Is time a kind of perception of mental beings, or some concrete property of objects and motions in space? — Corvus

It is difficult for me to think that time is not something proper to external objects. Imagine a world independent of the mind in which time does not pass, our experiences would not be able to perceive the movement of things either, don't you think?

Do dogs perceive time? When you throw a ball in the air, the dogs could jump and catch it before it falls on the ground. Surely they notice the motion of the ball. Is the motion noticeable to the dog, because of time? Or time has no relation to the motion, because dogs are not able to perceive time? — Corvus

I would not say because of time. Time is not the cause of movement, but time is part of movement. For a dog it is obvious that time passes, but it has no concept of time. The important thing here is to understand that movement does not occur without time, because any movement can only be explained in a before and an after. But they are not the same thing: without movement we do not perceive time; but time passes even for a hypothetical motionless object, we call it persistence or duration.

Marxist materialism is a different kettle of fish — Wayfarer

Yep.

Sometimes the OP is too broad for the thread to keep to a theme. That's the case here. Too many side issues.

:worry:

Imagine a world independent of the mind… — JuanZu

Now there’s an oxymoronic phrase! I’m forming the view that ‘the world independent of mind’ is precisely and exactly what the ‘in itself’ refers to.

Imagine a world independent of the mind in which time does not pass, our experiences would not be able to perceive the movement of things either, don't you think? — JuanZu

It sounds illogical to be able to imagine a world independent of mind, when imagining is a function mind.

Human mind must have the common objective capability for perception and judgement such as reasoning and sympathy. Wouldn't time perception be some sort of perceptive mechanism from the shared capability of mind?

Without watches or clocks, no one can tell the exact time anyway. If you lock yourself in an empty room with no windows, and stay in there for days or even hours, would you be able to tell what time it is when you trying to tell time?

I would not say because of time. Time is not the cause of movement, but time is part of movement. For a dog it is obvious that time passes, but it has no concept of time. The important thing here is to understand that movement does not occur without time, because any movement can only be explained in a before and an after. But they are not the same thing: without movement we do not perceive time; but time passes even for a hypothetical motionless object, we call it persistence or duration. — JuanZu

That seems to suggest even motions and movement has nothing to do with time. Motions and movements are result of energy or force applying to mass or object. Time is measurement of the start and end of motion or movement, not motion or movement themselves.

You need motions and movement first before they tell you how long it took to end the process. At the end of the day, you have measured the intervals, not time itself. Would you agree?

I do address that problem in The Mind Created World, although if you would like to discuss it further, that would probably a better thread for it. — Wayfarer

Do you believe mind also creates time? or is time a part of the world? Were there postings regarding time in the thread?

So reflecting on past and future doesn't have bearing on their having actually been a past, nor in there eventually being a future. Right? — Relativist

Yes, you are correct here.

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them. — Relativist

In theory, the ordered relation is true, but in reality they are one. If you think about it, future continuously becomes present, and present becomes past. In this case, is the division actually valid?

These are big questions. There have been debates over them forever. I’ve explained, I say that time has an irreducibly subjective aspect. In other words that time exists in the awareness of an observer. But that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

What's Buddhism's account of time? Is your view of time from Buddhism?

Not specifically. Mine is an intuitive understanding but I believe it can be justified philosophically. I’ve never researched the question from the perspective of Buddhism.

I’ve never researched the question from the perspective of Buddhism. — Wayfarer

From my understanding, Buddhists claim there is no eternity and no self. Time is known to be eternal. Could it mean Buddhists deny time too? Would be interesting to find out.

Mine is an intuitive understanding but I believe it can be justified philosophically. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by "it can be justified philosophically"? I agree time is a wide topic, but at the end of the day, the OP is asking if time exists. When it asks if it exists, it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It means in what form it exists. Actually t may be found that time may not exist. But isn't nonexistence a pure form of existence?

It would be silly to ask if water or air exists. But it is a valid question to ask in what form time exists.

Indeed, comrade. Indeed. — Arcane Sandwich

Comrade sounds more spiritualistic.

Comrade sounds more spiritualistic. — Corvus

That's why I said it. We can't speak too much in Spanish, in this Forum, even though this Thread is called Ontology of Time.

Think of it like this: Heidegger said "remanens capax mutationem". That's Latin. And Spanish, unlike English, evolved from Latin.

Imagine a world independent of the mind… — JuanZu


Now there’s an oxymoronic phrase! I’m forming the view that ‘the world independent of mind’ is precisely and exactly what the ‘in itself’ refers to. — Wayfarer

We can make things clearer by considering the following example. Let us suppose that two dogmatists are arguing about the nature of our future post-mortem. The Christian dogmatist claims to know (because he has supposedly demonstrated it) that our existence continues after death, and that it consists in the eternal contemplation of a God whose nature is incomprehensible from within the confines of our present existence. Thus, the latter claims to have demonstrated that what is in-itself is a God who, like the Cartesian God, can be shown by our finite reason to be incomprehensible for our finite reason. But the atheist dogmatist claims to know that, on the contrary, our existence is completely abolished by death, which utterly annihilates us.

It is at this stage that the correlationist comes along to disqualify both of their positions by defending a strict theoretical agnosticism. All beliefs strike her as equally legitimate given that theory is incapable of privileging one eventuality over another. For just as I cannot know the in-itself without converting it into a for-me, I cannot know what will happen to me when I am no longer of this world, since knowledge presupposes that one is of the world. Consequently, the agnostic has little difficulty in refuting both of these positions - all she has to do is demonstrate that it is self-contradictory to claim to know what is when one is no longer alive, since knowledge presupposes that one is still of this world. Accordingly, the two dogmatists are proffering realist theses about the in-itself, both of which are vitiated by the inconsistency proper to all realism - that of claiming to think what there is when one is not.

But then another disputant intervenes: the subjective idealist. The latter declares that the position of the agnostic is every bit as inconsistent as those of the two realists. For all three believe that there could be an in-itself radically different from our present state, whether it is a God who is inaccessible to natural reason, or a sheer nothingness. But this is precisely what is unthinkable, for I am no more capable of thinking a transcendent God than the annihilation of everything - more particularly, I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now. Consequently, my mind, if not my body, is immortal. Death, like every other form of radical transcendence, is annulled by the idealist, in the same way as he annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from the correlational structure of the subject. Because an in-itself that differs from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist declares it to be impossible.

The question now is under what conditions the correlationist agnostic can refute not only the theses of the two realists, but also that of the idealist. In order to counter the latter, the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether dazzled by God, or annihilated) is just as thinkable as my persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason - of this facticity - which implies that the other three thesis -those of the two realists and the idealist - are all equally possible. For even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this eventuality. The possibility of my not being is thinkable as the counterpart of the absence of any reason for my being, even if I cannot think what it would be not to be. Although realists maintain the possibility of a post-mortem condition that is unthinkable as such (whether as vision of God or as sheer nothingness), the thesis they maintain is itself thinkable - for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real. Consequently, the agnostic can recuse all three positions as instances of absolutism - all three claim to have identified a necessary reason implying one of the three states described above, whereas no such reason is available.

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. In order to think myself as mortal, as the atheist does - and hence as capable of not being - I must think my capacity-not-to-be as an absolute possibility, for if I think this possibility as a correlate of my thinking, if I maintain that the possibility of my not-being only exists as a correlate of my act of thinking the possibility of my not-being, then I can no longer conceive the possibility of my not-being, which is precisely the thesis defended by the idealist. For I think myself as mortal only if I think that my death has no need of my thought of death in order to be actual. If my ceasing to be depended upon my continuing to be so that I could keep thinking myself as not being, then I would continue to agonize indefinitely, without ever actually passing away. In other words, in order to refute subjective idealism, I must grant that my possible annihilation is thinkable as something that is not just the correlate of my thought of this annihilation. Thus, the correlationist's refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an absolutization (which is to say, a de-correlation) of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of facticity - this latter is the absolute whose reality is thinkable as that of the in-itself as such in its indifference to thought; an indifference which confers upon it the power to destroy me. — Quentin Meillassoux

We are the victims of an age when men of science are discredited, and only a few remain who are capable of engaging in scientific research. Our philosophers spend all their time in mixing true with false and are interested in nothing but outward show; such little learning as they have they extend on material ends. When they see a man sincere and unremitting in his search for the truth, one who will have nothing to do with falsehood and pretence, they mock and despise him. — Omar Khayyam

That's why I said it. We can't speak too much in Spanish, in this Forum, even though this Thread is called Ontology of Time.

Think of it like this: Heidegger said "remanens capax mutationem". That's Latin. And Spanish, unlike English, evolved from Latin. — Arcane Sandwich

remanens capax mutationem ? - I need to go and think about it for a while to see what it actually means.

Being seems to be another vast topic in Philosophy, similar to Time, hence why I tried to read Heidegger, because he wrote about Being and Time extensively. But his language in the original texts is highly abstruse, and uses the Greek words extensively in his sentences, which I found difficult to penetrate.
I put them down, and decided to return when I learned some Greek, which hasn't happened yet.

I didn't know Latin and Spanish had the same root. But Latin is another language which would be very useful in reading philosophy I would imagine. I had tried to learn Spanish long time ago, when I had a friend from Chile. But I realised it is impossible to learn so many different languages within the limited time we each have in life.

Talking about languages, I believe that a large part of Time is also embedded in our languages.
Always, eventually, gradually, at the end, in the beginning, at the same time, instantly, .... all seem to describe Time. But then is it the case they describe Time? Or would it be the case that they describe motions, movements and changes rather?

It is difficult for me to think that time is not something proper to external objects. — JuanZu

This idea is easily refuted, therefore you ought to be able to reject it without difficulty. Through observation, the reality of time manifests as motion. And motion is not proper to objects, but is a relation between objects. This is why relativity theory is so useful. So "time" as a concept is similar to "space", as a concept, in the sense that they are both concepts which refer to the relations between external objects, not the objects themselves. As such, we cannot say that time and space are "proper to external objects", because they are external to external objects.

Incidentally, this is actually the most basic way that naive materialism is also refuted. If all objects consist of one common element, "matter", then we still need to assume something else to account for all the observed differences in the world. If we claim that differences are the result of different configurations of matter, then we need to assume something else, something immaterial (space, or something like that) to account for the reality of "different configurations". This is why monism, as an ontological principle is fundamentally flawed.

remanens capax mutationem ? - I need to go and think about it for a while to see what it actually means. — Corvus

It's a phrase from Being and Time. Ask @Joshs about it, he thinks it's an important phrase for some reason, and I would agree, but I think that my reasons for considering it important are different from Joshs'.

Heidegger invented the phrase "remanens capax mutationem". No Latin author from the Middle Ages, and no Roman author from Antiquity, has ever used that phrase. There is no evidence for its existence, prior to Heidegger's Being and Time.

I didn't know Latin and Spanish had the same root. — Corvus

They don't. Latin itself is the root of the Spanish language. Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Catalan, etc., are Romance languages. They are like dialects of Latin. English, on the other hand, has nothing to do with Latin. It's more similar to German.

This might interest you:

The beginning of culture and of the struggle to pass out of the unbroken immediacy of naive psychical life has always to be made by acquiring knowledge of universal principles and points of view, by striving, in the first instance, to work up simply to the thought of the subject-matter in general, not forgetting at the same time to give reasons for supporting it or refuting it, to apprehend the concrete riches and fullness contained in its various determinate qualities, and to know how to furnish a coherent, orderly account of it and a responsible judgment upon it. This beginning of mental cultivation will, however, very soon make way for the earnestness of actual life in all its fullness, which leads to a living experience of the subject-matter itself; and when, in addition, conceptual thought strenuously penetrates to the very depths of its meaning, such knowledge and style of judgment will keep their due place in everyday thought and conversation. — Hegel

English, on the other hand, has nothing to do with Latin. It's more similar to German. — Arcane Sandwich

That's not really true. English is technically Germanic, as being rooted that way historically, but the Latin influence over time is so significant that it's false to say that English has nothing to do with Latin.

That's not really true. English is technically Germanic, as being rooted that way historically, but the Latin influence over time is so significant that it's false to say that English has nothing to do with Latin. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cry me a river, Anglo-Saxon. Spanish is essentially Latin, while English is only accidentally Latin.

I think we first must distinguish between subjective time and objective time. We perceive subjective time rather than objective one. The subjective time is created in the brain, and it is subject to change, depending on the mood, emotion, substance usage, diseases, etc. This article discusses the subjective time. Objective time is a part of the spacetime manifold and it is the subject of physics though. — MoK

If you posit time into two different types, then which one is the real time? Are the two different times synchronisable in any way? Would it not create confusion trying to find out which time you must accept as the real time?

If one is the real, then is the other illusion? Or are they both real, or both illusion?

Now that I've joined this thread, I will say something about this statement, namely, that I think it's fallacious. — Wayfarer

I have missed this post. Apologies. Belated welcome to the thread.

But this emphatically doesn't mean that 'time doesn't exist', simpliciter. Try holding your breath for a minute while you say that. — Wayfarer

I think I said it in some other replies the same answer. "time doesn't exist" doesn't mean it is denying the reality of time or our daily uses and reliance of time. But it is asking rather if time is the objective entity or property of the world, or it is rather internal perception of human mind.

If it is the former, it might exist in some form of physical entity. If it is the latter then it is psychological state of mind. In that case would it be correct to say time exists? We are not talking about the use or reliance of time in our daily life here, but we are (as the traditional philosophers have done) trying to find the arche of time.

If it didn't exist, it doesn't mean it is nothing. Because nonexistence is also a type of existence. It could be defined as a pure form of existence. If you are an idealist, then it is a perfectly acceptable definition.

Do all your all imaginings matter?

You clearly have an intuitive understanding of past present and future - because you refer to.them . Those are "imaginings", but they're primary - innate. No one has to train you to distingish events in this way. You just learn words to apply to your innate sense.

That distinguishes it from your other imaginings about past present and future.

The ordered relation: past-present-future refers to the actual, not to the order we choose to contemplate them.
— Relativist
In theory, the ordered relation is true, but in reality they are one. If you think about it, future continuously becomes present, and present becomes past. In this case, is the division actually valid? — Corvus

It does not follow that they are one. The "becoming" needs to be accounted for, and can be - in a way consistent with your intuitive basis.

time doesn't exist" doesn't mean it is denying the reality of time or our daily uses and reliance of time. But it is asking rather if time is the objective entity or property of the world, or it is rather internal perception of human mind. — Corvus

As I've said, my belief is that time has an unavoidably subjective aspect, so I agree that it is not solely objective. But then, nothing is is 'solely objective'. I agree with the idealists and phenomenologists who say that the world and the subject are 'co-arising'.

That's about the most of Mellaisoux I've read in a single sitting, but I'm generally hostile to speculative realism. The given characterisations of 'dogmatists', 'correlationists' and 'idealists' have shifting boundaries; it's not possible to define such attitudes in an air-tight kind of way such that comparing them will result in such pristine clarity and demarcation.

There's a critical paper by phenomenologist Dan Zahavi (thank you to @Joshs) 'The end of what? Phenomenology vs. speculative realism' from which:

In After Finitude, for instance, Meillassoux argues that phenomenology because of its commitment to correlationism is unable to accept the literal truth of scientific statements concerning events happening prior to the emergence of consciousness. When faced with a statement like “The accretion of the Earth happened 4.56 billion years ago”, phenomenology is forced to adopt a two-layered approach. It has to insist on the difference between the immediate, realist, meaning of the statement, and a more profound, transcendental, interpretation of it. It can accept the truth of the statement, but only by adding the codicil that it is true “for us”. Meillassoux finds this move unacceptable and claims that it is dangerously close to the position of creationists (Meillassoux 2008, 18, cf. Brassier 2007, 62). He insists that fidelity to science demands that we take scientific statements at face value and that we reject correlationism. No compromise is possible. Either scientific statements have a literal realist sense and only a realist sense or they have no sense at all (Meillassoux 2008: 17).

The way I put it is that this is accomodated in Kantian philosophy by the recognition that empiricism and transcendental idealism are not in conflict. The theory of the formation of the earth is an empirical theory, supported by considerable empirical evidence which I don't think Kant would deny. (Let's not forget that Kant's theory of nebular formation was also an empirical theory, and that this theory, modified by LaPlace, is still considered respectable.) But all empirical evidence is subject to judgement, and meaningful within a context. It may well be literally true - but what is literally true depends on literacy and the ability to interpret evidence and symbolic forms and to synthesise them into coherent concepts. Which leads me to wonder whether the entire assault on 'correlationism' is a straw man argument. But fortunately, not being in the academic trenches, it is a battle I don't have to fight.

Change reqires time whether the change is psychological or physical. If by real you mean the physical time is a substance then one has to study Hole argument which denies time to be a substance. There are all sort of responses to the Hole argument though. This is still subject to debates. Gravitation waves however were observed and that to me means spacetime is a substance. The psychological time is however another beast. It is required since otherwise we cannot function well. It is however contingent on brain function. I am currently thinking about nature of psychological time so I cannot by certainty say if it is a substance or not.

I'm very critical of Meillassoux myself. I've proven, in print, that his philosophy of mathematics is incompatible with Bunge's, for example. Not that this would be any kind of major achievement, but it's a modest victory, among other modest victories that I've had over Meillassoux's philosophy.

Some folk supose that since everything we believe is mind-dependent, everything is mind dependent.

It isn't so.

You clearly have an intuitive understanding of past present and future - because you refer to.them . Those are "imaginings", but they're primary - innate. No one has to train you to distingish events in this way. You just learn words to apply to your innate sense.

That distinguishes it from your other imaginings about past present and future. — Relativist

Time itself doesn't have past present future. It is us who divide time into those categories depending on what point, and what part of time we want to focus on.

It does not follow that they are one. The "becoming" needs to be accounted for, and can be - in a way consistent with your intuitive basis. — Relativist

Again, time itself doesn't become anything. We see them different way. There are no labels on time.

As I've said, my belief is that time has an unavoidably subjective aspect, so I agree that it is not solely objective. But then, nothing is is 'solely objective'. I agree with the idealists and phenomenologists who say that the world and the subject are 'co-arising'. — Wayfarer

If dichotomy is the nature of time, which one is the real time? What necessitates the "co-arising"? How could subjectivity co-arises with the objectivity? When they co-arisen, are they then one? Or still two?

I am currently thinking about nature of psychological time so I cannot by certainty say if it is a substance or not. — MoK

Let us know about it when you come to the Eureka moment.