No, I have not backtracked. You asked three questions, about novelty, error and consensus, and I addressed them, with reference to transcendental idealism. What you think are 'my claims' is not what I'm actually claiming.

Your reading is underwritten by an emotional commitment to realism (whether naive, scientific or metaphysical). But your return to the objects of domesticity - crockery and cutlery, cups in the cupboard - reassures you of the reality of the common-sense world. It is also why you so often express both resentment and hostility in this matter - because it threatens the common-sense understanding of the world. I can sense the exasperation in your posts - how can he say that? that is preposterous! They're not written to provoke, but this matter does provoke, because it calls into question one's innate sense of how the world is. But then, isn't that part and parcel of philosophy proper?

I say that without the mind, there can be neither existence nor non-existence.
— Wayfarer
yet
...you are obliged to agree that there is a world that is independent of what you or I believe.
— Banno

I never said otherwise!
— Wayfarer — Banno

Novelty emerges from new external data — Wayfarer

Error occurs when our interpretations fail to match that data. — Wayfarer

Consensus arises because we all operate with fundamentally similar mental structures. — Wayfarer

Each of these supposes a world, independent of our beliefs, in which there is "external data" that is novel, shared or at odds with those beliefs.

Yet you say that this too is created by mind.

You want your cake and to eat it.

Hoffman. Fucksake.

His argument supposes that there is no tiger, only the booming and buzzing background quantum thingy.... and yet he still runs away form the tiger. — Banno

I'm not saying I agree with Hoffman, just that there are arguments against evolution as providing a true picture of reality. A similar argument is put by Alvin Plantinga - the evolutionary argument against naturalism.

I think Hoffman will tell you that the Tiger is still a risk to human survival, just not what we think it is.

But I am not a Hoffman acolyte.

How can there be intersubjective agreement without a shared word independent of each individual's beliefs? What is it that this "language, social practices, and culture" take place in, if not a shared world? Where is that "similar cognitive apparatus" if not in the world? What is a "shared bodily structure" if not something more than the mere creation of your mind? — Banno

Just because language, social practices, and culture take place within a "shared world" does not mean this world exists independently of human minds.

Doesn't Husserl and later phenomenology argue that our sense of a common world is constituted through experience, communication, and mutual recognition - not discovered as something external.

I have some sympathy for the idea that humans create meaning and value and that these are largely contingent rather than inherent. Perhaps we live in a reality that, in itself, lacks intrinsic form or meaning; it is through our perception, interpretation, and conceptual frameworks that we impose structure upon it.

Our shared biology and cognitive capacities provide a foundation for commonalities in perception, ensuring that, despite individual differences, much of what we experience aligns. Likewise, our participation in culture and community shapes our values and collective notions of truth, reinforcing a sense of shared understanding.

That said, this does not mean that we might deny scientific and empirical truths. What it highlights is that even within objective inquiry, our engagement with the world is mediated by the frameworks we use to interpret and explain it. Science itself is a human endeavor, shaped by methodologies, paradigms, and theoretical models that evolve over time. However, this does not undermine the effectiveness of scientific practice in describing and predicting phenomena - it just shows that knowledge is always developed within a particular context.

Or something like this. I think it is stimulating to ponder these things. Not all of us are certain our world-views are correct. :wink:

Yet you say that this too is created by mind. — Banno

Important to know that this is true in one way, but not in another. It is empirically true that there is vast world outside my knowledge of it - heck, I only know two or three people in my street. You think that is what is meant by 'mind', hence it makes no sense to you. But there's another meaning in play, another sense of 'mind' altogether - not the personal, individual ego, but mind as it structures our experience-of-the-world. But I know that is likely to trip you up, as you'll probably say, what is that? What evidence can there be for it? Which is already to ask a wrong question, as it presumes it is something you're outside of. (This came up in the Rödl thread.)

That's why Kant acknowledges that transcendental idealism and empirical realism do not have to conflict, per Kant and Empirical Realism (Larval Subjects).

That's enough out of me, I have to do some quotidian chores.

just that there are arguments against evolution as providing a true picture of reality. — Tom Storm

Yep, and the common problem is that they suppose one description - usually that of the physisist- to be the "true picture". This, incidentally, is a point of agreement between @Wayfarer and I - the rejection of a physical hegemony.

I think Hoffman will tell you that the Tiger is still a risk to human survival, just not what we think it is. — Tom Storm

He seems to think that once it is described in quantum terms, it ceases to be a tiger. I'll point out that it is still a tiger. With big, sharp, pointy teeth.

Doesn't Husserl and later phenomenology argue that our sense of a common world is constituted through experience, communication, and mutual recognition - not discovered as something external. — Tom Storm

Perhaps, in which case the problem for them is to avoid solipsism. The answer here is that the world is not constituted by experience, communication, and mutual recognition, but sits independently of, yet is understood via, experience, communication, and mutual recognition. It's that problem of mistaking what one believes to be the case for what is the case. So

Our shared biology and cognitive capacities provide a foundation for commonalities in perception, — Tom Storm

...and therefore there is a shared biology that is "external" to our cognitive capacities. Biology will not work as an explanation of commonality unless there already is such a commonality - the shared world.

...mind as it structures our experience-of-the-world. — Wayfarer

Nothing odd about that, except that the world already has some structure apart from that mind, and hence novelty, error and agreement.

Your next step is usually to hint at some panpsychic undermind that permeats space and time...

Nothing odd about that, except that the world already has some structure apart from that mind, and hence novelty, error and agreement. — Banno

But it doesn't, Banno. 'The world' outside any mind has no structure or any features. Structure and features are imposed on it by the mind. This doesn't mean that the structure and features are invented from whole cloth, either. They are dependent on the kinds of beings we are. Human beings will naturally see features and structures that are determinable in accordance with their sensory capabilities and prior understanding. In one sense, they pre-exist the mind discovering them, but in another, they're dependent on our consensus agreement - weights and measures, units of distance and duration, qualities and quantitative attributes, which we decide and inter-subjectively agree on.

And it's not a panpsychic undermind, but the mind - the mind that you and I and every other sentient being is an instance of. Granted, perhaps something like Hegel's geist (although I'm no Hegel scholar.)

The point about time, again, and this is a thread about time, is simply that it cannot be said to be real, in the absence of an observer.

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

'The world' outside any mind has no structure or any features. — Wayfarer

You can't know that. that's the step too far. All you can say is that you do not know what that structure might be. At least until it is understood, by coming "inside" the mind.

But there is the false juxtaposition, of what is inside and outside the mind, what can be spoken of and what cannot.

And it's not a panpsychic undermind, but the mind - the mind that you and I and every other sentient being is an instance of. — Wayfarer

Hmm. The Claytons panpsychicism, the panpsychicism you have when your not having a panpsychicism. (Australia reference).

The point about time, again, and this is a thread about time, is simply that it cannot be said to be real, in the absence of an observer. — Wayfarer

Nothing can be believed without a mind. But that is different to nothing's being the case. You conclude that there is no time without an observer, but there is no observer to check your claim. That's your step too far, again. If someone counters that there is time, unobserved, how are we to decide which is correct? We cannot. Yet you do.

it's an act of faith.


(Added: and the next step is to move on to quantum hand waiving without the maths, and obtuse references to supposed authorities in physics who are outside of their area of specialisation... as Davies.)

Our shared biology and cognitive capacities provide a foundation for commonalities in perception,
— Tom Storm
...and therefore there is a shared biology that is "external" to our cognitive capacities. Biology will not work as an explanation of commonality unless there already is such a commonality - the shared world. — Banno

Don't know it that's accurate - your argument assumes that a shared biology requires a pre-existing external world. How do you rule out the possibility that biological commonalities emerge through evolutionary and developmental processes. Shared biology and cognitive capacities don't presuppose an independent "shared world" in the metaphysical sense. Couldn't they arise from genetic inheritance, environmental pressures, and social interactions?

'The world' outside any mind has no structure or any features.
— Wayfarer

You can't know that. that's the step too far. All you can say is that you do not know what that structure might be. At least until it is understood, by coming "inside" the mind. — Banno

No, I reject that emphatically. Again, 'before h.sapiens existed' is itself mind-dependent. That doesn't mean it is all in the mind.

Yours is the act of faith.

your argument assumes that a shared biology requires a pre-existing external world. How do you rule out the possibility that biological commonalities emerge through evolutionary and developmental processes. — Tom Storm

What is the "evolutionary and developmental processes" apart from "a pre-existing external world"? What does evolution take place in, if not the world?

Couldn't they arise from genetic inheritance — Tom Storm

How could there be a genetic inheritance apart from the physical world? There being genes is that there is a physical world. I can't see what it is you are proposing, if it involves evolution both occurring in and bringing about, mind.

Again, 'before h.sapiens existed' is itself mind-dependent. That doesn't mean it is all in the mind. — Wayfarer

De re and de dicto. Believing that there was a time before humans is mind-dependent. There being a time before humans, isn't. You are making an error in scope. That our access to a fact is mediated by minds does not imply that the fact itself is mind-dependent.

Believing that there was a time before humans is mind-dependent. There being a time before humans, isn't. — Banno

Time itself is mind-dependent. Given that, we know there was a time before h.sapiens evolved. The two levels, again. It is logically possible that the Universe and everything in it was created so as to appear to have a specific duration. It's the evil daemon argument all over again.

Horses' mouth.

Time itself is mind-dependent. — Wayfarer

Begging the question. Or better, how could we make sense of the sentence "Time is mind-dependent"?

We know time passed before humans evolved, before Earth even formed. So it could not be that time only passes in the presence of mind. Of course, that we know time passed before Earth was formed is indeed mind dependent. But that is not what you want to say, is it? You still insist on taking that step too far.

Saying that time is mind dependent is like saying the moon didn't exist before folk noticed it. It had to be there in order to get noticed.

If you wish to introduce and evil daemon, the level of scepticism required will remove any capacity for rational judgement. Sure, the world was created just before you read that sentence. If that's what you need in order to make your doctrine coherent, then your doctrine is feeble.

How could there be a genetic inheritance apart from the physical world? There being genes is that there is a physical world. I can't see what it is you are proposing, if it involves evolution both occurring in and bringing about, mind. — Banno

Fair enough. Someone like Kastrup would respond that genes (physicalism) is what consciousness looks like when viewed from a particular perspective. Which I’m sure you would regard as bullshit.

I’m not proposing anything in particular, just holding up what seem to be interesting arguments to me. I guess I would prefer not to propose there is no “world” at all - there seems to be something, perhaps just flux to which we provide a type of coherence.

Someone like Kastrup would respond that genes (physicalism) is what consciousness looks like when viewed from a particular perspective. Which I’m sure you would regard as bullshit. — Tom Storm

Well, bullshit in the way that it is pretty much self-serving pop nonsense. If genes are explained by consciousness, then it is circular to then explain consciousness in terms of the evolution of genes.

It's dreadful stuff, really, that any undergrad ought be able to undermine. But critique is unfashionable.

- there seems to be something — Tom Storm

So why not just go with that. After all, it works.

IF you say the keys are in your pocket when they are in the door, then you are wrong. — Banno

As I said, that's a judgement. Do you dispute the obvious?

Why is it not plausible that organisms with sensory equipment have evolved to perceive what is there? How long would we survive if our perceptions were not mostly accurate?
— Janus

Isn't the famous argument by Donald Hoffman and others that evolution does not favour seeing the world as it truly is, but rather seeing it in ways that enhance survival and reproduction. — Tom Storm

Presumably that argument is based on the understanding of evolution of species which is in turn based on the assumption that the fossil evidence is giving us an accurate picture of what organisms existed, when they existed and how they related to one another in terms of structural developments.

But the theory has no justification if it assumes that our senses, and hence the fossil remains, do not give us an accurate picture of the reality, or in other words does not give us an accurate picture of the evolution of species. It is a performative contradiction and as such I cannot take it seriously.

That's right, any well-schooled undergraduate should be able to spot the faulty reasoning, the unjustified conclusions in these kinds of arguments.

The irony is that @Wayfarer can offer only psychologistic explanations of how Western culture has arrived where it has with the additional assertion that we have lost something of the ancient wisdom, when most of the critiques of those ideas are not psychologistic in nature but purely based on critical thinking that examines what we have the best evidence for.

Psychologistic explanations of how idealist thinking is based on wishful thinking could be given, since those ideas which include the possibility of enlightenment, personal salvation and redemption including ultimately immortality would seem to be, for many at least, more attractive than the deflating realist idea that we have just one life.

How could time function as a physical constraint on what is possible and what is not, if it didn't exist? — hypericin

Time flows, but it doesn't have to exist. It is like God. God creates, but God doesn't have to exist.

My overall point is, if time falls, so does space. Since they really are the same sorts of things. — hypericin

Time flows. Space doesn't flow. Therefore they are not the same sort of things.

I never said otherwise! — Wayfarer

So manifestly tiresome, I should think, to be put in a defensive position, the accusatory ground for which having been seriously misunderstood. Or perfectly understood but miserably disavowed.

Given that Kant has already been invoked, as he usually is, it is permissible to further posit the “transcendental illusion”, whereby your defense of existence/non-existece, with respect to mind**, is mis-taken by antagonists in their collective proclamations regarding only existence (of)/non-existence (of), under the same conditions.

How foolish to ask of existence without mind, absent conjoined temporal qualification, when it is from mind the question is asked, in which that very qualification is immediately presupposed.

Existence is not an existent, from which follows existence belongs to mind alone as a pure conception; existence is given iff there is that mind capable of its deduction, and, that in which such deduction resides.

On the other hand, that which is conditioned by the pure conception, re: that which is an existent, merely indicates that on which the cognitively functional part of the human intellect performs. Cognitively functional in juxtaposition to the aesthetically pleasing.
(** reason, in all congruent instances)

All that to say this: even without any possibility of apodeictic empirical justifications, re: proofs, I agree with what you’re saying.

How foolish to ask of existence without mind, absent conjoined temporal qualification, when it is from mind the question is asked, in which that very qualification is immediately presupposed. — Mww

:rofl: :naughty:

Force and energy are both physical constructs. Time is part of the construction. — frank

Indeed, and your explanation was that they move because of force and energy; yet force and energy are defined in terms of time. Hence, on your own account, they move because of time.

The stuff you claim does not exist. — Banno

Technically, those are mathematical definitions which are not the same thing as the 'ontological' connecting tissue of the universe they refer to.

An objects 'extension' is not the same as the ACT of 'measurement'. A measurement takes time as you have to roll out the measuring tape and set it at the ends of the object. An object IS (tenseless) extended. That is a property it has regardless of time under a naive presentist manifest image of the world.

This is also distinguished from other operative definitions of force such as it being a 'reading on a force-meter'.

However, we can all agree that if there is no one to measure a force, to ascribe a value to it by operational standardization, or give a mathematical definition that there WOULD still be interactions. Casual omph's in nature and these we call or dub forces.

This is a perfect example of the sloppy language that can be used in physics which doesn't distinguish between: Instrumental/operational definitions, ontological definitions, mathematical definitions etc.

THOSE ARE ALL DIFFERENT! Even though they be used in the service of a similar referential/descriptive goal. That minor misunderstanding is what prompts this individual to complain about the prevalence of 'reified' usages of the word force in physics.

Then there are those who consider alternative definitions of force such as this person who consider them as,

. . . real, symmetrical and non-casual relations.

Yeah, well, you know….no one’s gonna admit to being “done with all this thinking”, but might still judge that everyone else seems to be done with his.

Yeah, well, you know….no one’s gonna admit to being “done with all this thinking”, but might still judge that everyone else seems to be done with his. — Mww

We should go back to Kant.

"We dispute all claim of time to absolute reality [absolute Realität], namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can also never be given to us through the senses. Therefore herein lies the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if one abstracts from the subjective condition of our sensible intuition, it is nothing at all, and can be considered neither as subsisting nor as inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition). " - CPR (A36/B52)

Everybody should go back to Kant, but most everybody is “done with all this (kind of) thinking”.

I’m more affirming your arguments than denying them, except for the opening statement, which I find catastrophically false, if only with respect to the CPR, re: space is no more real than time, and thereby doesn’t exit as do the real objects that are conditioned by it.

Pretty simple, really: space doesn’t move, and time doesn’t change, yet the movement of things in time is the ground of all empirical knowledge whatsoever. How to reconcile one with the other, is what the hoopla is all about.

Fairdos. I am still thinking, and try to perceive time. But time is not perceivable like the other objects around me. I still use time, and tell the time. But that doesn't convince me time exists. Time is a concept or as Kant put it a priori condition for human perception. If time is a priori transcendental condition, then it doesn't exist. We have them in our minds. :)

Investigate someone else’s metaphysical exposé of time, you’ll get a different set of premises for its explanation, right?

Investigate someone else’s metaphysical exposé of time, you’ll get a different set of premises for its explanation, right? — Mww

Just ordered a book on time. It is filled with various articles by 30 different academic contributors. It is called "Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality"

What's your view on time?