, I think we would all like to know about it, especially physicists — NotAristotle

That's my point. Saying composition needs a composer assumes the conclusion in the premise. So how was a movement of logic even made to demonstrate God?

That wasn't a scientific definition of blue. I was just listing what things pop to mind and therefore are related to what people understand the concept of blue as related to it.

Those have to serve as a part of the conceptual foundation of the concept of blue even if they do not exhaust it.

THAT IS WHY I LISTED CONSCIOUSNESS after you all those SCARY science terms and left in the phrase ETC!

It seems your philosophical views are clouding you judgements here.

I don’t understand what you are really objecting to. I originally was noting that blueness cannot be defined just like temporality and space. You objected that we can and should give proper definitions of these; and I used blueness as an analogous example. You now are agreeing with me that blueness cannot be defined—right? It seems like you are noting that we can describe it to some extent—I wasn’t disputing that.

4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition. — NotAristotle

:fire:

Ok.

Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false

Again, that is just a more complicated way of saying they are propositional!

Your "burden" is to succeed at that.

All I am doing is providing an argument for why God exists from the idea that composition requires an absolutely simple being that ends up necessarily being God: you seem to want a book about this argument.

The whole point is to get people to read it, consider it, and respond with any questions, comments, or objections they have; and to see if we can find common ground. That’s how all arguments work. You are acting like my OP establishes merely that the premises themselves are propositional; which is actually a prerequisite.

Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts

No it does not, but I understand why you would think this (given where your head space is at). There is no such thing as an unstated premise: there are implications of premises and conclusions; and this implication you speak of is definitely there, but there’s nothing wrong with that.

For example, if I successfully demonstrate to you that quantum entanglement can happen, then it would not be a valid objection to say “but, how can that happen?”. We don’t have to explain how it happens to demonstrate that it happens: your objection here hinges on this conflation.

To your point, though, you could formulate a rejoinder that demonstrates the improbability of, e.g., quantum entanglement being true by considering how it would seem to violate classical laws of nature; and this may convince some people.

You can offer a valid rejoinder that knowledge would have to exist in a simple being for this argument to work and that seems improbable; and you might convince people.

However, I don’t see how you have demonstrated it is metaphysically impossible.

We are just approaching this two different ways: I am convinced by the argument of composition that such a being must exist (and so knowledge would exist in this simple being), and you are tackling it by starting with your understanding of knowledge and seeing if it jives with a simple being having it. The problem is that even if it doesn’t jive well for you, it doesn’t negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is false—for it would have to be false if you don’t believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being.

It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.

Nope. That will not suffice. If you are right, then my premises that derives that the being has knowledge—which makes no reference to this “hidden premise”—must be false; and you would have to demonstrate where it that is; or concede that a person approaching this exposition from the standpoint of composition would be warranted, ceteris paribus, on believing that a simple being has knowledge (even if it does not cohere with their knowledge of physics).

So let me try again, which premise is false:

20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.

One of these has to be false for the argument for fail. You would have to deny 20 or 21 or both. Both of them have nothing per se to do with knowledge in the sense of data.

I would say, if I am being charitable, that you are denying both 20 and 21; because you think intelligence has to do with bits of data (and I don’t) and that thusly this simple being cannot apprehend the forms of things.

So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.

An implication; yes. It is not a premise. I don’t need to deny physicalism itself to make the argument work: it is implied though if I succeed. That’s like saying an argument for physicalism has an “unstated premise” that “idealism is false”, “substance dualism is false”, etc. They don’t.

You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model

But the argument in the OP demonstrates that this is impossible. Like I have said many times in this thread, an infinite per se causal series cannot exist; and this also applies to infinite loops and circular relations. If all objects have properties, then they all have parts; and if they all have parts, then they are infinitely composable. They can’t be infinitely composable. So your theory can’t be true.

Here’s a basic argument in two different ways. Here’s my way:

A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible

Here’s @NotAristotles way:

1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.

You would have to accept that all beings are infinitely composed (either regressively or circularly) for your view of real things always having properties. That’s very problematic.

Thoughts

The answer to the question "if there is a God", "why there is a God", and "how there is a God" is the same for all considering the simplicity of God. But simplicity would just mean sameness, uniformity, lack of what we humans call design. So a non-designed single-thing designs designs. I suppose. This is such an exercise in control however, making the world managerable. I prefer Sartre-eques, gritty sink, existential mental affections for the most part. The day in a life, not a day in the life. No support

The problem is that even if it doesn’t jive well for you, it doesn’t negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is false—for it would have to be false if you don’t believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being. — Bob Ross

Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.

If all you want to hear is that your argument is valid, and that you had no desire to defend its soundness, you should have said so.

I don’t understand what you are really objecting to. I originally was noting that blueness cannot be defined just like temporality and space. You objected that we can and should give proper definitions of these; and I used blueness as an analogous example. You now are agreeing with me that blueness cannot be defined—right? It seems like you are noting that we can describe it to some extent—I wasn’t disputing that. — Bob Ross

Anyone can give a definition of blue its only you who has a problem with certain definitions with blue and may be unhappy with any of them so he throws his hands up in the air saying, "Well you just can't!"

Except, difficulty to define or find an acceptable definition is not coincident with impossibility as you also agree on. So we are going to try to define blue anyways despite your misgivings and move on.

So now that we agree that your assertion that its 'undefinable' is just you being lazy and unwilling to enter the discussion into defining other such difficult terms only because its 'hard'. Could you stop gish galloping. . . give a definition!

It's also impossible to know things because something. . . something. . . skepticism but that doesn't stop ordinary people from using the term knowledge in ignorance of a precise definition or arguing a particular definition for their purposes. Why? This is because skepticism doesn't actually remove this discussion from the intellectual dialectic.

So I don't want to hear about how 'undefinable' it is and mysterious or perplexing which are substitutes here for not philosophically putting in any work.

Again, define you terms and no griping this time around. Simple, easy, end of story.

Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.

No you don’t have a burden of proof: you have to contend with a premise. That’s not the same thing as having a burden of proof. If you don’t contend with a premise, then you are providing a red herring.

So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet haven’t contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case.

Anyone can give a definition of blue its only you who has a problem with certain definitions with blue and may be unhappy with any of them so he throws his hands up in the air saying, "Well you just can't!"

I already explained why blue cannot be properly defined. Remember Mary’s room thought experiment? Are you just ignoring that?

So now that we agree that your assertion that its 'undefinable' is just you being lazy and unwilling to enter the discussion into defining other such difficult terms only because its 'hard'. Could you stop gish galloping. . . give a definition!

Have you not heard of Moorean intuitionism?

It's also impossible to know things because something. . . something. . . skepticism but that doesn't stop ordinary people from using the term knowledge in ignorance of a precise definition or arguing a particular definition for their purposes. Why? This is because skepticism doesn't actually remove this discussion from the intellectual dialectic.

Nothing I said is an argument from skepticism. Again, I think Mary’s room thought experiment demonstrates how the phenomenal properties we experience cannot be reduced to physical properties; which means there are forms of knowledge which cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge; which also means that these properties cannot be defined—they must be intuited from experience.

Another example is being. Being is the granddaddy of impossible-to-define-concepts; and this is not me being lazy or appealing to scepticism. We literally cannot define it; and yet we all intuit exactly what it is. It is a pure intuition.

This is relevant because space and time are pure intuitions.

My argument doesn’t care if you are a realist or not about space and time, ironically, as there will still be ontological parts to things even if they are not in space or time; so I say take your pick! **shrug** (:

Again, define you terms and no griping this time around. Simple, easy, end of story.

I already described them sufficiently for purposes of the OP. Space is extension; time is temporality.

So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet haven’t contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case. — Bob Ross

The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed. This is sufficient reason to reject your conclusion prima facie that a being with magical knowledge exists. But in principle, it's possible your conclusion is based on premises so likely to be true, that it could raise the a priori probability of the conclusion. I'll go through a first set of them to explain why it doesn't.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
Definition. No problem.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being. (This pertains to the metaphysical question of the persistence of individual identity. Your view is probably based on essentialism, implying an unstated premise. If you choose not to make a case for essentialism, then I simply apply my own view, so I judge it categorically false: probability=0).

3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
Agreed.

4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.

The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily, even if it is composed. Add or subtract even one part, and the being that WAS, no longer exists.

5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.

6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Agree

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.

8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
Agreed.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
False (p=0). Two different types of simple being can exist (e.g. up-quarks and electrons).

11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
Non-sequitur; false (p=0)

No point in proceeding further, since later statements and conclusion depends on the above falsehoods. Perhaps you could nudge me to increase some probabilities from 0, but as I said before, you'd need to push all of them pretty high to have any persuasive power.

I already explained why blue cannot be properly defined. Remember Mary’s room thought experiment? Are you just ignoring that? — Bob Ross

Definitions are built on either axiomatic fiat symbolic reference or reference, through symbolization or metaphor, to other base notions/concepts/experiences.

Everything is trivially not able to be properly defined and you could probably motivate a version of the problem of the criterion to make this concrete by asking what a proper definition is then making it clear how circular or unfounded that criterion is leading us to doubt all definitions. That is, however, trivial and obvious.

Un-intriguing examples of definitions devolve into mere pointing or gesturing as they by nature DON'T tell us much that we don't already get OR they don't make important aspects clear enough. They are by nature lazy and by nature dangerously uninformative as they leave great uncertainty when one demands SPECIFICATION.

When one demands specification you point not to that object but in reference to other things. Contrary or similar.

Time is a complex notion but it has to do with clocks, it supposedly flows, flashes by in frames as if its a movie, it can be slowed or sped up, it is universal or sometimes coincident with physical processes.

Those are all different notions and metaphors/figures of speech that exemplify either different aspects of the same concept or completely different concepts but that is what is needed. Not this pointless and trivial gesturing you are doing which tells me nothing of what extension is.

Try at least a via negativa approach for god sake. Make use of the numerous metaphorical figures of speech people have constructed to talk about such things that the internet should allow you access to. TRY AGAIN!

Nothing I said is an argument from skepticism. — Bob Ross

I know, that wasn't the point as I was just pointing out how philosophical skeptics can miss the point of how normal individuals conduct themselves choosing to devolve into intellectual labyrinths in an attempt to shut down the discussion. The token pessimistic skeptic may ask, "What is the point of discussing this or that if there is no way of knowing?"

As if the attainment of knowledge as so narrowly and unobtainable that this person defines or sees it as is relevant to why people still indulge in these debates. Perhaps, they have other reasons.

You are the skeptic in this analogy. Unwilling and seemingly unable to move forward in a constructive manner.

My argument doesn’t care if you are a realist or not about space and time, ironically, as there will still be ontological parts to things even if they are not in space or time; so I say take your pick! **shrug** (: — Bob Ross

. . . and I say it doesn't make sense to ask how many parts a number has so it wouldn't make sense to ask what an entity devoid of spatiality would even be to possess parts yet not be extended.

I already described them sufficiently for purposes of the OP. Space is extension; time is temporality. — Bob Ross

Which doesn't make a difference between what others have deemed the 'spatial extension' notion of physicality. . . which is different from the spatial separation of any two physical things. . . which is different from spatial location/place. . . which is different from fundamental physical action at a distance interactions. These are all different notions.

All of which have been advanced on differing levels to make more precise the concept you refuse to do the same to.

It also leaves out the esoteric but ever present spatial anti-realists of various idealist varieties which deny that the notion of spatiality is even a coherent mind-independent notion at all. There are also the ontological structural realists of the modern age which may advocate for parts without things. Then there are the process philosophers who may look down upon or see as incoherent in their own sense attempting to ascribe any coherency to the static part of a thing at all amidst the Heraclitan mess of universal processes.

. . . you know. . . because that spatial anti-realist or that process philosopher might just have different moorean intuitions than you.

The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed

The idea of it being magical just begs the question; but it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain. We have reason, which is distinct from AI, and we have every reason to believe it could never be facilitated by the brain. Why? Because reason abstracts the universal of a particular—not just pattern-matching given the universal like AI—and this seems to posit yet another hard problem for physicalists: how could an brain processes abstract out the universal from a particular—which is necessarily to go beyond the given data of the particular itself—when nothing about the particular itself entails its universal? AI, on the other hand, is given concepts (universals) and then trained to pattern-match particulars: our minds do not do that.

False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being.

A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. Contingency is about existenting dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.

Now, what you are noting, is actually what I noted just with less precise language. You are absolutely right that a composed being will not be the same being if it has different parts or if those parts are arranged differently; and, so, what makes that composed being that kind of composed being is necessarily relative to those parts and their arrangement. This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts.

"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.

Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; and the part being contingent on its own parts would entail that that part does not, in turn, exist necessarily (i.e., independently of any dependencies on other beings).

Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms; then if the atoms exist only insofar as the electrons, protons, and neutrons exist in such-and-such arrangement, then that makes the atoms contingently existent on the electrons, protons, and neutrons. None of these beings can exist as a necessary being because they lack existence themselves (subsistently); for they depend actively on something else to sustain their existence.

The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily,

Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. They exist contingently—viz., they could not continue to exist if their parts are removed or modified in such-and-such manners.

Secondly, what you are really noting is traditionally called per se properties; which is different than a necessary vs. contingent being analysis. E.g., a circle is no longer a circle with being the shape of a circle—so that property of circularity is a per se and necessary property for circles—but a circle, e.g., block that that child is playing with right now does not necessarily exist: it exists contingently on atoms and what not—the guy who made it could have decided not to make it, etc.

I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.

Beautiful! This means, Relativist, that a per se series of causality for composition cannot be infinite (circularly nor in a regression) for each being lacks itself composition (i.e., subsistent exist): none of them are capable of existent themselves and this kind of essential relation between them (for exist) entails that they could never begin to exist nor continue to if it weren’t for some thing which as the ipsum ens subsistens—pure being itself. Why? Because if it can’t be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of composition—and we just established that that is impossible).

Now you concur that an absolutely simple being must exist to account for such-and-such composition. From there, we then continue to deriving God’s existence.

7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.

OH COME ON! (;

In all seriousness, you cannot agree that a composed being cannot be only infinitely comprised of parts (because none of them is capable of existent by themselves) and then say that the first cause is composed. If it is composed, then it is a member of that infinite series we stipulated because it exists contingently on its parts (no differently than the table).

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

I am not sure we can make headway on this one ):

All I will say is that if the two beings have properties—irregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsic—then they are not absolutely simple. In other words, they have parts. Remember, a part is something that comprises something else—it is NOT something material that comprises something else. E.g., a letter in a word uttered in a sentence is a part of a part of a whole (i.e., the sentence) and this thing is not material (i.e., the sentence). E.g., the number two is comprised of two number ones.

A word has the property of being made of letters; and a particular word has the property of being made of certain letters.

I think you are thinking of a part in the stricter sense of something that comprises a material object. A quark having an X property would entail that, even if it is non-spatiotemporal, it has parts because X would relate to some part that it has—just like a letter is a part of the word. The upness, or whatever, of the quark is a part of that quark; and it is a part because it is something which is not identical to the whole—the quark—but contributes to its existence as a quark. I would presume that an up-quark, for you, would no longer be an up-quark if it didn’t have the property of ‘upness’.

In short, we are talking about ontological parts—not just material parts (e.g., wheels on a car).

Hey Bob, quick question. Why is it called an argument from composition, if God is simple?

Yes, but then it would not be an argument from composition. There is a correlation between composing and being composed. A being that composes finds its function insofar as there is a composite being. Therefore its essence as a composing being is ontologically dependent (contingent). This terms comes from fundationalism.

In other words God must create the world in order to be God, which means that his essence (being God) is contingent upon the creation of the world. Therefore, God is essentially dependent on the world in order to be God. And God cannot have essential dependence on anything. Therefore, there is no possible argument of composition+fundation to demonstrate the existence of God.

The idea of it being magical just begs the question; but it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain. — Bob Ross

Nor would a philosopher ever figure it out either if they don't understand, just as many physicists, the difference between talking about something in reference to other things and bare un-interesting direct reference.

If you directly reference something you are not going to explicate much of anything about it no more than making an undefined utterance without context.

Just as other philosophers have quibbled with spatialized language to talk about time as possessing numerous intellectual faults so then the only problem really with 'figuring out the brain' is just your personal misgivings about the metaphors/analogies they use. As if you wouldn't also yield metaphors/analogies that themselves may hide further misunderstandings or make precise something that layman or scientists never really disagreed with in the end.

This is expressly clear in your later continued response below. . .

We have reason, which is distinct from AI, and we have every reason to believe it could never be facilitated by the brain. Why? Because reason abstracts the universal of a particular—not just pattern-matching given the universal like AI—and this seems to posit yet another hard problem for physicalists: how could an brain processes abstract out the universal from a particular—which is necessarily to go beyond the given data of the particular itself—when nothing about the particular itself entails its universal? AI, on the other hand, is given concepts (universals) and then trained to pattern-match particulars: our minds do not do that. — Bob Ross

. . . which talks of reified abstractions and the possession of these "things" or the manipulation of them.

If you are going to do that why don't we just all venture into Meinong's jungle and drop the intuitions we have about the words 'exist' or 'real' at the tree line.

The idea of it being magical just begs the question — Bob Ross

I use the term "magical knowledge" to refer to the existence of knowledge by brute fact in the absence of any sort of medium. Both aspects are grossly implausible. You've presented no metaphysical account of how this could be, you haven't suggested a metaphysical grounding of it.
Question-begging applies to arguments. I'm not the one making an argument. I'm just explaining what I believe, and why I believe it.

it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain — Bob Ross

We don't know how information is stored in the brain, but we have strong evidence that it is stored there: disease and trauma to the brain can destroy memory.

The apparent fact that information entails some form of encoding doesn't entail a physical encoding. Information theory still seems to apply, and information theory takes it for granted that the information exists in some non-simple form.

A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. — Bob Ross

Nonsense. A complex being could exist by brute fact. If it does then its existence is a necessary fact. Here's why.

Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Here’s how I account for it: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).

This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.

So if C is a brute fact, there is no E that accounts for C & possibly(~C). Therefore brute facts are necessary.

Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. There is contingency only if some prior condition is contingent. Because determinism is assumed, the only possible contingent fact is the initial conditions. If those initial conditions existed by brute fact, then their existence is not contingent.

It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility. Stephen Yablo shows this to be the case here: Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? You do exactly that, as I'll show below.

Contingency is about existing dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.

That is only conceptual contingency, not metaphysical. If the universe is deterministic, then every state of the universe is the necessary consequence of past states. There are relations among objects in the universe (such as distance, gravitational attraction, and the chemical bonds), but all these factors are necessarily present. You're just conceptualizing (say) the solar system existing without (say) Mercury. But it's not truly metaphysically possible.

This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts. — Bob Ross

Only conceptual contingency. Your conception ignores the overall context that I described.

Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; — Bob Ross

No, it doesn't. I defined it as something that exists without cause or dependency. The universe (the totality of material reality) exists autonomously if naturalism is true.

Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms — Bob Ross

The existence of a table at a time and place, within a deterministic universe, has necessarily come to exist. Again,you are conceptualizing by ignoring the broader context.

Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. — Bob Ross

What entails it being necessary or contingent is whatever accounts for its existence.

Because if it can’t be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of composition—and we just established that that is impossible). — Bob Ross

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious. You're conflating 2 different things.

9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.

I am not sure we can make headway on this one ): — Bob Ross

The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption. That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.

All I will say is that if the two beings have properties—irregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsic—then they are not absolutely simple — Bob Ross

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

I am, of course, judging this from the perspective of my metaphysical theory. As I said in my first post, your argument depends on metaphysical assumptions that I disagree with. You refused to accept that, and insisted I comment on your premises. In every case, I evaluated them on my metaphysical views, as you should expect because you didn't present an argument for YOUR metaphysical system. I believe I have proven my point.

What part of space and time being extension and temporality is hard for you to understand? If there's specific concepts of space and time that would be immune to the OP, then please feel free to bring them up: I don't see any. You can go the Einsteinien, Kantian, or literally any other route and it will not matter for the OP since we are talking about ontological parts which could be outside of space and time.

It is important to note the difference between a necessary being in the sense of being incapable of failing to exist vs. in the sense of being uncaused. The former still allows for contingency of existence on other things, and the latter entails brute facts. I think this is the crux between us, which rides on a conflation between these two.

The OP is talking about a contingent being in the latter sense—not the former—and you are talking about a necessary being in the former sense—not the latter. I don’t think you disagree that a chair which, under necessitarianism, cannot fail to exist is still contingently existent on its parts such that IF the parts didn’t exist it wouldn’t either. All you are noting is that the chair and its parts could not have failed to be caused; but this does not take away from the OP’s point that they are caused. A necessary chair in the latter sense would be a chair that exists with no cause—I don’t think you are arguing that.

If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility

What the heck is a non-actual possibility?!?

This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.

Right, but C would still be contingent upon the things which caused its existence even if it could not have failed to exist.

Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions.

No. Causal determinism dictates that every entity subject to natural laws has a cause: this does not entail that every entity has a cause and consequently does not entail that every entity is necessary in the former sense. What you are thinking of is called necessitarianism, and it is basically causal determinism’s roid’d brother.

Again, even if this is true, it is irrelevant because the caused thing—the effect—is or at least was dependent on its cause for it to exist (even if it could not have failed to exist because its cause must have occurred in such-and-such a manner to bring about it as an effect). E.g., the eternal chair is still contingent on its parts to exist.

It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility

Agreed, and I am not doing that. It is not merely conceivable that a chair is dependent upon its parts: that is actually true of chairs—period.

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious

This isn’t true, though; and that’s why my argument and classical arguments like this one do not rely on that. Aquinas’ prime example is an infinite series of begetting children: there’s nothing, i.e., impossible about an infinite series of per accidens causality. There’s nothing “viscious” about it; but there is something absurd about an infinite per se causal series.

The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption.

:lol:

That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.

Hopefully I clarified in this response how that definitely did not happen (:

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

Ok, but let’s go back to the composition quick argument I gave you: that demonstrates that your metaphysical theory here is false; so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.

What part of space and time being extension and temporality is hard for you to understand? If there's specific concepts of space and time that would be immune to the OP, then please feel free to bring them up: I don't see any. — Bob Ross

What is extended and what is temporal?

What metaphors/analogies do you use and do you understand their limitations and errors?

Until you are absolutely clear on this we will not make head way.

You can go the Einsteinien, Kantian, or literally any other route and it will not matter for the OP since we are talking about ontological parts which could be outside of space and time. — Bob Ross

Outside is spatialized language which I don't choose to indulge in so I don't understand what you mean. Use different language. I don't accept it.

Second, you keep using this substance metaphor to reify the notion of properties or talk about them if you don't know.

Is reification always good in your eyes and proper philosophical method?

Third, going off of moorean intuition. . . everything I've ever experienced and said was ever a 'single piece' or a 'whole' has always been itself composed. I have never in fact met with an un-composed entity and therefore perhaps the notion of an 'un-composed' entity is itself a limiting abstraction that is therefore unreal and un-warranted to postulate. My notion of part/whole comes from these things that have never been wholes and have always been composed.

If you say something along the lines of, ". . . but I can imagine. . ." Then you need to justify the method or role of imagination in proper philosophical practice.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-existentialist/

I feel like this concept that God is "out there" and can never be pointed to is a practice in speculation of logic itself but without any real content that would render its "demonstrations" to be real proofs

Correct me if I am wrong -- are you saying that there are no composites, composition is impossible?

Not at all. What I am saying is that, supposing that there are simple things at the end of the composition, these simple things are explained in essence by the whole of which they are a part. That is to say that their essence or identity is conditioned by the whole of which they are a part.

And as you have seen in this topic a confusion is made between the simple thing at the end of the composite and God. But if every simple thing that forms a whole is conditioned in its identity and essence by the whole, then no simple thing that is part of a whole can be God.

In other words, if God is part of the world then he is conditioned in essence and identity by the world. But if he is not part of the world then we are no longer talking about wholes and parts.

It is important to note the difference between a necessary being in the sense of being incapable of failing to exist vs. in the sense of being uncaused. The former still allows for contingency of existence on other things, and the latter entails brute facts. I think this is the crux between us, which rides on a conflation between these two. — Bob Ross

Here's my Axiom of Contingency:

A contingent entity requires not merely a explanation for its being or being such as it is, but an explanation for the possibility that it could have been otherwise.

As previously discussed, an uncaused object exists without explanation, therefore it is not contingent.
Could an uncaused object be contingent upon its composition? Let's see.

First a preliminary point. There is more to a composition than a list of objects. It also includes the arrangement of the objects. Example: A molecule of glucose has the exact same set of atoms as a molecule of fructose, but the atoms are arranged differently (they are termed "isomers").

Now apply the axiom to a composed object, C. C is explained by its composition. C is contingent only if this explanation (the composition) could also explain C's nonexistence. That's obviously false. C IS the specific arrangement of the objects that compose it. It's a strict identity.


Conclusion: an object's composition necessitate the object being what it is; the composition is not contingent. Necessitarian Amy Karofsky puts it this way:

"the necessity of a necessary entity just consists in its being the way that it actually is. Thus, an explanation of the entity’s being as it is will be an account of its necessity. "
(Page 3 of "A Case For Necessitarianism")

What the heck is a non-actual possibility?!? — Bob Ross

This reflects back to the axiom.
Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities". Also, if C caused D, then "D's nonexistence" is a non-actual possibility.

There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious

This isn’t true, though — Bob Ross

"Viscious" means having a vice; i.e. something objectionable about the account. The vice I identified was that there would be nothing to account for the chain as a whole. You're right, that IF God exists, he could account for it. That might be relevant if it could be shown that the past is infinite. Even if it's a live possibility, it doesn't entail God, it just entails that something must underlie the causal chain. You'd at least have to show that God is the best explanation. Your case would require you to show magical knowledge is plausible, which you obviously can't.

But we don't need to debate that, because there's a worse vice for an infinite past: it entails reaching the present from an infinite past, through a sequence of steps of finite duration. No set of finite duration steps can complete an infinity.

The past process is symmetrical to reaching an infinite future through a day-by-day process. Every step takes you a finite number of days from today. "Infinity" is never reached. The past is a mirror image: it's impossible reach from an infinite past.

Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".

Ok, but let’s go back to the composition quick argument I gave you: that demonstrates that your metaphysical theory here is false... — Bob Ross

I showed that your composition theory is inconsistent with my contingency axiom.

so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.

It's irrelevant what you believe. You have the burden of proof. But you could try to undercut my belief. I believe objects have properties, because: 1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited - 2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power. 3) it fits a coherent, parsimonious metaphysical theory.

What I am saying is that, supposing that there are simple things at the end of the composition, these simple things are explained in essence by the whole of which they are a part. That is to say that their essence or identity is conditioned by the whole of which they are a part. — JuanZu

:ok:

Okay, I think I get it now. So it is not composition itself that is at issue. Rather, that a part should be responsible for composition when it itself is dependent on the whole at least for its mereological function as part; that's what is at issue.

Again, correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be asserting that even if some composed being were grounded in simple parts, those parts could not have composed the whole because their function is determined by the whole of which they are parts. And if their function were to compose a whole, they would already have to be a part of the whole of which they acquire their function from, which would render composition impossible by that part.

That is an important qualification because without it, one might incorrectly suppose that a whole could be fully grounded in its parts, which you maintain (and I agree) does not work.

What is extended and what is temporal?

Extension and temporality are pure intuitions. We get them from our experience of the world; or more accurately they are the forms of our experience.

You are asking of me, e.g., what does it mean to exist? Well, its a pure intuition. There’s nothing more I can say; nor can you.

What metaphors/analogies do you use and do you understand their limitations and errors?

Until you are absolutely clear on this we will not make head way.

We might be able to say some things about how space and time behave scientifically; but not what they are themselves. Space and time are the a priori intuitions of the sensory data (manifold) of our outer and (some of our) inner senses; and there may be a space and time akin to these a priori modes of intuition which may or may not behave similarly (e.g., Einstein’s special relativity). Our brain represents things which occur in a multiplicity as in space (whether that be material [e.g., my hand] or immaterial [e.g., the feeling of pain in my hand]); and it represents things which change in time (which may or may not include space—e.g., thinking). It is impossible for me to speak of anything without referencing spatiality and temporality because they are pure intuitions a priori in our brains—viz., they are so integral to the human understanding—but it is important to distinguish space and time proper (in the sense of the forms of the understanding) from conceptual space and time: the latter can be used to talk analogically about things which may not be in the former (e.g., Platonic forms, God, a non-spatiotemporal “particle”, etc.).

Outside is spatialized language which I don't choose to indulge in so I don't understand what you mean. Use different language. I don't accept it.

You literally cannot describe space and time without using them in language. That’s a waste of time to try and avoid.

Second, you keep using this substance metaphor to reify the notion of properties or talk about them if you don't know.

Is reification always good in your eyes and proper philosophical method?

What “substance metaphor”???

Third, going off of moorean intuition. . . everything I've ever experienced and said was ever a 'single piece' or a 'whole' has always been itself composed. I have never in fact met with an un-composed entity and therefore perhaps the notion of an 'un-composed' entity is itself a limiting abstraction that is therefore unreal and un-warranted to postulate.

That’s called in inductive case against an absolutely simple being; and it holds no weight against the argument from composition because it demonstrates the need for its existence. Your argument only works as a probabilistic-style argument IF we have no good reasons to believe a simple being exists. All you are saying is “well, we haven’t had any good reasons to believe there are black swans, so we shouldn’t”. Ok. But now we know there are black swans….

If you say something along the lines of, ". . . but I can imagine. . ." Then you need to justify the method or role of imagination in proper philosophical practice.

Did you read the OP? It is not an argument from conceivability. I will outline a shorter version here:

A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.

Here’s the other version:

1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.

Instead of bringing up red herrings and straw mans, maybe try actually contending with the above arguments?

A contingent entity requires not merely a explanation for its being or being such as it is, but an explanation for the possibility that it could have been otherwise.

That’s nonsense. That’s never what contingency has been about in the sense I described; and will never exclusively refer to what you mean here. All you did is axiomatically preclude a discussion about contingency in the sense of being caused. Even if this axiom were granted, then we would just refer to caused beings then instead of contingent beings: this doesn’t help your case. If a chair is caused by, at least in part, the atoms which comprise it; then, boom, we have the same argument taking lift off…

"the necessity of a necessary entity just consists in its being the way that it actually is. Thus, an explanation of the entity’s being as it is will be an account of its necessity. "
(Page 3 of "A Case For Necessitarianism")

Yes, but this doesn’t mean what you think it does. This means that the entity’s composition suffices to demonstrate the necessity of that being because, under necessitarianism, causation could not have failed to be exactly what it is. This does NOT entail that this being is not contingent on its parts to exist—in fact, that is a necessary presupposition for what they are saying to be true. If the table, e.g., is not contingent on its parts to exist, then it would be false that its parts suffice to explain why the chair necessarily had to exist (for it would exist at least in part independently of its parts).

Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities"

No, no, no. If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise—not even laws, numbers, logic, etc.

The only cogent interpretation of a ‘non-actual possibility’ would be either A) a possibility which failed to occur or B) something which is conceivable but not currently actual. With respect to A, this kind of possibility is not possible; with respect to B, it is possible but confusing language—it should just be referred to as conceivability.

That might be relevant if it could be shown that the past is infinite
…
But we don't need to debate that, because there's a worse vice for an infinite past:

You are not understanding this argument at all. Temporal causality is not necessarily a per se causal series. E.g., begetting children is a per accidens series of causality even if it stretches infinitely backward and forward in time—this kind of causality is not viscious and does not require any further explanation causally.

1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited

This would be a reasonable a posteriori argument if, again, we didn’t have an example now by way of demonstrating that a simple being is required to explain completely the causal chain of composition of an object.

2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power

It does, because we cannot explain composition otherwise.

That’s nonsense. That’s never what contingency has been about in the sense I described; and will never exclusively refer to what you mean here. All you did is axiomatically preclude a discussion about contingency in the sense of being caused. — Bob Ross

The axiom I cited was a direct quote from Amy Karofsky's book, "A case for Necessitarianism". She makes a strong case for the past failure of philosophers to provide a metaphysical account of contingency. She convinced me that contingency needs to be accounted for, not just assumed (as you do). I'm confident she would agree with the way I applied it to composition, not that it matters per se. It's coherent and consistent with everything we know about the world. You obviously don't like it because it's inconsistent your Thomist metaphysical framework. But as I've repeatedly reminded you, YOU have the burden of proof, and in my case - that means you would have to undercut the contingency axiom I stated. You can't, and that's why you're just reacting emotionally now.

This shouldn't have been necessary. It was obvious to me from the beginning that your argument depended on Thomist metaphysics. In my first post, I said "Thomism is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true."

You didn't accept this THEN, but I've given you a good basis to accept it NOW.

Even if this axiom were granted, then we would just refer to caused beings then instead of contingent beings: this doesn’t help your case. If a chair is caused by, at least in part, the atoms which comprise it; then, boom, we have the same argument taking lift off…

Composition and cause are two different things. Funny that you relied on this difference in your last post, when you argued that an object that was causally necessitated was (ostensibly) contingent upon it's composition. Since I proved you wrong, you're now backtracking.

Contingenct axiom aside, the necessity of composition can only be false if objects have contingent properties. If such were present then individual identity would violate identity of indiscernibles. Of course, you believe there are contingent properties because you embrace Thomism, which assumes there is essence. The existence of essence is axiomatic to Thomism.

This means that the entity’s composition suffices to demonstrate the necessity of that being because, under necessitarianism, causation could not have failed to be exactly what it is.

I am 100% certain I correctly interpreted what Karofsky said. Her wording was intentional, and I applied it correctly.

Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities"

No, no, no. If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise—... — Bob Ross

Why the heck does it matter what necessitarianism would entail? I've never suggested I'm defending necessitarianism. I was simply answering YOUR QUESTION: "What the heck is a non-actual possibility?", I simply gave you an example in which I STIPULATED that the outcome was indeterminate, to help you understand the concept. Personally, I'm agnostic as to whether quantum indeterminacy entails metaphysical contingency. But if it does, it's consistent with my contingency axiom.

The only cogent interpretation of a ‘non-actual possibility’ would be either A) a possibility which failed to occur or B) something which is conceivable but not currently actual. — Bob Ross

ROFL! I previously called you out for what appeared to be, your conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, which you then denied. But now you're being explicit - suggesting that conceivablity is all that's needed to establish that something is contingent. There's no rational basis for this claim, and that's why IMO my axiom of contingency makes perfect sense to me. Contingency entails "non-actual possibilities", and I find it absurd to think that non-actual possibilities don't need to be accounted for metaphysically. I don't care if you accept that, because I'm not defending an argument with the hope of persuading you. I'm just explaining the reasons I reject YOUR argument.

You are not understanding this argument at all. — Bob Ross

You don't appear to be understanding MY argument. I explained why I'm convinced the past is finite. If you think I made a logical error, identify it.

As an aside, I arrived at my view that the past is finite after spending a good bit of time examining the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which depends on the past being finite. Although I didn't find William Lane's Craig's argument for a finite past persuasive, I studied the issue on my own, applying my math background, and landed on the argument I gave you. My only point here is to demonstrate that I don't simply go into denial when seeing an argument I disagree with. You should try to do the same.

1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited


This would be a reasonable a posteriori argument if, again, we didn’t have an example now by way of demonstrating that a simple being is required to explain completely the causal chain of composition of an object.

2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power


It does, because we cannot explain composition otherwise. — Bob Ross

Apparently THOMIST metaphysics can't explain composition otherwise, but that's irrelevant. I can explain composition with MY metaphysical framework just fine.

Why the heck does it matter what necessitarianism would entail?

Your view is a form of necessitarianism, as exemplified by your example from “A Case for Necessitarianism”. The ideas you quoted are only compatible with necessitarianism.

Let’s back track a bit, because we are not making progress. Let me ask you this: do you believe that a table is dependent upon its parts to exist?

I previously called you out for what appeared to be, your conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility

I was charitably interpreting your idea of a “non-actual possibility”: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.).

I explained why I'm convinced the past is finite

How is that relevant to the OP?

As an aside, I arrived at my view that the past is finite after spending a good bit of time examining the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Yes, I could tell: the Kalam argument is not neo-Aristotelian. It depends on an argument from efficient causes—which is a per accidens kind of causal series—whereas Aristotelian arguments stem from per se kinds of causal series. For Aristotle, in fact, matter is eternal and yet still requires a first cause; and even if it were finite then it would still need a first cause (according to him).

The OP’s argument is from per se causality.

My only point here is to demonstrate that I don't simply go into denial when seeing an argument I disagree with

I am not engaging in your argument for a finite past because it is a red herring: it does not matter if there is an infinite past of causal events or not for the argument of composition to work. If you think it does, then I would need to here why before spending the time engaging in your argument.

Composition and cause are two different things

Yes, but composition is a kind of causality—I’ve maintained this the entire discussion. Again, composition is a kind of per se causality whereas, e.g., begetting children is a kind of per accidens causality.