You are comparing it to the norm. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course all comparison needs criteria for what is norm. If not, how can you compare anything?

The general capacity to compare something to a norm. You don't seem to be paying attention to my post. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, if you played the above 2x recordings to someone (a indigenous tribe man in a jungle or someone who doesn't like western classic rock music) who never listened the song in his life or a tone deaf, then he won't be able to tell the difference. In that case, where is the general capacity?

You don't seem to be paying attention to my post. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do. But when I see vague points or ambiguities in the post, I will point them out. :)

Of course all comparison needs criteria for what is norm. If not, how can you compare anything? — Corvus

So the point is that the ability to recognize a piece of music as at a speed other than the norm, is not an innate ability. It requires the criteria of the example which serves as the norm, and this example is not provided innately.

Well, if you played the above 2x recordings to someone (a indigenous tribe man in a jungle or someone who doesn't like western classic rock music) who never listened the song in his life or a tone deaf, then he won't be able to tell the difference. In that case, where is the general capacity? — Corvus

The general capacity is not demonstrated here, because that capacity is the ability to compare, and there is nothing being compared in this example.

So the point is that the ability to recognize a piece of music as at a speed other than the norm, is not an innate ability. It requires the criteria of the example which serves as the norm, and this example is not provided innately. — Metaphysician Undercover

Listening is an empirical sensation, but the judgement on the listened music as normal or not normal is a mental operation from the innate capacity.

The general capacity is not demonstrated here, because that capacity is the ability to compare, and there is nothing being compared in this example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure what you mean. There are 2x piece of guitar solos given above in the recording. The top one is 30% slowed down in speed, and the bottom one is the normal one. Anyone can have a listen to both recordings and make comparisons.

There is no ontology of time, simply because time as an independent entity simply does not exist.
Time is a concept derived from the change, the flux, the process and becoming of nature.
In a universe where there was no activity, no flux, the concept of time or the word time would simply become meaningless. Much the same could be said of the concept of empty space (no such thing). — prothero

Nonexistence is also existence.

This is explained quite well by physicist Richard Feynman…. — Metaphysician Undercover

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....”
(Feynman lectures, (CalTech, 1956), in Vol. II, Ch 1.5, 1963)
————-

I can see I’ve opened a can of worms…. — Wayfarer

Nahhhh…I get it. Pretty simple, really. It all begins with an idea, in this case, “fields”. Forgetting the altogether unremarkable commonplace rendition of field as merely grass-y ground, the idea of fields as “quantitative values in space” or fields as “subjectivity”, are nothing but the idea under which distinguishing conceptions are subsumed, but without contradicting the bare notion itself.

This field possesses, e.g., momentum and energy, that field possesses, e.g., sensibility and discursive/aesthetic judgement;
This field is the condition of every object to which it relates, that field is the condition of every subject to which it relates;
That the relations are different does not contradict the validity of the respective conditions. That every particular kind of thing called a subject belongs to a subjectivity field is no less logically coherent than every particular kind of thing called an electron belongs to an electromagnetic field.

Whether that’s of any benefit or not, whether there’s any explanatory gain…..dunno. As my ol’ buddy Stephen says…..nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.

You are not the person to be giving out physics lessons.

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity. — Wayfarer

From math to woo. A little like the aether.

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields. But particle physics is wholly quantitative, it deals only with the measurable attributes of observed phenomena, something which is axiomatic to science generally. In physicalist philosophy, the observer is seen as being a consequence or outcome of those observed quantitative phenomena. But such observations leave out the subjective reality of existence and the role of the observing scientist, as a matter of principle. Which is why the qualitative nature of conscious experience is anomalous in this overall worldview, hence the significance of David Chalmer's 1996 paper on that topic.

Objective idealism begins from different premisses. It doesn't begin with the presumption that the quantifiable objects of empirical science are foundational or fundamental and that the observing mind can be explained with reference to them. In a sense, it incorporates the Cartesian principle of the primacy of mind, cogito ergo sum - that the existence of the observer can't plausibly be denied - even while eschewing the infamous mind-matter division that is also Cartesian. It points out that whatever is observed, measured, known, is always observed, measured and known by an observer, who as a matter of definition is not amongst the objects of analysis.

Aside from Bernardo Kastrup, other objective idealists are C S Peirce and (arguably) Plato (although the term 'idealism' was not coined until the early modern period.)

:up:

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer

The electromagnetic field has vector values at every point in space. Photons are ripples in the field - the photon can be described by a frequency and a direction, or by its energy - values in that field.

If there is a field of subjectivity or consciousness or whatever, it would need to be defined by the values attached to the points in space across which the field is spread. Presumably zero for empty space, and then... what? How will subjectivity be measured or calculated? What are it's units?

Moreover, if it has no units, and yet is somehow to explain the physical world, how does one get from the field of subjectivity to the measurable values of the electromagnetic field? Where do they come from? What equations show the relation here?

An issue not unlike that faced by Cartesian dualism in its inability to explain how one consciously moves one's hand.

I still call bullshit.

And I don't think much of his friends.

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity. — Wayfarer

Isn't this a religious-like flaw of begging the question or an infinite regress?

Our consciousness is Hard to understand, so we push it onto a Greater Consciousness as the experiential basis underlying reality, making it really HARD.

Why presume the ultra complex as First when we can see the simplex as First and the more complex as coming later?

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....” — Mww

You do see here that the points of the field each have an associated value, don't you?

So the question is, what are the values in the supposed field of subjectivity?

ou are not the person to be giving out physics lessons. — Banno

I was not giving a physics lesson, only pointing out your equivocation with the word "field".

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields. — Wayfarer

Photons are the excitations of the electromagnetic field. Each different type of particle has its own type of field. The real difficulty for quantum physics is in establishing the relations between one field and another. For instance, quarks and gluons are supposed to be distinct fields, essentially massless, yet through the strong nuclear force they make up hadrons which are massive. And due to the nature of the strong nuclear force they cannot actually be separated in practise.

After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10000 N, no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7]: 164  As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. — Wikipedia

So the gluon "field" actually represents the strong nuclear force which is responsible for creating massive hadrons from quarks which are almost massless.

The interaction between quarks and gluons is responsible for almost all the perceived mass of protons and neutrons and is therefore where we get our mass.

https://www.energy.gov/science/doe-explainsquarks-and-gluons

Moreover, if it has no units, how does one get from the field of subjectivity to the measurable values of the electromagnetic field? Where do they come from? — Banno

Since fields are massless, the real question is where does mass come from.

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.
— Wayfarer

Isn't this a religious-like flaw of begging the question or an infinite regress? — PoeticUniverse

It would take a lot more explanation, or conversely, a great deal more reading, to elaborate on what this means, and as the various contributors here think it's all bullshit, I'm not inclined to try. There are plenty of other topics to talk about.

Well, you asked...

The argument that we all operate with similar mental structures cannot explain more than the common ways in which we perceive and experience, it cannot explain the common content of our experience. I've lost count of how many times that point has remained unaddressed or glossed over.

In any case we cannot understand those structures other than via science, and in vivo they are precognitive, part of the in itself, which would indicate that the in itself has structure, and so is not undifferentiated at all. Structure without differentiation is logically impossible.

If structure exists independently of any mind, then it exists independently of all minds, unless there is a collective mind, and we have, and could have, no evidence of such a thing. — Janus

The 'collective mind' is not a separate entity, not some ghostly blob hovering over culture. It's more like expressions such as “the European mind” or “the Western mind.” In these cases, there are, on the one hand, individual minds—each with its own personality and proclivities—but also a vast pool of meanings, references, and, of course, language, which is common to all of them. That is the 'collective' nature of mind, and it closely resembles ideas found in Hegel’s philosophy.

Whereas Kant emphasizes that knowledge is shaped by the individual mind’s cognitive structures, Hegel highlights the collective dimension of knowledge. For Hegel, knowledge is not merely an individual achievement but emerges through historical and social processes—hence concepts like the Zeitgeist (spirit of the times). There is a tension between individual perspectives and the need for universal concepts. This is why, in Hegelian thought, consciousness develops dialectically: individuals grasp reality through immediate, personal experience, but this experience must be mediated by shared categories of thought and language. The ideas we have of the world are not merely personal; they are shaped by a linguistic and conceptual framework that has been historically developed through collective reasoning and cultural transmission.

As for the concern about the common content of experience, the explanation lies in the interplay between shared cognitive structures and intersubjective meaning. While universal cognitive structures explain how we perceive, the content of our experience - and therefore the meaning we attribute to them - is influenced by common linguistic categories, shared cultural contexts, and biological constraints. This does not require positing a separate “collective mind” but simply recognizes that cognition is always situated within a web of inherited meanings and social interactions.

Finally, regarding whether this perspective can be empirically proven—this is not an empirical hypothesis but an interpretive model of epistemology. It is not something that can be tested in a laboratory but rather a framework for understanding how knowledge and meaning emerge in human experience. Demanding empirical validation for such conceptual frameworks is again an appeal to verificationism, a discredited aspect of positivism.

The 'collective mind' is not a separate entity, not some ghostly blob hovering over culture. It's more like expressions such as “the European mind” or “the Western mind.” — Wayfarer

Right, it's an abstract entity, an idea, not an ontologically substantive being then. Commonalities of conceptual schemas and worldviews, which do of course evolve and even radically change over time, as I already said cannot

explain the common content of our experience. — Janus

so you haven't really answered the question.

Finally, regarding whether this perspective can be empirically proven—this is not an empirical hypothesis but an interpretive model of epistemology. It is not something that can be tested in a laboratory but rather a framework for understanding how knowledge and meaning emerge in human experience. Demanding empirical validation for such conceptual frameworks is again an appeal to verificationism, a discredited aspect of positivism. — Wayfarer

If structure exists independently of any mind, then it exists independently of all minds, unless there is a collective mind, and we have, and could have, no evidence of such a thing. — Janus

I'm not demanding empirical verification for a substantive collective mind, It is clear that empirical evidence in the sense of direct observation would be impossible in principle.

If we were all joined to a real collective mind that could determine the content of perceptual experiences rather than just the forms of perceptual experiences (which is itself explainable by the structural similarities between individual human bodies, brains, and sensory organs) then although that hypothetical entity, just like the individual human mind, could not be directly observed, we might expect to observe so called psychic phenomena that could lead us to infer the existence of such a collective mind.

I already know that the ideas of such collectivities exist, but such entities, if not substantive, are merely abstract concepts. I'm not asking for empirical evidence at all, but for an explanation as to how such socially and historically and biologically mediated commonalities of the forms of human perceptual experience could possibly explain the commonalties of content of human perceptual experience, and that you have certainly not provided. As I see it this is the central weakness in your position. You would be more consistent if you believed in a substantive (not merely abstract) "mind at large" as Kastrup does.

You never fail to mention positivism, apparently in an attempt to discredit what I argue, rather than dealing with it point by point on its own terms. Consequently, I've given up on addressing your posts, and was assuming you would do likewise with mine. However, if you continue to address me and yet still fail to address the critical points, then I will continue to call you out on that.

Right, it's an abstract entity, an idea, not an ontologically substantive being then. — Janus

You mean, not a thing, therefore, not real. What you mean by 'substantive' means 'can be verified scientifically'. There's no conflict between the fact that ideas and languages change, and that they are real.

so you haven't really answered the question. — Janus

Just be clear about this: I've answered it, but you either don't understand that answer, or don't accept, the answer. So instead of constantly complaining that I'm evading the question or not answering it, just recognise that. OK, you don't accept it, but don't say I'm not addressing it. I am saying that the cognitive systems through which we view the world are also constitutive of the world we view, meaning that the world is not really mind-independent in the sense that empiricism presumes.

You never fail to mention positivism, apparently in an attempt to discredit what I argue, rather than dealing with it point by point on its own terms — Janus

Because you constantly appeal to what is empirically verifiable by science as the yardstick for what constitutes real knowledge. If I had time, I could provide many direct quotes from you, saying that. It's not as if I'm accusing you of something radically objectionable: positivism is an identifiable and powerful influence in modern thinking, and you frequently appeal to it and to verificationism. Folllowed by 'and what about OSHO?!?' ;-)

You mean, not a thing, therefore, not real. What you mean by 'substantive' means 'can be verified scientifically'. There's no conflict between the fact that ideas and languages change, and that they are real. — Wayfarer

Social processes such as general changes of worldview are real, but they only exist in the individuals, books, computers and other media and so on, in which they are instantiated, manifested, recorded.

The fact that you and I may have generally similar perceptual organs, brains and worldviews cannot determine the content of perceptual experience, it can only determine its general form. If you believe that is wrong, then you would need to explain how those commonalities could explain the specific shared content of our perceptual experiences. You haven't done that.

Actually, you and I don't even share the same worldview, and yet I have absolutely no doubt that if we were together, we would be able to confirm that we both see precisely the same things in the surrounding environment.

Because you constantly appeal to what is empirically verifiable by science as the yardstick for what constitutes real knowledge. — Wayfarer

When it comes to understanding how the physical world works I believe science is the answer. I've already said many times that understanding human or even animal behavior cannot be achieved by physics. I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes, and animal and human behavior in terms of reasons. So, it's obvious you don't closely read what I write, or at least do not comprehend it.

If you believe that is wrong, then you would need to explain how those commonalities could explain the specific shared content of our perceptual experiences. You haven't done that. — Janus

The fact that you and I see the same things is precisely because we belong to the same species, language-group, culture, and the rest. I'm not, again, saying that the world exists in your or my mind which is what you think I'm saying. We draw on a common stock of usages, meanings, and so on. But there are times when that breaks down - when individuals from two cultures meet, for example, with completely incommensurable understandings of the same thing, they will see different things. Again, I'm not denying objectivity or that there is an external world, but that all our knowledge of it is mediated.

I've already said many times that understanding human or even animal behavior cannot be achieved by physics. I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes, and animal and human behavior in terms of reasons. — Janus

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. Again that can be illustrated with reference to your own entries. The point about philosophy generally, is to ascertain the nature of that framework - the space of reasons, as it has been called - such that it's not just a matter of opinion or individual proclivities. Metaphysics, originally, was intended as the foundation of that enquiry, the 'philosophy of philosophy'.

The fact that you and I see the same things is precisely because we belong to the same species, language-group, culture, and the rest. — Wayfarer

I think that is wrong or at least incomplete: you are leaving out the things which are actually in the world. Species, language-group, culture cannot determine what is there to be perceived. I know form observing their behavior that my dogs perceive the same environment I do, even though I cannot say how exactly the things in the environment look to them or even, for that matter to another person.

Again, I'm not denying objectivity or that there is an external world, but that all our knowledge of it is mediated. — Wayfarer

I've never denied that the ways in which we see things, the things we notice, as opposed to what is there to be noticed is mediated, as I've already said by biology and culture and even individual differences. An artist will notice different things in the natural environment than the hunter for example, but it doesn't follow that they inhabit different environments

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. Again that can be illustrated with reference to your own entries. — Wayfarer

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons?
.

I know form observing their behavior that my dogs perceive the same environment I do — Janus

Something that is not in question.

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons? — Janus

That's not relevant. What I'm criticizing is the view that matters OTHER than those that can be measured scientifically - such as values - are, therefore, up to the individual, that they're essentially subjective in nature.

Something that is not in question. — Wayfarer

What is your explanation for that?

species, language-group, culture — Wayfarer

don't suffice.

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. — Wayfarer

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons?
— Janus

That's not relevant. — Wayfarer

Well then what was your point?

Something that is not in question.
— Wayfarer

What is your explanation for that?
species, language-group, culture
— Wayfarer
don't suffice. — Janus

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience. So when you blithely assume that

I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes — Janus

In what does that causality inhere? Wittgenstein remarks that 'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.' Why does he call it an illusion? I say it's because the perception of causal relations is itself mind-dependent. It is because we can form ideas of what things are, and then perceive the necessary relations of ideas, that we can establish causality in the first place. It's not merely 'given' to us in the way that naturalism assumes. Which is also the basis of Husserl's criticism of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge,
all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot
be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness
should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since
consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in
the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in
any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a
consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is
cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made
meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable
apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world,
reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational,
disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point
of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is
presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the
study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in
Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge,
...

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience. — Wayfarer

You are blithely assuming that. How do you know it's true?

In what does that causality inhere? — Wayfarer

From the point of view of science that question doesn't matter. It may well be unanswerable. Whatever the explanation, the fact is clear that we understand the physical world in terms of causation, which includes both local processes and effects and global conditions.

'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.' — Wayfarer

As I read that he's just pointing out that the so-called laws of nature don't explain anything—they are merely formulations that generalize observed regularities. 'The Law of Gravity" doesn't explain anything it is just a statement that gravity always obtains and does not explain why gravity obtains. Newton was puzzled by such 'action at a distance'. Then Einstein came along and spoke of spacetime as a real existent thing that could be warped by mass, leading to the gravitational phenomena we observe. But again, this does not explain what mass is or why it warps spacetime or how we can visualize three dimensional space warping into a fourth dimension.

Science doesn't explain everything. It might even be said it doesn't really explain much, but it's the best we have, and it's really just an extension of ordinary observation and understanding. Of course, when you consider all the sciences it does form a vast and mostly coherent body of knowledge and understanding. We can understand how things work without needing to understand why they work the way they do in any absolute sense. The search for absolute knowledge appears to be a vain pursuit.

The Husserlian approach, and the phenomenological approach in general I am fairly familiar with on account of a long history of reading and study. It is rightly only concerned with the character of human experience, and as such it brackets metaphysical questions such as the mind-independent existence of the external world. Whether phenomenology yields any useful or substantive knowledge is a matter of debate. If Husserl makes absolutist metaphysical pronouncements based on how things seem to us, then for my money he oversteps the bounds of cogent reasoning. In any case I don't have much interest in phenomenology anymore since it didn't for me, to the extent I studied it, yield any knowledge I found to be particularly useful or illuminating.

Science for me offers a far more interesting, rich and complex body of knowledge. I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable. I have views which are based on what I find most plausible, but I acknowledge that there are not definitive criteria for plausibility, which are not based on the very presumptions which are in question.

Apart from an interest in science and the arts, my main interest is the cultivation of critical thinking. That's the only reason I post on here—to hone those skills as well as my writing skills in general.

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience.
— Wayfarer

You are blithely assuming that. How do you know it's true? — Janus

It's not an assumption, it is a philosophical observation and nowadays with ample support from cognitive science.

In what does that causality inhere?
— Wayfarer

From the point of view of science that question doesn't matter. It may well be unanswerable. Whatever the explanation, the fact is clear that we understand the physical world in terms of causation, which includes both local processes and effects and global conditions. — Janus

Right! 'The question doesn't matter'. And yet, you continually defer to science as the arbiter for philosophy.

The Husserlian approach, and the phenomenological approach in general I am fairly familiar with on account of a long history of reading and study. It is rightly only concerned with the character of human experience, and as such it brackets metaphysical questions such as the mind-independent existence of the external world. — Janus

But notice that Husserl says that consciousness is foundationally involved in world-disclosure, meaning that the idea of a world apart from consciousness is inconceivable in any meaningful way. That is the salient point.

I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable. — Janus

But you have long since made up your mind, going on what you say.

It's not an assumption, it is a philosophical observation and nowadayds with ample support from cognitive science. — Wayfarer

Nonsense you don't know they're not "out there"...how could you when such knowledge is impossible in principle according to your own arguments?

Right! 'The question doesn't matter'. And yet, you continually defer to science as the arbiter for philosophy. — Wayfarer

That's bullshit too. I'm always saying that much about the human cannot be understood adequately by science. The only areas I would say that science has something to contribute to philosophy would be metaphysics and epistemology. Certainly not ethics or aesthetics.

The great irony is that you are always saying I don't understand your position, when I do very well since I used to hold a very similar position myself, whereas you constantly show by your misrepresentations of my arguments that you either don't understand them, or else deliberately misrepresent them.

But notice that Husserl says that consciousness is foundationally involved in world-disclosure, meaning that the idea of a world apart from consciousness is inconceivable in any meaningful way. That is the salient point. — Wayfarer

This is again your own and perhaps Husserl's prejudice. I can readily conceive of a world absent consciousness. Of course, my consciousness is involved in the conceiving, but that is a different thing, an obvious truism. What you say is stipulative, it is not a logical entailment. You have no business stipulating to others what they can or cannot conceive of or what is or is not meaningful to them. It's dogmatism pure and simple.

But you have long since made up your mind, going on what you say. — Wayfarer

I don't think the question is of much importance, my views are not "hard and fast" but I know what seems most plausible to me at my current stage of understanding. You on the other hand seem absolutely obsessed with it and rigidly attached to your views. I've seen no change as long as I've been reading your posts.

It's virtually all you talk about (apart from your political concerns), continually repeating the same mantras. I don't know what motivates that, but I'm guessing that for you it's a moral crusade, and if so, i think that's misguided.

Anyway, we've been over this same old ground too many times, so I think it would be best to desist from now on, since it never goes anywhere.

perhaps Husserl's prejudice — Janus

:roll:

It's virtually all you talk about — Janus

It's a philosophy forum. I write about philosophy.

perhaps Husserl's prejudice
— Janus

:roll: — Wayfarer

I don't share your reverence for authority figures, and I said "perhaps" because it's a while since I read Husserl, I don't want to assume that your interpretations of his views are the correct ones and I have no interest in researching his work in order to determine whether or not they are. Life is too short.

It's a philosophy forum. I write about philosophy. — Wayfarer

You write about your conception of philosophy imagining it to be "philosophy proper", and not very cogently at that in my view.

You make that clear. At least I try and articulate a philosophy rather than hanging around just taking potshots at other contributors, just for the sake of it.

You make that clear. At least I try and articulate a philosophy rather than hanging around just taking potshots at other contributors, just for the sake of it. — Wayfarer

Rubbish, I say what my views are and defend them, with a great deal more argument than you do. Most of what you do consists in quoting your "authorities" instead of presenting your own arguments. And the fact that you think my questioning of your views consists in merely "taking potshots" just shows how superficial and lacking in any critical dimension your thinking is.