the content of thoughts can and should be doubted, at least as far as they pertain to thoughts about the external world. Obviously there are some thoughts where "doubt" would be a category error. Probably.

So if I have a thought of "I am replying to this person" - I might not be thinking that thought?

is that a thought about the external world?

But even if the thought was about the external world, the thought would still be the thought?

I mean: I think I am watching my laptop screen.

Of course I might not be, my senses could deceive me.

But despite understanding that my senses could deceive me, I still conclude that I am watching my laptop screen.

The thought itself is certain.

I'm still stuck on this idea lol.

Our senses can be doubted.

But if I 'experience' a thought, then it is certain that that exact thought is happening.

Even if it is an hallucination, or I am a brain in a VAT, the exact thought would be certain?

It wouldn't be possible to be thinking of anything else because there is no awareness of that happening?

if you think a thought, the fact that you're thinking that thought is straight up factual, but only in that moment. If you think in a later moment, "I remember having that thought 2 seconds ago", you could be mistaken. Lastthursdayism

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

No. What could the existence of the thought/belief by doubted by? Only by a thought/belief. Then it would be the case that a thought/belief was doubting its own existence, which is a logical impossibility, as a thought/belief must exist in order for it to doubt its own existence.

"I think therefore I am" is the first principle of Descartes philosophy.

Good question. I think Nietzsche was asking something similar:

There are still harmless self-observers who believe 'immediate certainties' exist, for example 'I think' or, as was Schopenhauer's superstition, 'I will': as though knowledge here got hold of its object pure and naked, as 'thing in itself', and no falsification occurred either on the side of the subject or on that of the object. But I shall reiterate a hundred times that 'immediate certainty', like 'absolute knowledge' and 'thing in itself', contains a contradictio in adjecto: we really ought to get free from the seduction of words! Let the people believe that knowledge is total knowledge, but the philosopher must say to himself: when I analyse the event expressed in the sentence 'I think', I acquire a series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove - for example, that it is I who think, that it has to be something at all which thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an 'I' exists, finally that what is designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided that matter within myself, by what standard could I determine that what is happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? Enough: this 'I think' presupposes that I compare my present state with other known states of myself in order to determine what it is: on account of this retrospective connection with other 'knowledge' at any rate it possesses no immediate certainty for me. - In place of that 'immediate certainty' in which the people may believe in the present case, the philosopher acquires in this way a series of metaphysical questions, true questions of conscience for the intellect, namely: 'Whence do I take the concept thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?' Whoever feels able to answer these metaphysical questions straight away with an appeal to a sort of intuitive knowledge, as he does who says: 'I think, and know at least that this is true, actual and certain' - will find a philosopher today ready with a smile and two question-marks. 'My dear sir,' the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, 'it is improbable you are not mistaken: but why do you want the truth at all? — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §16

I have some questions about certainty.

I understand that our senses can be doubted. E.g. Everything I 'see' could be an hallucination or an illusion etc.

But I have read lots about the certainty of thoughts.

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

My own two cents:

If the certainty you’re in search for is that of infallible certainty – a certainty that cannot be wrong in principle as well as in practice under any circumstance whatsoever – I will fallibly affirm that no such thing can occur.

As to thoughts being doubtable, I’m preferential to the bumper-sticker affirmation of, “Don’t believe everything you think”. After all, via judgments, such as those regarding what is and is not real, one will tend to select one of the multiple thoughts and discard all other options as false thoughts regarding the matter. Example 1: is my laptop real? One option available to you will be endorsed and all others rejected upon arriving at a conscious decision regarding the matter. Example 2: I think Earth is both necessarily solid and approximately spherical. And I can of course come to doubt this by consciously asking myself for what justifications I in fact have to think this. (Troubles tend to start when one, for example, thinks the Earth is flat, or else hollow on the inside, and in no way doubts this thought irrespective of the evidence to the contrary.)

As to, not infallible certainty, but “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”:

Given that one can come to doubt both one’s own perceptions and one’s own entertained thoughts, can you then come to in any way rationally doubt the following proposition here placed in quotes?

You – here strictly entailing “a first-person source of awareness (i.e., an aware being, else an occurrence of first-person awareness)” – will be, i.e. occur, for as long as you are in any way aware of anything whatsoever (to include being aware of doubts regarding your perceptions or else the thoughts which you are momentarily aware of).

I could try to rationally evidence why this proposition cannot be an infallible certainty - even if it’s not possible for you to in any way cogently doubt - but so doing would take a considerable amount of reasoning to express. Notwithstanding, I do find this quoted proposition to be an example of “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”.

(BTW, in case this might be in any way pertinent, this specific “strongest fallible certainty” just specified will in no way then provide either rational or empirical evidence to the effect of there not occurring similar aware beings in existence at large other than yourself.)

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

Nietzsche is right to point out that people naturally separate the "I" from the "thought".

What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?'

However, this cannot be the case, otherwise it would lead into the homunculus problem of infinite regression.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought.

It still remains the case that a thought cannot doubt itself.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought. — RussellA

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts?

a series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove - for example, that it is I who think, that it has to be something at all which thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an 'I' exists, finally that what is designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - that I know what thinking is. — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §16

I’ve wanted to dwell on this passage before but never found the occasion. So . . . what are the actual objections FN is raising here?

“It is I who think” – Not sure what the alternative would be. Joe? God?

“It has to be something at all which thinks” – Again, the alternative? Perhaps “thinking” is a happening which I observe? OK, not impossible.

“Thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause” – Yes, this one is easily doubted. We have no idea how cause and effect might apply here.

“An 'I' exists” – We could use the quotes around ‛I’ to make a distinction on FN's behalf, and say that this ‛I’ may not be what actually exists, but rather our mistaken personification of it, or some such. But using ‛I’ in its ordinary sense of “me,” it would be incorrect to say that I don’t exist, wrong though I may be about who or what I am.

“What is designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - that I know what thinking is” – Same point about distinction-drawing. The quotes around ‛thinking’ invite us to problematize the use of the word, and wonder whether what we’re calling ‛thinking’ here is the real deal, actual thought, or some such. But regardless if we call it thinking or shminking, we do know the event in question when it happens, however wrong we might be about its nature.

'immediate certainty', like 'absolute knowledge' and 'thing in itself', contains a contradictio in adjecto — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §16

Does anyone know what he means here? Why does "immediate" contradict "certainty"?

Does anyone know what he means here? Why does "immediate" contradict "certainty"? — J

I can only presume that what he intended by "immediate certainty" was something like "a certainty that is prior to any reasoning or empirical, else experiential, evidence". In this manner thereby being what can then be termed "infallible certainty".

I'm in agreement with all your comments, btw. Maybe FN's key objection to the cogito was to a possible reification of what the term "I" references that might have been typical in his day; here specifically thinking of the Cartesian "res cogitans" and "res extensa" distinction (such that FN might have disagreed with this dichotomy?). My best guess, at any rate.

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts? — javra

Yes, for each change in thought there will be an ontological change in the "I". Are you the same person you were ten years ago?

There is the question of identity through time. The "I" is not just the thought being had at the present moment in time, but is the complete set of thoughts stored as memories that stretch back into the distant past.

The problem is, if the "I" is separate to its thoughts, then how can the "I" know about its thoughts? The "I " can only know about the thoughts it has if these thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I", such that "I" is its thoughts.

If the "I" is separate to its thoughts, the question is, how can the "I" be privy to any thoughts at all?

Or, would the experience of the thought itself mean that you could not doubt the content of the thought itself?

E.g. There appears to be a conscious thought of "I believe I am watching a sunset". Why would that thought be free from any form of doubt about its existence as a thought? — Kranky

Come to think of it, you might(?) be here referring not to the though/belief itself but the very experience of the thought/belief. If so:

While we can come to doubt the content of what we experience (be this an experienced perception or an experienced thought/belief) that we so experience at the given present time will likewise so be "a strongest form of fallible certainty'.

For example: you are seeing a pink elephant. You can come to doubt whether or not you are in fact so seeing a pink elephant in the external world or else are hallucinating a pink elephant in the external world. But the fact that you so experience visually at time X remains a fact regardless.

If the "I" is separate to its thoughts, the question is, how can the "I" be privy to any thoughts at all? — RussellA

I'm no sure what you mean by "separate". The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. Same with all thoughts. And we seem to agree on perceptions, at least, being doubtable all the same.

As to the question you ask, the answer I offer is: via its faculties of awareness.

Lets explore this idea:

You express the following thought to me, “A circle has four sides.” I may reply, “Not sure what you are thinking here, but a square has four sides.” Is this not doubting what thoughts you may have about “circles.”? You might want to say, “Well privately, I know what I am referring to or thinking about.” Sure, you have thoughts that no one understands, but how could we agree that they are thoughts at all!?

The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. — javra

As Nietzsche wrote:

What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?'

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has?

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I".

In the same way, iron is an intrinsic part of the Eiffel Tower. Remove the iron, and what is left? Nothing.

Remove the perceptions and thoughts, and what is left? Nothing. There is no "I" remaining.

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has? — RussellA

Long story short, most typically, the "I" decides upon which thoughts to uphold and then upholds these, with such options of possible thoughts to uphold being "caused" (which I find to be an ill-suited term, but all the same) by the unconscious mind rather than by the "I".

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I". — RussellA

I did not claim that the "I" is not separate from its perceptions or thoughts, I only asked you to clarify what you mean by "separate". This, to be honest, because so far it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed be separated givens.

Here's one example: if the "I" is not (in some non-physical way) separate from either its thoughts or percepts, then how can thoughts in any way of themselves be separate from percepts? Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". And one does not need to see a house when so contemplating the concept, nor contemplate the concept when seeing a house.

This, to be honest, because for it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed hold separated givens. — javra

In the mind, there can be the concept of a house and the thought of a particular house. These are different things. I agree that there can be a concrete example of an abstract concept.

Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". — javra

The Indirect Realist would argue that we never directly see the house, but only perceive a representation of a particular house.

Both the concept of a house and the representation of a particular house exist in the mind, and in this sense are not utterly separate, as both exist in the mind.

Both the concept of a house and the representation of a particular house exist in the mind, and in this sense are not utterly separate, as both exist in the mind. — RussellA

Yes, true, but the concept filled with sense data (in the IDR sense) is not synonymous with the concept. It's a particular, modified expression of the concept in a Platonic sort of way, i think. They do both exist in the mind, but one has been triggered by (physical) information from outside the mind. THe other is a rehashing of some of our oldest data. I would not think these the same.

I agree that thought in the now is the reality. The certainty of thought in the now is embedded in the experience of self. You can be 100% certain that whatever thought is going through your mind in this now is an accurate reflection of who and what you are in this now, as thought is part of your experience of your self (even if based on a hallucination). In the next now, your memory of your thought in the previous now could be inaccurate, but your experience of thought in the current now is never inaccurate. Even if your senses are all messed up and inaccurate, your thoughts are giving you an accurate experience of your messed up senses. You can be uncertain about your senses, but never be uncertain about your thoughts - they are what you are. Your thoughts are consciousness of self in relation to everything else.

I can only presume that what he intended by "immediate certainty" was something like "a certainty that is prior to any reasoning or empirical, else experiential, evidence". In this manner thereby being what can then be termed "infallible certainty". — javra

Good guess. He may be poking fun at people who can't imagine that their experiences might ever lead them astray.

Maybe FN's key objection to the cogito was to a possible reification of what the term "I" references that might have been typical in his day — javra

And that's perfectly fair, when stated a bit more carefully. Paul Ricoeur made a similar point in "The Question of the Subject" which is worth quoting in full:

Before Freud, two moments were confused: the moment of apodicticity and the moment of adequation. In the moment of apodicticity, the I think - I am is truly implied, even in doubt, even in error, even in illusion; even if the evil genius deceives me in all my assertions, it is necessary that I, who think, be. But this impregnable moment of apodicticity tends to be confused with the moment of adequation, in which I am such as I perceive myself. . . . Psychoanalysis drives a wedge between the apodicticiy of the absolute positing of existence and the adequation of the judgment bearing on the being-such. I am, but what am I who am? That is what I no longer know. — in The Conflict of Interpretations, 241-2

Nor do we need Freudian theory, strictly speaking, to drive the wedge Ricoeur is talking about. We are all now comfortable with the idea that consciousness can be false consciousness, that we may mistake the picture it seems to paint of a thriving, masterful self. The greater part of "me" may dwell underwater, as it were.

I am, but what am I who am? That is what I no longer know. — in The Conflict of Interpretations, 241-2

I love that! Yes indeed.

Remove the perceptions and thoughts, and what is left? Nothing. There is no "I" remaining. — RussellA

It's interesting that serious meditation practice, especially in Hinduism and Buddhism, makes this point vivid. My understanding is that an experienced meditator would agree that there is indeed no "I" remaining -- but this does not show that consciousness requires an object. For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects. Of course we're free to raise an eyebrow at that, but there's a lot of testimony to the validity of this experience.

So if I have a thought of "I am watching a sunset"

It would not be certain that I am watching a sunset (potentially inaccurate senses) BUT it would be certain that there is a belief of watching a sunset.

The belief would be certain.

You are thinking the thought. There can be no doubt about that.

The accuracy of the thought may be doubted, of course.

I think I'm watching my laptop drink a milkshake. Well, I certainly am thinking that. But it's not accurate.

It's interesting that serious meditation practice, especially in Hinduism and Buddhism, makes this point vivid. My understanding is that an experienced meditator would agree that there is indeed no "I" remaining -- but this does not show that consciousness requires an object. For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects. Of course we're free to raise an eyebrow at that, but there's a lot of testimony to the validity of this experience. — J

Again, nicely expressed. As to the raised eyebrow, without the meditater's active awareness of this transient ego-death which can reputedly occur during meditation - which, as active awareness, is clearly not that of an I that can only occur in relation to something not-I, i.e. which is not a duality-bound ego - the person would have no way of experiencing, much less recalling, the occurrence. Often enough as something associated with a moment of bliss. I believe it's this non-dualistic ego of active awareness that remains at such junctures of transient ego-death which then gets addressed as "pure consciousness". Without it, one might just as well be entering and then emerging from out of a state of coma.

Later in the same essay, Ricoeur puts it even more clearly:

The cogito is at once the indubitable certainty that I am and an open question as to what I am. — 244

Yes, true, but the concept filled with sense data (in the IDR sense) is not synonymous with the concept. — AmadeusD

I agree. I may have the concept of a house in my mind. If I perceive something that I understand as one instantiation of my concept of a house, then I perceive this something as a house.