why is it meaningless? The word has a literal meaning. It might be untestable, but I don't think it's meaningless. — flannel jesus
A deterministic world is not necessarily reverse deterministic. Classically, our physics seems to be, but it is weird watching entropy go the wrong way. A world like Conway's game of Life is hard deterministic, and yet history cannot be deduced since multiple prior states can result in the same subsequent state...
...Actually simulating our physics (even the most trivial closed classical system with say 3 particles) cannot be done without infinite precision variables, which puts it in the 'not possible even in theory' category. — noAxioms
although I wouldn't use "predetermined"
— wonderer1
I mean, maybe you should.. — DifferentiatingEgg
The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and abomination. But humanity's excessive pride has got itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense. The longing for “freedom of the will” in the superlative metaphysical sense (which, unfortunately, still rules in the heads of the half educated), the longing to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for your actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance, and society of the burden – all this means nothing less than being that very causa sui and, with a courage greater than Munchhausen's, pulling yourself by the hair from the swamp of nothingness up into existence. Suppose someone sees through the boorish naivete of this famous concept of “free will” and manages to get it out of his mind; I would then ask him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further and to rid his mind of the reversal of this misconceived concept of “free will”: I mean the “un-free will,” which is basically an abuse of cause and effect.
We should not erroneously objectify “cause” and “effect” like the natural scientists do (and whoever else thinks naturalistically these days –) in accordance with the dominant mechanistic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it “effects” something; we should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts, which is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, not explanation. In the “in-itself ” there is nothing like “causal association,” “necessity,” or “psychological un-freedom.” There, the “effect” does not follow “from the cause,” there is no rule of “law.” We are the ones who invented causation, succession, for-each-other, relativity, compulsion, numbers, law, freedom, grounds, purpose; and if we project and inscribe this symbol world onto things as an “in-itself,” then this is the way we have always done things, namely mythologically. The “un-free will” is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills. It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in a thinker when he senses some compulsion, need, having-to-follow, pressure, unfreedom in every “causal connection” and “psychological necessity”. (Beyond Good and Evil)
…the eternal return and the Overman are at the crossing of two genealogies, of two unequal genetic lines. On the one hand they relate to Zarathustra as to the conditioning
principle which "posits" them in merely hypothetical manner. On the other hand, they relate to Dionysus as the unconditioned principle which is the basis of their apodictic and absolute character. Thus in Zarathustra's exposition it is always the entanglement of causes or the connection of moments, the synthetic relation of moments to each other, which determines the hypothesis of the return of the same moment. But, from Dionysus' perspective by contrast, it is the synthetic relation of the moment to itself, as past, present and to come, which absolutely determines its relations with all other moments. The return is not the passion of one moment pushed by others, but the activity of the moment which determined the others in being itself determined through what it affirms. Zarathustra's constellation is the constellation of the lion, but that of Dionysus is the constellation of being: the yes of the child-player is more profound than the holy no of the lion. The whole of Zarathustra is affirmative: even when he who knows how to say no, says no. But Zarathustra is not the whole of affirmation, nor what is most profound in it.
ll affirmation finds its condition in Zarathustra but its unconditioned principle in Dionysus. Zarathustra determines the eternal return, moreover he determines it to produce its effect, the Overman. But this determination is the same as the series of conditions which finds its final term in the lion, in the man who wants to be overcome, in the destroyer of all known values. Dionysus' determination is of another kind, identical to the absolute principle without which the conditions would themselves remain powerless. And this is Dionysus' supreme disguise — to subject his products to conditions which are themselves subject to him, condi-tions that these products themselves surpass. The lion becomes a child, the destruction of known values makes possible a creation of new values. But the creation of values, the yes of the child-player, would not be formed under these conditions if they were not, at the same time, subject to a deeper genealogy.
The Heaviest Burden.—What if a demon crept after thee into thy loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to thee: "This life, as thou livest it at present, and hast lived it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same series and sequence—and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!"—Wouldst thou not throw thyself down and gnash thy teeth, and curse the demon that so spake? Or hast thou once experienced a tremendous moment in which thou wouldst answer him: "Thou art a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!" If that thought acquired power over thee as thou art, it would transform thee, and perhaps crush thee; the question with regard to all and everything: "Dost thou want this once more, and also for innumerable times?" would lie as the heaviest burden upon thy activity! Or, how wouldst thou have to become favourably inclined to thyself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing?— — Nietzsche's Heaviest Burden/Greatest Weight
Our world is indeed deterministic, in the sense that every effect has a cause. But some effects have multiple causes. As a physical metaphor, consider the Mississippi river, which has multiple tributaries. So, when it floods in New Orleans, which prior cause do you blame : the river from Tennessee to the gulf, or Missouri, Ohio, Arkansas, & Red? Or do you blame the hurricane that delivers above normal rain to the flood plain? Today, with professional weather observers and high-tech tools, we can track the blame even back beyond the hurricane, to local heat & humidity in the Atlantic ocean. So, like an Agatha Christie mystery, the determining cause is shrouded in complexity. It's "full intricacy". And don't forget the confounding side-effect/cause of individual Free Will. :smile:Does anyone else here feel that determinism, in its full intricacy, actually leaves room for more mystery rather than less? Or do you see it differently? — Matripsa
What is free about Free Will in this scenario? From what is will free?Our world is indeed deterministic, in the sense that every effect has a cause. But some effects have multiple causes. As a physical metaphor, consider the Mississippi river, which has multiple tributaries. So, when it floods in New Orleans, which prior cause do you blame : the river from Tennessee to the gulf, or Missouri, Ohio, Arkansas, & Red? Or do you blame the hurricane that delivers above normal rain to the flood plain? Today, with professional weather observers and high-tech tools, we can track the blame even back beyond the hurricane, to local heat & humidity in the Atlantic ocean. So, like an Agatha Christie mystery, the determining cause is shrouded in complexity. It's "full intricacy". And don't forget the confounding side-effect/cause of individual Free Will. :smile: — Gnomon
Indeed, the presumption that physics is deterministic is almost certainly mistaken. — Banno
How would you convince one of them that they're mistaken? — flannel jesus
All animals have WillPower : the ability to make voluntary movements of the body. In addition, human WillPower includes the ability to choose between imaginary scenarios, and to restrain internal impulses. Social freedom of Will is the ability to choose to disobey unfair laws. It does not include freedom from natural laws, such as gravity.What is free about Free Will in this scenario? From what is will free? — Patterner
physics has come a long way since newton. Banno is most probably thinking about QM when he says that. — flannel jesus
Whether or not the world is deterministic is a matter of metaphysics, not a matter of fact. I'm not sure I can convince anyone of that. — T Clark
Good, 'cause he doesn't understand physics.I'm not sure about that tbh. — flannel jesus
So metaphysics is not about facts... — Banno
Oh, I see, that bit where some folk restrict facts to observations. So it's not a fact that 2+2=4, or that the bishop stays on her own colour in chess. — Banno
Whether or not the world is deterministic is a matter of metaphysics, not a matter of fact. I'm not sure I can convince anyone of that. — T Clark
So metaphysics is not about facts... — Banno
Surprised to see you so confused, Banno. 2+2=4 is both a proposition (i.e., true or false) and absolute presupposition. It's true, but never a fact, except for people who do not distinguish between truth and facts. As to bishops, it seems that's a truth too; that bishops stay on their own colour is certainly not a fact - assuming by "fact" you mean necessarily so.Oh, I see, that bit where some folk restrict facts to observations. So it's not a fact that 2+2=4, or that the bishop stays on her own colour in chess. — Banno
:up: :yum:Determinism is stupid. If you disagree, that's just the way it has to be. — Hanover
This figures in another thread. I'll ask here: In terms of descriptions of the world, are deterministic (D) and indeterministic (non-D) together exhaustive of all possibilities?no significant difference, in my opinion, between the claim that this universe is deterministic, and the claim that this world is indeterministic. — flannel jesus
To say that something is - D - and at the same time isn't - non-D - is what I call strange. Or odd, or illogical, or wrong — tim wood
For you, are conservation laws facts?
You can't prove that energy is conserved in every case, since not every case is available for you to check. Nor can you disprove it - if you came across a perpetual motion machine that seemed to be breaking the conservation law, you might hypothesis that it is somehow drawing energy frome elswhere in the universe...
SO, is conservation of energy a fact, or a bit of metaphysics?
an hour ago — Banno
You misquote.Isn't non-D. Maybe you can't write clearly. — flannel jesus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.