Terminology again . . . we do hear a series of tones, we just can't recognize them. A software program can. — J

As I said, there is only a series of tones in conception, and when that conception is applied. That's what the software program does, applies the conception. We do not hear a series of tones, evidenced by what you say, we "can't recognize them".

So sound is not a physical thing. I give up. — Banno

OED: Sound 1) "a sensation caused in the ear by the vibration...". Sensations are not physical things. Therefore sounds are not physical things, just like colours are not physical things. Get with the program!

As I said previously, we can perform the operation of inspecting a single impression or ideas in our reflecting operations by mind after the perception. — Corvus

The point though is that the creation of "a single impression", is a product of that act of reflecting. It is not the direct product of sensation, so it is not an accurate description of perception, it is a description of how perception appears when revisited in the memory. This makes the "single impression" a mental abstraction rather than a sense perception.

Is continuity a single movement of smooth, undisturbed and conjoined movement from start to the end of the movement? Or is it an illusory appearance of the many instances of the sliced images? What is your own idea on this? — Corvus

There is no real start and end. The start and end are arbitrarily assigned by the sensing being, for whatever purpose.



Here's someone at Oxford who's as crazy as I am, Frank Arntzenius: https://philpapers.org/rec/ARNATR

I argue that, despite the fact that there have been interesting and relevant developments in mathematics and physics since the time of Zeno, each of these views still has serious drawbacks. — Are there really Instantaneous Velocities?

Speaking of melody, you might have missed this quote I provided a few weeks back

We usually imagine time as analogous with space. We imagine it, for example, laid out on a line (like a timeline of events) or a circle (like a sundial ring or a clock face). And when we think of time as the seconds on a clock, we spatialise it as an ordered series of discrete, homogeneous and identical units. This is clock time. But in our daily lives we don’t experience time as a succession of identical units. An hour in the dentist’s chair is very different from an hour over a glass of wine with friends. This is lived time. Lived time is flow and constant change. It is ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’. When we treat time as a series of uniform, unchanging units, like points on a line or seconds on a clock, we lose the sense of change and growth that defines real life; we lose the irreversible flow of becoming, which Bergson called ‘duration’.

Think of a melody. Each note has its own distinct individuality while blending with the other notes and silences that come before and after. As we listen, past notes linger in the present ones, and (especially if we’ve heard the song before) future notes may already seem to sound in the ones we’re hearing now. Music is not just a series of discrete notes. We experience it as something inherently durational.

Bergson insisted that duration proper cannot be measured. To measure something – such as volume, length, pressure, weight, speed or temperature – we need to stipulate the unit of measurement in terms of a standard. For example, the standard metre was once stipulated to be the length of a particular 100-centimetre-long platinum bar kept in Paris. It is now defined by an atomic clock measuring the length of a path of light travelling in a vacuum over an extremely short time interval. In both cases, the standard metre is a measurement of length that itself has a length. The standard unit exemplifies the property it measures.

In Time and Free Will, Bergson argued that this procedure would not work for duration. For duration to be measured by a clock, the clock itself must have duration. It must exemplify the property it is supposed to measure. To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. — Aeon.co

Which supports my view, that time is meaningless without there being an awareness of duration. In that sense the expression ‘the world before time began’ is not entirely metaphorical.

I’ll head off the predictable objection that we know of a vast period of time before we existed. Yes, we are aware of that. That period is measured in durations of years, which are based on the period of time it takes for the Earth to complete an orbit of the Sun.

The point though is that the creation of "a single impression", is a product of that act of reflecting. It is not the direct product of sensation, so it is not an accurate description of perception, it is a description of how perception appears when revisited in the memory. This makes the "single impression" a mental abstraction rather than a sense perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

But in Hume, reflection and inspection on perceived ideas are also perceptions. Every mental event is perception.

There is no real start and end. The start and end are arbitrarily assigned by the sensing being, for whatever purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think of a security camera monitoring a set space in your garden.  When it detects a movement via infrared lighting, the sensor in the camera triggers recording.  When the motion ends, or goes out of sight, the detection operation switches off, ending the recording of the image of the object which triggered the recording.

Motion and movement have start and end points, hence they trigger the sensing mechanisms of the cameras or monitoring devices. Start and end point of movement also allows you to be able to measure the time it took for the movement completion for further analysis on the energy it generated and velocity of the movement etc.

Which supports my view, that time is meaningless without there being an awareness of duration. In that sense the expression ‘the world before time began’ is not entirely metaphorical. — Wayfarer

Many important philosophers in history and the contemporary physics folks view time as emergent properties from human mind.

that we know of a vast period of time before we existed. — Wayfarer

We can guess about anything before we existed. But it neither can be proved nor disapproved.

Yes, we are aware of that. That period is measured in durations of years, which are based on the period of time it takes for the Earth to complete an orbit of the Sun. — Wayfarer

:up:

Julian Barbour is an independent scholar who also argues that time doesn't exist. I haven't listened to the whole presentation, but it might be of interest to you. He also has published a book on the subject.

But in Hume, reflection and inspection on perceived ideas are also perceptions. Every mental event is perception. — Corvus

This is indicative of the problem I am talking about. Hume does not acknowledge the difference between sensing (simple observation as time passes), and the analysis of what has already been sensed. By saying that for Hume "every mental state is a perception", you confirm that Hume does not recognize the difference.

What I am arguing is that sensation consists of a continuous flow of change and motion, whereas the analysis consists of representing this continuity as distinct states, perceptions, impressions, or ideas. There is a fundamental difference between these two, the continuous flow of sensation, and the succession of discrete impressions. This difference implies that this type of analysis is fundamentally flawed. It's based in the false premise, or assumption, that a continuous activity can be truthfully represented as a succession of discrete states.

The problem is demonstrated by the example of a movie being a succession of still frames. It may be the case that what appears through sensation to be continuous activity, is really a succession of still frames. But to justify the claim that the apparent continuity really is a succession of frames, requires that we determine the stops and starts, the distinct frames themselves, exposing the mechanism by which the distinct frames are changed and displayed to us one at a time. When in analysis, we simply apply arbitrary stops and starts, we do not base that division into distinct frames on anything real, the frames are arbitrarily assumed and projected onto the apparent continuity. Therefore the whole assumption of a "succession of discrete impressions" is completely ungrounded, because the frames are mental constructs arbitrarily created, and this renders the premise that what appears through sensation as continuous activity is really a succession of discrete moments, as completely unsound.

Think of a security camera monitoring a set space in your garden.  When it detects a movement via infrared lighting, the sensor in the camera triggers recording.  When the motion ends, or goes out of sight, the detection operation switches off, ending the recording of the image of the object which triggered the recording. — Corvus

The sensitivity of the trigger is set at an arbitrary value, and the range of possible values has physical limitations. Also the detector has a limited spatial range. The start and end of the motion are determined relative to these arbitrary features.

2) A slide moves from D to E.
— J

The pitch moved from D to E. — Banno

But see above. The pitch changed. There is nothing called "pitch" that can move yet be self-identical. Unless we're OK with saying, e.g., "The logic of the argument deteriorated as he went along" and maintaining that "the logic" is an item that holds steady, and be said to deteriorate (compared to what standard?). Sure, there's something like "logic" in the world, but it isn't much like Achilles in terms of what we can say about it.

Are we gnashing over usage here? To some extent. I talk about pitches and melodies "moving" all the time; it's standard English. I just wanted us to reflect on how differently this idea of movement must be understood in such a context. And I firmly hold out for the position that, literally, acoustically, a pitch cannot move. In what (conceptual?) space is it moving? Why can't my software detect the movement?

Terminology again . . . we do hear a series of tones, we just can't recognize them. A software program can.
— J

As I said, there is only a series of tones in conception, and when that conception is applied. That's what the software program does, applies the conception. We do not hear a series of tones, evidenced by what you say, we "can't recognize them". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fine, then, with adopting the other usage I suggested:

But if you'd rather reserve the term "hear" to mean "can distinguish acoustically," that's fine. Then we would say that I don't hear a series of tones when I hear a slide, I "process them auditorially" or some such, and when I do that, being human, I don't hear the discrete pitches — J

But I think you're questioning whether even the most sophisticated software can "hear the pitches." That is, you're wondering if "discrete pitches" is something a perceiver brings to the auditory stream, rather than locating or identifying them there. A fair question, but then there would be nothing special about this question as applied to music. It would be the huge, overhanging question of the extent to which our subjectivity creates the reality it seems to encounter.

Think of a melody. Each note has its own distinct individuality while blending with the other notes and silences that come before and after. As we listen, past notes linger in the present ones, and (especially if we’ve heard the song before) future notes may already seem to sound in the ones we’re hearing now. Music is not just a series of discrete notes. We experience it as something inherently durational. — Aeon.co

Nice. As you may know, this question of how we retain previous moments as we listen, and project future moments, is integral to a composer's skill. Can I reasonably expect a listener to remember that a song chorus has been played twice before, and recognize (at least part of) it the third time? Can I expect her, hearing it for the first time in the song, to project the likelihood of its repetition? The answers to these kinds of questions in turn depend on how a composer imagines their audience -- what cultural familiarities and listening skills are presupposed.

I wish you all the best in your attempts to help Banno to resist the bad habit of equivocation, but I'm afraid it will be fruitless.

But I think you're questioning whether even the most sophisticated software can "hear the pitches." That is, you're wondering if "discrete pitches" is something a perceiver brings to the auditory stream, rather than locating or identifying them there. — J

The issue, is that the software will definitely hear "the pitches", but only because it is designed to pick those designated pitches out. So the hearing of distinct pitches is a feature of the software, and that's not necessarily a feature of our sense apparatus. The device would be set to distinguish specific frequencies as they occur, and it would record "hearing that pitch". The problem is that the machine would not be distinguishing that as a distinct and separate note, it would just be registering the time when the transmitted frequency passes the designated range. So it's an artificial and arbitrary creation of "a pitch".

A fair question, but then there would be nothing special about this question as applied to music. It would be the huge, overhanging question of the extent to which our subjectivity creates the reality it seems to encounter — J

That's right, I see nothing special about this question as applied to music. The same issue, in a more general sense, is what I am discussing with Corvus. That is the question of whether we sense distinct and discrete perceptions, impressions, or ideas, (as described by Hume), or whether we sense a continuity of changing information.

The problem is that the machine would not be distinguishing that as a distinct and separate note, it would just be registering the time when the transmitted frequency passes the designated range. So it's an artificial and arbitrary creation of "a pitch". — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. I'm tempted to respond, "Well, if 'a frequency passing into a designated range' is not a standard understanding of what pitch is . . . then what would you suggest?" This would be too glib, but I am curious what you have in mind that would not be "artificial and arbitrary." Or does any use of "pitch" have to be that way?

. . . the question of whether we sense distinct and discrete perceptions, impressions, or ideas, (as described by Hume), or whether we sense a continuity of changing information. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Music makes a good laboratory to examine some of our intuitions here, because (most?) acousticians accept the idea that the "movement of sound" is an illusion. We could just as well use film, I suppose, and talk about how individual frames do not move, but taken together create the illusion of a "moving picture."

. . . attempts to help Banno to resist the bad habit of equivocation — Metaphysician Undercover

Speaking of bad habits, I don't know why so many on this forum seem compelled toward personal disparagement. It is perfectly possible, and surely preferable, to respond post by post without deleterious characterization of others' alleged strengths and weaknesses.

I don't see that physics does adopt "the cinematographic view of time as 'frames of a universal movie'". Certainly classical and relativistic physics assumes continuity. Some recent theories may use discrete mathematics - Lattice Quantum Field Theory, Cellular Automata, or Loop Quantum Gravity, for example. Not central and not accepted. — Banno

It's popular is the point. If it wasn't then I feel I'd see esoteric language from the purview of process philosophy or organicism used more often despite their, sometimes intentional, poetic impressions. I would expect the language to then make or take an extremely dramatic turn which makes meta-physicists jealous in the obscurity or strangeness of the new terminology/concepts.

For that reason, philosophers who advocate for strange dissections of the light-cone seem to try their best to break out of that mold.

And it may be worth considering what is going on here. The physical world does not care whether we choose continuous or discrete mathematics to best describe it. It is what it is, regardless of whether we describe it one way of the other. The choice between discrete and continuous mathematics is not a choice between how things are, but about what we say about how things are. — Banno

Exactly! So if philosophy/mathematics can't tell a DAMN THING about how the real world actually is then WE NEED TO MOVE ON to where we can actually have a fruitful debate or discussion.

If you want to talk about what things there really are or are not then you relegate it to ontology. . . but without direct access to the world around us past the spectre of skepticism then we might feel that epistemology is more worth it. . . but there are great philosophical limits to that which have been beaten into us for centuries.

So what happens when we are unsure about the ontology or how to even approach figuring it out and may even be skeptical its even possible to do so? Well, you abandon that line of inquiry of course! It's leading you no where if it doesn't allow you to make any intellectual progress aside from sitting in the corner being as skeptically neutral as possible.

So we move on to what happens after that. . . after underdetermination plagues our theories and their interpretations. . . we move on to non-empirical virtues (unification, simplicity, counterfactual reductions, etc), to aesthetics, to the politics of it, the sociology, the history, or more importantly to its PEDAGOGY as to how its taught.

There are much more fruitful discussions to partake in than the question of what the world REALLY is or how we gain access to it if philosophy is going tell us after much introspection that its altogether a pointless endeavor. Fuck them then! Let's just go on to a different topic that can actually be pushed forward to something new.

As you may know, this question of how we retain previous moments as we listen, and project future moments, is integral to a composer's skill. — J

This analogy is not about music or composition. It's about the fact that music comprises individual sounds which, by themselves, are not music. It is the awareness of the sequence of sounds. This analogy is then applied to the awareness of duration. What ties together the succession of moments into duration?

we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. — Aeon.co

This analogy is not about music or composition. It's about the fact that music comprises individual sounds which, by themselves, are not music. — Wayfarer

I know. I just thought the point about composition was interesting, sorry.

This is indicative of the problem I am talking about. Hume does not acknowledge the difference between sensing (simple observation as time passes), and the analysis of what has already been sensed. By saying that for Hume "every mental state is a perception", you confirm that Hume does not recognize the difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't sensing via impressions, and the matching ideas for thoughts, reasoning and reflective analysis in Hume? So, there is a clear division between the live sensation and knowing, thinking, reflecting, remembering in Hume. The former are via impressions, and the latter by the matching ideas.

Impressions and ideas work under the principle of association of contiguity, resemblance and cause and effect.

What I am arguing is that sensation consists of a continuous flow of change and motion, whereas the analysis consists of representing this continuity as distinct states, perceptions, impressions, or ideas. There is a fundamental difference between these two, the continuous flow of sensation, and the succession of discrete impressions. This difference implies that this type of analysis is fundamentally flawed. It's based in the false premise, or assumption, that a continuous activity can be truthfully represented as a succession of discrete states. — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn't it depend on how fast the movement was? When you are observing a fast movement of an object, let's say, firing a gun at a long distance target. You will not see the bullet flying due to the high speed it travels towards the target. All you will perceive would be loud banging, and see the smoke, and instant bullet holes on the target. You haven't seen anything, but the movement still happened from the bullet movement starting point i.e. the barrel, to the end of the movement, the target. With the high speed of the object movement, the continuity was not visible but it was still there.

Now think of a movement of a Chinese man doing Tai Chi. His arms and legs move as he performs the Tai Chi practice. The movement is well visible, and even stoppable while the movement is being made. The speed of the movement of the arms and legs are so slow, the impression coming into the perceiver appears smooth and continuous. The impression of the movement is not deceiving anyone, but it just appears as continuous, and that is just the way perception works.

Julian Barbour is an independent scholar who also argues that time doesn't exist. I haven't listened to the whole presentation, but it might be of interest to you. He also has published a book on the subject. — Wayfarer

Great video. Thank you for the info. Much appreciated. :pray: :cool:
I was really inspired to see someone who has a similar ideas to mine on the topic.

There is nothing called "pitch" that can move yet be self-identical. — J

The sound changed in pitch. What changed? The sound. What was self-identical (a phrase that only a philosopher would use)? The sound, the tone, the note - it moved from low to high.

I firmly hold out for the position that, literally, acoustically, a pitch cannot move. In what (conceptual?) space is it moving? — J

The pitch of the note moved.

I talk about pitches and melodies "moving" all the time; it's standard English. — J

Yep. Let that be your guide, rather than an esoteric rant. At some point, one can only laugh and walk away.

Fuck them then! — substantivalism

Philosophy is a pointless endeavour.

Philosophy is a pointless endeavour. — Banno

So is living but I haven't gone back on my promise to myself to continue on since two years ago. There is too much to learn and change than to be some old miser who complains all the time. . . although that habit dies hard if you've seen my previous posts on here even recently but I'm always hoping someone will see through that all that noise I'm making to get to the same existential conclusion.

What else am I supposed do?

@Wayfarer Hey! I found this book going on about organicism and new metaphors in biology. Thought it would be interesting for you.

Here is a quote of interest that piqued mine. . .

A pure observation language as the basis of science exactly inverts the order of things. Operationalism might make sense as a post theoretical exercise in clarification, but it does not help in the process of planning experiments or in judging the fit of expectation and result. Further, the theory must be "reintegrated," at least tacitly, after positivist analysis if it is to make sense, that is, for its structural character to show. The reverse of the positivist claim seems to be the case: the positivist program is the useful device but a richer conception is required to generate or understand science.

So is living — substantivalism

Only if you choose to view it as such.

But if you have a choice, better not to spend your time here.

I'm off to plant some flowers.

Only if you choose to view it as such.

But if you have a choice, better not to spend your time here.

I'm off to plant some flowers. — Banno

. . . but then after you've spent your time astray in the vivid forests of the coming age I can't bear to ignore the other poor creatures stuck in thickets and thorns. Some self inflected and unable to ask for help as they do not possess the right words.

Hey! I found this book going on about organicism and new metaphors in biology. Thought it would be interesting for you. — substantivalism

Does look interesting, albeit (groan) yet another book. I don't know if you've had much interaction with the sometime contributor here, Apokrisis, but he has a lot of interesting things to say about biosemiotics, a field I didn't even know existed until he came along. That has lead me research into that field, and also into the phenomenology of biology, subject of books by Hans Jonas and Evan Thompson. Also Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature'. I think there'd be some crossover to that book you're mentioning. I notice:

The reverse of the positivist claim seems to be the case: the positivist program is the useful device but a richer conception is required to generate or understand science.

Surely rings true for me. Positivism, especially the Vienna Circle type, is that attempt to restrict the scope of philosophy within the bounds of science, which of course came to grief with the realisation that the setting of those bounds was itself a matter for philosophy.

I don't know if you've had much interaction with the sometime contributor here, Apokrisis, but he has a lot of interesting things to say about biosemiotics, a field I didn't even know existed until he came along. — Wayfarer

I think he has a PhD in biophysics. This thread seems to be in a rut of sorts. He might add something original to the discussion. My own ideas, shallow as they are, is that time certainly exists and is a continuum of instances, like the points on the real line. How to isolate an instant? Take a photo.

The book "Subjective Time" arrived, and the 1st chapter starts with the excerpt from "The Principle of Psychology" by William James. James starts the chapter saying he will deal with what is sometime called internal perception, or the perception of time. So, James seems to have thought that time is an internal perception.

Another good video on Time.

"Well, if 'a frequency passing into a designated range' is not a standard understanding of what pitch is . . . then what would you suggest?" — J

I noticed in your reply to Banno, that you accept the idea that the wave would have to hold that frequency for a period of time to be recognizable as the designated pitch. So, wouldn't it be necessary that the source maintain a spcified frequency of vibration for a duration of time, in order for us to have a "pitch"?

Now take the example of the slide. Suppose that throughout the duration of the slide, there is an even, and continuous changing of frequency. From this premise we wouldn't have any pitches at all, because each moment would provide a new frequency, and there would be no duration of any specific frequency, therefore no "pitches" as defined.

However, notice that I spoke of a "designated range". Having a range of frequency which provide the criteria for any specific "pitch", adds another parameter. This allows that the machine could detect some pitches, because the frequency of vibration could be within the designated "range" for the designated period of time. Then, the breadth of the range, and the speed of the slide, become important factors.

So we have three very important factors, the specified range, the required length of time within the range, and the speed of the slide. Two of these are very clearly completely arbitrary, the range, and the required duration within the range. These would be programed into the machine through some arbitrary choice. The third factor, the speed of the slide, appears to be somewhat objective, because it is the object being analyzed, but it's really not. The described slide is simply artificially created from the purpose of the thought experiment, and not representative of anything real. We assumed something unrealistic in the first place, a perfectly even, continuous slide.

Isn't sensing via impressions, and the matching ideas for thoughts, reasoning and reflective analysis in Hume? So, there is a clear division between the live sensation and knowing, thinking, reflecting, remembering in Hume. The former are via impressions, and the latter by the matching ideas. — Corvus

The point being that ideas and perceptions are not properly separated or distinguished.

Doesn't it depend on how fast the movement was? — Corvus

No I don't think so. The fact that some motions are too fast to sense doesn't affect the fact that we sense motions.

How to isolate an instant? Take a photo. — jgill

As I've explained above, that is an arbitrarily created "instant". So it provides nothing toward proving that real time consists of a succession of instants.

The point being that ideas and perceptions are not properly separated or distinguished. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume distinguishes ideas from impressions, and the rest of perceptions too.
Ideas are faint copies of the matching impressions. Only ideas work under the principle of the association i.e. contiguity, resemblance and cause and effect.

No I don't think so. The fact that some motions are too fast to sense doesn't affect the fact that we sense motions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your saying "we sense motions" sounds like contingent acts of guessing. Not accurate perception. Your visual sensation can never capture the motion of a flying bullet. You would be just guessing it. That is not perception. What does it tell you? Continuity is an illusion created by your mind, and it is a concept. It doesn't exist in reality.

Ideas are faint copies of the matching impressions. — Corvus

That looks like an arbitrary distinction. Faint/clear?

Your saying "we sense motions" sounds like contingent acts of guessing. Not accurate perception. Your visual sensation can never capture the motion of a flying bullet. You would be just guessing it. That is not perception. What does it tell you? Continuity is an illusion created by your mind, and it is a concept. It doesn't exist in reality. — Corvus

Perception is not accurate, that's the point. We create accuracy with conception, and that is why we need proper principles to distinguish between perception and conception. This allows us to understand how conception obtains such a higher degree of accuracy. Kant for instance, proposes the a priori intuitions of space and time, as the condition for sense impressions.

That looks like an arbitrary distinction. Faint/clear? — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume makes clear statement on the definition of ideas in his Treatise and Enquiries too. Impressions are sensations which first appear into our minds with liveliness and vivacity. Ideas are the matching copies of the impressions which are faint in vivacity and liveliness. This makes sense. When we remember past events, the images and ideas are not as lively and vivacious as the impressions from live perception.

Perception is not accurate, that's the point. We create accuracy with conception, and that is why we need proper principles to distinguish between perception and conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course perception is not 100% accurate. Nothing is. But it is far more accurate than guessing or imagining.

and that is why we need proper principles to distinguish between perception and conception. This allows us to understand how conception obtains such a higher degree of accuracy. Kant for instance, proposes the a priori intuitions of space and time, as the condition for sense impressions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that is a guarantee for absolute accuracy on perception. Space and time as a priori condition for perception in Kant is just the foundation his transcendental idealism is based on. What Kant was aiming at was possibility of Metaphysics as Science, not accuracy of perception.