Notice that this doesn't follow? Another use of false dilemma, a pattern in your posts here. It's not that either something is the result of a constitutive rule or it is "not from the hand of man". — Banno

Alright, then to the point. We have a proscription. Where did it come from?

In the last page or so it was pointed out that ethics might not be algorithmic, that there might be no rules that suit all situations — Banno

But there are rules in particular situations, as in not stomping babies for fun. That rule, where did it come from? Surely there was a day it was not known. How was it found?

Think of it this way: treating a rule as absolute is giving succour to the devil, who will delight in inventing traps in which following the rule leads to cruelty. — Banno

In any scenario rules must be interpreted and considered against conflicting rules. It's not as if the followers of the absolute rules don't spend considerable time in their interpretation. Isn't that the entiety of Western jurisprudence (and rabbincal law)? Not only do we look at our rules, but also at how we've previously interpreted them, analogizing through precedence.

Ethical rules (e.g. "thou shall not kill") are not just a handful of literal words (yes, the literalism I complained of earlier), but are interpreted within the entire context of the tradition.

Why do you have such fear of misuse of moral absolutes but not of legal absolutes? The law in a nation is set forth clearly, and surely it could be misused, but you don't suggest a nation without laws is superior to one with?

The same for ethics: They are laws, interpreted through principles, reason, analogy. etc.

The distinction between ethics and law is only upon where each originated. Laws originate in the minds of men and women. Ethics either do the same or come from somewhere you've yet to identify. If, though, you think morals are human inventions, just like laws, then the moral/legal distinction collapses. They are just two sets of rules passed and codified differently, but not importantly.

You see ethics as a set of rules. Better to understand it as a conversation, or as a progression in our acts.

There is something repugnant, something lacking, in those who refrain from stomping on the heads of babies for fun only becasue it is against the law, be that a moral or a legal code.

We have a proscription. — Hanover

proscription: from Latin proscriptionem, "a public notice; proscription, outlawry, confiscation," noun of action from past-participle stem of proscribere "publish in writing"

BRIAN: Why aren't women allowed go to stonings, Mum?
MANDY: It's written. That's why.

This by way of trying to show that the premise of your last post, is muddled.

The distinction between ethics and law is only upon where each originated. — Hanover

Well, no.

You see ethics as a set of rules. I see it as a conversation, or better, as a progression in our acts. — Banno

No, we see that the same. What we see differently are (1) you think ethics are interpreted differently than laws, and (2) i think ethics aren't man made, regardless of whether they are rule based or arise from conversations.

As to #1, this is our perennial dispute in these religions threads. You think religious rules are interpreted just by reading the rule ""women shalt not attend stonings" and suddenly we know the entiety of the rule.

That is, it is my position that the 613 commandments of the Hebrew Bible are part of a conversation. This literalism where you just read a set of words in isolation, non-contexualized isn't a thing in ethics or law.

You can no more read a legal rule forbidding murder without reference to other legal code sections, the dozens of prior opinions written on matter, the Constitution, and the full complexities of the people doing the interpreting. Same for ethics.

As to #2, once you've arrived at a moral decision, is your knowledge dependent on your justified belief or on your justified true belief? What makes it true? Just that you believe it.?

No, we see that the same. — Hanover

Then where does your emphasis on proscriptions come from.

When the US was formed they asked Thomas Jefferson to rewrite the laws of Virginia for the new country. Virginia was a big state and it was known that all the smaller states would do whatever Virginia did. Jefferson refused saying that the meaning of the law had been created by centuries of lawyers wrangling over every syllable. Jefferson said if he rewrote the law, it would condemn future generations to redoing all that wrangling.

So the law isn't words hanging in a void. Today's law has meaning forged from yesterday's problems.

Gesundheit. Need a hanky?

This seems to conflate happiness and eudemonia with pleasure. — Hanover

It doesn't. Pleasure has as it's opposite pain. Happiness has as it's opposite suffering.

My response here is just a push back on the comment regarding the ubiquity of happiness seeking by all life forms. — Hanover

OK. Still, that wasn't the pivotal issue addressed.

The answer is, of course, that such an authority is not much use. Do you think that applies to God? I fear it does. — Ludwig V

I do think it applies to God. According to general Abrahamic religious doctrine God can only be known via revelation, and the works of revelation are human works and thus cannot be considered infallible. Even if it is accepted that the voice of Gi9d was directly heard by the prophets, they are still just fallible humans, and their writings must be acknowledged to be infected by their own interpretations.

Ultimately the idea of God as authority must come down to considering some humans to be authorities, if not infallible, in their interpretations. We see the Catholic notion of the infallibility of the pope for example. I can't see how the same would not apply to the Eastern idea of spiritual enlightenment.

Regardless, change from what I said to "thou shall not stomp babies for fun." Is this just our rule, like a ball in the net counts as a goal, or is it immutable? — Hanover

That moral injunction is just an expression of a healthy human disposition. There's something wrong with you if you don't think stomping babies is wrong, and arguably almost every person recognizes this fact.

A "hinge proposition", if ever there was one.

A hinge proposition", if ever there was one. — Banno

What about "genocide is wrong"? Is that a hinge belief?

What about "genocide is wrong"? Is that a hinge belief? — Hanover

Not according to the God of the Old Testament.

Not according to the God of the Old Testament. — Janus

Literalism again. Super. I'm as interested in conducting an exegesis on Amalek as you are. Suffice it to say, there is no virtue in sympathizing with the devil.

Anyway, regardless of what the Bible says, is it a hinge belief or not?

A faith based belief in the existence of a moral force sounds theistic, suggesting that without this moral force, it wouldn't matter if we murdered. Meaning is implanted in this belief isn't it? — Hanover

I don't think I've ever considered the idea of a "moral force" before. It's an interesting concept, but after reflecting on it, I don't see how it provides the religious with a stronger moral foundation than the non-religious. Could you clarify your perspective? Are you suggesting that the non-religious lack a moral foundation or have a weaker one?

Literalism again. — Hanover

Any declaration can be made compatible with any theory with the addition of suitable ad hoc hypotheses.

I do much prefer literalism. Especially over sophistry.

"Genocide" is not so easy to pin down as head-stomping. What says the "moral force"? Do we need "Moral Jedi" to do the interpretation?

Ultimately the idea of God as authority must come down to considering some humans to be authorities, if not infallible, in their interpretations. We see the Catholic notion of the infallibility of the pope for example. I can't see how the same would not apply to the Eastern idea of spiritual enlightenment. — Janus

That's correct. Though I don't know enough to pronounce on Eastern ideas, interesting though they are. I got the impression that the idea was that a guru (who is himselt Enlightened) is able to discern whether someone else is Enlightened. I think of it as something like the idea that a trained musician is better able to detect when a note is out of tune than a member of the public.

I don't think I've ever considered the idea of a "moral force" before. It's an interesting concept, but after reflecting on it, I don't see how it provides the religious with a stronger moral foundation than the non-religious. — praxis

There's something odd about the idea of a moral force, if that means something that forces one to obey it. The whole point of morality is that one must obey the rules of one's own free will. But it might be more like the meaning of a moral rule.
The idea that religious people are more moral than irreligious people has been endorsed by some religious people for a long time. It is obviously very convenient for believers who wish to demonize people who disagree with them. But I don't think there is any decisive empirical evidence that it is true.

Anyway, regardless of what the Bible says, is it a hinge belief or not? — Hanover

I'm not very clear about hinge propositions, though I know they are quite popular these days. Wittgenstein doesn't give us much to go on. But my understanding is that we can choose what propositions we make the hinges of our debates. Presuppoisitionalist theologians, apparently, arbitrarily decide to mke the truth of the Bible a hinge of their reflextions and debates. That seems rather extreme, especially as it is open to anyone who disagrees with them to make a different choice. I guess they are not much interested in missionary work.

Do we need "Moral Jedi" to do the interpretation? — Banno

We've already got them. They come in two flavours, religious and secular. The former are called priests. The latter are called ethicists.

Believing that putting the ball in the net counts as a goal is not an act of faith but simply to understand how to play football.

Consenting to our social institutions is not an act of faith. — Banno

The act of faith here is not believing in specific rules, but belief in the relevant institution's (IFAB here) authority to will rules in and out of being, and for their intercessors, ritually outfitted with uniform, cards and whistle, to arbitrate them.

Similarly, faith is not in a rule that stomping babies is bad, but in the belief that underpins that rule, be it God/Gods, religions institutions, or the sanctity of human life.

That's correct. Though I don't know enough to pronounce on Eastern ideas, interesting though they are. I got the impression that the idea was that a guru (who is himselt Enlightened) is able to discern whether someone else is Enlightened. I think of it as something like the idea that a trained musician is better able to detect when a note is out of tune than a member of the public. — Ludwig V

The point remains that the enlightenment of the guru must be taken on faith, whereas a note's being out of tune can be rigorously determined. Perhaps the aesthetic quality of a piece of music or performance would be a better analogy.

As I see it to be enlightened is not to know any extraordinary propositional thing about anything but rather to be in an altered state...of equanimity for example.

But then it remains questionable that those in such states know how to guide others to personal transformation. As an analogy, aesthetic judgement and creative vision cannot be taught.