It's strange (weird) to use letters for writing about numbers. It's better to use numerals for that purpose. Because A, B, C are not the same thing as 1, 2, 3.

But there are certain concepts in mathematics that can accurately be described as conceptually colossal. One such number is TREE(3), but there are others, such as Graham's Number, for example.



https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/math/a28725/number-tree3/

That's an interesting way of conceptualizing what Logic is. — Arcane Sandwich

Symbolic logic from the textbooks are the engines in the model cars for the model tracks.
In the real word, no one says P, P^Q, P->Q.

Applying logic to the real world for finding the objective truths in the world are the engines in the real cars for us getting A to B for commuting daily, carrying the loads, delivering the goods, and the real racing cars in the real racing tracks. :smile:

I'm not an empiricist, but here's how I imagine an empiricist will respond:

Though all knowledge is derived from experience, we don't need to have direct experience to know something. Example: though detectives don't directly observe the killer, they can know the killer exists and infer certain characteristics about the killer by investigating the crime scene. Thus, we can have knowledge of something without direct experience. This does not go against empiricism since the ultimate source of this knowledge is experience. So, there is reason to think AE1 is false.

If this is an argument against a strict empiricism (where we can only have knowledge of something if we directly observe it), then the strict empiricist will still object to AE1. They will likely just deny that magnetism exists (because we cannot directly observe it), so it cannot be perceived by human beings.

Either way, empiricists will deny AE1, so I don't think this argument works.

I'm betting sure that Kant never said that any noumenon "appears." — tim wood

Safe bet, go all in. Wife’s car. That autographed Roger Maris 59th. First-born.

….what appears is the phenomenon, that is, a creation of mind…. — tim wood

What appears is the thing, that which effects the senses, the material object the representation of which becomes experience. Phenomenon is the creation of intuition specifically, mind generally if you like, representing the affect on the senses.

The noumenon is no creation of mind, and being itself thereby not a phenomenon, never appears. — tim wood

Not a phenomenon hence never appears, true, but a creation of understanding specifically, mind generally if you like. A creation of understanding is a conception; noumena is a conception alone, never anything else, never cognized, never sensed.

As an aside, Feynman said in one of his CalTech lectures, that fields are real things, insofar as they occupy space and are measurable as a force over time. From this point of view, magnetism does not refute empiricism, iff empiricism represents the possibility of knowledge of real things conditioned by space and time. Problem is….I can’t find the reference so…never mind.

Glad humans chose to repurpose all those compasses they made to throw at people for Navigation instead... pretty cool we made compasses without being aware of or perceiving magnetism...

Damn, how do cells divide again? We cannot perceive such notions cause you know we can't perceive magnetism... yet some how we did... must me magic.

"We can't perceive something we can literally sense in action."

Very interesting, thank you for providing sufficient reasons for how AE1 can be denied.

Pardon. I hope you don't mind if I quote Kant's CoPR, just to have it here as a useful reference for further discussion.

In the Preface to the Second Edition (1787), Kant says:

At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in themselves.¹ For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears — which would be absurd.

¹ In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or a priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective validity, that is real possibility — the other possibility being merely logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but may derive them from practical sources. — Kant

Damn, how do cells divide again? — DifferentiatingEgg

Well, maybe you know more about cell division than we do. Your forum name here is "DifferentiatingEgg", after all.

Deleuze has some interesting things to say about differentiating eggs...

great answer

Yeah but wasn't he crazy?

Good quote.

If you say so.